Former members of the Free Aceh Movement hold up their weapons before handing them over to the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Banda Aceh, December 2005. © Tarmizy Harva/Reuters
The Limits of DDR
REINTEGRATION LESSONS FROM ACEH

INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Helsinki peace agreement in August 2005 sought to bring an end to nearly 30 years of secessionist conflict in Aceh. The province, at Indonesia’s western-most tip, provided a setting for reintegration programming aimed at consolidating a nascent peace. Under the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) was to hand in 840 weapons and its members were to be demobilized (Gol and GAM, 2005, paras. 4.3, 4.2). Section three of the agreement focused on reintegration with clauses stipulating assistance for former combatants, pardoned political prisoners, and victims of war. The Indonesian government established a reintegration agency (Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh, the BRA) and international agencies lined up to support reintegration programmes and processes.

Three-and-a-half years on, Aceh is a much more peaceful place. GAM handed in its firearms, which were subsequently destroyed, Indonesian troops moved out of Aceh, and elections for a provincial governor and district heads passed off smoothly. A former rebel leader won the governorship, many former GAM rebels were installed as district heads, and GAM transformed itself into a political party (Partai Aceh) ready to contest local legislative elections in April 2009. Security has improved markedly and support for peace in Aceh is almost universal. Unsurprisingly, Aceh has been presented as a model with potential application for other troubled spots (Morfit, 2007; Husain, 2007). The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who chaired the Helsinki talks, was but confirmation of the massive turn-around in Aceh.

Yet while the Aceh post-war story is a broadly positive one, the experience of delivering reintegration support to former combatants and others is not. There has been widespread disillusionment with the ways in which reintegration assistance has been provided and the impacts it has had. The year 2008 saw a rise in localized violent conflict, often involving former combatants. Many of the people who were affected by the conflict remain much worse off than others in the province. Ineffective reintegration assistance is viewed by many in Aceh and Jakarta as a cause of these problems and a potential ‘time bomb’ for the peace process (Hariyanto, 2008). There are concerns that the peace is more fragile than some suspect (ICG, 2007a; 2008). As Aceh enters its fourth year of peace, the finding that only around half of countries coming out of armed conflict make it through ten years without relapse is frequently cited in Aceh (Collier et al., 2003; POST-CONFLICT SECURITY).

In exploring the reasons why peace has held thus far in Aceh and the role reintegration programmes have played, this chapter seeks to draw out lessons for international disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programming. It features new and original data on reintegration in Aceh, drawing upon a number of World Bank studies conducted in the province over the past four years. These include two representative surveys of former combatants carried out in 2006 and 2008 (the latter also including interviews with more than 3,000 civilian households), ongoing conflict monitoring, an Aceh-wide survey of infrastructure damage and social relations, and a provincial poverty
assessments. The chapter, and the data it uses, builds upon a growing body of micro-studies and surveys of ex-combatants that have been conducted in post-war countries such as Colombia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and Uganda. Such data allows for a rigorous evaluation of how reintegration efforts have proceeded and how these programmes have succeeded (or failed) and why.

Among the main findings of the chapter are the following:

- The main reasons for the success of the peace process in Aceh to date are the high-level commitment from the leadership of both sides and widespread support for peace among the people of Aceh.
- Reintegration programmes for former combatants have not played a key role in supporting peace. At times, the way assistance has been provided has increased tensions.
- The approach to reintegration implemented in Aceh stems in part from a set of assumptions about the situation of former combatants and their relationship with non-combatants. Derived from other post-war settings, many of these do not fit well with the Aceh experience.
• Social cohesion between combatants and non-combatants is strong in Aceh. Former combatants are more likely to be employed than non-combatants, rendering targeted assistance unnecessary in many cases.

• The provision of cash to individuals has had little impact on their welfare and has instead fuelled disillusionment among many former combatants and non-combatants.

• The failure to link—even partially—the reintegration programme to tsunami reconstruction and broader development efforts left key post-war issues unresolved and, moreover, exacerbated inequality in Aceh.

The chapter proceeds by summarizing the genesis, evolution, and settlement of the Aceh conflict and highlights some of the emerging problems in the post-war period. It then looks at how reintegration programmes have been implemented in Aceh, including the extent of their reliance on principles derived from international experience. The chapter then focuses on three weaknesses of the reintegration and broader post-war programme in Aceh using data from the World Bank studies. It concludes with a short summary of potential ways forward in the province, drawing attention to the implications of the Aceh experience for reintegration programming elsewhere.

**Box 8.1 Data sources used in this chapter**

The **GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment** was conducted by the World Bank between October 2005 and March 2006. Qualitative fieldwork in half of Aceh’s districts explored progress on reintegration, emerging post-conflict issues, and how people had benefited from aid. A statistically representative survey of 642 former GAM combatants and prisoners was implemented with members of the European Union-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) acting as enumerators. The World Bank has outlined the results (World Bank, 2006a).

The **Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS)** comprise original data on more than 3,000 civilians, a statistically representative sample of more than 1,000 ex-combatants, and more than 800 village heads. The surveys were conducted in all 248 of Aceh’s urban and rural sub-districts. They collect information on numerous factors that affect the reintegration of civilians and ex-combatants, including social cohesion, economic livelihoods, attitudes towards government, and conflict-affectedness. The ARLS was designed by researchers from Columbia and Stanford universities together with the World Bank and was implemented in July–September 2008.4

Data on conflict trends in Aceh is from the World Bank’s **Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates**, which are published monthly. Local media are monitored, with all incidents of reported conflict clipped, coded, and entered into a master database. The monitoring also involves regular field trips around the province to investigate particular incidents and emerging trends.

The 2008 **Aceh Poverty Assessment** looks at the impact of the conflict, the tsunami, and reconstruction on poverty (World Bank, 2008e). It draws on data from government surveys such as SUSENAS,5 which it combines with secondary data collected on the ground in Aceh.

The **Aceh Village Survey** was administered through the World Bank/Government of Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program (World Bank/KDP, 2007). Local facilitators in almost all rural villages in Aceh collected data on the degree of infrastructure damage from the conflict and tsunami, and on various dimensions of local social life including flows of internally displaced persons (IDPs), social cohesion, and access to information.

**CONFLICT AND PEACE IN ACEH**

Armed conflict in Aceh has ebbed and flowed since 1976, resulting in somewhere between 12,000 and 20,000 violent deaths (Aspinall, forthcoming). As with most wars, a number of plausible explanations can be given for why it occurred and persisted. The most common relate to the capture of rents from natural resource extraction, state-
perpetuated violence and repression, and the mobilization of a distinct Acehnese identity for violent purposes (Barron and Clark, 2006). Grievances among the Acehnese over the capture of oil and gas revenues by the central government added to prior resentment of a perceived domination of national Indonesian culture by the island of Java (Sulaiman, 2006; Ross, 2005). Promises that Aceh would receive political and cultural autonomy were broken, compounding dissatisfaction (Miller, 2006). The horrific counter-insurgency tactics of the Indonesian military served to increase perceived alienation and GAM was able to recruit widely across the province (Schulze, 2004). Lack of economic development despite Aceh’s abundant resources, and the perceived ineptitude and corruption of the state, led many in Aceh to feel that separation from Indonesia was necessary (Barron and Clark, 2006).

The establishment of a military operations zone, with tens of thousands of Indonesian troops pouring into Aceh, led to an escalation of conflict in 1989. A series of failed attempts at negotiating peace from 2000 resulted in the implementation of martial law in Aceh in May 2003 (Sukma, 2004). Aceh was largely closed off to the outside world as all-out war led to serious human rights abuses (HRW, 2003; AI, 2004).

Three factors coalesced in late 2004 and early 2005 to make Aceh ripe for peace. First, the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his deputy, Jusuf Kalla, resulted in a new impetus from Jakarta to find a peaceful solution. Kalla had been involved in past attempts to bring peace to other troubled parts of Indonesia and had used intermediaries to probe the GAM leadership’s desire for a settlement (Husain, 2007). Yudhoyono, a former military leader, commanded respect from the army’s top brass. He quickly replaced some senior military leaders with reformists, thereby securing a new ability to guarantee peace once an agreement was found (Morfit, 2007).

Second, there was a change in calculus from GAM. The movement had been decimated by martial law, with many combatants killed or imprisoned and many others leaving Aceh. GAM leaders also realized that support for independence from the international community was increasingly unlikely, given the lack of international support for the independence of a small Muslim state astride the shipping lanes of the Strait of Malacca in the post-9/11 environment; GAM turned to a strategy of demanding increased political and economic autonomy (Barron and Burke, 2008, pp. 10–11).
Third, the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, which killed at least 167,000 people in Aceh alone, played a part. Thousands of aid agencies poured into the troubled province. In this environment, all-out offences from either side could not take place (Awaluddin, 2008). The tsunami created a face-saving opportunity for both sides to acknowledge that different approaches were needed. The preamble to the Helsinki MoU noted the moral imperative of both parties to work towards peace. The windfall of post-tsunami aid also strengthened the incentives of GAM to support peace, with former combatants having opportunities as direct beneficiaries and with jobs and contracts for reconstruction work. International demands that reconstruction funds be used effectively made a continuation of war unthinkable for a government keen on boosting its image as a rising democratic power (Barron and Burke, 2008).

