A father, craft firearm in hand, stands by his children near the goldmine where he works. © Chris Sattlberger/Panos Pictures
The Scourge of the Gun
ARMED VIOLENCE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

INTRODUCTION

In response to chronic armed violence in the country’s urban centres and Highlands provinces,¹ the Papua New Guinea (PNG) government initiated a far-reaching review of its firearms legislation and controls in 2005. This review included the establishment of a National Guns Control Committee, a road-show that brought the issue of firearms control to the top of the national agenda and culminated in a National Gun Summit, and a lengthy report to Parliament—which has yet to draw a response. Firearms, while few in real numbers relative to the population, were determined to be a major contributor to real and perceived insecurity, and an obstacle to good governance, improved state security, and sustainable development. This chapter traces out the findings of an armed violence assessment administered in the country’s National Capital District (NCD) and Southern Highlands Province (SHP) by the Small Arms Survey, with support from the United Nations Development Programme.² The assessment contributes to and furthers the public debate and policy interest as manifest in the recent National Gun Summit, builds upon the growing body of research on small arms in the Pacific,³ and offers a comprehensive mapping of armed violence in two of PNG’s most affected areas. It also advances a forward-looking agenda by raising an array of findings that call into question received wisdom concerning armed violence in PNG, and comes at a time when there is a rare opportunity to take some decisive steps towards addressing the problems identified. Specifically, it challenges donors, practitioners, researchers, and advocates alike to reconsider conventional arms control and disarmament approaches in contexts such as PNG.

PNG is a young nation that is chronically affected by armed violence. Its citizens are currently experiencing victimization rates that are among the highest in the world. Firearms (both craft and factory-made) have played a significant role in exacerbating the country’s law and order problems and have given rise to invidious forms of violence, including maiming, abduction, and kidnapping for ransom.⁴ The costs in both human and material terms have been substantial. Though the prospects for improving security in PNG might at first appear rather bleak, armed violence there is heterogeneous and diverse, comprising many different law and order environments (Dinnen, 2001). It is through recognizing this that interventions might be better developed and targeted. To this end, this chapter yields a number of critical and counter-intuitive findings that should also usefully inform and influence prospective interventions designed to mitigate insecurity and reduce arms availability and demand. The chapter’s key findings include the following:

- Victimization rates among households in NCD and SHP are higher than previously reported. Over half of all households surveyed reported being victimized in the previous six months.
- More than 80 per cent of all victimization events in NCD and SHP involved the use of a weapon, though not necessarily a firearm.
Domestic violence is the primary contributor to insecurity, though other factors such as social conflict and armed criminality are also important.

Inter-group fighting and criminal violence are key sources of insecurity in both NCD and SHP. As such, the received wisdom that associates tribal fighting with the Highlands provinces and criminal violence with urban areas must be reconsidered.

The calls to turn the Hela region into a province represent a potential source of conflict in SHP. People there are arming themselves with the intention of causing widespread civil unrest should their calls continue to fall on deaf ears.

The demand for firearms is robust in both NCD and SHP. Coupled with this, ammunition prices are lower than previously reported, and appear to be declining.

Weapons reduction programmes do not, as yet, have widespread support in SHP or NCD. Without improvements in law and order, people in NCD and SHP are generally unwilling to disarm.

Successful interventions will need to be targeted and based on a sound, evidence-based diagnosis of PNG’s law and order problems region by region.
METHODOLOGY

The aim in undertaking this particular violence assessment, as with others, was to generate quantitative and qualitative data that would better inform geographic and demographic understandings of armed violence in PNG. The overall methodology employed was adapted from methodologies previously employed by the Small Arms Survey in more than 25 countries around the world. The primary tools included two survey instruments: a large-scale household survey on armed violence, and participatory focus groups supplemented by individual interviews. Specifically, the household survey comprised structured questions about victimization, weapons misuse and armed violence, personal views on guns, law and order, and the effects of violence, while the focus groups explored five key thematic areas: types of violence, causes of violence, costs of violence, ways to reduce violence, and the circumstances under which communities would willingly disarm.

Because of the need to generate preliminary findings in time for the National Gun Summit, it was determined that the assessment should be purposive and non-random, consisting of two area-based assessments—one urban, the other rural—that would assess the causes, scale, and distribution of armed violence in two of the most conflict- and crime-riven parts of the country. NCD and SHP were chosen because what little objective crime data there is available makes evident that the urban centres of Port Moresby and Lae, and the Highlands provinces, are acutely affected by armed violence.3

In all, 292 household surveys were completed at 12 survey locations in NCD, with surveys being undertaken in six suburbs—Gerehu, Ensisi, Waigani, Gordons, Tokorara, and Hohola—and six settlements: Vadavada, Kaugere,
Oro, Two-Mile, Morata, and Nine-Mile. In SHP, some 235 household surveys were completed. They were administered and focus groups held in 5 of the province’s 8 districts (Ialibu/Pangia, Imbonggu, Koroba/Kopiago, Mendi, and Tari) and in 15 of its 30 Local Level Government (LLG) areas (see Map 7.2).

VIOLENCE TRENDS

PNG’s law and order situation has attracted much national and international attention. Invariably it is described as deteriorating, with many commentators asserting that crime rates have steadily increased over the last 20 to 30 years (Levantis, 1998; Sikani, 2000; Windybank and Manning, 2003). Certainly, local and international media reports suggest that criminal violence is rampant, small arms proliferation rife, and security at an all-time low due to rising levels of armed violence. Travel advisories from around the world recommend that visitors to PNG exercise a high degree of ‘caution’ (Australia, 2005, p. 1) or ‘vigilance’ at all times (New Zealand, 2005, p. 1). These advisories tend also to reflect the received wisdom that urban centres are troubled by criminal violence, whereas the mostly rural Highlands provinces are troubled by ethnic or tribal violence. The findings arising from this assessment directly challenge such assumptions.

