Two Hezbollah fighters walk through the destroyed town of Ait Ta Chaab, 16 August 2006. © Jason Howe/WPN
The Israeli–Lebanese border has been the site of numerous armed attacks since 2000, when Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon. The 2006 war between Israel and Hizbollah killed approximately 1,000 people in Southern Lebanon, decimated its infrastructure, and led to the displacement of an estimated one million people in both countries. It also illustrated the region’s continuing volatility.

Although many have written about the situation in Southern Lebanon, a number of questions remain unanswered. Namely, in the wake of a devastating war, how do the people of Southern Lebanon feel about their security? Whom do they look to for protection against local and external threats? Which political parties do they support? How many households own weapons, and what are their views on arms control, including the regulation of non-state armed groups?

This chapter presents the results of a household survey conducted in Southern Lebanon in March–May 2008 to explore these and other questions. Its key findings include the following:

- Some 1,000 people were killed and 5,800 injured in Southern Lebanon as a direct result of the 2006 war, while combat activity resulted in the damaging or destruction of approximately 69,000 homes in this area.
- The people of the south, whatever their political affiliations, express strong support for state security institutions, with the Lebanese army and police consistently cited as preferred security providers.
- Less than a quarter of the population believes that expanding the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on the border with Israel would enhance community safety.
- Although it is often assumed that Hizbollah is broadly popular among southerners, it appears that support for non-state armed groups in general—and Hizbollah in particular—is at least partially overestimated.
- The extent of civilian firearm ownership in Southern Lebanon is unknown but is probably much higher than that captured in survey responses. There is also evidence that arms flows to non-state groups such as Hizbollah continue despite a 2006 UN Security Council arms embargo.
- There is significant support among the people of Southern Lebanon for government control of civilian weapons ownership, as well as the outlawing of armed militias; those who back opposition parties, such as Hizbollah, are much less likely to favour such initiatives.

The chapter begins by outlining the turbulent history of Southern Lebanon and Lebanon as a whole. It provides historical background to the 2006 war and describes the key players and principal dynamics of that conflict. The chapter then presents the findings of the Southern Lebanon Armed Violence Assessment, devoting particular attention to those relating to insecurity during and after the 2006 war, attitudes towards security provision, party affiliation, and gun ownership and control.
The conflict with Israel has been central to recent Lebanese history, but in no part of the country has this been truer than in the south. Some commentators blame the Lebanese civil war on outside actors—Israel, Syria, Iran, France, the United States, and others—but other factors were also at work. The civil war was not exclusively a symptom of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but in the south that conflict does seem to overshadow all else. A capsule summary of Lebanon’s modern history cannot do justice to the complex dynamics and range of actors influencing it. In this section, emphasis is given to the major events and trends that have shaped the experience of Southern Lebanon from 1975 onwards.
Lebanon did not truly gain independence from France until 1943, when the fledgling state established a confessional government that was dominated by Christians, though the population was and remains a diverse mix of Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim, Druze, Maronite Christian, and Greek Orthodox, among many other groups. With the rise of pan-Arab nationalism in the Middle East in the 1950s, however, Lebanese Muslims became increasingly dissatisfied with the sectarian political system. Ideologically driven groups also opposed the elitist, status quo character of the government that was partly a hold-over from the pre-independence period. A brief civil war in 1958 manifested as essentially a Christian–Muslim conflict over the nature of the Lebanese state. US military intervention was instrumental in ending militia fighting but did little to address the underlying antagonisms (Rabinovich, 1985, pp. 25–28).

By the late 1960s the Lebanese political system struggled to manage the domestic effects of rivalries between competing Arab states and especially the Arab–Israeli conflict. Most importantly, Lebanon was by then home to some 300,000 Palestinian refugees, mostly unwanted by the Lebanese and increasingly militarized following the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The Cairo Agreement of 1969 granted the PLO a semi-autonomous base of operations in Southern Lebanon from which to organize their armed struggle with growing military and financial support from Arab governments (Cobban, 1984, p. 47). Itamar Rabinovich calls this the era of ‘controlled tension’ prior to the collapse of the state (Rabinovich, 1985, p. 32).