Five rounds of negotiations resulted in the Helsinki MoU, which the Government of Indonesia and GAM signed on 15 August 2005. An unarmed Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), staffed and funded by the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), arrived to oversee the implementation of the deal. Relatively problem-free early implementation of the agreement was accompanied by a remarkable improvement in security. Predictions of a spate of revenge attacks issued at the time the MoU was signed proved incorrect (Barron, Clark, and Daud, 2005; ICG, 2005a); throughout 2006, only three serious incidents involving GAM and the military were reported by the local media. Where incidents occurred, both sides worked together to resolve them and local tensions did not escalate (World Bank, 2006b).

Yet while high-level commitment to the peace agreement from both sides has remained intact, cases of violence in Aceh were on the rise in 2008 (see Figure 8.1). As in other post-war contexts, these acts of violence differed in nature from those of the war era (POST-CONFLICT SECURITY). Whereas past clashes tended to be between GAM combatants and government troops, new incidents involved a wider range of actors. On 1 March 2008, five former combatants were brutally murdered in the central highlands by a gang affiliated with pro-Indonesia militias (World Bank, 2008a). In May and June, a series of incidents along the central highlands and North Aceh border conflated community-level problems with broader political tensions (World Bank, 2008b). In July, a shoot-out between police and a group of renegade former GAM fighters resulted in four deaths.
In July and August 2008, 19 people died from conflicts in Aceh, with 23 injured in August alone. Forty-three cases of violent conflict were reported in August 2008, 70 per cent higher than the average monthly total from January to July 2008 (World Bank, 2008c). The number of new violent conflict incidents remained the same in September 2008 (World Bank, 2008d). The number of cases of violence subsequently fell, only to rise sharply in December 2008. From October 2006 to the end of 2008, World Bank monitoring shows 39 violent conflict incidents involving the use of firearms and 20 violent conflict incidents involving the use of explosives.

The police have claimed that the number of armed crimes is 22 times higher than before the Helsinki MoU was signed (Jones, 2008), although no doubt crime was to some extent hidden during the conflict era, with criminal incidents reported and recorded as conflict incidents. Influential think tanks such as the International Crisis Group, aid agencies, government officials, and GAM itself have frequently attributed these problems to the ineffective implementation of reintegration programmes in Aceh (ICG, 2007a; World Bank/DSF, 2007, p. 5; Bean and Knezevic, 2008).

There is global consensus on the importance of programmes to support the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life following peace settlements. Since 1989, when the United Nations Security Council sanctioned an operation in Namibia, more than 60 DDR programmes have been launched (Muggah, 2009). As development agencies have increasingly invested in DDR as a ‘central pillar of military–civilian transition operations’, such programmes have proliferated (Muggah, 2005). As Kees Kingma notes, reintegration, along with disarmament and demobilization, ‘are now compulsory elements of new peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations’ (Kingma, 2001, p. 1).

The rapid rise of DDR as a tool for post-war support—by 2007, the annual budget for DDR exceeded USD 630 million (Muggah, 2009)—has not been accompanied by an extensive discussion on its suitability to all post-war contexts.
This is particularly worrying given the broad lack of empirical evidence allowing for an assessment of impacts as well as comparative analyses of where different approaches work (or not) and why (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007).

A set of orthodoxies informing the design and implementation of reintegration programmes in a vast array of post-war environments has emerged nevertheless. A number of frameworks for DDR, most notably the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR, have been developed (UNDDR, 2006; Swedish MFA, 2006). These reflect decades of policy and practice and consolidate ‘best practice’ and ‘lessons learned’; as such, they are the repository of a kind of conventional wisdom. The principles embodied in such frameworks provided a rationale for reintegration programming in Aceh and helped shape the design of such programmes. The reintegration model is based on the following five tenets.

**Unique challenges for former combatants.** The fundamental basis for reintegration programming is the recognition that there are immediate and unique challenges associated with consolidating peace at both the individual and the community level. Individuals who fought during the war era face incentive structures that may discourage them from pursuing peaceful lives. Former combatants may not have the skills to undertake new non-violent, income-generating activities. These difficulties may be compounded by the lack of working opportunities in post-conflict economies (Collier, 1994). Unemployed combatants can place strains on the social fabric of communities, dependent on support networks that were weakened by war. Experience of conflict, and resultant trauma, can lead to behaviour that increases tensions and the risk of local conflict (Husain et al., 1998).

**Targeted reintegration programmes preferred.** The natural extension of this logic is that there is a need for reintegration programmes focusing specifically on the economic, social, and political needs of former combatants. The market and regular development expenditures are unlikely to provide for former combatants for a number of reasons, including: relative lack of education of former combatants compared to the general population; discrimination in hiring them; risk avoidance from those implementing development programmes; and anti-social or uncooperative attitudes acquired by combatants during wartime. Reintegration programmes tend to assume that they can identify a cadre of former combatants who should be targeted for reintegration assistance. The IDDRS, the key reference for reintegration programmers, sets out procedures for data collection to determine the size of the caseload (UNDDR, 2006, module 4.30, pp. 8–9, 20). It then calls for provision of assistance to individual combatants (UNDDR, 2006, pp. 17–18, 25–26).

**Prioritizing security over development.** The primary aim of assisting combatants and affected communities is to stabilize peace. Complex political and economic interests shape the extent to which different individuals and groups are motivated to invest in peace; spoilers may aim to wreck peace efforts through conflictual behaviour (Stedman, 1997). In the short run, buying off these groups or individuals is viewed as being more important than pursuing development impacts. Programmes focusing on development and broader recovery, and benefiting broader populations, can come later. As the IDDRS observes, ‘DDR is a precondition, and not a substitute, for recovery interventions aimed specifically at vulnerable groups’ (UNDDR, 2006, module 4.30, p. 6, emphasis added). This overriding security focus can justify a certain lack of transparency and inequitable targeting of reintegration assistance in the short run (UNDDR, 2006, module 2.10, pp. 8–11).

**Building state capacity not the immediate priority.** The reintegration model emphasizes the importance of support being delivered quickly on the ground at the expense of a longer-term emphasis on enhancing the ability of the state to assume this role. This guideline largely reflects the fact that almost two-thirds of reintegration initiatives have been implemented in African countries (Muggah, 2009, p. 6). While it is recognized that conflict is often a result of weak or illegitimate state structures and practices, and that conflict in turn weakens these further, the primary
focus of reintegration is not on building state capacity or citizen–state relations. According to the prevailing doctrine, such considerations can be addressed later, once immediate security challenges are dealt with.\(^{13}\)

**Separate implementation structures.** The importance of ensuring that programmes are delivered quickly, combined with the weakness of state bodies in most post-conflict contexts, may necessitate the development of implementation structures outside of regular government systems. The IDDRS assumes that the UN will play a coordinating role and that international funds will be the primary resources for reintegration.\(^{14}\)

### DDR in Aceh

The Helsinki MoU contains a set of provisions that form the basis of Aceh’s DDR programme. GAM was to demobilize all of its 3,000 military troops while decommissioning all ‘arms, ammunition and explosives’ held by its members (GoI and GAM, 2006, paras. 4.2, 4.3). As discussed in Box 8.2, 840 weapons were to be handed to the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

#### Box 8.2 Disposing of the guns

The Helsinki agreement committed GAM to handing 840 arms to AMM in four stages by 31 December 2005, just four-and-a-half months after the MoU was signed. Table 8.1 lists the number of weapons collected during the process.

In addition, 4,849 rounds of assorted ammunition were handed over and destroyed, as well as many explosives, largely home-made 40 mm grenades (exact numbers are not available).

Firearms were of varying quality. The MoU did not stipulate what an eligible firearm was but GAM and the Government of Indonesia subsequently agreed on a basic set of standards: the gun had to have a steel chamber and barrel and had to be capable of firing munitions. Firearm, munitions, and explosives were submitted in bulk by GAM representatives at public ceremonies across the province. AMM monitors publicly cut each weapon into three parts using 1.7-kw rotary cutting machines powered by mobile generators after AMM had ‘verified’ each weapon to ensure it met with the required standards. The last weapon-cutting ceremony took place in Banda Aceh on 21 December 2005. The decommissioning was declared a success by GAM, the military, and AMM.

It is widely felt that more weapons exist in Aceh, and that former rebels (and others) can access these. However, the weapons destruction helped build confidence between the two sides and no one from either side has publicly discussed the issue of remaining arms. Where former combatants have been involved in armed crime, GAM spokespersons have said that they are acting alone, as GAM has already surrendered its guns.

Sources: AMM internal reports; Fradin (2008)

#### Table 8.1 Firearms collected by AMM during four-phase decommissioning, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of firearms handed in</th>
<th>Number of firearms accepted by AMM*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15–18 September</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>mid-October</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>mid-November</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,018</strong></td>
<td><strong>840</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The AMM only accepted fully functional firearms.
The MoU also contains provisions for a reintegration programme. ‘Economic assistance’ of undefined levels and forms was to be given to former combatants, amnestied prisoners, and civilian victims. Infrastructure damaged by the conflict was also to be repaired (see Box 8.3).