Available surveillance data in the form of official crime statistics does not support the widespread view that crime is at an all-time high. Instead, it suggests that crime in Port Moresby and regional crime levels are both falling, and have been since 2000.

It is difficult to know what to make of these figures. Officially, crime is declining, but data gathering, where it exists, is limited, incomplete, notoriously unreliable, and shows a marked urban bias. Massive under-reporting and under-coverage means that less than half of all crime is now recorded. That said, this survey and the 2004 Port
Prior to the assessment discussed in this chapter, three previous studies had considered victimization and insecurity in PNG. All three had an urban focus. They offer opportunities for comparison with this survey. For instance, PNG was one of 13 countries covered in the 1992 International Crime Victimization Survey (Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995) conducted by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). That survey, which involved 1,583 PNG respondents—597 of whom were resident in Port Moresby—revealed that PNG’s victimization prevalence rates with respect to assaults and threats (10.3 per cent), robbery (9.8 per cent), and sexual incidents (11.8 per cent) were higher than those reported in the other 12 cities surveyed—Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, Cairo, Tunis, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Costa Rica, Beijing, Bombay, Jakarta, and Manila.

Unlike the UNICRI assessment, which focused specifically on armed violence, two other studies considered both violent and non-violent crime. In doing so, the Safer Port Moresby Initiative’s Youth and Crime Survey found that 38 per cent of crimes in Port Moresby were perpetrated with violence and that 61 per cent of offenders used a weapon (UNDP, 2004, p. 52). Similarly, the 2004 Port Moresby Community Crime Survey found that crimes of violence accounted for 46 per cent of victimization incidents (NRI, 2005, p. 3). It also found that two-thirds of NCD households had been victims of crime in the previous 12 months; 57 per cent of households had been the victims of multiple crimes; 33 per cent of repeat crime; and 1 household in 8 had been a victim of crime ten or more times.

Moiresby Community Crime Survey (NRI, 2005) indicate that reporting rates in Port Moresby are much the same as they were a decade or so ago (see Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995), suggesting that crime in NCD might well be falling or at least stabilizing. Participants in both surveys agreed.

The situation in the Highlands is much less ambiguous. In contrast to the national crime trends reviewed above, reported crime in the Highlands is at an all-time high. This is in spite of the fact that only a small fraction of actual crimes occurring in the Highlands are reported. To let one example stand for many, SHP’s western regional administrator has revealed that there were over 200 conflict-related deaths in Tari District alone in 2003–04 (Phillip Moya, cited in Lewis, forthcoming), yet the National Crime Incidents Summary for 2004 (Annexe 1) records only 38 murders for the entire province.

Despite the inherent limitations of PNG’s crime data, it is possible to render crude cross-country comparisons. For example, there were 97 reported murders (33 per 100,000) in NCD in 2004 (see Annexe 1). By contrast, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) with a population of 324,000—comparable to that of NCD—recorded no murders in 2004 (ABS, 2005). There were 862 reported armed robberies, or 294 per 100,000 persons, in NCD, whereas in the ACT there were only 106 armed robberies, or 33 per 100,000 (ABS, 2005).

**VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION**

Far from being generalized and prolific throughout the country, armed violence in PNG is geographically and demographically specific. The present assessment, for instance, revealed that NCD’s settlements and SHP’s western Hela region (which is represented by the Kopiago and Tari Districts) are disproportionately affected by armed violence. In NCD, the assessment found that 60–65 per cent of the most prevalent types of violence—domestic violence, intergroup fighting, armed robbery, and armed assault—occur in the settlements. Sikani (2000, p. 41) reports that offenders too are disproportionately represented in the settlements—accounting for 90 per cent of police arrests between 1996 and 1998. That the settlements are disproportionately affected by violent crime was also borne out by the Port Moresby Community Crime Survey (NRI, 2005).
Though armed violence is concentrated in specific regions and among certain groups, the present assessment also found that overall victimization rates among households in NCD and SHP are higher than previously reported. The reasons for this are two-fold: official data gathering in PNG, as in other underdeveloped countries, is extremely weak, and few assessments to date have used the multisource diagnostic tools employed by the Small Arms Survey for this study. These findings have implications for researchers and policy-makers alike, and alert them to the fact that official data should always be analysed with caution, as it will not always accurately reflect violence trends or victimization rates.

Table 7.1 provides a typology of violence and comparative victimization rates as reported in the two survey areas. It shows that domestic violence is the principle type of victimization and the primary contributor to insecurity in both areas, but also indicates the role that social conflict and armed criminality play as catalysts for insecurity.

It is important to review these victimization trends in detail. Household surveys revealed that 50 per cent of NCD households and 51 per cent of SHP households were the victims of violent crime in the six months to May 2005. What is more, over a quarter of all households (26 per cent in NCD and 28 per cent in SHP) had been victimized more than once.

The survey also revealed that four out of five (80 per cent) instances of victimization involved the use of a weapon, though not necessarily a firearm. Of those victimization incidents where weapons were involved, bladed weapons and firearms were the weapons of choice. Twenty-seven per cent of all SHP households participating in the study and 28 per cent of all NCD households reported some form of victimization involving a bush knife or axe in the preceding six months, while 23 per cent of SHP households and 19 per cent of NCD households reported some form of victimization involving a firearm. These findings suggest that violence prevention initiatives that focus on firearms alone (e.g. pure collection or buy-back programmes) are missing much of the broader picture in PNG.