Sectarian tensions ignited once more in 1975, precipitating a bloody multi-phase, multi-party civil war that would last until 1990, claim around 150,000 lives, and decimate representational government. The inter-sectarian militia violence soon drew in foreign actors. Syrian troops intervened in 1976 in an attempt to quell the fighting. Threatened by the proximity of Syrian forces and responding to PLO attacks, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded the country in 1978, progressing as far as the Litani River, the traditional dividing line between Northern and Southern Lebanon. Though the IDF withdrew in response to UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC, 1978a; 1978c), Israel maintained influence through allied Christian Lebanese militias, leading to ongoing violence in the south. The Security Council-mandated UN Interim Force in Lebanon was largely unable to provide security (ICG, 2006).

Following an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom and a bus bombing in Israel, the IDF bombed and then invaded the country once again in June 1982 in an attempt to expel the PLO from Southern Lebanon. The fighting also brought Israel into direct battle with Syrian, leftist, and Lebanese Muslim forces. In August, a multinational force composed of Italian, French, and US troops arrived to oversee the withdrawal of PLO fighters from Lebanon (ICG, 2006). By 1985 Israel had withdrawn most of its troops but established a Security Zone within Southern Lebanon, which it deemed crucial for its security and in which IDF troops patrolled. But much of Southern Lebanon remained in the hands of an Israeli-allied militia (the South Lebanon Army), which faced growing opposition from the emerging Shi’ite Islamist militia, Hizbollah.

Hizbollah came to dominate the Shi’ite landscape in Lebanon, supplanting the Amal Movement as the principal militia force in the south (see Box 10.1). It also waged low-intensity warfare against IDF forces in the Security Zone, prompting Israel to launch two short, but intensive, military campaigns in Southern Lebanon in July 1993 and April 1996.

Following failed US mediation between Israel and Syria over Lebanon, Israel unilaterally abandoned the Security Zone in 2000 in the face of protracted guerrilla engagement from Hizbollah. The Lebanese government left a power vacuum in the border area that was soon filled by Hizbollah and Amal fighters with the government’s blessing. But the south remained unstable and poorly serviced by the government (Norton, 2000, pp. 35, 39, 40).

Hizbollah and Amal meanwhile pursued new grievances with Israel over the Shaba Farms, an Israeli-occupied area in the disputed Golan Heights zone. Only months after the IDF withdrawal in 2000, escalating Israeli–Palestinian violence sparked an engagement between the IDF and Palestinians on the Israel–Lebanon border, prompting
Box 10.1 Key players

Amal Movement

Harakat AMAL or the Amal Movement was founded in 1975 as the military wing of the Movement of the Disinherited, a political reform group established by Iranian-born Imam Sayyed Mousa al-Sadr, Lebanese parliamentarian Hussein al-Husseini, and other young Shi’ites. At its outset the movement was distinctively Shi’ite but communal in orientation, seeking to improve living conditions for all Lebanese (Collelo, 1989). Historically it has been aligned with Syrian interests, but not exclusively.

After the disappearance of al-Sadr in Libya in 1978, the movement went through a series of leadership changes. By 1980, Nabih Berri was in control, and with Syrian assistance the group entered the Lebanese civil war against anti-Syrian Palestinian and left-wing groups such as the Druze-led Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). In 1982 Husayn al-Musawi, deputy head of Amal, broke away to form Islamist-oriented Islamic Amal, supported by Iran. Islamic Amal quickly drew away much of the movement’s support base. By 1984, Islamic Amal was absorbed into Hizbollah, which was to clash with Amal within the context of the broader, ongoing Lebanese civil war.

In 1985-89 Amal engaged in the ‘War of the Camps’, a series of battles with Hizbollah- and PSP-supported Palestinian groups prompted by years of mistreatment by Palestinians (Collelo, 2003, p. 142). These battles formed an important component of the civil war’s latter phase. Following the 1989 Ta’if Agreement that ended the civil war and cemented Lebanese-Syrian relations, Amal became a mainstream political party in the national government. Nabih Berri was appointed a cabinet minister and elected speaker of the National Assembly (head of Parliament) in 1992, a position he still holds at this writing. Since 2005 Amal has allied itself with Hizbollah in elections. Following Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 and Hizbollah’s 2006 war with Israel, Amal entered into the Shi’ite-opposition March 8 Alliance with its former enemy. It also participated in the Hizbollah-led May 2008 military occupation of the predominantly pro-government Sunni areas of West Beirut (described below).

Hizbollah

Hizbollah was formed by defectors from Amal who were radicalized in response to the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, during which nationalist Palestinian and left-wing Lebanese groups failed to defend mainly Shi’ite communities located in the south, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley. Iran provided early financial and military support to the group and sent 1,500 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to provide training in 1982, though a small number had already been there since 1979 (Butler, 2006, p. 60).