The impetus for including the reintegration provisions came from the international officials who were brokering the Helsinki talks (Kingsbury, 2006, p. 41). Reintegration was not a priority for either GAM or the Indonesian government negotiators. GAM disliked the use of the term reintegration from the start as they felt it implied a division between combatant and community members that did not exist. On several occasions during early post-Helsinki sittings of the Committee on Security Arrangements (the meetings between GAM and the Indonesian government chaired by the Aceh Monitoring Mission), GAM asked that the word not be used in discussions (Barron and Burke, 2008, p. 35). From the government’s perspective, reintegration was a side issue, of much less importance than other issues such as security and the legal status of Aceh. While neither side objected to the reintegration provisions being included, it was a low-priority part of the deal. This meant there was little if any haggling over the MoU’s reintegration clauses.

**Aceh’s reintegration programme**

Soon after the agreement was signed, the government started the process of working out what would be provided and to whom. The MoU stipulated that reintegration programmes were to be funded and administered by the Government of Indonesia and the Aceh authorities; the government in Jakarta consequently allocated a considerable sum of money, almost USD 190 million, to fund reintegration efforts. Donors sought to support the reintegration programme, too, contributing around USD 160 million (MSR, forthcoming).

A new reintegration agency under the control of the local Acehnese authorities, the Aceh Reintegration Agency, or BRA, was established in early 2006 to manage reintegration funds from Jakarta and local government and to coordinate assistance from the international donors. Together with Bappenas, Indonesia’s powerful national planning agency in Jakarta, a programme was developed to provide assistance to former combatants and conflict-affected persons (see Table 8.2).

There were thus a number of BRA programmes:

- Programmes targeted former combatants on both sides of the conflict. Military troops leaving Aceh also received bonuses, although this came from a separate government allocation outside of the reintegration budget (Mietzner, 2006, p. 51).
- Programmes provided cash payments to others affected by the conflict. This includes cash payments to 1,059 victims, yearly compensation paid to people who lost family members, and assistance for physically disabled persons. While conflict victims’ assistance was originally given to affected communities, with communities decid-
ing how to allocate funds, the approach was changed after one round to individually targeted cash payments (Aspinall, 2008; Barron and Burke, 2008, pp. 50–51; ICG, 2007a).

- Money was provided for houses for conflict victims and medical services for those in need.

**Donor reintegration support**

Donors funded three streams of programmes. The first was technical assistance and advisory support provided to the BRA and Bappenas. UNDP and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a cadre of national and international advisers who worked closely with both agencies to help shape the emerging reintegration programme. The United States established a Forum Bersama (Joint Forum) and Aceh Peace Resource Center, both of which aimed to create spaces and mechanisms for international actors to provide advice to the local and national bodies. Other aid agencies, including the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the European Commission, also worked closely with the BRA and Bappenas, providing consultants, ad-hoc advice, and funding workshops and overseas trips to conferences and training on DDR and peace-building.

The second stream involved IOM’s reintegration programme. IOM was the biggest international actor directly implementing reintegration programmes and has provided almost USD 20 million to former combatants and amnes-
In-kind assistance was issued to beneficiaries through Information Counselling and Referral Service centers, a standard model used by IOM in other post-war locations. In addition, IOM has been involved in providing cash grants to affected communities (approximately USD 6 million), in giving medicines and counselling to traumatized victims (approximately USD 2 million), and in providing training for the police (around USD 10 million). A wide range of donors has supported these programmes, including the European Commission, Japan, USAID, UNDP, the World Bank, the Netherlands, Canada, and Norway. By and large, these projects have been implemented in parallel with BRA programmes. Despite efforts to share data on beneficiaries and divide up the caseload, few mechanisms were in place to ensure the same people did not get targeted by more than one programme (and, indeed, many did) (Barron and Burke, 2008).

Donors also funded local and international NGOs working in a range of reintegration-related areas. These have included support to IDPs, local capacity building, public information programmes, and conflict resolution training. The scale of such programmes, which collectively totalled around USD 70 million, was small compared with the amount of aid for post-tsunami reconstruction (see below). Around USD 5 million of analytical work on conflict issues was also conducted, primarily by the World Bank.

Internationally, many DDR programmes are financed through pooled funding mechanisms. In Aceh, this approach never materialized. A Multi-Donor Fund existed for tsunami reconstruction but reintegration and post-war reconstruction were not part of its mandate. The government sought to avoid the creation of a second fund, fearing that international stakeholders might attempt to take the lead in reintegration programming, thereby displacing the government. As a result, donors and aid agencies implemented their programmes in parallel, with relatively little coordination, and a common strategy was not developed (Barron and Burke, 2008).

The reintegration paradigm is built upon a number of assumptions about the social, political, and economic challenges former combatants face and this, in turn, has shaped the goals of reintegration programmes (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). These reflect the fact that most reintegration programmes have been implemented in sub-Saharan Africa, where civil wars have been largely of a ‘symmetric, non-conventional’ nature, with the loyalties of the population split between different factions and the state (Kalyvas, 2008). The civil war in Aceh was of a different nature: it was a popular movement for increased autonomy for Aceh rather than a (relatively) balanced struggle between competing groups for control of state resources. While the types of post-war challenges in Aceh are by no means unique, many of them differ from those that the reintegration model aims to address.

**MISDIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM: REINTEGRATION NEEDS IN ACEH**

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**Social reintegration**

In many civil wars, there are multiple conflicting parties, each of which command loyalty from sections of the local population. Reintegration programmes are designed to help heal the divides between former rivals, both combatants and their supporters. Tensions can also exist between former combatants and civilians if atrocities have been committed. The Aceh reintegration programme aimed to provide support to a wide range of groups in parallel in order to ensure that any latent tensions were not accentuated, and both donors and the government funded a number of local peace-building initiatives aimed at healing divides (Barron and Burke 2008).
Yet, in Aceh, intra- and inter-community relationships did not pose a major threat to peace. Relationships between GAM fighters and the civilian population remained strong throughout the conflict (ICG, 2007b). Indeed, the boundaries between who was a combatant (in the jungle) and who was a sympathizer (in the village) were often blurred (Frodin, 2008). During the war, combatants returned to their villages for periods of rest or for special occasions; even during the height of the armed conflict, GAM members would go back to their villages at least once every few months to visit their families (Barron, Clark, and Daud, 2005, p. 29). Combatants also rotated, serving for limited periods of time before others took over their role. Many non-combatants played important supporting roles, sheltering those who were armed, providing them with food, reporting on military movements, and raising funds for the struggle. There was strong support for GAM’s goals, if not always its means, among the civilian population in most areas of Aceh (Barron, Clark, and Daud, 2005, p. 28).

As a result, there was acceptance, indeed often celebrations, when combatants returned home after the peace deal, a situation that has been observed in other post-war cases such as Timor–Leste (Peake, 2009). Six months after the Helsinki MoU, a survey of 642 former combatants found that 90 per cent had experienced no problems on their return. In more than three-quarters of villages surveyed, traditional pesijuk (welcoming) ceremonies were held to celebrate the return of the combatants (World Bank, 2006a, p. 25). Even where active anti-GAM groups existed, such as in the central highlands, returnees experienced few problems of acceptance.

Many returning combatants felt such acceptance and celebrations were natural. As one former combatant explained:

“We are the same as the villagers. We are their fathers, sons and grandsons, it’s impossible for them not to accept us back into the village. Which parent would not accept the return of their son? It’s like a happy reunion now.”

(World Bank, 2006a, p. 23)

Indeed, the return of combatants has in most cases helped improve social cohesion. A World Bank survey in every village in Aceh in 2007 found almost two-thirds to have reported improvements in village solidarity since the MoU (World Bank/KDP, 2007, p. 78). Only 7.4 per cent of villagers interviewed said that there were low levels of trust between ‘those who just returned from the mountain’ and some other community members (p. 77).

As time has gone on, trust between former combatants and non-combatant villagers has not diminished. Of the more than 1,000 former GAM members surveyed in mid-2008, only seven have reported some difficulties in being accepted since they returned to their villages. In some areas of the central highlands, where pro-government militia were strong due to the presence of non-Acehnese ethnic groups such as the Gayo and Javanese, tensions are greater. Yet even here trust has been gradually growing, although there have been isolated cases of unrest, as discussed above. Across all of the areas surveyed, 97 per cent of female community members and 96 per cent of civilian men reported that the presence of former combatants was not a source of division within their village. Class differentials and, particularly, unequal access to aid were more likely to cause problems, as discussed below.

