Acute armed violence can persist long after formal war comes to an end, with some so-called ‘post-conflict’ environments presenting as many, or more, direct and indirect threats to civilians than the armed conflicts that preceded them.1 Anticipating the many expressions of armed violence during the post-conflict period is key to achieving human security and, eventually, national stability.

Yet few programmes that seek to promote post-war security are designed to deal with the many facets of such violence. Ceasefires, peace agreements, and even popular elections—important as they may be—do not necessarily deliver tangible improvements in the safety of individuals and communities.

Some of the reasons why armed violence continues to simmer or mutates in the aftermath of war are well known. Many armed conflicts end without a strong commitment to a ceasefire or peace agreement, resulting in a precarious transitional period. Moreover, efforts to impose victors’ justice can unintentionally worsen the situation (Kreutz, Marsh, and Torre, 2007; Licklider, 1995). Some armed groups—and particularly senior officers and commanders from the ‘losing side’—may be dissatisfied with the new political dispensation and therefore fuel future instability (Weinstein, 2007; Darby, 2001; Stedman, 1997). Scholars and practitioners have observed how predatory networks and patronage structures associated with the war economy may remain intact and even emerge strengthened after protracted warfare.2

The intensity and distribution of post-conflict armed violence—and the victimization it inflicts—tend to change over time. Societies emerging from war can experience a surge in predatory and organized criminal violence due to risk factors and vulnerability associated with the war and post-conflict period. A fluid constellation of state agents and armed groups use various forms of coercion in pursuit of competing (and often overlapping) motivations and interests. The causes of armed violence—whether political, economic, or communal—may shift in complex ways. Likewise, armed violence once concentrated in specific locales, such as the rural hinterland or international frontiers, may diffuse into urban slums or seep into wealthier neighbourhoods (Rodgers, 2004; 2007).

Quelling post-war armed violence is a major preoccupation for multilateral and bilateral agencies promoting peace- and state-building. Given the way violence can undermine day-to-day security and social order, it is an even more urgent priority for affected states and civil societies. This chapter considers some of the challenges inherent in defining a society as ‘post-conflict’. It first examines how, far from heralding a return to normalcy, such contexts are frequently as unsafe as war-affected environments. The chapter then highlights an array of newer security promotion measures that, when combined with conventional interventions such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, can reduce the risks of armed violence and promote personal safety and long-term stabilization of war-ravaged communities. Its findings include the following:
• Certain post-conflict societies and population groups suffer rates of direct armed violence comparable to (or even higher than) the armed conflicts that preceded them.
• Excess (non-violent) mortality can also remain high in post-conflict societies—often much higher than violent death rates—long after the shooting stops.
• The risk of armed conflict recurring in post-war societies appears to be greater than the risk of war erupting in societies that have not experienced armed conflict.
• Proximate and structural risks in post-conflict environments—from alcohol, narcotics, and arms availability to high rates of unemployment among men and concentrations of displaced populations—can influence the onset, intensity, and duration of armed violence.
• Conventional security promotion activities such as DDR have a mixed record and, on their own, may not be suited to deal with many of the dynamic forms of post-conflict armed violence.
• Interim stabilization measures, tightly connected to the overarching peace- and state-building framework, serve as ‘holding strategies’ in the immediate post-conflict period.
• Second-generation security promotion interventions—routinely undertaken in combination with or following DDR and security sector reform (SSR)—are evidence-led and community-focused.

The chapter documents an abundance of strategies that are designed to prevent and reduce armed violence around the world. While many of these unfold in post-conflict (as well as ostensibly non-conflict) contexts, solid evidence of what works and what does not is still lacking. Beyond expectations of security, order, and reductions in armed violence, clear benchmarks of ‘success’ are seldom established. There are comparatively few credible impact or cost–benefit evaluations of such activities. Nevertheless, a modest but convincing evidence base suggests that ‘interim stabilization’ and ‘second-generation security promotion’ interventions offer promising means of diminishing the risks and effects of post-conflict violence (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schjörlien et al., 2008; WOLA, 2008; Muggah, 2008b). Taken together with more conventional approaches such as DDR and arms control, these measures comprise a broader, more sophisticated set of tools for enhancing security in the aftermath of war.

**Interim stabilization** initiatives are undertaken during the sensitive period coinciding with or immediately following the end of armed conflict. Designed to create space before more formal and large-scale security promotion activities take place, they can include activities such as the promotion of civilian service corps, military integration arrangements, transitional security forces, dialogue and sensitization programmes, and differentiated forms of transitional autonomy. **Second-generation** measures are usually deployed later, overlapping with or following DDR and SSR. They include community security and safer-city interventions, weapons for development programmes, and more targeted evidence-based activities focusing on at-risk youth and hot spots. Key factors distinguishing such initiatives from conventional security promotion include their data-driven approach, a municipal or community focus, and emphasis on risk and symptom mitigation.

Conventional security promotion frequently lacks clear standards of effectiveness. Since it aims to establish political stability, this type of intervention is often unable to contend with the criminal and quasi-political violence that frequently overtakes politically oriented violence in the post-conflict period (Muggah and Krause, 2009). Interim stabilization and second-generation security promotion—by focusing on key risks, enhancing resilience in affected communities, and concentrating on reducing indicators of armed violence—can complement and reinforce conventional security promotion. While no panacea, these measures may be especially useful if targeted at specific groups at risk for, or vulnerable to, armed violence, and at potential ‘spoilers’ of war-to-peace transitions.
A widespread assumption held by diplomats and donors is that when wars come to an end, safety and security will improve and normality will resume. A period of relative stability—or peace consolidation—is expected to follow the conclusion of a peace agreement and the deployment of peacekeepers.\(^5\)

But these expectations are routinely confounded by experience on the ground. While direct violent deaths can and often do rapidly decline when wars end, particularly in the wake of UN-supported peace-support operations, it is important to recognize that new forms of armed violence also routinely emerge (Fortna, 2008). As discussed below, violent killings may start to rise once more, particularly among youthful segments of the population. What is more, the incidence of excess mortality can remain comparatively high until access to basic services is re-established and armed violence diminished.\(^6\)

Map 7.1 Violence and instability by district in the DRC, 2006–08
Armed violence may assume qualitatively different characteristics during the post-war period than during the preceding armed conflict. For one, post-conflict armed violence transforms and can become entrenched in new geographic areas and among specific demographic and socio-economic population clusters. In some cases, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, post-conflict armed violence can escalate and exceed wartime rates (Small Arms Survey, 2005). These escalations may be at odds with regional tendencies. At the same time, post-conflict armed violence can substantially increase the exposure of civilians, especially women and children, the elderly, and the displaced, to excessive rates of non-violent mortality and morbidity (see Box 7.1). In the wake of the 1990–91 Gulf War, for example, one expert observed how ‘far more persons died from post-conflict health effects than from direct war effects’ (Daponte, 1993). Where wars are especially severe and protracted, abnormally high levels of mortality and morbidity can persist after the formal end of armed conflict.