The household survey data concerning the typology of victimization is confirmed by hitherto unpublished hospital and epidemiological data sourced from various hospitals and clinics. This data specifically enables researchers to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence type</th>
<th>% of SHP households victimized</th>
<th>% of NCD households victimized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup fighting</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed assault</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed robbery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats/Intimidation/Extortion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murder</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assault/Rape</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: For purposes of this study, a victimized household was one in which one or more household members were reported as having experienced the relevant violent crime.*
distil the role of firearms in victimization as compared to other weapons. For instance, in-patient records and reports from Mendi and Tari Hospitals in the SHP confirm that victimization involving bush knives and axes results in significantly more trauma admissions than that involving firearms: at Mendi Hospital, gunshot and bladed injuries resulted in 12 and 41 per cent of all in-patient admissions, respectively (Embiap, 2005), while at Tari Hospital, they accounted for 12 and 25 per cent of serious trauma cases, respectively.

Despite the fact that bush knives and axes result in far more trauma admissions, firearm-related trauma is more likely to result in a lethal outcome. Indeed, while 82 per cent of the gunshot injuries treated at Tari Hospital between 2003 and 2005 proved fatal, only 30 per cent of the bush knife and axe injuries did so. The Tari Hospital data also revealed that men are disproportionately affected by gunshot injuries—accounting for over 80 per cent of all case of external injuries. There was no such bias in the case of bush knife and axe trauma. The Mendi Hospital data revealed similar patterns, although women accounted for a greater proportion of violence-related trauma admissions. Indeed, while women accounted for 47 per cent of all trauma admissions at Mendi Hospital between May 2004 and May 2005, they accounted for some 54 per cent all violence-related admissions (Embiap, 2005, p. 4).

**Domestic and family violence**

As noted above, domestic and family violence, including that between co-wives, emerged as the chief cause of victimization and related insecurity across the survey of both areas. Specifically, domestic and family violence were reported to have affected 18 and 26 per cent, respectively, of all households in NCD and SHP in the six months prior to the survey. Although survey and focus group participants appeared willing to discuss frankly the issue of domestic violence, it is submitted that victimization rates are still most likely under-reported, as further qualitative investigations indicated that only the most serious cases—those that resulted in injury or trauma of some kind—were being reported. This is not altogether surprising. Research undertaken by the PNG Law Reform Commission (PNG LRC) in 1983–84 revealed that a third to two-thirds of men in PNG, 95 per cent of men in the Highlands, and 57 per cent of rural women considered it acceptable for husbands to beat their wives (Ranck and Toft, 1986, p. 24; Bradley,
The present assessment noted too that in many parts of PNG, cases of domestic violence only ever go before the village court if there is obvious trauma, such as broken bones.

The assessment also revealed that domestic violence is likely to involve the use of weapons. Of those households reporting domestic violence, 63 per cent in SHP and 77 per cent in NCD reported the use of a weapon such as a firearm, bush knife, blunt instrument, fire, or ‘red hot’ metal. These findings not only confirm those of the PNG LRC (1992) survey on domestic violence, which evinced significant levels of victimization involving the use of weapons, but also reveal increasingly high levels of serious domestic/family violence—something policy, advocacy, and research communities will need to address more purposively in future.

Domestic violence is not, it seems, distributed evenly across all regions and households. In NCD, for example, a greater proportion of affected households were located in the settlements. The assessment also found a correlation between province or region of origin of NCD households and the likelihood that they had been affected by domestic violence. Specifically, it found that 24 per cent of households originally from the Highlands or Gulf Provinces and 23 per cent of Central Province households were affected by domestic violence. By contrast, no Momase or Islands-origin households reported domestic violence.

**Intergroup fighting**

Intergroup fighting also emerged as a key source of insecurity in both NCD and SHP. In SHP, this finding was not particularly surprising, given the attention tribal fighting in the province has attracted. The prevalence of intergroup fighting in Port Moresby is, however, a worrying new trend. The assessment found that in NCD in the six months

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**Figure 7.2** Summary of trauma reports at Tari Hospital, 2003–05

**Note:** The records for 2005 cover January to mid-May only.
prior to the survey, 18 per cent of respondent households had been victims of intergroup fighting, 27 per cent included someone who had been involved in intergroup fighting as a combatant, and 15 per cent included someone who had changed residence due to intergroup fighting. The assessment further revealed that 65 per cent of victimized households and 75 per cent of households that included a combatant or someone who had changed residence due to intergroup fighting were located in the settlements.

These findings warrant further investigation, especially as ‘tribal’ or intergroup fighting in PNG has tended to be viewed as a Highlands problem. Was it predominantly households that were originally from the Highlands that were affected by intergroup fighting? The answer, surprisingly, is ‘no’, though it remains the case that a significant proportion of households originally from the Highlands were affected. Importantly, the assessment also found that almost one-third of victimized households, one-third of households with combatants, and over half of all the households that included someone who had changed residence due to intergroup fighting were originally from Central Province. It also found that households originally from Central, Gulf, and the Highlands Provinces were all disproportionately affected by, and involved in, intergroup fighting, such that approximately one-third of all households from these provinces reported being affected by intergroup fighting (see Table 7.2). By contrast, only 13 per cent of households from the remaining 12 provinces were similarly affected. Tribal or intergroup fighting is not, in other words, a Highlands-specific problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province(s) of origin</th>
<th>% of total households in the NCD survey</th>
<th>% of NCD households from specific provinces with combatants*</th>
<th>% of all victimized NCD households from specific provinces with combatants</th>
<th>% of all NCD households that had changed residence due to intergroup fighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Province</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Province</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands Provinces</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other provinces</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The percentages shown here are the percentage of households from a particular province or group of provinces that had a household member who had been a combatant in the six months prior to the survey, e.g. the percentage of households originally from Gulf Province that included a combatant. In this case, the survey revealed 63 households originally from Gulf Province. Of these 63 households, 21 households (33 per cent) reported that a household member had been involved in intergroup fighting as a combatant.
Intriguingly, intergroup fighting in SHP now appears to be less prolific than it is in NCD. Specifically, in the preceding six months, 17 per cent of SHP households reported having been the victim of intergroup fighting, 24 per cent included someone who had been involved in intergroup fighting as a combatant, and 11 per cent included someone who had changed residence due to intergroup fighting. In the case of SHP, the assessment found that the majority of households affected by and involved in intergroup fighting were clustered in the west of the province.