Survey evidence also shows remarkably high levels of trust between former combatants and non-combatant community members three years after the MoU (see Table 8.3). Ninety-five per cent of civilian men and 97 per cent of civilian women said that former combatants should be fully welcome in their village; 94 per cent and 95 per cent, respectively, said that they should be allowed membership of community associations. Around 90 per cent of informants said they would be happy to welcome former combatants into their family through marriage and that former combatants could be among their close friends.
Strong social relations between former combatants and the civilian population is reflected in the role that former combatants have been playing in community activities. Overall, this role is as large as that played by civilians. Former combatants are not facing major barriers to participating in village associations and community activities. As Table 8.4 shows, former combatants are actually more active in certain areas than non-combatant civilians. Larger proportions are active in religious groups, cultural and ethnic associations, and youth or sports groups. Ex-combatants are less likely to be involved in development and finance groups. However, they are more likely to be involved in other groups that involve a wide range of community members such as youth and sports groups or religious bodies (for men only). The higher figures for membership in political groups for former combatants is likely to reflect their membership in the Komite Peralihan Aceh (Aceh Transition Committee, or KPA), the civilian body set up to represent the interests of former GAM. In the 2008 survey, all of the 1,086 ex-combatants interviewed reported never having been prevented from using social services, such as accessing health or educational services or participating in associations, by other villagers.
These findings differ from those in some other post-war contexts. For example, a recent study in Liberia found evidence of friction between ex-combatants and their communities: 35 per cent of former combatants interviewed felt they were not viewed positively by their communities. These findings are also likely to be representative of the ex-combatant situation in neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire (Hill, Taylor, and Temin, 2008).21

Whether such acceptance will remain intact over a longer period of time is still an open question. Yet the findings thus far suggest that the focus of the reintegration model, and of some programmes in Aceh, on peace-building within and between communities may have relatively little relevance in Aceh.

**Political reintegration**

Successful post-war transitions inherently involve a move from the use of violent means to competition mediated through political processes (Paris, 2004). Ultimately, former combatants need to accept the legitimacy of state institutions. In many post-war contexts, this can be difficult, in particular where, as in Aceh, war has been ended through a negotiated settlement rather than an outright victory for the rebel group. It might have been expected that senior GAM commanders and representatives would be frustrated at their lack of immediate influence over policy-making. For lower-level combatants, accepting that power is mediated through formal political processes can also be difficult.

Yet survey evidence shows high levels of political participation by former combatants in Aceh. Former combatants were more likely to vote than the civilian population in the gubernatorial elections of late 2006 (see Table 8.5). In mid-2008, combatants and civilians were almost equally likely to say that they would vote in the elections for the next governor of Aceh. Only one-third of former combatants voted in the last presidential elections, compared with more than four-fifths of civilians. Yet by the middle of 2008, almost all former combatants said they would vote in the presidential elections taking place in 2009.

These findings reflect broad acceptance of political institutions and processes by former combatants. Political participation is not merely motivated by tactical or strategic considerations but by a desire to take advantage of the new opportunities afforded by the peace deal. For former GAM members, the Helsinki MoU provided rapid access to positions of power in the province. The gubernatorial and district head elections in December 2006 resulted in a landslide for the ex-rebel group. Irwandi Yusuf, the former GAM representative to the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and his running partner, Nazar, a former leader of the pro-independence referendum SIRA movement, beat the establishment candidates in one round for the governorship. GAM won in almost half of Aceh’s districts. Elsewhere, candidates sought
deals with GAM commanders to ensure success (Clark and Palmer, 2008). Unsurprisingly, former combatants were more likely than the general population to support the winning gubernatorial pairing. Communities also revealed that they were open to former combatants assuming local leadership positions: 83 per cent of civilian men and 87 per cent of civilian women said they would be happy for ex-combatants to take formal leadership roles in their villages (ARLS, 2008).

This is not to say that all former combatants properly understand the mechanics and norms of democracy. On several occasions during the start of the campaign for the 2009 legislative elections, for example, GAM’s political party, Partai Aceh, pursued thuggish tactics to intimidate the electorate into voting for them (World Bank, 2008g). Rather than stemming from an aversion to democracy among the former rebel group, this conduct is associated with the broader challenges of consolidating democracy in a transitioning state. Democracy is still relatively new to Aceh and to Indonesia, and candidates of all parties and stripes tend to try to utilize muscle to gain votes (Barron, Nathan, and Welsh, 2005). Dealing with such issues requires the strengthening of electoral institutions and broader political education for candidates and voters, activities not normally associated with reintegration programming.

Table 8.5 Political activities: GAM vs. civilians, by sex, mid-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-combatant</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-combatant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=1,024)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote in the last election for the governor of Aceh?</td>
<td>92% 88%</td>
<td></td>
<td>90% 88%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you plan to vote in the next election for the governor of Aceh? (almost certainly or very likely)</td>
<td>98% 97%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% 97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote in the last election for the Indonesian president?</td>
<td>39% 89%</td>
<td></td>
<td>45% 86%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you plan to vote in the next presidential election? (almost certainly or very likely)</td>
<td>91% 97%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% 98%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARLS (2008)

A former GAM member casts his ballot at a polling station in the district of Pidie on 11 December 2006. © Reuters
Economic reintegration

A basic assumption of the reintegration model is that former combatants are likely to face significant barriers to returning to work or pursuing their livelihoods. Providing assistance to former combatants that enables them to get jobs, start their own businesses, or productively work the land is viewed as being necessary to help them make the transition to civilian life. Once they are working, they are less likely to partake in violence.

The GAM Needs Assessment, conducted in the first year after the signing of the Helsinki MoU, showed that unemployment for former combatants was a major issue. Seventy-five per cent of the 642 ex-combatants interviewed said they were lacking regular work (World Bank, 2006a, p. 16).

Yet the situation two years later is very different. Table 8.6 shows that very few former combatants are un- or underemployed. Indeed, former combatants are more likely to have full-time employment than are civilians. Access to reintegration support does not appear to be key in determining employment status. Former combatants who received assistance from the BRA or IOM are no less likely to be unemployed than those who did not receive any support.24

The Aceh Poverty Assessment shows the extent to which the end of the armed conflict itself created an important peace dividend (World Bank, 2008e). Improvements in security—in part a function of the disarmament of GAM and the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, but largely not related to reintegration efforts—led to increased mobility of labour and reduced transaction costs and risk for investment. One result is that poverty levels dropped substantially in areas that were greatly affected by the armed conflict. While in 2005 people in high-conflict areas were 43 per cent more likely to live below the poverty line, by 2006 they were 4 per cent less likely than the average person in Aceh (World Bank, 2008e, p. 15). The massive tsunami reconstruction effort also had an impact, although this was lower in conflict-affected areas, which received significantly less help. Agriculture, a sector in which almost half of Acehnese are employed, grew by 4.5 per cent in the first half of 2008 (World Bank, 2008f).

The growth in farming has created working opportunities for many former combatants. The GAM Needs Assessment found that prior to joining the movement, 94.6 per cent of former combatants and prisoners were employed, with most working as farmers or small traders (World Bank, 2006a, p. 16). These figures are similar to those of the wider Aceh population. Land scarcity and access to farming land are not a problem in Aceh—one reason why there have been few complaints from former combatants that the land promised to them in the MoU has not yet been

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which option best describes your employment situation?</th>
<th>Ex-combatant (n=1,024)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=1,794)</th>
<th>Ex-combatant (n=29)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=1,237)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employment</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent part-time/contract work</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some part-time/contract work</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABLS (2008)
provided (see Box 8.3). Few if any barriers prevent former combatants and others from working the land. Lower employment rates for younger combatants might be a result of fewer familial responsibilities for members of this group. As a result, they may choose not to work, or to take part-time jobs with less frequent income, relying on their parents or other family members for support.  

For other jobs, GAM members are also competitive. The GAM needs assessment conducted in 2006 clearly shows how similar former combatants are to the civilian population in terms of education levels (World Bank, 2006a). Compared to the rest of the population, GAM members are more likely to have completed some schooling, although they are less likely to have a high level of education (see Figure 8.2).

In post-war Aceh, educated former combatants, who are most likely to live in urban areas and have commanding roles, have an additional advantage when seeking out work. Edward Aspinall shows how recent political developments have increased economic opportunities for some former combatants (Aspinall, 2009). He estimates, for example, that 500 former combatants received jobs at the tsunami reconstruction agency BRR. Senior GAM figures, such as Teuku Kamaruzzaman, have been appointed to high-level positions, which have allowed them to influence other appointments. Others have received positions as security guards or in monitoring teams.

New opportunities in contracting and other important sectors of Aceh’s economy have been even more important. Aspinall outlines how former combatants have become key players in the construction industry, which is booming due to tsunami reconstruction. At higher levels, this provides a source of revenues, a portion of which flows down through the GAM/KPA hierarchy. Most notably, former GAM leader Muzakkir Manaf now runs a large contractor firm, PT Pulau Gading. In Aceh Barat Daya, it is alleged that the bupati (district head) has allocated IDR 12 billion (USD 1.3 million) in contracts to companies owned by KPA members, all of whom are former GAM (World Bank/
DSF, 2007). George Aditijondro cites projects that Muzakkir’s company has won, including a IDR 2.4 billion (more than USD 200,000) project to construct a bridge in the city of Lhoksuemawe (Aditijondro, 2008). At lower levels, construction contracts provide opportunities for manual work for less educated former combatants. One GAM figure estimates that 25–30 per cent of the 3,000 former combatants in Aceh Besar were employed in some capacity in construction projects (Aspinall, 2009).26

Stabilizing security in Aceh

Many of the social, political, and economic challenges that reintegration programmes are traditionally designed to address were not present in post-war Aceh. By and large, there are no great divides between former combatants and the communities to which they have returned. Strong relationships existed between combatants and civilians in the conflict period and these have endured in the post-war era. Former combatants are participating in the political processes that provide means to mediate differences now that the war has ended. The local elections of 2006–07 saw the accession of many former GAM figures to power; the positions and the interests of the former rebel movement are strongly represented in provincial and district decision-making bodies (Clark and Palmer, 2008). The large majority of former combatants are not facing barriers to income-generating activities and, indeed, are less likely to be unemployed than the population at large.