Targeted efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence in the post-conflict period may not only reduce intentional killings, but also diminish excess mortality and morbidity. Even so, it should be noted that focused interventions to minimize instability such as peacekeeping and DDR—while important—achieve only so much (see Box 7.2). Other factors shaping excess post-conflict non-violent mortality and morbidity are not tied only to rising crime or communal violence, but also to real and relative investments in human and public infrastructure, including health care. Following a war, the professional health workforce may be seriously

---

**Box 7.1 Excess mortality in ‘post-war’ Congo**

In countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, post-conflict excess mortality rates declined but remained elevated for an unspecified period. These high rates are a major challenge for humanitarian and recovery operations. Indeed, far more resources are devoted to reconstructing basic health infrastructure than to negotiating ceasefires or disarming and demobilizing former soldiers.

The relative vulnerability of a population combined with the inability of public authorities to rehabilitate and resume basic service delivery can contribute to an increase in mortality. The DRC was affected by systemic conflict for more than a decade, with devastating implications for societal vulnerability and ultimately health. The acute period of armed conflict (1998-2002) contributed to a dramatic escalation in violent death, together with displacement and excess mortality.

After the signing of a formal peace accord in 2002 and a sharp reduction in armed violence, persistent tensions in several eastern provinces continued to exact a monumental human toll. A robust UN peacekeeping effort supported by the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has shored up the security situation since 2004. Following sustained onslaughts by rebel leader Laurent Nkunda’s forces in North Kivu, the situation remained precarious, particularly in eastern areas of the country (see Map 7.1). Nkunda’s arrest in Rwanda in early 2009 could contribute to important changes in the region.

On the basis of five surveys conducted between 2000 and 2007, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimates that more than 5.4 million excess deaths occurred after 1998. An estimated 2.1 million of these occurred since the formal ‘end’ of war in 2002. More than six years after the signing of the formal peace agreement, the country’s national crude mortality rate (CMR) is roughly 2.0 deaths per 1,000 per month—more than 50 per cent higher than the sub-Saharan African average (IRC, 2008, p. ii). As Table 7.1 shows, these rates are even higher in eastern areas of the country. Crucially, fewer than one per cent of these deaths were attributed to armed violence. The vast majority died as a result of easily preventable diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia, and malnutrition (IRC, 2008, p.iii).
depleted, often taking generations to recover. Rapid reductions in excess post-conflict mortality also depend on the length and intensity of an armed conflict, the extent of dispersion of populations, and the level of aid provided during various stages of the war and post-war period. Because surveillance and monitoring systems may also collapse, there are serious challenges to defining and tracking the global burden of post-conflict armed violence. Another impediment to better diagnosing and therefore responding to the dynamics of post-conflict armed violence is semantic. There are routine disagreements over basic definitions of ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ on the one hand, and ‘post-conflict’ and ‘post-war’ on the other. For the purposes of this chapter, ‘armed conflict’ and ‘war’ are treated as synonymous. And while a debate persists among conflict specialists over the characteristics of different types of ‘war’, it is useful to recall that ‘conflict’ is a socially embedded and arguably necessary feature of all societies. In other words, notwithstanding the popularity of the term in policy-making and practitioner circles, there is in fact no such thing as a ‘post-conflict’ society if one understands that term to include non-violent forms of conflict.

There are also a series of practical challenges in determining whether and when a country is classified as ‘post-conflict’. This is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage CMR due to violence</th>
<th>CMR in east DRC (per 1,000)</th>
<th>CMR in west DRC (per 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Surveys were not undertaken in 2005.
** Figures refer to ‘proportion of violent deaths in conflict area’ and therefore are not representative of the whole country. See IRC (2007, p. 13).

Source: IRC (2008, pp. 9–13)
not altogether surprising. Just as there is frequently disagreement among international humanitarian lawyers about when countries are considered to be ‘at war’, decision-makers, mediators, and relief workers actively grapple with the question of when a war has ended (see Box 7.3). This is not a simple semantic challenge. In fact, the label or categorization shapes concrete decisions relating to the design of peace agreements, humanitarian intervention, withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and relief personnel, and budgeting and funding cycles.

Multilateral and bilateral aid agencies often struggle to distinguish between their conflict and post-conflict portfolios. The World Bank, for example, seldom provides lending or grant support to countries ‘at war’. Between the early 1980s and late 1990s, however, the agency increased lending to post-conflict countries by more than 800 per cent with reconstruction operations reaching across multiple sectors (World Bank, 1998b). In 1998, the World Bank identified a range of possible indicators for determining whether a country could be considered ‘post-conflict’. The World Bank noted at the time that it should ‘examine this issue and explore the development of indicators to determine when the “post-conflict” period ends and “normalcy” begins’ (World Bank, 1998b, p. 44). Surprisingly, the agency’s Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries Group recently abandoned defining ‘post-war’ scenarios after many years of trying. Operational protocol 8.5 featured indicators, but the latest version quietly dropped them.

Just as it is difficult to determine when a ‘post-conflict’ situation begins, it is equally hard to know when it can be said to have ended. When can a society be considered to be experiencing a durable or sustainable ‘peace'? There
is in fact no consensus as to whether a post-conflict situation ends after a comprehensive ceasefire is put in place, within a certain number of months or years after a peace agreement is signed, following the withdrawal of a peace support operation, or even in the wake of a sharp reduction in the incidence of collective armed violence. A number of multilateral and bilateral agencies introduced temporal thresholds—five to ten years after a war is officially declared ‘over’—but diplomats and aid officials frequently acknowledge that these markers are arbitrary.  

Post-conflict environments are more easily described than defined. As noted above, the challenges of defining which countries are post-conflict are often as intractable as those of determining what is (or is not) ‘war’ (HSRP, 2005; Small Arms Survey, 2005; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, 2002). It may well be easier to define the broad parameters of a ‘post-conflict’ situation than to determine precisely when it begins or ends. For the purposes of this chapter, a post-conflict situation can be described as:

\[
\text{a period following an armed conflict, characterized by a clear victory of one party, a declared cessation of war (i.e. ceasefire and/or peace agreement), and/or a dramatic de-escalation in armed violence in comparison to the ‘wartime’ period.}
\]

The above description coincides with recent efforts by the United Nations Development Programme to establish ‘peace milestones’ or benchmarks of transition (UNDP, 2008).  

Reflecting concurrence among key armed conflict datasets and a variety of other reports, Table 7.2 lists a selection of areas where wars officially ended as of 1990. The generation of such a list reveals practical difficulties inherent in designating when a war ends. For many countries, comparatively high rates of political violence, criminal violence, and counter-insurgency persist or increase after the war has officially been declared ‘over’. Such cases—including Afghanistan and Iraq—are not included in the table.
Table 7.2 Selected post-conflict countries: 1990–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Post-conflict start date</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Reduced conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Reduced conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic</td>
<td>1999, 2002</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Republic of the</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia *</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti *</td>
<td>1994, 2004</td>
<td>Reduced conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Aceh)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Timor-Leste)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo *</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Reduced conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Reduced conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Casamance)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Disagreements over semantics can generate contradictions that inhibit a clear understanding of post-conflict environments. For example, owing in part to the terminological disagreement signalled above, there are routine disputes among political scientists, forensics specialists, and epidemiologists over how to ‘count’ violent deaths, human rights violations, and criminal violence during and after wars (Small Arms Survey, 2005, pp. 229–57). Likewise, certain governments may feel they have legitimate reasons to shield the true magnitude of armed violence from public scrutiny. As a result, comparatively limited analysis has been carried out on post-conflict armed violence, and only a few comprehensive datasets explain patterns and trends both during and after war.