**Armed assault and armed robbery**

Armed assault and armed robbery were the next most commonly experienced forms of victimization in SHP and NCD. Surveyed SHP households reported that in the six months to May 2005, 13 per cent had been affected by armed assault and 8 per cent by armed robbery. By contrast, 12 per cent of NCD households had been affected by armed assault and 15 per cent by armed robbery. In both cases, victimization events were clustered in specific geographic areas. In SHP, four out of five reported events occurred in the Hela region, while three out of five events in NCD occurred in the settlements.

**Murder and attempted murder**

Households experiencing a murder or attempted murder were also concentrated in certain areas. In SHP, at least four out of five victimization events occurred in the west of the province. Alarmingly, 13 per cent of households in the Hela region reported an attempted murder in the six months prior to the survey, while 7 per cent reported an actual murder. This compared with just 3 per cent and 1 per cent of households respectively in the east. Overall victimization rates in NCD were similar to those found in eastern SHP. Incidents were also clustered in particular areas, such that all households reporting a murder and almost three-quarters of those reporting an attempted murder were located in NCD’s settlements.

**Sexual assault and rape**

Sexual assault and rape remain a major concern in PNG. More than 8 per cent of responding households in SHP and 3 per cent in NCD reported that someone in their household had been the victim of sexual assault or rape in the six months to May 2005. In both cases, reported victimization events were geographically clustered—89 per cent of reported SHP incidents occurred in the Hela region, while 60 per cent of NCD’s victimized households were located in the settlements. Alarmingly, the survey also revealed that rapes and sexual assaults in SHP and NCD typically involve the use of weapons, particularly firearms and bush knives. This was so in all but one case reported in the survey, which also revealed that the vast majority of reported rapes occur in the village, and often in the home, and that in most cases the assailant(s) are known.

Although the survey did not obtain data concerning the age or sex of the victims or details about the contexts in which the assaults took place, researchers were able to obtain some supplementary data from Tari and Kainantu Hospitals that suggests that young girls are disproportionately affected. When considering possible intervention strategies, victim profiles are critical. Taken collectively, the Tari and Kainantu data suggests that three-quarters of sexual assault and rape victims are under 20 years of age. In the much smaller Tari sample, four out of five victims were actually 15 or younger, and 35 per cent were under 5. In the Kainantu sample, 30 per cent of rape victims were 10 years or under, while 45 per cent were aged between 11 and 20. By way of comparison, a survey undertaken by Riley, Wohlfahrt, and Carrad (1985), cited in the PNG LRC report (1992, p. 15), found that girls aged between 11 and
15, 8 and 11, and under 8 years accounted for 22, 13, and 12 per cent, respectively—i.e. just under half—of all of the rapes and sexual assaults reported to Port Moresby General Hospital in the first quarter of 1985. Seemingly, then, young and very young girls make up a somewhat greater percentage of rape victims than they did two decades ago.

**Where violence occurs**

The home emerged as the principal location for victimization in this violence assessment, just as it had in the 2004 Port Moresby Community Crime Survey (NRI, 2005, p. 24). Indeed, 26 per cent of all victimization events reported to the NCD assessment team occurred in the home and another 18 per cent in the immediate vicinity of the home. A further 30 per cent of victimization events were reported to have occurred within the home community. In the SHP, 40 per cent of reported victimization events occurred in the home, 7 per cent in its immediate vicinity, and 29 per cent in the home community. In both cases, three-quarters of all victimization events occurred in the home community.

**FIREARMS-RELATED VIOLENCE**

In order to isolate the role of firearms in armed violence and victimization, the survey also explored community views on guns and the prevalence of firearms (DEMAND). It found that the demand for firearms is robust in both NCD and SHP—over 40 per cent of all respondents indicated that guns make them feel safer, while 41 and 34 per cent of those surveyed in NCD and SHP, respectively, claimed that they would acquire such a weapon if they could. Many already own guns, claiming to hold them, among other reasons, for self-protection, enforcing compensation arrangements, and status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firearm type</th>
<th>% of SHP households having seen</th>
<th>% of NCD households having seen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home-made shotgun</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory-made shotgun</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handgun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump-action shotgun</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16/AR15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-loading rifle (SLR)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun (M-60/.50)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: While the frequency with which particular firearms types are seen is suggestive of how prevalent those particular weapons are, it should be noted that several people might in fact see the same weapon. As such, it is not possible to estimate total gun numbers based on reported sightings alone. For instance, although ten SHP survey respondents reported seeing a machine gun, on further discussion it became evident that only four separate machine guns had actually been seen.*
Perceptions concerning the prevalence of firearms, however, varied between regions, and even within them. For example, in SHP, half of respondents felt that gun ownership was on the rise, while 45 per cent felt that gun numbers were static. For the most part, it was people in the west of the province who felt that gun ownership was increasing. By contrast, only 21 per cent of those surveyed in NCD felt this. Almost half felt that gun numbers were static, and close to a third actually felt they were decreasing. Table 7.3 highlights the firearms types seen and the proportion of respondents claiming to have seen a particular firearm in the six months prior to the survey.

As Table 7.3 suggests, there are variations in the types of weapons and the frequency with which they are seen in various parts of PNG. For example, although the reported presence of home-made shotguns, factory-made shotguns, M16s and AR15s, SLRs, and .22 rifles was remarkably similar in SHP and NCD, there were differences with respect to pump-action shotguns, handguns, and hand grenades—all of which were twice as likely to be seen in Port Moresby. There were differences, too, as regards the types of weapons being seen in different parts of SHP (see Map 7.3). For instance, respondents in the Hela region mostly reported seeing home-made shotguns, single-shot factory-made shotguns, and to lesser extent pump-action shotguns, and reported seeing them at least five times as often as an M16 or AR15. In the east, however, where people were claiming to see firearms relatively infrequently, high-powered assault rifles, such as M16s and AR15s or SLRs, accounted for a greater proportion of all weapons seen. Although firearms sightings differed from region to region in SHP, no such variation was found in NCD.