This is not to say that there are not important social, economic, and political dimensions to Aceh’s transition from war to peace. Helping those affected by war—combatants and non-combatants alike—to overcome experiences of violence is vital (IOM et al., 2007). While former GAM members have access to political power, this does not mean that they are fully versed in the norms of how democratic decision-making should work. Among the few former combatants who have only part-time work, some may be involved in violent criminal acts. Increasing intra-GAM squabbles related to competition over economic resources such as construction contracts is also leading to violence.27

Dealing with these issues will be vital if peace is to be consolidated. But, by and large, these are not the types of problems that reintegration programmes can conceivably impact in a large way.

**PROBLEMS WITH INDIVIDUAL TARGETING**

Programmes focusing on former combatants in Aceh have had two main characteristics. First, assistance has been targeted largely at individuals through specially created reintegration programmes aimed at all who were members of the former rebel group. This has been true for both BRA and donor programmes. Second, for BRA programmes the predominant modality has been the provision of cash aimed primarily at compensating former combatants rather than improving their welfare (see below). The characteristics of Aceh mean that these approaches have had minimal impact in improving the prospects of former combatants or in satisfying them. This has fuelled disillusionment and has at times led to low-level tensions on the ground.

**Assisting which former combatants?**

From the beginning, a real difficulty for reintegration programmers in Aceh was working out to whom assistance should be provided. Reintegration programmes tend to assume that there is a cadre of former combatants who can be identified for reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Normally former combatants are registered when they hand
in their guns. Assessments of the needs of each individual are then conducted and ID cards are provided entitling recipients to reintegration support (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, 2003). Such methods, when implemented well, allow for the identification of a clear caseload to whom assistance can be provided and who can be monitored over time (UNDDR, 2006, module 4.10). In Aceh, attempts to follow such an approach proved ineffective. This was not because of poor programme design—international expertise was on hand to support combatant registration—but because these methods could not be applied given the local politics and the nature of the GAM movement. Reintegration support continued to be provided to individual combatants. Due to unclear selection criteria and verification mechanisms, however, much of it did not reach intended beneficiaries and others needing help.

The distinction between GAM combatants and sympathizers is a finely grained one in Aceh. Membership of GAM was extremely fuzzy. The movement had general support from much of Aceh’s population. This created immense challenges for targeting. The MoU called for the demobilization of 3,000 GAM members who were to receive assistance and provided the basis for the number of ex-combatant benefit packages to be financed. Yet, as in many post-war situations, there were far more people who felt they were eligible for support, rendering extremely difficult the identification of those who were entitled to assistance.

The extent of this problem became clear early on. IOM, at the request of the Indonesian government, had run an extremely effective reinsertion programme for amnestied prisoners. They had provided cash assistance, health checks, and transport home. The programme adopted the approach used by IOM elsewhere and was widely viewed as a success (World Bank, 2006a). However, attempts to extend the programme to the former combatants who had not been imprisoned met with difficulties. IOM envisioned that, in conformity with international practice and norms, they would provide reinsertion assistance and enrol former combatants in reintegration programmes as they handed in their guns. Yet while guns were handed in on time, ex-combatants did not emerge from hiding, so there was no one to enrol (Barron and Burke, 2008, p. 37).

Without clear beneficiaries to target, IOM sought a list of the 3,000 combatants from GAM’s leadership. However, GAM refused to provide the list, partly because of security concerns. Yet the larger problem was that there were significantly more ex-combatants out there than the 3,000 noted in the MoU. GAM’s leadership, eager to maintain control and influence over members, did not want to decide who would receive benefits and who would not (ICG, 2005b; Barron and Burke, 2008, p. 38). Without a list, IOM’s programme stalled. Politically, there was little space to acknowledge that more than 3,000 former combatants existed as this number had been cast in stone in the MoU, or that it might be more effective if reintegration benefits for former combatants were spread more widely. Yet little effort was made by IOM, or indeed other aid agencies, to make the case for wider targeting.

Subsequent efforts to work out the size of the former combatant caseload were not fruitful. GAM eventually provided a list of 3,000 but it was clear that this did not represent all their members. Negotiations between the government and GAM led to the inclusion of another 6,200 ‘non-combatants’ in the reintegration programme (Aspinall 2008, p. 23). Those who made the list(s) were those likely to be connected to high-level leaders in the movement.

To get around the numbers problem, the government tried several approaches. First, money was given to former GAM commanders who redistributed the resources across the former combatant base as well as to some supporters. Three rounds of assistance of IDR 1 million (around USD 100) per head were provided by local government for 3,000 combatants in late 2005 and early 2006. Subsequent monitoring found that funds had been spread widely, with GAM supporters and some civilians receiving money. Forty per cent of former combatants received less than IDR 200,000 over the three rounds, with some receiving as little as IDR 30,000, or just over USD 3 (World Bank, 2006a).
Many who did not receive money felt they should have. In early 2006, a new scheme involved GAM leaders setting up micro-projects involving their former cadres. Names were listed. Yet funds were again transferred to GAM leaders, and in the majority of cases were then shared widely across the combatant population and sometimes with other GAM supporters (Zurstrassen, 2006).

IOM continued to provide reintegration packets to former combatants, although they were not worried about whether recipients were part of the official 3,000. Programmes targeted female combatants and vulnerable youth. The result was some overlap between government and IOM programmes, different levels of assistance, and varying quality of assistance. Some former combatants missed out altogether.30

Providing targeted assistance to individuals assumes that a clear caseload can be identified. In Aceh, as in many other post-war places (Jensen and Stepputat, 2001), the development of a clear list of combatants was neither politically possible (given concerns within the GAM leadership about revealing the names of former combatants) nor technically feasible (given the fuzzy dividing line between combatants and civilians). This led to serious limitations as to what could be achieved through individual targeting. Assistance was spread widely within GAM as a means of minimizing jealousies, but consequently levels of support were so low that impacts were limited. Further, the low amount of assistance only served to increase dissatisfaction among many former combatants who had been expecting more support (ICG, 2005b, pp. 5–6).

The reintegration programme was largely ineffective but not initially harmful.

**Limited welfare impacts**

There is a debate in DDR literature over whether the provision of cash is more effective than in-kind assistance for reintegrating former combatants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Willibald, 2006). The decision to provide cash in Aceh was not one based on an assessment of whether it would have greater impacts than in-kind aid. Rather, the primary purpose of BRA assistance for former combatants was viewed—by GAM and the BRA alike—as compensation for former fighters.31 As Bill Rolston notes, the provision of compensation may be necessary after wars end to avoid potentially destabilizing political disaffection (Rolston, 2007, pp. 262–63). There is a strong case to be made that providing compensation is just as vital an element of transitional justice as prosecuting human rights offenders (Aspinall, 2008). Yet this approach was always unlikely to exert much influence on the key drivers of conflict in Aceh.

In general, money from the BRA was given in lump sums with no requirements on how it should be spent and with no technical assistance provided to help recipients use it effectively (Zurstrassen, 2006). In essence the money was an attempted pay-off to potential spoilers. Flowing from the logic of the reintegration model, in the early days the primary focus of assistance was to ensure security. This, in the eyes of the programme’s supporters, justified a lack of transparency and unequal targeting of reintegration assistance. Yet the focus on solely getting cash to former combatants, without concern for the effective use of funds, has been counter-productive. Funds have been spread widely (and thus funding per capita has been reduced) and a large proportion of assistance has been used for unproductive consumption with few longer-term impacts (Zurstrassen, 2006). Former combatants, too, asked why they were only being given uang rokok (money for cigarettes) when they deserved more and when the MoU mandated that assistance should economically empower them (World Bank, 2006a, p. 31).

The resulting programme was largely ineffective but not harmful, at least initially. Funds generally did not enhance former combatants’ ability to enter the labour market, but they did satisfy political pressures for the government to be seen to be implementing the reintegration provisions of the MoU. With the passing of time, however, the approach does appear to have had some negative consequences. One has been the creation of new demands for assistance from former combatants and rising disillusionment when this was not forthcoming. A second has been
increasing suspicions—from ex-combatants and non-combatants alike—that Jakarta and the Acehnese authorities do not care about their needs and that they are reneging on the promises of the peace deal.