Although quantitative data on post-conflict armed violence is limited and of mixed quality, certain broad qualitative generalizations can be rendered about different post-war contexts. For example, Chaudhary and Suhrke (2008) contend that post-conflict societies can be distinguished according to the specific character and form of armed violence they experience. One group of countries that emerged from war, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, continue to exhibit stable or rising rates of homicidal violence—sometimes equivalent to peak periods of armed conflict (see Table 7.3). These effects are especially pronounced among youthful segments of the population, in particular young males. Other countries, such as Mozambique, Peru, Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands, appear to have more successfully transitioned into periods marked by greater personal security for the civilian population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (South)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: An explanation of the methodology employed for this table is available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/ass/publications/year2009.html

1 In 2003 the name Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was dropped by Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006 Montenegro declared independence and subsequently Serbia declared itself the lawful successor to Serbia and Montenegro.

2 While it was subjected to repeated coups and more than seven peacekeeping missions since 1991, Haiti was never theoretically ‘at war’. As such, it offers a challenge to conventional definitions of ‘conflict’, which require two or more organized fighting forces.

3 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February of 2008.

Sources: Data compiled by CERAC and the Small Arms Survey using IUCP (2008); Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008); UNDP (2008); IISS (various dates); academic and media reports.

Members of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) are demobilized at a ceremony in Tiba, Colombia, December 2004. © Luis Acosta/AFP
It is possible to identify a range of different, potentially overlapping post-conflict scenarios (see Table 7.4). These include societies affected by political violence, routine state-led violence, economic and crime-related violence, community and informal justice, and post-war property-related disputes. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they can be overlapping as the case of Aceh readily shows (ACEH). It is important to recall that post-conflict environments do not emerge in a vacuum—they imperfectly reflect the armed conflicts that precede them. They may continue to feature government-supported militia, quasi-insurgent groups, and organized crime. On the other hand, these groups may rely on new forms of capital and encourage the progressive militarization of society, including in the service of economic and political elites.

| Table 7.3 National and youth homicide rates in selected Latin American countries (homicide rates per 100,000 population) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| El Salvador youth | 74.7 | 73.7 | 59.5 | 71.8 | 64.1 | 58.3 | 60.2 | 52.1 | 57.1 | 74.4 | 92.3 |
| El Salvador national | 45.5 | 44.7 | 38.0 | 44.2 | 38.3 | 35.8 | 35.1 | 30.8 | 32.3 | 39.6 | 48.8 |
| Guatemala youth | 28.0 | 29.7 | 44.0 | 41.0 | 27.8 | 31.8 | 34.9 | 45.5 | 55.1 | 55.4 | n/a |
| Guatemala national | 19.6 | 21.1 | 28.6 | 26.2 | 18.1 | 19.4 | 20.3 | 24.2 | 28.5 | 28.5 | n/a |
| Nicaragua youth | n/a | 10.6 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 12.4 | 12.0 | 11.3 | 16.1 | 15.5 | 16.6 |
| Nicaragua national | n/a | 6.3 | 6.2 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 10.4 |
| Colombia national | 64.4 | 67.0 | 60.1 | 64.2 | 66.0 | 72.2 | 74.3 | 77.3 | 61.3 | 52.6 | 43.8 |
| Mexico national | 16.8 | 15.4 | 14.1 | 14.0 | 12.4 | 10.7 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 9.6 | 8.8 | 9.3 |


| Table 7.4 Types of post-conflict armed violence |
|---|---|---|
| Type of violence | Indicators | Examples |
| Political violence | Extra-judicial killings, explosives attacks, kidnappings, routine torture, population displacement, organized riots | Cambodia, Guatemala, South Sudan |
| Routine state-led violence | Excessively violent law enforcement activities, encounter killings, social cleansing operations, routine torture | Angola, Mozambique |
| Economic and crime-related violence | Armed robbery, extortions, kidnappings for ransom, control of markets through violence | Afghanistan, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia |
| Community and informal justice | Lynchings, vigilante action, mob justice | Liberia, Mozambique, Northern Ireland |
| Post-conflict property-related disputes | Clashes over land, revenge killings, small-scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ | Afghanistan, Guatemala, Kosovo, Liberia |

Source: Chaudhary and Sahrke (2008)
What are the factors that keep the incidence of post-war armed violence unexpectedly high, and why does its form change over time? One reason is that the domestic balance of power is usually fundamentally realigned after an armed conflict. Whether as a result of concessions made during peace negotiations, the disarmament and demobilization of commanders and rank and file, or efforts to install or institutionalize democratic reforms, different winners and losers emerge during the post-conflict period. Political elites operating in the public and private spheres may rely on political violence to shore up their negotiating positions and advance their personal agendas. The shape and direction of such armed violence will be informed by, among other factors, the dynamics of a given peace settlement or internationally supported recovery strategy.

Escalating political violence is common in the aftermath of war. If one party ‘wins’ the war and controls a strong security apparatus, violent purges and retributive acts to eliminate remnants of the enemy may ensue, as was the case in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. Alternatively, if a war ends with an inclusive or widely accepted settlement overseen by peacekeeping forces, there may be fewer instances of flagrant violations. In the latter case, erstwhile and newly posted political authorities, military personnel, and private elites may resort to violent intimidation against possible foes. Such actions may be reported erroneously as common or petty crime. Even more problematic, in some post-conflict settings experiencing fragmentation and division, political violence can appear to take on more anarchic characteristics. Following the US-led armed invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, for example, the factionalization of the security sector contributed to an escalation in warlord-inspired violence and the emergence of under-governed spaces (AFGHANISTAN).

Many post-conflict environments are characterized by routine state-led armed violence perpetrated by the security apparatus. In certain countries, such as Angola, Guatemala, or Mozambique, the military, police, and paramilitary forces may be more inclined to pursue violent strategies than to deliver public security (Chaudhary and Suhrke, 2008). These actions may be implicitly sanctioned, even if not explicitly authorized, by politicians and public authorities who may not be susceptible to the same intensity of (pre-war) oversight and scrutiny. Such violence often features extra-judicial killing of suspected criminals rather than arrest or prosecution. It also includes the systematic use of torture. Security agencies may also condone social cleansing operations in slums and shantytowns as part of law and order—or mano dura (heavy hand)—operations (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers, 2009).

Another common feature of post-conflict societies is economically motivated armed violence. Countries such as Liberia, South Africa, and others in Central America experienced violent crime waves in the aftermath of war...
(Chaudhary and Suhrke, 2008). Policy-makers and social science researchers have focused on the way illegal war economies, including their complex (and frequently transnational) networks of patronage, contribute to persistent armed violence after war in states such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, and elsewhere.24 Armed groups that were not effectively disarmed and demobilized may morph into private security entities and organized criminal networks, as in the case of the Balkans and Timor–Leste.25 Such violence becomes increasingly normalized and entrenched due to the continued presence of armed ex-combatants lacking credible opportunities for employment and income generation. Government and state security forces may also seek to continue to profit from illegal rents. Indeed, organized crime of a certain scale cannot continue without some degree of official complicity (Muggah and Krause, 2009).