Another indicator of firearms prevalence and/or desirability is market price. Predictably, the more sought after the firearm, the higher its price. Table 7.4 lists reported firearms prices by type in mid-2005. Variations in price for particular firearms types were evident across districts in SHP. Prices also varied within NCD’s settlements and suburbs,
although there were no significant differences between settlements and suburbs.

It was evident too that other forms of ‘currency’—particularly women and locally grown marijuana—are also being used to acquire firearms and store-bought goods of various kinds in SHP’s remote areas, where there is little cash and few income earning opportunities.¹⁴

Worryingly, the survey also revealed that ammunition supplies, previously thought to be tight (Alpers, 2005), are in fact compara-

Table 7.4 Firearms types and their market prices (PGK*) in SHP and NCD by district, December 2004—May 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firearm type</th>
<th>SHP range</th>
<th>SHP average</th>
<th>Kopiago District (SHP) average</th>
<th>Tari District (SHP) average</th>
<th>Mendi District (SHP) average</th>
<th>Ialibu/ Pangia &amp; Imbonggu Districts (SHP) average</th>
<th>NCD range</th>
<th>NCD average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home-made shotgun</td>
<td>100–500</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>100–800</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-made shotgun #2**</td>
<td>700–1,500</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory-made shotgun</td>
<td>400–5,000</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>2,667</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>200–6,000</td>
<td>2,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump-action shotgun</td>
<td>1,500–10,000</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>1,500–14,000</td>
<td>6,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16/AR15</td>
<td>4,000–15,000</td>
<td>8,045</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>8,715</td>
<td>4,500–20,000</td>
<td>8,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLR</td>
<td>5,000–14,000</td>
<td>9,438</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8,125</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>10,667</td>
<td>8,000–20,000</td>
<td>13,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handgun</td>
<td>200–3,000</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>1,000–7,000</td>
<td>2,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenade</td>
<td>1,000–1,800</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>400–2,000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun</td>
<td>20,000–40,000</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>12,000–30,000</td>
<td>23,625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* PGK 100 are worth about USD 33.

** These are a recent innovation: bolt-action home-made shotguns specifically designed to take 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition, which is the cheapest and most commonly available ammunition in the far western end of SHP.
tively abundant, and that prices are rapidly declining, especially in the Hela region, where new supply routes have
opened up. Table 7.5 lists the three main ammunition types and their black market prices as at mid-2005.

Ironically, as new trade routes encompassing Hela have opened up in the west of the region, allowing North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard ammunition (5.56 x 45 mm and 7.62 x 51 mm) to flow more readily
onto the black market, shotgun cartridges have become increasingly hard to come by relative to other ammunition
types. This price differential has given rise to some quite innovative practices, including the production of more
sophisticated home-made firearms—weapons that take 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition and versions that operate like
traditional bolt-action rifles—as well as the production of modified ammunition, whereby NATO standard ammuni-
tion is fitted into spent shotgun cartridges for use in home-made shotguns and pistols. Collectively, these innovations
represent potential catalysts for increased violence in the near future.

CAUSES OF AND RESPONSES TO ARMED VIOLENCE

This and past research has shown that there is no single cause of armed violence in PNG. Microeconomic analyses
of urban crime in PNG have by and large taken the view that rapid population growth generates crime, concluding
that marginal youth are propelled into crime as a consequence of limited economic and employment opportunities
2000) concurs, pointing out that urban drift, the growth of large squatter settlements,15 the breakdown of traditional
values, limited employment opportunities for high school graduates, structural inequalities between the ‘haves’ and
‘have nots’, and contestation over resource ownership are all contributing to contemporary criminality in PNG.
Anthropological accounts, however, have shown that other factors such as prestige (Goddard, 1992; 1995; Dinnen,
1995; 2000)16 or the desire to escape the expectations or demands of kin (Monsell-Davis, 1993) often come into play
as well. They have also shown that ‘fighting is both a recurrent and legitimate means of prosecuting claims and
seeking restitution for many PNG societies’ (Goldman, 2003, p. 2).

Just as there were regional differences with respect to armed violence, victimization, illegal gun ownership, and
ammunition prices, the assessment revealed that the attributed causes of armed violence differ from area to area. It
is instructive, then, to compare the eastern and western areas of SHP, and the suburbs and settlements of NCD, in
order to highlight the differentiated causes and responses to armed violence.

### Table 7.5 Ammunition types and their typical market prices (PGK*) by district, December 2004–May 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition type</th>
<th>Kopiago District (SHP)</th>
<th>Tari District (SHP)</th>
<th>Mendi District (SHP)</th>
<th>Ialibu, Pangia &amp; Imbonggu Districts (SHP)</th>
<th>NCD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.56 x 45 mm</td>
<td>5–12 (7)</td>
<td>5–12 (8)</td>
<td>15–20 (18)</td>
<td>30 (30)</td>
<td>10–50 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 51 mm</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8–14 (11)</td>
<td>20–25 (23)</td>
<td>30 (30)</td>
<td>10–50 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* PGK 100 are worth about USD 33.

Note: Average price given in brackets.
In eastern SHP, men and women alike asserted that there were few guns in their respective communities and that they were not particularly troubled by armed violence, except during national elections and when travelling. They also reported that tribal fighting seldom occurs, because large compensation payments are made within the community to aggrieved parties in a speedy fashion so as to ‘cool off’ any motivations for fighting. Instead, they cited domestic and family violence as the most common and troublesome forms of violence in their communities. Women attributed domestic violence to polygamy and/or promiscuity, and to drug and alcohol abuse, while men considered jealousy, gambling, alcohol, marijuana, and adultery as causal factors. In the east, jealousy and sorcery accusations also emerged as key causes of violence, with sorcery being invoked to explain motor vehicle fatalities and other accidental deaths.