**The missing dimension: building state legitimacy**

Scepticism about the motives of the government, and particularly the BRA, has grown among both former combatants and civilians in Aceh. Unequal access to benefits, lack of transparency in delivery mechanisms, and perceptions of corruption have tainted the image of local government. Tarmizi, the director of a local NGO, notes the potential for conflict:

> The reintegration programme only benefits the elite in GAM. This will have a big impact on horizontal conflict at the village level. . . . I think they have to change the programmes—do regional development in areas affected by the conflict, make infrastructure, make small-scale economic activity, but now they only make a priority of some [people]. (Aguswandi and Large, 2008, p. 51)

Discontent with how reintegration assistance is being provided is not unusual in post-war settings. In Aceh, however, the approach risked accentuating many of the underlying causes of the conflict. A lack of state legitimacy was one of the factors that drove the conflict initially and that could provide a basis for future unrest (Barron and Clark, 2006). This related to both the Jakarta government and the Acehnese authorities, with the latter often seen as puppets of Jakarta (McGibbon, 2006). Historically, conflict in Aceh has been driven by the perceived unresponsiveness of elites to the needs of the Acehnese people (Aspinall, forthcoming). Anthony Reid identifies cycles of violence being triggered whenever such dissatisfaction reaches a tipping point (Reid, 2006; 2009). The activities and programmes of the BRA were closely monitored among the Acehnese population, former combatants and non-combatants alike, in part because the agency’s functioning served as a bellwether for the extent to which the local government could provide for the Acehnese people in the autonomy era. With the BRA failing, murmurs of dissatisfaction about what the local government could achieve in the post-war period increased to the point that one local analyst predicted that the agency could lead to the downfall of Governor Irwandi (Hariyanto, 2008).

Clearly a well-functioning BRA and effective reintegration programme alone would not build the legitimacy of the state that had eroded in the conflict era. Yet reintegration assistance as it was implemented does risk contributing to the very processes that triggered armed violence in Aceh in the first place. International approaches tend to prioritize the disbursement of funds to potential problem groups over transparency concerns. Yet in the Aceh case, this was problematic because the major conflict cleavage had always been between society and the state. Reintegration funds could have been used to help build state legitimacy, although this is a long-term endeavour. That these funds were not used in this way was not only a missed opportunity; it could also contribute to an undermining of peace in the longer run.

**A ‘maximalist’ approach to reintegration**

‘Maximalist’ conceptions of reintegration emphasize the need to connect initial combatant-focused assistance to a broader set of activities aimed at supporting the war-to-peace transition. Early DDR programmes tended to focus primarily on a narrow set of goals around establishing security. Over time, the goals have expanded with a focus on linking to other efforts aimed at promoting development and broader forms of security promotion (Jennings, 2008; Muggah, 2006; POST-CONFLICT SECURITY).
Objectives of DDR programmes around the world now also include provisions for dependants of former combatants, strengthening state institutions, promoting property rights, and addressing distortions in state spending (Muggah, 2009). This expansion of focus has been the result of lessons learned about how security-promoting activities can have little impact if they are not joined to broader strategies that aim to address the short-, medium-, and longer-term causes of conflict. In most post-war countries, funding for the reintegration of former combatants is just one element of broader approaches that also seek to repair the economy of conflict-devastated areas (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, 2003). A number of experienced practitioners have argued for a relatively quick integration of traditionally conceived reintegration activities into mainstream development efforts (Ball, 1997).

In Aceh, there was clearly a need for this wider approach given the nature and extent of the post-war challenges. Foremost among these are ensuring that the economy grows and produces sustainable, well-paying jobs (World Bank, 2008e). Former combatants may be more likely to be employed than others, but the quality of such jobs is often poor and many are still living at or below the poverty line. Growth rates in Aceh for the first half of 2008 were less than half of those across Indonesia as a whole, with Aceh’s economy actually contracting by 5.8 per cent over the first six months of 2008 (World Bank, 2008f). As Rolston points out, it does not make sense merely to ‘reintegrate ex-combatants into poverty’ (Rolston, 2007, p. 265); such a move can lead to fresh conflict or a rise in violent crime (Babiker and Özerdem, 2003; Baare, 2001). Improving the lot of the Acehnese (including former combatants) requires structural changes to the economy that in turn will create jobs and improve returns to work.

As with most areas affected by war, there are also vast reconstruction needs in Aceh. Tens of thousands of houses were damaged or destroyed by the conflict. From 1989 to 1998, when Aceh was declared an ‘area of military operations’ in an attempt to root out the rebels, 527 schools were burned; another 880 schools closed due to damage in the second half of 2003, when martial law was re-established following the collapse of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (Barron, 2008). Twenty-two per cent of village health clinics and 11–20 per cent of transport infrastructure were directly damaged by the conflict; 28 per cent of rice fields and 45 per cent of other crop land were damaged or destroyed. Lack of maintenance, closely related to the presence of conflict, resulted in even more damage (MSR, forthcoming). A preliminary estimate places the costs of post-war reconstruction and recovering losses from the conflict era at more than USD 1.4 billion, a figure that only includes the 2003–06 period (MSR, forthcoming).
Aceh provided a potential arena for the implementation of a ‘maximalist’ approach to reintegration and recovery. Unlike many post-war settings, resources were not scarce in Aceh. In their review of six peace processes, Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick cite a lack of money and failure to follow up on pledges as major problems (Forman and Patrick, 2000). Yet in Aceh resources abounded: the tsunami resulted in the arrival of around USD 8 billion of reconstruction and development resources (Barron, 2008); 3,645 international NGOs were registered in Aceh by January 2006 (Schulze, 2006).

These funds offered a potential means to promote growth and the development of conflict-affected areas in ways that would help consolidate peace. However, reintegration programmes, and post-war strategies, were separated from those aimed at tsunami reconstruction or broader development. As a result, relatively few of these resources have made it into war-affected areas. This has created inequalities that are driving new tensions.

**Limitations on the use of tsunami aid**

The vast majority of donor aid that arrived in Aceh was tied. Limitations were placed on where it could be spent (the tsunami-affected coastal areas) and who could receive assistance (those directly affected by the tsunami) (Schiller, 2008). The Multi-Donor Fund, a USD 600 million plus pot of money for tsunami reconstruction assistance, for example, could not get permission from its donors to expand into conflict programming. In particular, the United States argued that changing the mandate of the fund to include broader development and post-war reconstruction
Figure 8.3  Conflict damage, tsunami damage, and tsunami funding, per district

- Conflict impact (%)
- Earthquake and tsunami (%)
- Commitment (%)

Aceh Timur
Aceh Utara
Pidie
Bireuen
Bener Meriah
Aceh Besar
Aceh Selatan
Aceh Tengah
Aceh Tamiang
Aceh Barat
Aceh Singkil
Nagan Raya
Aceh Jaya
Simeulue
Gayo Lues
Aceh Barat Daya
Aceh Tenggara
Lhokseumawe
Banda Aceh
Sabang
Langsa

programming would require approval from Congress. Given this, they, along with other donors such as the European Union, strongly resisted pressures to move into conflict-affected areas situated away from the tsunami-hit coasts (Barron and Burke, 2008). While more and more agencies became interested in peace-building issues over time, most found that they could not use their resources in some of the regions that were hardest hit by the conflict in Aceh (Burke and Afnan, 2005).

These restrictions were understandable given the immensity of the tsunami’s impacts and the enormous post-tsunami needs. Yet while tsunami funds could not be used for key post-war needs, few additional sources arrived to support many of the province’s most conflict-torn areas. There was a perception among donor nations that it was difficult to make a case for significant funding for post-war reconstruction when Aceh was already receiving such high levels of tsunami aid. As mentioned, only certain parts of Aceh were receiving such aid. Government tsunami reconstruction money, much of it from Jakarta, avoided many conflict-affected areas and explicit funding for peace support programmes was relatively limited.

As a result, there was a massive discrepancy between the amount of resources available for tsunami and conflict programming, with resources for the former over 20 times larger than those for reintegration. Around seven percent of the ‘tsunami funds’ reached areas affected by conflict that were not hit by the tsunami. This did help. But, overall, there were large funding gaps for post-war reconstruction and development in many of the areas hit hardest by the conflict. As Figure 8.3 shows, the districts in Aceh with the highest levels of conflict damage (Aceh Timur, Bireuen, Aceh Utara, Pidie, and Nagan Raya) all received very little tsunami money.

Post-conflict donor money that did arrive tended to be focused on reintegration issues (such as livelihoods for former combatants and conflict victims or psychosocial support) and a narrow range of peace-building efforts (such as conflict mediation training, public information, gender awareness). There was little money to work on other vital areas such as infrastructure reconstruction and broader economic development. (Post-)conflict programming and reintegration assistance became synonymous in Aceh. As a result there was a key gap with respect to the provision of post-war development aid aimed at rebuilding conflict-affected infrastructure, creating sustainable livelihoods, and strengthening local institutions.

**Lack of synergy between tsunami and conflict programming**

A second issue relates to the lack of synergy between strategies and programmes providing tsunami and conflict assistance. On the Jakarta and Aceh government side, there were few incentives for the agencies responsible for reintegration (BRA) and tsunami reconstruction (BRR) to work together. From the outset, BRR viewed their mandate as only relating to tsunami reconstruction. In the days leading up to the signing of the Helsinki MoU, discussions were held about what role BRR would play with reintegration and post-war reconstruction programmes. The agency had sufficient capacity and expanding its mandate to cover these areas would ensure that the vast pool of tsunami funds could be tapped for peace-building purposes. However, BRR representatives were understandably reluctant to take part in the formation and implementation of the reintegration programme or for broader post-conflict work. They were already struggling to deal with the immense challenges of tsunami reconstruction and wanted to avoid what was seen as bumpy political terrain (Barron and Burke, 2008).