An under-reported but nevertheless important category of post-conflict armed violence relates to community and informal justice. The sudden imposition of ‘modern’ forms of law enforcement can be heavily contested in post-conflict societies. Moreover, owing to the failure of transitional governments to provide adequate security, informal, if often locally legitimate, forms of community justice delivery, vigilantism, and militia ‘policing’ can come to the fore. The lines between these various ‘justice’ mechanisms are fluid and shifting. For example, vigilante groups are often formally structured and draw on popular support (Höglund and Zartman, 2006). Related armed violence may derive legitimacy from the real and perceived protection offered civilians, often with complicity from public authorities. In Liberia, for instance, the Ministry of Justice (controversially) called for the formation of vigilante groups to counter increasing violent crime in the capital, Monrovia (Chaudhary and Suhrke, 2008). Lynching and mob justice also appear to enforce certain forms of order and moral codes.26 Neighbourhood gangs established along ethnic or community lines may also establish elements of local control through the provision of ‘protection services’, as has occurred in post-conflict Timor–Leste and Nicaragua.27

A final category of post-conflict armed violence is prompted by property disputes arising from competing claims registered by displaced or recently resettled populations. Large-scale dislocation can generate renewed armed violence if repatriated or returning families find that others have seized their houses, lands, or assets. In certain cases, entire villages and population groups may have been coercively evicted, as was the case with certain Tamil and Sinhalese populations in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 2001 and since 2005 (Muggah, 2008a). Mandingo Liberians who fled during the war found their land occupied by other ethnic groups when they returned, and attempts to reclaim it led to rioting and new forms of communal violence (Chaudhary and Suhrke, 2008). Likewise, in post-war Kosovo, the Serb minority was particularly exposed to Kosovar Albanians seeking to establish an ethnically homogeneous territory. Revenge or retribution killings over the death or maiming of family and community members are also common in many post-conflict societies.28 In certain instances, such killings can escalate and intensify smouldering tensions (Mac Ginty, 2006).

RISK FACTORS FACING POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

International concern with post-war armed violence is motivated by a number of factors. A major preoccupation relates to the susceptibility of such countries and municipalities to renewed full-scale armed conflict. Relatedly, policymakers are worried that if armed violence is left unchecked, it can contribute to continued fatal injuries and indirect
mortality, unnecessary suffering, and escalating human rights violations, while also undermining investments in state-building. Post-conflict states are, in the vernacular, ‘fragile states’. In order to stay their collapse, considerable attention has been devoted to promoting armed conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention, and peace-building initiatives, including transitional justice and security sector reform.

Macro-level research suggests that many post-conflict societies are vulnerable to a disproportionately high risk of war recurrence, in addition to rates of armed violence that are higher than expected. But the extent to which societies emerging from armed conflict are at risk is a subject of much controversy (see Box 7.4). Indeed, the oft-cited statistic that post-conflict countries have a 40–50 per cent risk of sliding back to open warfare within ten years is probably overly pessimistic, but the risk is still likely to be in the order of 20–25 per cent. The reasons why certain countries do not succumb to renewed armed conflict has also eluded close examination. According to Charles Tilly, however, knowledge of discrete ‘causes’ of war and war recurrence may be less important than a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of the resulting armed conflicts and post-conflict environments (Tilly, 1995).

Nevertheless, better evidence is needed on these macro-level risks, since these differences matter for policy and programming. Some researchers fear that if the estimated risk of war recurrence is exaggerated, it could encourage decision-makers to resort more easily to (military) interventions, including peacekeepers (Easterly, 2008). Yet if the risks are downplayed, they contend that outsiders may be more inclined to adopt ‘softer’ tactics and a more cautious approach that emphasizes diplomacy and targeted sanctions. These concerns do not appear to be borne out by reality: even where there is solid evidence of post-conflict countries sliding back into war—as in the DRC, Somalia, and Sri Lanka—UN member states have rarely pursued assertive military interventions. On the contrary: even in those countries where international engagement is comparatively strong—as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan—outsiders are hardly rushing in to assist, much less with well-resourced military operations.

Meanwhile, post-conflict societies are subject to proximate and structural risks that can shape patterns of armed violence onset and intensity (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; OECD, 2008b; Small Arms Survey, 2008). Many of these same factors are relevant in ostensibly ‘peaceful’ environments as well. Understanding why armed violence occurs in either context, who commits violent acts, and who is at risk of victimization is at the core of effective strategies for armed violence prevention and reduction. Successful security promotion interventions typically focus not only on minimizing the symptoms of armed violence, but also on targeting the proximate risk factors associated

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**Box 7.4 When do post-conflict societies return to war?**

The claim that post-conflict countries had a 40–50 per cent risk of going back to war within a decade of war was established as part of an enquiry led by the World Bank into the economic aspects of armed conflict. The assessment was overseen by the World Bank’s then Development Research Group director Paul Collier and associates (Collier et al., 2003). The figure rapidly circulated in the academic world, the UN system, and the international donor community and was subsequently used as a justification for the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Numerous social scientists contend that the figure is misleading and probably too high. Revised figures suggest a lower magnitude of risk of armed conflict recurrence—approximately 20–25 per cent within the first five years. This revision is based on the use of alternative datasets and independent retesting of the original data (Walter, 2004; Suhrke and Samset, 2007). The authors of the World Bank study revised their earlier figure downwards to 40 per cent (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderboom, 2006, p. 14).
with perpetration, enhancing resilience and better understanding the historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural ‘embeddedness’ of violence in a given society.

Proximate risk factors for heightened armed violence include unregulated small arms and light weapons availability, substance abuse, a history of victimization, abuse in the home, and prevailing attitudes that support the use of coercion. While the presence of these risk factors is routinely correlated with the increased likelihood of armed violence, different forms of violence appear to be shaped by distinct combinations of risk factors. For example, in the case of youth violence, predictors include exposure to warfare, the presence of gangs in the neighbourhood, having an older sibling who is in a gang, perceptions of insecurity at school or in the neighbourhood, and lack of economic opportunities. Likewise, substance abuse, association with delinquent peers, and school bullying also appear to be associated with the onset of certain forms of youth violence, especially in post-conflict societies where support services are comparatively limited (WHO, 2008b).

Structural factors such as social and economic exclusion, rapid and unregulated urbanization and social dislocation, unequal access to basic public services, systemic unemployment, and living in poorer and socially marginalized areas can also be correlated with a higher risk of armed violence (Small Arms Survey, 2007; 2008; UNODC, 2005). But these factors on their own offer only limited insight. Understanding how they are connected in specific contexts is potentially even more important. In some cases, as in post-conflict societies throughout West and Central Africa, youths are rapidly recruited (voluntarily and forcibly) from urban slums into more organized institutions such as militia or even rebel groups (Small Arms Survey, 2006, pp. 295–322). Similar phenomena have been observed in Central America among gang members, many of whom were formerly combatants (or sons of combatants) during local civil wars (Muggah and Stevenson, forthcoming). Given that many of these factors are associated with rapid urbanization, greater attention to the dynamics of post-conflict urban armed violence is warranted. War-torn cities serve as magnets for the young, and youths are the most likely to perpetrate and be victimized by armed violence (WHO, 2008b; Graham, 2004).