There was also general consensus that local leaders in eastern SHP are strong and that they continue to command respect. Specifically, it was asserted that they are quick to attend to disputes and that they work tirelessly to see conflicts resolved quickly, so as to diffuse the likelihood of further conflict. It was also asserted that they take family conflicts seriously, intervening quickly before the extended family becomes involved. Because of this, the researchers found considerable respect for customary law and practices, despite deteriorating confidence in the police and judicial systems. Communities in the east, for instance, were prepared to have disputes dealt with by the village courts rather than take matters into their own hands.
Despite their willingness and desire to solve disputes peacefully without recourse to violence, people in eastern SHP felt that it is increasingly difficult to do so due to inflating compensation demands. Many lamented the contradictory nature of compensation, pointing out that while it contributes to the management of disputes, it is also crippling local economies. Men and women alike felt something should be done to limit compensation payments, before they become completely unmanageable. They noted that compensation demands in the event of a death are now routinely in the order of PGK 40,000–50,000 (USD 13,000–16,000) plus pigs and up to PGK 100,000 (USD 33,000) in the case of motor vehicle accidents. To put this in perspective, average incomes in the Ialibu/Pangia and Imbonggu districts amount to less than PGK 100 (USD 33) per person per year (Hanson et al., 2001, p. 93). Local public servants at Ialibu also saw correlation between the weakness of the state and these high compensation payments: ‘The law is weak so we must pay more in order to maintain peace.’

Compensation was also found to be causing problems in the Hela region, where the rule of law is comparatively weak and local leadership undermined by young thugs with guns (ANGRY YOUNG MEN). There compensation had become so inflated that people are having difficulty paying the amounts demanded, thus ratcheting up the potential for renewed violence. Kopiago men were particularly vocal in asserting that threats, intimidation, and extortion with firearms are the most virulent form of violence in their community. They further explained that local leaders had become powerless due to the proliferation of weapons, and that with guns, people are able to extract increasingly large compensation payments. Clearly, then, there are variations in the respective capacities of local communities to manage conflict and maintain peace in their own areas.

Armed violence was of particular concern to people in western SHP, though men and women tended to envision the root causes differently. Women, for instance, saw escalating bride prices as a huge problem, pointing out that large payments keep them in bad marriages (because they can’t possibly repay the bride price in the event of a divorce), causing them and their children to suffer. Women were also very much concerned about the growing incidence of domestic and family violence. They saw three key factors as contributing to the problems they were experiencing—polygamy, gambling, and marijuana. They were most concerned about polygamy and promiscuity, and linked with it the risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS.

Men also identified these same three factors, but ranked them in the reverse order. They felt that marijuana was the key cause of armed violence in their communities. Indeed, village leaders, local mediators, and peace and good order committees complained over and over again that their attempts to maintain law and order were being undermined by ‘marijuana boys’ who turn up at village court cases and support one or other of the involved parties on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis. Because of this, local leaders now feel compelled to arm themselves when hearing disputes. Indeed, throughout the province, but particularly in the west, researchers encountered the view that the law and order situation had deteriorated to the point where ‘good people’ are arming themselves ‘for their own protection’. That demand appears to be growing more robust has real implications for potential disarmament (DEMAND).

In the SHP, conflict over resources has also emerged as a key contributor to insecurity and as a subsequent reason for acquiring firearms, particularly in the west. It was generally agreed that the upsurge in fighting in SHP coincided with the advent of resource development. Certainly, many of the province’s ongoing conflicts concern the distribution of oil and gas royalties and access to the benefits of resource development. Much of the current conflict can also be attributed to state failure: the failure to provide basic services, such as health and education; the failure to mediate land and royalty disputes; the failure to address existing law and order problems; and a lack of accountability in relation to the expenditure of funds generated by resource development (Haley and May, forthcoming). Throughout
SHP, but most particularly in the Hela region, researchers regularly encountered the sentiment that the money being generated through resource development is not being channelled back into rural areas, and this is an ongoing source of discontent.

The state’s failure to maximize and equitably distribute the benefits of resource development or to provide essential services in the Hela region has led to calls for the establishment of a separate Hela province, with many suggesting that if the Hela people continue to be denied essential services and a more equitable share of the benefits of resource development, then SHP will go the way of Bougainville. Certainly, this was the mantra the assessment team encountered in the Tari area.

There are no services here . . . . We are ready for a fight. If they don’t give us a Hela province we will fight . . . . If we don’t get our province, forget about the gas pipeline project. It won’t go . . . . We men and boys are gathering guns. If we don’t get our own province by 2007 we will fight. It will be bigger than Bougainville. They had only a few guns; we have plenty—not just home-made guns, but high-powered weapons. They had plenty of languages—we have only one. We will fight. It will be bigger than Bougainville. Bougainville was a small fight. We are ready to fight . . . . We number 300,000. The government must hear us.
There can be no doubt that the Hela province issue presents a potential source of conflict in SHP. People in the Hela region are arming themselves with the express purpose of causing widespread civil unrest should the national government fail to respond to their calls for the establishment of a separate province prior to the 2007 elections (Agiru, 2005).

The problems in the Hela region also highlight the fact that service delivery failure contributes to insecurity in that it gives rise, among other things, to contestation over non-state resources and access to non-government service providers (Haley and May, forthcoming). In SHP, service delivery failure has also seen public services become privatized, creating yet another source of conflict. Increasingly, those without cash resources are finding it difficult to utilize the judicial system and to access non-violent solutions to their problems. As such, there can be no doubt that state failure is contributing to armed violence in SHP.