There was also little interest from the BRA to work with BRR. This was partly due to jealousy: BRR not only had far more resources to spend, but also far more capacity, and the agency received much greater attention from both the Jakarta government and donors. Most importantly, BRR had a far greater level of authority, and a wider mandate, The resources available for tsunami programming were over 20 times larger than those for reintegration.
than did the BRA. At no point was there significant collaboration between the BRA and BRR in strategy development or programme implementation.

**Rising inequality and tension**

The separation of tsunami and post-conflict programming had a number of consequences. First, there was a lack of conflict sensitivity in the use of tsunami funding. With a separate government agency deemed responsible for ‘conflict issues’, BRR deliberately remained ‘conflict blind’. Yet many areas where tsunami programmes were operating had been affected to some extent by the conflict. Former combatants and conflict victims lived across the province. Lack of conflict sensitivity in tsunami programming, reflected in the failure to tap the expertise and networks of those working on the reintegration agenda, was pervasive (Burke and Afnan, 2005).

Second, one result of the vastly different funding levels for post-war and tsunami support has been rising inequality between tsunami- and conflict-affected areas (Barron, 2008). At one level, the larger support for tsunami victims is understandable given the immense impacts of that disaster. Yet the armed conflict caused about half as much infrastructure damage as did the tsunami (World Bank/KDP, 2007, p. 4).

### Table 8.7 Sources of division and violence within communities: non-combatant community members, by sex, mid-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference between [ . . ] is a source of division</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Of the men and women who reported divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source of division</td>
<td>Source of division</td>
<td>n=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich and poor</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men and women</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger and older generations</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees/IDPs and other community members</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New migrants and other community members</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-combatants and village members</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different ethnic groups</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have received special assistance from government and those who have not</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in this village and people from neighbouring villages</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ARLS (2008)*
Those affected by the conflict have been far less likely to receive help than those hit by the tsunami. By mid-2008, 47 per cent of those whose houses were damaged or destroyed by the tsunami had received compensation compared with 16 per cent of those whose houses or workplaces were damaged or destroyed by the conflict.38 In areas affected by the tsunami and the armed conflict, victims of the former were often prioritized when receiving assistance such as a new house. Conflict-affected infrastructure is only being built back at half the speed of that affected by the tsunami (World Bank/KDP, 2007, p. 38). Levels of post-war assistance also tended to be significantly lower than tsunami support. On average EUR 7,000 (USD 11,000) was allocated for each new tsunami house compared with EUR 3,500 (USD 5,500) if the same house was destroyed by the conflict (Frodin, 2008).

This discrepancy has fuelled resentment. The 2008 survey asked community members what sources of division existed in their village. As Table 8.7 shows, differences between men and women, young and old, ethnic groups, and returning IDPs and community members were not viewed as a great source of disputes. Fewer than four per cent said divisions between former combatants and village members were a source of friction. On occasion, conflicts related to these divisions escalated into violence or prevented economic activities from being conducted, but the number of cases is very low. Far more problematic was unequal access to government assistance, which 44 per cent of men and 43 per cent of women cited as a source of tension. Eighty-seven informants reported that these divisions had escalated into violence.39 From March 2007, disputes over the delivery of aid recorded in the World Bank’s conflict monitoring averaged almost 30 per month (Barron, 2008).

Local government funds: opportunities and risks

These problems were not the fault of the reintegration programme alone. Rather, they were a result of a poorly conceived and executed conflict recovery and peace-building strategy that failed to synchronize short-term reintegration assistance with other ongoing programmes and funds in the province. The arrival of fresh government resources from 2008 has offered an opportunity to redress some of the mistakes already made. But it also accentuates risks if funding is not spent equitably and transparently.

From 2008 onwards, tsunami and reintegration funds will be supplemented by substantial extra resources for regular development spending. The Law on Governing Aceh (national law 11/2006), which implements many of the provisions of the MoU, stipulates that 70 per cent of the revenues from current and future hydrocarbon deposits are to remain in Aceh. Of more significance, given declining gas deposits, an additional two per cent of the Indonesia-wide DAU (the discretionary block grant from the centre to the regions aimed at equalizing the fiscal capacity of regional governments) will be given to Aceh for 15 years, and one per cent for the following five years (Barron and Clark, 2007). With this extra *dana otsus*, the budget of the Acehnese authorities in 2008 was USD 1.4 billion, six times as much as in 1999 (World Bank, 2006c, p. 39) (see Figure 8.4). Even as tsunami assistance leaves Aceh, the money available to develop the province will remain fairly constant.

This creates big opportunities in Aceh but also risks. The ways in which these resources are spent and the extent to which they can successfully spur equitable economic growth and improve the delivery of services will in part determine the likelihood of large-scale violence re-emerging. Armed conflict in the past was driven by a perceived gap between the wealth of Aceh and the ways in which local people benefit from the province’s development (Ross, 2005). If the vast resources that Aceh will control do not translate into economic growth and improvements in living standards for ordinary villagers, violent conflict may arise again.
It is unlikely that such a conflict would pit GAM against the Jakarta government, at least in the short term. GAM’s leaders, and many former GAM members, are fully committed to the peace deal; Aceh’s special autonomy provisions give them unprecedented power over the province’s vast resources. Yet rebellion may come from other sources. Those excluded from power (including elites who have lost their positions of prominence since the war has ended) may seek to mobilize Acehnese villagers, disappointed at not seeing a greater peace dividend. If Aceh does not grow, and this growth does not move people out of poverty, there is a real risk that people will feel that the special autonomy provisions are not enough and that outright independence is necessary. Aceh’s history shows that times of peace are less common than periods of war.40

Despite this, donors have paid relatively little attention to building local capacity in ways that strengthen the performance and legitimacy of the state and which build links between those in power and the governed. Relatively little assistance has been provided to the governor, district heads, and parliament members to help them manage their budgets in ways that ensure effective and equitable use of funds. Where such support has been provided, limited attention has been paid to how fund distribution may affect (post-)conflict dynamics.

In the longer term, wider geographically targeted programmes aimed at promoting economic growth, creating jobs, delivering services, reforming the security sector, and strengthening state institutions are more likely to contribute to reintegration and conflict prevention than more finely targeted programmes. Strategies for spurring reintegration and post-war development in Aceh need to take account of the wide range of funding sources (including for non-conflict-focused programmes) and the diverse types of programmes needed (not all of which are directly conflict-related).
This chapter has argued that reintegration programmes in Aceh have been largely ineffective. In part, this is because many of their key design characteristics have flowed from a set of assumptions derived from post-war settings that are very different from the one encountered in Aceh.

First, the orthodoxies of reintegration, as encapsulated in documents such as the IDDRS, reflect a set of post-war challenges that were of minimal importance in Aceh. Social relations and trust between combatants and the non-combatant population were, and are, strong. The Helsinki process created close-to-immediate opportunities for former rebels to assume political positions and former combatants largely accepted that power should be achieved through political processes rather than by force. Most importantly, former combatants have not faced major barriers to work; any barriers also affect Aceh’s non-combatant population. Aceh’s reintegration needs thus differ from those of many places emerging from war.

Second, the mechanisms by which reintegration assistance was provided in Aceh were also ill-conceived. Reintegration programmes followed the international model in that they attempted to target individual ex-combatants in ways that prioritized security over broader development or welfare impacts. Government funds were distributed in cash without the provision of technical assistance or monitoring to ensure they were productively used, and without mechanisms to identify those most in need. At the same time, however, it is hard to envision how cash assistance to individual ex-combatants could have been successfully provided.

International practice has increasingly emphasized ‘maximalist’ conceptions of reintegration, where short-term support to former combatants is linked to broader strategies aimed at restarting economic growth, improving institutions, and dealing with other peace-building issues. Such approaches were needed in Aceh, where many of the post-war challenges related to larger, structural economic and political issues. Yet a wider programme was only partially—and very selectively—implemented in Aceh. International and domestic funding for tsunami reconstruction, for example, was massive. But funds generally could not be spent in the most conflict-affected areas; the reintegration programme became divorced from other development work going on in the province. The separation of reintegration efforts (which became synonymous with all post-conflict support) and broader reconstruction and development work has contributed to rising inequality across the province. This is fuelling resentment and tensions, although it is still too early to see whether there will be serious long-term consequences.

To date, these failings have not had a disastrous impact for a number of reasons. First, former elites within the rebel group were successfully (re-)integrated into political institutions, a development that was not a result of any post-conflict programming but of the structure of the peace deal. This helped bind leaders and their followers into continuing to support peace. Second, the end of the armed conflict created a peace dividend in and of itself that helped reduce poverty and led to new opportunities for work. In this environment, GAM’s swift accession to power allowed for a channelling of resources to (some) former combatants. Unequal and non-transparent distribution of reintegration resources has caused tensions. But in an environment where opportunities exist to access far larger sums of money (for example, through construction contracts), getting effective reintegration help was never going to be of utmost importance to most combatants.

Serious post-war challenges exist in Aceh. However, the mechanisms to deal with them relate far more to issues of state-building and ensuring longer-term economic growth and development, than to helping a small subset of the population (that is difficult to define). In Aceh, the challenge now is how to make the transition effectively from
targeted assistance to efforts aimed at supporting long-term conflict-sensitive development. The reintegration tool kit
says little about how to engineer that shift.