Meanwhile, other structural risk factors are being linked to the recurrence of war. Sharp macro-economic shocks (Collier et al., 2003), rising levels of horizontal inequality (Diprose and Stewart, 2008; Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008), the expansion of unemployed youth populations (Collier et al., 2003), the persistence of ‘bad neighbourhoods’, and simmering identity-related grievances have all been offered as explanations for the onset of armed conflict as well as its contagion across borders. Although debates continue over the influence of these risks, the fact that a high number of countries afflicted by war slip back into armed conflict would imply that security promotion, peace-building, and development interventions should place a priority on minimizing proximate and structural risks (OECD, 2008a; 2008c; 2008d).

Although knowledge about proximate and structural risk factors for the onset and duration of war appears to be growing, a number of important issues remain unresolved. For example, the abovementioned distinction between proximate and structural risk factors does not adequately capture the instrumental mobilization of violence, including by so-called ‘violence entrepreneurs’, as is often the case in ‘ethnicized armed conflicts’. More attention also needs to be paid to the factors that contribute to the resilience of individuals and societies in the face of the extreme adversity that often characterizes post-conflict settings. Given the potential (and contested) role of ‘youth bulges’ and ‘horizontal inequality’ as factors explaining armed conflict and violence, a better understanding of these specific risk factors—whether for political, economic, state-led, communal, or property-related armed violence—is warranted.
PROMOTING SECURITY AFTER WAR

Although the number and intensity of armed conflicts appear to be in decline since the early 1990s, armed violence simmers on in many post-conflict countries. Encouragingly, certain lessons associated with preventing and reducing armed violence in such environments are being learned. Some of these are emerging from unexpected sources, including the crime and justice sectors. For example, in addition to the importance attached by military and development actors to peace-support interventions and conventional security promotion such as DDR, there is growing awareness of the critical role to be played by functioning and punitive security sectors.

Over the past decade, it appears that some security promotion activities have begun adjusting to the dynamic landscapes of post-conflict armed violence. Many have focused deliberately on manipulating and mitigating proximate risk factors for post-conflict violence. In some cases, these newer interventions have consciously sought to alter the incentives of violence entrepreneurs, disrupt enabling factors for armed violence onset, and change the built environment in which armed violence occurs. Adapted from or reinforcing conventional approaches, these newer activities have borrowed liberally from criminology, urban geography, and epidemiological disciplines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interim stabilization</td>
<td>Civilian service corps: South African Service Corps and the Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<td>Military integration arrangements: Brassage of the DRC, UNITA in Angola</td>
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<td>Transitional security forces: Afghan Military Forces, Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq</td>
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<td>Dialogue and sensitization programmes: Rwandan Ingando process, Labora farm experiment in Uganda</td>
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<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>Community security mechanisms: Community security fund in Sudan, community violence reduction in Haiti, Safer Cities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>At-risk youth and gang programmes: Gang violence reduction programmes in El Salvador, education and recreation programmes in Brazilian favelas (slums)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons for development and weapons lotteries: Weapons in exchange for development in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mali, and Niger and weapons lotteries in Haiti, Mozambique, and the Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban renewal and population health programmes: Targeted slum development in Caracas (Venezuela), health-based interventions in Medellín and Cali (Colombia) and Kingston (Jamaica)</td>
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</table>

Creative approaches to security promotion are fast emerging in post-conflict theatres as a result of experimentation on the ground. Conventional interventions such as DDR and SSR are routinely being transformed and adapted as practitioners seek to reorient activities towards (proximate) risk reduction and enhancing resilience. Likewise, designers of security promotion activities are increasingly reducing incoherence and competitive friction among relevant agencies by developing collaborative and inter-sector interventions (ACEH, AFGHANISTAN, LEBANON). Conventional interventions focused more broadly on promoting national stability and civilian accountability over the agents and means of violence are in some cases giving way to (or being complemented by) interim stabilization interventions and second-generation security promotion on the ground.

The incremental evolution of post-conflict security promotion reveals a degree of pragmatism among security and development practitioners. It is suggestive of the way in which military, policing, and development actors are registering and responding to known risks on the ground and seeking to promote ‘whole-of-government’ approaches (OECD, 2008a; Easterly, 2008). Alongside mainstream peace-building activities including mine clearance, transitional justice, and international criminal courts, newer interventions designed to promote safety and security are flourishing. And while the extent of their effectiveness remains subject to debate, they appear to complement and reinforce conventional security promotion strategies, expanding the menu of options available to prevent and reduce armed violence (see Table 7.5).

**Interim stabilization**

As noted above, there are a variety of reasons why many negotiated peace accords collapse within five years. More often than not reversions occur because the conditions are not ripe in the fragile post-conflict environment for the implementation of key security sector reforms or the social and economic reintegration of former combatants. In the rush to declare peace and finalize an exit strategy, and faced with looming security vacuums, negotiating parties may forgo the detailed planning and programming required of carefully timed and phased interim stabilization measures that accompany conventional security promotion. Alternatively, such interventions may not be pursued by peace mediators and negotiating parties if they run up against the vested interests of powerful elites and armed groups.

Interim stabilization measures are part of a broader transitional integration process that seeks to balance adequate security with necessary development. While no guarantee of stability, such interventions can create and sustain a ‘holding pattern’, keeping former combatant cohesiveness intact within a military or civilian structure, and also buying time and creating space for political dialogue and the formation of an enabling environment for legitimate social and economic reintegration (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schjörlein, 2008).
Interim stabilization measures aim to set clear, immediate, and limited objectives. These are to: dramatically reduce armed violence; improve real and perceived security; build confidence and trust; and buy time and space for longer-term conventional security promotion activities, including second-generation initiatives. Buying time and space is more important than it may at first appear. After all, peace agreements are often only the beginning rather than the end of the peace process. It is crucial to continue constructive dialogue among warring parties in order to develop a conventional DDR or SSR framework that outlines parameters for specific interventions if these are not part of the peace agreement.

Time is required in order to constitute administrative structures and legal instruments essential to DDR, including related reintegration commissions, veterans’ bureaus, amnesties, and peace and justice laws. There is a need to create space for participants to understand and ultimately play a part in conventional security promotion. As expectations of a peace dividend begin to rise, time may also be required to allow the state to reinforce its capacity and reach, to promote community involvement in local security provision, and to facilitate opportunities for markets to regenerate and allow for rapid labour absorption.

The various types of emerging interim stabilization measures include: (i) the establishment of civilian service corps; (ii) military or security sector integration arrangements; (iii) the creation of transitional security forces; (iv) dialogue and sensitization programmes and related halfway-house arrangements; and (v) differentiated forms of transitional autonomy. These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In most cases, interim stabilization measures integrate elements of two or more of these categories. These activities aim to convert potential spoilers into stakeholders during the transition period (particularly with regard to the security sector) and allow for the eventual management of small arms and armies.