As in SHP, the NCD focus group participants were asked to identify the types and causes of violence in their communities. Some eight key causal factors were identified, including unemployment, school drop-outs, alcohol abuse, drug trafficking and abuse, financial difficulties, family problems, lack of funds to pay school fees, and peer pressure. Across NCD, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, was held to be the single most important factor contributing to violence. Financial difficulties and alcohol and/or drug abuse were also widely seen to be the next most significant factors contributing to armed violence. NCD focus group participants expressed particular concern about the availability and consumption of locally brewed alcohols such as ‘steam’.

Despite these grim findings, affected communities agreed that there are a number of pragmatic and immediate interventions that might alleviate these problems. These included employment generation, programmes to reduce alcohol consumption, restrictions on carrying weapons, increased police presence and law enforcement, and compulsory education. As in SHP, views concerning the causes of violence tended to differ by gender, with men and women also diverging in their views about the most effective ways of combating violence. For instance, women in NCD advocated a total ban on the sale of alcohol, citing alcohol as a key cause of violence in their communities. Women, too, were most vocal about wanting to see the Vagrancy Act reactivated and about stopping migration from rural to urban areas. Men, however, saw unemployment as the key contributor to violence. More so than the women, they felt that the creation of employment and income generation opportunities would see violence reduced.

NCD residents also pointed out that their communities are actively involved in trying to improve the security situation in their own local areas. Many had established community groups, neighbourhood watch initiatives, and peace and good order committees to mediate minor conflicts. The peace committees were particularly active in the settlements. Although people generally felt that they had strengthened law and order, it was also felt that compensation was on the rise, with some communities meeting up to five times a week at local parks to solve disputes, to discuss how compensation monies could be raised, or to agree upon demands to be imposed on other groups. As in SHP, it was felt that compensation demands were steadily inflating, such that current levels of compensation were held to be unsustainable. It was also felt that rising compensation payments were contributing to greater cycles of retribution and violence.

Clearly, any effort to enact civilian disarmament will be a challenging enterprise in PNG. Despite the havoc caused by guns, concern about rising compensation payments, and recognition that they are crippling livelihoods and contributing to the escalation of violence, the vast majority of respondents claimed that they would be unwilling to give up their guns unless the law and order situation improved. Specifically, they rejected the idea of gun buy-backs or ‘weapons...
for development’ programmes, arguing that such schemes would not work unless everyone disarmed simultaneously. Instead of being seen as part of the problem, guns were seen by many to be offering a degree of protection, with respondents in both SHP and NCD asserting that their guns were their ‘protection’ and ‘bodyguard’.

That said, respondents in NCD felt that firearms reduction might prove more successful if people received payment for their firearms and were provided with employment or other income earning opportunities. Significantly, it was repeatedly noted that one of the many motivating factors for firearms acquisition is the need to make a living: many NCD focus group participants reported that people in their communities had obtained guns with the express purpose of leasing them out or using them to eke out a living through crime. This suggests that economic factors are contributing to the proliferation of firearms in NCD in a way that they are not in SHP, and potential interventions will need to take account of this.21

CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD

As Dinnen (2004, p. 71) rightly notes, external interventions need ‘to be grounded in a thorough understanding of the socio-economic and political complexities of the recipient countries.’ Given the sheer size of mainland PNG, large-scale external interventions of the kind undertaken in the Solomon Islands and on Bougainville are unlikely to succeed or be financially viable. Further, there is as yet little local support for gun surrenders or weapons reduction initiatives. Certainly, past initiatives have either failed or have tended to yield mainly home-made weapons. Indeed, despite popularity among donors and policy-makers, weapons reduction initiatives often target the wrong people, tend to enjoy only limited success, and can even do more harm than good if they do not take proper account of the local context (Muggah, 2005, p. 289). For instance, reducing firearms numbers may well have little impact on violence against women—for as this survey has shown, SHP women are five times more likely to be admitted to hospital with a bladed injury than a gunshot injury. This is not to say that weapons reduction initiatives are doomed or that they have no merit, merely that they should be considered alongside a broader range of alternatives. In PNG, small-scale local interventions focused on violence reduction and support to customary law—as compared to straightforward gun collection—will most likely prove productive. This was particularly evident in NCD, where many communities had established neighbourhood watch patrols and peace and good order committees to mediate minor conflicts, as a means of improving and taking back responsibility for maintaining security in their communities.

In the absence of a strong state, civil society groups are seeking to combat the growing law and order problems in their own areas. Women’s, church, and other community-based organizations, for instance, have taken on a particularly active role in the area of peace-making, mediation, and conflict resolution (Dinnen and Thompson, 2004, p. 12). While undertaking this assessment, researchers encountered several small-scale local initiatives that have not only proved successful, but also self-sustaining. Researchers are of the view that such initiatives might well be replicated elsewhere, and that properly targeted donor support would not just see them grow, but even increase in effectiveness. Successful projects share several key characteristics: they were designed and developed locally, such that they value and draw upon local knowledge and cultural resources; they engage and gainfully occupy the local youth; they have empowered local leaders; and they have enhanced customary governance. This last feature is particularly critical, because when local leadership is strong, law and order can be maintained, even in the absence of effective state police and judicial systems. The different prevailing security situations in SHP demonstrate this.
In sum, this chapter finds that weapons reduction initiatives, such as the national gun amnesty that has been recommended by the National Guns Control Committee (NGCC, 2005), are likely to yield comparatively limited results in PNG’s most conflict-riven areas, unless some degree of law and order is first re-established and locally specific factors fuelling demand are addressed (DEMAND). In much of SHP and NCD, the two are intrinsically linked. Many responsible citizens, including local mediators, are arming themselves for protection and expressing a general unwillingness to disarm unless the law and order situation improves. In seeking to reduce violence in these regions, it will therefore be important to ‘think small’. Modest community-level interventions that build upon local capacity and seek to enhance customary governance will likely prove most productive.