The weaknesses of reintegration programmes in Aceh raise broader questions about the efficacy of the reintegration model for some post-war places. Reintegration frameworks such as the IDDRS arguably have far more utility for many of the states of sub-Saharan Africa, where conflicts have destroyed economies and devastated the social fabric, where democracy needs to be built from scratch, and where limited domestic resources or capacity exists (Peake, 2009). Yet these are not the only places where wars occur and where peace agreements are reached. Aceh is part of a strong, rapidly democratizing Indonesian state. Finding models to support peace processes in middle-income countries where markets still function is vitally important.

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARLS</td>
<td>Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Badan Reintegras-Damai Aceh (Aceh Reintegration Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRR</td>
<td>Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDR</td>
<td>Indonesian rupiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kecamatan (Sub-district) Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Komite Peralihan Aceh (Aceh Transition Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding (signed by GAM and the Government of Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENDNOTES**

1 At this writing, Indonesians involved in the Helsinki peace process (including Vice President Jusuf Kalla and his senior adviser, Farid Husain) are attempting to broker peace talks aimed at ending the conflict in southern Thailand (Khalik, 2008).
2 See, for example, Muggah (2009); Muggah and Baare (2009); and Muggah and Bennett (2009).
3 For reports related to these data sources, see Conflict and Development Program (n.d.).
4 Data from the ARLS used in this chapter is weighted. For male civilian respondents, weighting allows for projections to be made for the full provincial population, rather than just for the population sampled. For female civilian respondents, the data is not representative of all of Aceh but only the areas where the survey was conducted. The data for ex-combatants is representative of the full former combatant population.
5 SUSENAS is the National Socio-Economic Household Survey administered by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics.
6 The Helsinki MoU calls on GAM to nominate representatives to the tsunami reconstruction agency, known as the Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi or BRR (GoI and GAM, 2005, para. 1.3.9). Senior GAM leader Teuku Kamaruzzaman was subsequently appointed as secretary of the BRR. Employment opportunities for former GAM members in BRR are discussed in more detail below.
The following definition of ‘violent conflict’ is used: any physical action between individuals or groups that results in deaths, injuries, or property destruction, and that is not an act of violent crime. ‘Violent crime’ is defined as incidents of violence where there is no issue over which the actors are disputing, and where an ideology or identity is not explicitly mobilized in the incident. Figure 8.1 shows only violent conflict, not violent crime.

These figures do not include incidents of violent crime, for which use of firearms was higher. Correspondence with Adrian Morel, head of World Bank conflict monitoring work, February 2009.

World Bank conflict monitoring shows that levels of violent crime climbed sharply through 2007 but started to fall from the end of the first quarter of 2008. The monitoring does not record incidents before October 2006, so it is not possible to confirm or dismiss the police assertion. It is also too early to see whether the fall in violent crime is a temporary or longer-term phenomenon.

The United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards specify that ‘The UN should, wherever it is possible, and when in keeping with the mandate of the peacekeeping mission, establish an integrated DDR unit in the mission’ (UNDDR, 2006, module 2.10, p. 13).

Reintegration advisers in Aceh rarely made explicit reference to the IDDRS or SDDRS. However, many of them had been involved in the process of developing the frameworks and, as such, their advice reflected the contents of the documents.

Over time, DDR objectives have expanded from a narrow security focus to include broader forms of security promotion as well as development goals. See the section on ‘A ‘maximalist’ approach to reintegration’, below.

Explicit statements about prioritizing security over development are rare. Yet the basic premise of DDR, as outlined in the IDDRS, is that it will be an internationally led endeavour with the UN establishing an integrated DDR unit (UNDDR, 2006, module 2.10, p. 13). That DDR Unit reports to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (module 2.30, p. 9). Planning for DDR is to be situated within the UN mission’s broader strategic plan (module 3.10). DDR should support national institutions through capacity building, legal framework development, policy planning and implementation, financial management, logistics assistance, and community development work (module 3.30). However, implementation of projects is not envisioned through regular government mechanisms, but through either ad-hoc institutions or directly by international agencies or NGOs (module 3.30).

See previous endnote.

A final year (2008) of assistance from national government is planned. Funds for 2008 still have to arrive in Aceh and it is unclear how they will be used. Some of the programmes listed here are still being implemented.

Grants of USD 500,000 per year were provided to cover the health expenses of former combatants. It is unclear which mechanisms were used for distributing these sums. It appears that some system is in place for clinics and hospitals to receive reimbursements for expenses they incur when treating former combatants for free. Interviews with Asmawati, head of BRA social section, and Fuady, BRA secretary of the social department, Banda Aceh, November 2008.

Interview with IOM Banda Aceh team, Banda Aceh, November 2008.

This is by no means unique to Aceh. In Ethiopia, for example, many returning combatants from the front with Eritrea had close links with the communities to which they were returning (Muggah and Bennett, 2009).

Aceh is largely religiously homogenous: Muslim. Prayer and Koran recital groups are an important part of the social fabric of each village. It appears that former combatants are participating extensively in such groups.

It should be noted that Aceh is by no means unique. Evidence from a diverse range of cases, such as Ethiopia (Muggah and Bennett, 2009), Timor-Leste (Peake, 2009), and even Uganda (Muggah and Baare, 2009), points to strong relations between combatants and civilians.

Among former combatants under 30, 93.5 per cent said they voted for Irwandi–Nazar, compared with 73.6 per cent of civilians under 30. For those who are 30 or older, the difference was even greater: 87.5 per cent of former combatants said they voted for Irwandi–Nazar compared with 43.1 per cent of civilians in the same age bracket (ARLS, 2008).

N = 3,046.

This does not mean that the BRA or IOM programmes have not had positive impacts. If former combatants who were less likely to get a job by themselves were disproportionately likely to receive assistance, then the programmes may have had a positive effect. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess rigorously the impacts of these programmes, largely because neither has a monitoring and evaluation system that allows for comparisons to be made between those who received assistance and those who did not. Indeed, there is a lack of such evaluations in almost all post-war environments (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007).

Email correspondence with Yuhki Tajima, Harvard University, December 2008.

This raises questions about what happens when the tsunami reconstruction boom ends. However, as discussed below, provincial and district government budgets are high (and rising) and it is likely that construction will continue to be a major sector of Aceh’s economy.
A number of theories have been propagated as to why the MoU contains such a low figure. One version is that GAM deliberately gave a low number in order to minimize the number of guns they had to hand in. Military intelligence estimated there was one gun for every 3.5 combatants. Another version is that GAM were asked how many people they had active at the time of negotiations. GAM had 3,000 combatants active at that time (interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, May 2006); however the movement’s numbers were larger because combatants tended to work in shifts, fighting for three or four months before being replaced by other fighters. In any case, it appears the implications of the 3,000 number for the number of reintegration packages was not clear to GAM at the time of the Helsinki negotiations (interview with Nur Djuli, head of BRA, Banda Aceh, June 2007).

These sensitivities became particularly clear when an early draft of a needs assessment conducted by the World Bank noted that there were considerably more than 3,000 former combatants in Aceh. The country director of the World Bank was told forcefully by the Coordinating Minister for the Economy to stay out of what was a political matter (Barron and Burke, 2008, p. 39).

Forty-one per cent of male former combatants have not received any assistance; 23 per cent have received two or more forms of assistance (ARLS, 2008, n=1,024).

This view was less true for the IOM combatant programmes. The Information Counselling and Referral Service offices provided advice and technical assistance as well as funds to former combatants (Bean and Knezevic, 2008). However, it is impossible to assess whether this approach was more or less effective than BRA’s because data was not collected on combatants who did not receive help to allow for an evaluation of programme impacts.

In particular, there have been allegations and protests against money being skimmed by local government officials from BRA housing programmes. In the central highlands, it is alleged that around 40 per cent of funds were not delivered to communities, with BRA housing being of a sub-standard nature as a result. Large protests in Banda Aceh led to BRA compensating affected housing recipients to the tune of IDR 10 million (around USD 1,000) per household. Interviews with villagers and NGO workers in the central highlands, September 2008.

Only time will tell how this will play out. In his analysis of GAM’s role in the construction sector, Aspinall correctly identifies access to resources through non-transparent means as being important for ‘buying in’ GAM to peace in the short term (Aspinall, 2009). However, his historical analysis of the roots of and motivations for conflict in Aceh highlights a consistent pattern. When Acehnese have felt that governing powers are not representing their interests, resentment has risen, often taking violent form. See Aspinall (forthcoming) and Reid (2009).

More than 26 per cent of Acehnese households lived below the poverty line in 2006, significantly higher than for Indonesia as a whole. In rural areas, poverty levels are over 30 per cent (World Bank, 2008e, p. 8).

From ongoing World Bank monitoring.

From ongoing World Bank monitoring.

For each district, the percentage given is the amount of damage in that district as a proportion of the overall damage total across the province.

Tsunami figures include only those affected by the tsunami and not by the conflict; conflict figures include only those affected by the conflict and not by the tsunami. Sample size for the former is 708, for the latter it is 777 (ARLS, 2008).

The problem of unequal access to aid is also confirmed by other case study and key informant data collected as part of the MSR (forthcoming).

Substantial numbers of Acehnese have been in armed resistance against Jakarta’s authority for 86 of the past 132 years, making times of peace the more unusual since 1873 (Reid, 2009).

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