Civilian service corps arrangements are usefully illustrated with the cases of the South African Service Corps and the Kosovo Protection Corps. These transitional organizations transform former military groups into transitional civilian organizations (e.g. reconstruction brigades, environmental protection–civilian conservation corps, and natural disaster prevention and response corps) through the maintenance of social
structures and cohesion but with changed functions. They address the need to (at least temporarily) employ and occupy former combatants in some form of controlled, meaningful civilian activity. In addition to providing clear incentives to participate in the post-conflict recovery process, this type of arrangement may allow the time and space required for demobilization and reintegration to be pursued, while also permitting individuals to strengthen their life and vocational skills as they ease into civilian life.

Military or security sector integration is another common strategy employed in societies emerging from war (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003). It is a key interim stabilization mechanism for ‘right-sizing’ military and policing structures by bringing erstwhile warring parties together in a single entity and ensuring that potential spoilers and legitimate servicemen and -women are provided with ample livelihood. Military integration is exemplified by the brassage process in the DRC, the parallel integration and reintegration programme in Burundi, and the demobilization of the UNITA rebel group in Angola (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schörlein, 2008). Variations of the strategy have been employed in many other post-conflict zones (e.g. Afghanistan, the Philippines, Rwanda, and Uganda) where military integration and the consolidation of security within a single unified national security apparatus preceded a more structured demobilization of rebel groups (Colletta and Muggah, 2009).

The creation of more temporary transitional security forces is another clear interim stabilization measure. The formation of the Afghan Military Forces bringing together various militia under a single decentralized force and uniform payroll in Afghanistan following the US-led invasion is one clear example of a transitional security force. Many of these combatants were later demobilized or integrated into the new national Afghan security system (AFGHANISTAN). The more recent experience with the Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq is an example whereby local militia with strong ethnic, religious, or tribal ‘identity’ roots were incorporated into local community security forces. In this way they were provided with recognition and paid a salary. Local tribal or culturally based leadership was situated within a loose national command structure. It was intended that these groups eventually integrate into formal security forces or be demobilized when local security, governance, and economic conditions permitted (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schörlein, 2008).

Other interim arrangements include dialogue, sensitization programmes, and halfway-house arrangements. This category is illustrated by the Rwandan Ingando process. Former combatants were gathered into camps for problemsolving dialogue sessions in order to review the causes of violence and to take ownership of the tragedy. The process also served as a forum for the exposure of myths and stereotypes, and afforded an opportunity to rekindle trust following the deep trauma of the 1994 genocide (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schörlein, 2008). Many of the characteristics of this category can also be seen in the Labora farm experiment, an agricultural collective in Uganda, and in the creation of a non-governmental organization for former paramilitaries in Colombia (Muggah, 2008b; Colletta and Muggah, 2009). The effects of long-term economic and social marginalization and stigmatization are addressed in halfway-house arrangements, be they urban cooperatives, agricultural farms, or new NGOs created to enable a resocialization process and adjustment of mindsets and behaviour.

Another type of interim stabilization mechanism is enhanced autonomy during a transitional period. The primary example of such schemes is the agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge, with Hun Sen’s Win–Win Policy (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schörlein, 2008). In this case, social cohesion, local control over governance (including security) and natural resources, and livelihood were exchanged in a clearly defined time period (e.g. three years) for a public affirmation of loyalty to the state.
The above examples of interim stabilization are particularly successful when control and cohesiveness of rank-and-file combatants are maintained until such time as existing command structures are reshaped, emphasizing civilian authority, and conditions are ripe for social and economic reintegration or military integration. This approach typically plays out at three tiers: at the state level as it establishes power sharing and attendant institutional, legal, and administrative frameworks for transitional governance; at the community level, where sensitization, transitional justice, and reconciliation mechanisms are established; and at the individual level by way of improved security, transitional employment, the re-establishment of property rights (asset base), or the provision of life skills training and psychosocial support.

The effectiveness of interim stabilization arrangements depends on a careful appreciation of the key proximate and structural risks and other contextual factors. Ensuring that ground level realities are acknowledged is central to shaping the dynamics of intervention strategies, highlighting again the importance of effective and ongoing diagnosis and analysis. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. A range of incentives and organizational or institutional arrangements are possible—from non-governmental agencies, political parties, rural agri-business, urban public and private service delivery to military, police customs, and intelligence service integration. Moreover, there is a recognition that interim stabilization arrangements should be tightly connected to the over-arching peace- and state-building framework, and that they require adequate provisions for financing, coordination, and monitoring.

**Second-generation security promotion**

Second-generation security promotion approaches are fast emerging as alternatives and add-ons to DDR and SSR, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. They clearly overlap with conventional security promotion, but also represent the expanding toolkit of post-conflict interventions available to planners and practitioners. In contrast to conventional measures—particularly DDR—they tend to be evidence-led, focusing at the outset on identifying and mitigating demonstrated risk factors, enhancing resilience and protective factors at the municipal and community levels, and constructing interventions on the basis of identified needs. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, for example, have been supporting second-generation security promotion for more than a decade (see Box 7.5).

The emergence of second-generation security promotion is linked to a growing awareness of the limitations of conventional approaches such as DDR. In complex environments such as Southern Sudan and Haiti, for example, more ‘classic’ DDR programmes, focused on collecting weapons, cantonment, and reintegration of individual ex-combatants, swiftly gave way to a series of alternative interventions (Muggah, 2007). These activities sought to draw explicitly on local cultural norms rather than rigid externally provided incentives, put weapons beyond use rather than taking them (temporarily) out of circulation, target civilians and gang members rather than former soldiers, and draw on community-based leaders and associations rather than national public institutions.

Second-generation security promotion activities shift the emphasis away from top–down interventions designed by outsiders to more community-designed and -executed approaches. In certain cases, they include activities that carefully map out and respond to known proximate risk factors and that focus on the motivations and behavioural factors associated with actual and would-be perpetrators. From Timor–Leste to El Salvador, examples of second-generation approaches include (i) community security mechanisms, (ii) schemes focusing on at-risk youth and gangs, (iii) weapons for development activities and weapons lotteries, and (iv) urban renewal and population health programming.
Community security mechanisms tend to emerge in response to, or independently of, DDR activities grafted into UN-mandated peace-support operations. By virtue of their proximity to affected communities, field-based practitioners and local organizations are frequently more attuned to local contextual factors than decision-makers and peace negotiators charged with formulating conventional security packages. Community security mechanisms tend to adopt area-based approaches to security promotion, endorse collective incentives to enhance compliance and community participation, and harness the influence of indigenous power brokers and agents of change. ‘Community security funds’ and ‘violence reduction committees’ such as those introduced in South Sudan and Haiti are prominent examples (Muggah, 2007). Community security initiatives tend to feature integrated and multi-sector strategies. They foster confidence and legitimacy through the routine involvement of formal and informal security agents and affected communities. Crucially, their durability and scalability may depend on strong and decentralized local authorities and civil society actors—instutions that are often severely compromised or weakened by protracted armed conflict.
Activities related to **youth and gang-related violence** in post-conflict countries throughout Central America can also be categorized as second-generation security promotion. Violence prevention and reduction interventions focused on so-called ‘clikas’ and subgroups connected to the *Mara Salvatrucha* or *Barrio Dieciocho* have been pursued from San Salvador (El Salvador) to forced migrant communities in the United States. Community-led initiatives—such as Homeboy Industries in the United States or the Centro de Formación y Orientación in El Salvador—appear to demonstrably enhance the resilience of at-risk youth, former gang members, and post-conflict communities. Specifically, they aim to reinforce coordinated public and private sector responses to post-conflict economic violence and to provide mentorship, risk education, and alternative livelihoods for would-be perpetrators and victims, especially boys and young men in poor and marginal communities (WOLA, 2008). They offer important alternatives to enforcement-based *mano dura* approaches that are popular in the region (Muggah and Stevenson, forthcoming).
Second-generation interventions aim to promote ownership and locally legitimate activities by focusing on existing social institutions rather than forming or relying solely on (new) national entities and associated structures (see Box 7.6). They also advance a demand-side approach to arms control, emphasizing the importance of influencing the means and motivations rather than strictly reducing access to hardware. The introduction of weapons for development projects in Liberia, Mali, and the Republic of the Congo, weapons lotteries in Mozambique and Haiti’s slums, and gun-free zones in Brazil and South Africa are examples of innovative and context-specific approaches to reducing gun violence.