### ANNEXE 1. NATIONAL CRIME INCIDENTS SUMMARY, 2004, BY PROVINCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident type</th>
<th>NCD</th>
<th>Lae</th>
<th>Western Highlands Province</th>
<th>SHP (Eastern Highlands Province)</th>
<th>Simbu Province</th>
<th>Enga Province</th>
<th>Other 15 provinces</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious sex offence</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievous bodily harm</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed robbery</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking and entering</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle hijacking</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing (PGK 1,000+)</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escape from prison</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug offence</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms offence</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escape from police</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed ambush</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exchange of gunfire</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting incident</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factional fighting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incidents</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>2,554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNDSS (2005)*
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLG</td>
<td>Local Level Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCD</td>
<td>National Capital District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGK</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea kina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG LRC</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>Southern Highlands Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENDNOTES

1. There are five Highlands provinces: Western Highlands Province, Eastern Highlands Province, Southern Highlands Province, Enga Province, and Simbu Province.
2. The Small Arms Survey team included Nicole Haley and Robert Muggah, with a team of international and local researchers affiliated with the Australian National University’s State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project and the University of Papua New Guinea. Preliminary findings were presented at the PNG Gun Summit held in Goroka in July 2005.
5. Between January 2004 and March 2005, approximately half of all crimes reported nationally occurred in the urban centres of Port Moresby and Lae, while close to a quarter occurred in the Highland provinces (UNDSS, 2005). Anexe 1, which provides the National Crime Incidents Summary for 2004, reveals that Port Moresby—the country’s largest and fastest-growing urban centre, with a projected population now exceeding 300,000 (NSO, 2002)—currently accounts for some 34 per cent of all nationally reported crimes, despite being home to only 5 per cent of PNG’s 5.5 million people.
6. Settlements are unsanctioned and unplanned residential areas lacking basic amenities and services that were established by migrants and squatters.
8. The present assessment found that 48 per cent of the victimization events reported to the NCD team and only 16 per cent of those reported to the SHP team had been reported to the police. It also found that reporting rates are geographically and demographically differentiated, such that crimes occurring in areas where there is a police presence were more likely to be reported than those occurring in remote rural areas where there are no longer any police.
9. This is roughly consistent with the National Crime Incidents Summary for 2004 (Annexe 1), in which the violent crimes of murder, serious sexual offence, grievous bodily harm, and armed robbery account for 53 per cent of reported criminal events. It is worth noting, though, that violent crime tends to account for less than a quarter of all offences in other countries. In 2004 it accounted for 21 per cent of reported crime in the United States (US Bureau of Justice, 2005) and 11 per cent of reported crime in Australia (ABS, 2005).
10. An international comparison of criminal justice statistics, undertaken by Barclay and Tavares et al. (2003), reveals that the murder rate in Port Moresby/NCD is significantly higher than in most other cities around the world. They cite the following homicide rates per 100,000 people: Sydney (1.6), London (2.6), New York (8.9), Moscow (18.4), and Washington, DC (42.8).
11. The NCD survey included slightly more settlement households (156) than households in the suburbs (136), meaning that settlement households accounted for 53 per cent of the sample.
12. Data provided by hospital staff, 2005.
13. That survey found that 57 per cent of rural wives, 37 per cent of low-income urban wives, and 23 per cent of urban elite wives who had been hit by their husbands reported being injured with a weapon or implement (PNG LRC, 1992, pp. 16–17).
14. While undertaking this assessment, researchers received several first-hand reports from people who had traded marijuana in order to acquire an assault rifle. Typically, they had traded 40–60 kg of marijuana for a single M16 or SLR. Although this might seem high, people in the same areas reported trading 10 kg of marijuana for a pair of steel-capped work boots.
15. UNDP (2004, p. 16) estimates that 50 per cent of NCD residents now live in squatter settlements.
16. Embiap (2005, p. 1) concurs, suggesting that violence is used ‘as a way of earning respect, pride and wealth’. It is worth noting, too, that prestige can also motivate people to abandon criminal activities. Dinnen, for example, has shown that public weapons surrenders are seen by some as a strategy for accessing resources, ‘project funds and employment opportunities’ (Dinnen, 1995, p. 109), and a means of building prestige (p. 116).
17. Previous participatory assessments administered by the Small Arms Survey in South Asia, South-East Asia, and the South Pacific have found similar gender and demographic differences in how problems are conceived and ultimately acted upon. See, for example, Banerjee and Muggah (2001), Moser-Puangsuwan and Muggah (2003), and LeBrun and Muggah (2005).
18. The burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic is a factor fuelling violence in SHP and elsewhere in PNG. Anecdotal and qualitative evidence indicates that the incidence of HIV/AIDS is rising dramatically in SHP—recent figures suggest a five-fold increase since 2003. Already people in rural areas are dying of AIDS-related illnesses, yet sadly national awareness and prevention campaigns are yet to reach these areas due to service delivery...
failure. In some parts of PNG, AIDS deaths are now being attributed to witchcraft. At Kopiago, for instance, accusations of witchcraft have resulted in a spate of brutal witch trials over the past two years. In the first of these trials, six women were held captive and tortured over the space of a fortnight. They were beaten, stabbed, cut with bush knives, and burnt with heated reinforcing iron (Haley, forthcoming).

19 Violent conflict, sparked in part by secessionist sentiments and discontent about the distribution of benefits from the highly successful Bougainville Copper Mine, raged in PNG’s Bougainville Province from 1988 until the late 1990s. During that time, thousands of people were killed. In mid-2005, after a lengthy peace process, an Autonomous Bougainville Government was elected and sworn in. In 2020 there is to be a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on the issue of independence. There is extensive literature on the origins and unfolding of the conflict; see, for instance, May and Spriggs (1990) and Regan (1998).


21 Although people in SHP did not report acquiring weapons to lease out, both weapons and mercenary gunmen are available for hire and are serious and unpredictable variables in intergroup conflict (Alpers, 2005).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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