Rather than focusing narrowly on removing the tools of violence, the emphasis is instead on reshaping the conditions that foster their misuse (Brauer and Muggah, 2006). Such activities often complement more traditional approaches to post-conflict arms control, including the strengthening of national regulatory frameworks associated with civilian arms ownership, weapons stockpile management, and civilian oversight over the security sector.

Meanwhile, urban renewal—including Safer Community and Safer City design strategies—are other examples of second-generation approaches. There is growing evidence that innovative environmental design and effective use of the built environment by city planners, architects, social scientists, and community leaders can contribute to a reduction in opportunities for predatory violence and related fear of victimization in post-conflict settings (Moser, 2004; 2006). Interventions that support ‘positive territoriality’ by fostering neighbourhood interaction and vigilance, enhance ‘public-led surveillance’ through the identification of ‘hot spots’, establish ‘hierarchy of space’ through the encouragement of use and ownership of public spaces, emphasize ‘target hardening’ through the strategic use of physical barriers and security devices, contribute to ‘environment harmonizing’ by reducing space for armed violence and victimization to occur, and strengthen ‘image maintenance’ by creating well-maintained and lit public and private spaces all appear to enhance local resilience against violence. Safer Community activities that consciously integrate at-risk youth also reportedly improve routine safety and security in post-conflict societies.
A number of critical lessons are emerging from second-generation security promotion activities. An underlying principle appears to be a more scaled-back and facilitative role for international agencies. Rather than recreating new national-level institutions such as commissions or focal points or relying on blunt instruments, second-generation security promotion activities are forged on the basis of formal and informal cooperation with existing (including customary) local institutions. Where possible, the initiative, control, and responsibility of overseeing interventions resides in the hands of local partners; community ownership is therefore a hallmark of such initiatives. Although many second-generation initiatives are nascent and empirically demonstrated evidence of their effectiveness is only gradually being assembled, they potentially offer an important contribution to redressing post-conflict insecurity.

**CONCLUSION**

Any serious investment in post-conflict security promotion needs to take account of the many dimensions of armed violence. This means investing in diagnosing and ultimately reducing known risk factors and promoting armed violence-sensitive interventions. A failure to address effectively and comprehensively the immediate and underlying correlates of post-conflict armed violence means that the embers can smoulder, waiting for the next spark to reignite into war.

Conventional forms of post-conflict security promotion are often narrowly conceived and constructed as part of a general peace-support operation. They typically apply a limited range of measures to armed violence reduction and focus on specific categories of armed actors. Predictably, they also struggle to contend with the geographical and demographic complexities of armed violence before, during, and after war’s ‘end’.

Part of the reason for this is political and administrative. Programmes such as DDR, international policing, and small arms control are routinely introduced as part of a UN Security Council resolution or pursuant to a peace agreement with clear prescriptions on how such interventions should be executed. As such, they assume that war has passed its ‘peak’ and that some form of normalization (or stability) will ensue in the post-conflict period. Interventions are seldom developed on the basis of solid baseline evidence on the ground, or adequately equipped to handle the diverse types of armed violence and their interconnections.

A number of newer approaches appear to be more successful at containing arms and spoilers in post-conflict contexts. These draw upon emerging experiences of armed violence prevention and reduction in chronically violence-affected societies. In addition to creating space for conventional security promotion to take hold, they tend to focus on identifying and responding to risk factors, enhancing resilience at the municipal or community level, and constructing interventions based on identified needs. Interim stabilization measures and second-generation security promotion activities launched from Afghanistan and Cambodia to Colombia and Haiti have explicitly targeted the diverse dimensions of arms availability. More importantly, on the basis of sound information and analysis, they have also homed in on the preferences of actors using weapons and the real and perceived factors contributing to armed violence.

Mirroring the logic of mainstream community development, the design, control, and supervision of such armed violence reduction activities rests at least as much with local partners as with external actors. Although such interventions are nascent, and evidence of their effectiveness is still accumulating, they offer a promising means of keeping some of the more pernicious aspects of post-conflict violence in check.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CMR | Crude mortality rate  
DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo  
SNM | Somali National Movement  
DDR | Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration  
SSR | Security sector reform

ENDNOTES

1 See, for example, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) and Small Arms Survey (2005) for a review of direct and indirect conflict deaths during and after war.
2 See, for example, Spear (2006) and Pugh (2005).
3 Notable exceptions include Dobbins et al. (2005), Doyle and Sanhbanis (2006), Zuercher (2006), and Fortna (2008).
4 The recent launch of standards and guidelines to assist DDR and SSR—including the Integrated DDR Standards (UN DDR, 2006) and the SSR Handbook of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD–DAC, 2007)—should change this situation.
5 Violence does sometimes decline dramatically in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict and, in certain cases, during war time itself. Indeed, noted 19th-century sociologist Emile Durkheim argues that suicide rates can fall during war and post-conflict periods. This conclusion is backed by empirical evidence involving an analysis of suicide rates in France from 1826 to 1913, which indicates that suicide rates were lower during years of war than during years of peace (Lester, 1993). Similar trends were observed more recently in other war-affected areas such as Sri Lanka (Somasundaram and Rajadurai, 1995). Likewise, there are examples of the general health actually improving for populations during and following wars, as was the case of World War II Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, certain affected population groups in war-affected countries of Africa. Correspondence with Alex de Waal, November 2008.
7 See, for example, WHO (2008a; 2008b) and Glibbarah, Huth, and Russett (2003).
8 See, for example, the Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT) of the Centre for the Research of Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, n.d.).
9 See, for example, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) and Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003).
10 As discussed in the Global Burden of Armed Violence, reporting biases are common in post-conflict environments (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). In some cases, post-conflict killing may be classified as common crime rather than banditry. In other cases, the sudden and rapid expansion of reporting may give a false impression that criminal violence is on the increase. See, for example, Collier et al. (2003).
11 Small and Singer (1982) first defined civil war as armed conflicts involving active participation of the national government, military action internal to a country’s sovereign borders, and effective resistance by both sides. The principle difference between civil (internal or intra-state) war and colonial or imperial war was the internality of war to the territory of a sovereign state and the participation of the government as a combatant. Tilly (2003) describes war more broadly as a form of ‘coordinated destruction’—a typology that includes various forms of political violence that in turn generate ‘short-run damage’ and are perpetrated by coordinated, organized actors. Sanhbanis (2004) argues that classifying war is more problematic than presented by Small and Singer or Tilly, owing to: (i) challenges of distinguishing extra- from inter-state armed conflicts; (ii) the difficulties of determining what degree of organization is needed to separate war from other forms of one-sided state-sponsored violence; (iii) the obstacles associated with establishing a numerical threshold to identify wars (e.g. more than 1,000 or more than 25); and (iv) the challenges associated with deciding when an old war stops and a new one begins (as distinct from terrorism or other forms of armed violence).
12 Fortna correctly observes that since peacekeeping is not instated randomly, measuring whether it ‘works’ is not straightforward. Peacekeeping is most likely to be used where the chances that peace will last are otherwise comparatively low, that is, in the most difficult cases. A comparison of whether (and how long) peace endures with and without peacekeeping would therefore yield misleading results unless these underlying prospects for peace were controlled for. See Fortna (2008).
13 These indicators include: (1) macroeconomic stability and its probable sustainability; (2) recovery of private sector confidence, as measured by the investment ratio; and (3) the effectiveness with which institutional arrangements and the political system are coping with the tensions, schisms and behaviors that lay behind the conflicts’ (World Bank, 1998b, p. 44).
14 Operation protocol 8.5 was originally designed for reconstruction after natural disasters. It mentions a ‘Stage Five: Return to Normal Operations’ defined as ‘when the emergency phase is over and operations are once more carried out under normal lending procedures, and the consciousness of conflict begins to wane’ (World Bank, 1998a, p. 9). Indicators are left vague and under-developed. Guidance is also provided by the Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Countries (World Bank, 1997).
15 Alex de Waal notes that the ‘post-conflict’ concept is founded on normative assumptions about the direction of causality: ‘A checklist approach might find that a post-conflict country also fits the criteria for a pre-conflict one.’ Correspondence with Alex de Waal, November 2008.
16 For a review of these concerns, consult Muggah (2008b) and Muggah and Krause (2009).
17 These peace milestones include ‘a cessation of hostilities and violence; signing of peace agreements; inception of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; return of refugees and internally displaced persons; establishment of the foundations of a functioning state; initiation of reconciliation and societal integration; and the start of economic recovery’ (UNDP, 2008, p. 5).
18 Journalists and human rights agencies may also under-report the incidence and scale of violence due to state repression and self-censorship. In an era heavily influenced by the so-called ‘war on terror’, governments may also describe simmering violence as ‘terrorism’, concealing ongoing domestic struggles and legitimate grievances.
19 For casualty information, consult, for example, UCDP (2008), COW (n.d.), ISS (n.d.), and ACLED (2008).
20 Since the end of civil war in all three countries criminal violence has exploded—especially in urban areas. Although under-reporting and under-recording is significant, in Nicaragua, for example, the absolute number of crimes tripled between 1990 and 2003. Crime perception surveys confirm rising fear among the population at large. See Rodgers (2004).
21 This framework draws explicitly from Chaudhary and Sahrurke (2008) and the Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008). It should be noted that there are also instances of societies emerging from war that do not experience egregious rates of violence, though this category is not included.
22 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, which took control of the state after the 1994 genocide, used military means to pursue the genocidaires and the ethnic group associated with them as they fled into neighbouring DRC, reportedly killing tens if not hundreds of thousands of people (Chaudhary and Sahrurke, 2008).
23 For instance, militia leaders and rivals Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammed have repeatedly clashed in their attempts to control the country’s northern provinces. See Chaudhary and Sahrurke (2008).
24 See, for example, Cooper (2006), Spear (2006), Goodhand (2005), and Pugh (2005).
25 For details, see Issue Briefs on armed violence, private security, and gangs in Timor-Leste (TLAVA, n.d.).
26 This is not new. Lynchings of African-Americans in the post-Civil War United States were sometimes announced in newspapers beforehand. See, for example, Moses (1997).
27 For more information on Timor-Leste, see TLAVA (n.d.). In post-conflict Nicaragua, urban youth gangs evolved from ‘providing micro-regimes of order as well as communal forms of belonging’ in the mid-1990s, to forming predatory organizations ‘concerned with regulating an emergent drug economy’ the exclusive interest of the individual gang members instead of protecting their local neighbourhood’ (Rodgers, 2006, p. 321).
28 Such killings tend to reflect the interests of narrow, groups, which distinguish them from the community and informal justice described above.
29 See, for example, OECD (2008c, 2008d).
30 See, for example, OECD (2008b). The Human Security Report has made the claim that robust peace-support operations and peace-building activities are correlated with reductions in armed conflict, though the authors do not examine the micro-level determinants of how such activities prevent war renewal (HSRP, 2005).
31 Apprehending the factors that enhance resilience in post-conflict societies is the subject of www.urban-resilience.org and will also be explored in future editions of the Small Arms Survey.
32 See, for example, Ragan (2009) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) for a review of what makes peacekeepers more likely to intervene.
33 These risks have been divided into descriptive categories by Roy Licklider: (i) external (e.g. neighbouring countries, behaviour of peacekeepers, support or lack of it from the international community), (ii) societal (e.g. unemployment, weak respect for the law, limited experience with democracy, arms availability), (iii) the nature of the settlement (e.g. imposed from above, exclusion of key groups, inadequate provisions for enforcement), (iv) governmental (e.g. lack of legitimacy, inability to generate revenues or respond to social demands, limited tradition of legitimate opposition), and (v) important groups within the country (e.g. spoilers, victims and key leaders). Correspondence with Licklider, November 2008.
34 See, for example, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) and WHO (2008b).
35 See, for example, Keen (1998).
36 The Global Burden of Armed Violence is an important step towards expanding the evidence base. See, for example, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) and Cincotta (2008).
37 See, for example, HSRP (2005).
38 See, for example, OECD (2007) and the burgeoning work on security sector reform and international policekeeping including Cockayne and Malone (2004).
39 At the same time, multilateral and bilateral development donors have sought to alter structural risk factors through targeted assistance and investment. See Easterly (2008).
40 Fortna (2009) also points to other factors that shape the likelihood of war onset, such as the decisiveness of military victory, history of conflict between belligerents before the war, balance of power between actors, costs of wars, and issues at stake.
41 A recent three-country (Cambodia, Colombia, and Uganda) exploratory study financed by the Swedish government as a follow up to the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration accented the importance of assessing contextual factors, unbundling reintegration processes, and identifying interim stabilization measures that support sufficient security in the short term in order to create the enabling conditions for sustainable development in the long term (Colletta, Berts, and Samuelsson Schjörlein, 2008).
In Colombia, for example, a rash of targeted second-generation security promotion programmes focusing on temporary alcohol and weapons-carrying restrictions, and related activities focused on prospective gang members and urban renewal, contributed to the fastest decline in homicidal violence yet recorded in the Western hemisphere. See, for example, Muggah (2008b) and Small Arms Survey (2006, pp. 295–322).

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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