Early activities included suicide bombings against the US Marines and French forces in Beirut in 1983, the assassination of left-wing intellectuals and leaders in 1984-85, and the hijacking of a US passenger jet in 1985. Hizbollah was formally formed in February 1985. In its manifesto it undertook to expel colonial forces from Lebanon, avenge civil war killings committed by right-wing Lebanese Christian militias, and establish a consensual (rather than coercive) Islamic state in Lebanon (Hizbollah, 1985). The party was led by secretary-general Sayyed Abbas Al-Moussawi.

Soon after its inception, and following successful anti-Israeli guerrilla warfare in the south, Hizbollah challenged Amal in an intra-Shi’ite war from which it emerged victorious in 1989. While the Ta’if Agreement, adopted the same year, called for the disbandment of all non-state armed groups, the Lebanese government considered Hizbollah exempt as a ‘national resistance group’ (Ta’if Agreement, 1989; UNSC, 2004b, para. 19). In 1992 Al-Moussawi was assassinated by Israel and succeeded by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

In the absence of strong Lebanese state authority in most Shi’ite areas, and with the financial backing of Iran, the party was able to develop an elaborate social welfare network in poverty-stricken neighbourhoods and assist in the rebuilding of communities destroyed or damaged by Israeli bombardments (Salamy and Pearson, 2007). Later it branched into road repair and other infrastructure projects. It appears unique in Lebanon for its resistance to corruption (Butler, 2006, p. 59).

Following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 and Syrian pullout in 2005, the party captured 14 out of 128 parliamentary seats in the 2005 elections and held two out of 24 cabinet ministries in the largely non-Shi’ite, anti-Syrian coalition government. While its perceived victory in the 2006 war with Israel further consolidated its influence and importance in Southern Lebanon and regionally, concern over Hizbollah’s armed presence was growing in the Beirut government.

In May 2008 a long-standing political crisis exploded when the ruling coalition sought to shut down Hizbollah’s military telecommunications network and remove an airport security chief allegedly close to the party. Hizbollah and its opposition partners responded by seizing control of most of pro-government West Beirut. The conflict, which threatened to return the country to civil war, ended only when the ruling majority agreed to key political demands of the Hizbollah-led opposition (BBC,
2008). During the Israeli occupation, Hizbullah is thought to have had only 450–500 active fighters. In 2006, its strength was estimated to be 1,000–1,200 active members and 6,000–10,000 volunteers operating on reserve (Butler, 2006, p. 62; Rao, 2006).

**Lebanese Armed Forces**

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has historically been regarded as a weak, poorly resourced, and ineffective fighting force. This weakness is a reflection of long-standing sectarian tension. From independence onwards, ruling elites had an interest in suppressing the army’s power and authority, though Islamic groups in particular hoped the LAF would be competent enough to defend the country from Israeli attack (Collelo, 2003, p. 157).

During the civil war, the LAF was divided along sectarian lines, with some soldiers siding with the government and others defecting to the militias. In 1987 the entire military consisted of an estimated 15,000–18,000 men, supplied with minimal US, British, and French weapons (Collelo, 1989). The army has rarely undertaken offensive engagements; it has traditionally deployed to supervise elections (Collelo, 2003, p. 157).

Prior to the 2006 Hizbullah-Israel war, there was no Lebanese army presence in the former Israeli Security Zone; the LAF was largely a bystander to the 2006 conflict (Nerquzian, 2009, p. 12). For purposes of extending the government’s control over the region, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 called for the deployment of Lebanese troops throughout Southern Lebanon with UNIFIL support (UNSC, 2006b, para. 2). About 15,000 troops had been deployed south of the Litani River as of late 2007, with a further 8,000 in the Lebanese-Syrian border area (Nerquzian, 2009, p. 33).

In May 2007, 2,000 LAF soldiers took part in suppressing a violent attack by Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist group of uncertain origin, in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. This episode, in which 169 LAF, 222 militants, and 42 civilians were killed, is the most significant military engagement the LAF has carried out in the post-civil war period. While the casualties were high, it demonstrated that the army could be effective, despite being ill-equipped and suffering from coordination difficulties (Nerquzian, 2009, pp. 17–18).

In fact, the LAF has shown that it is one of the few Lebanese institutions in the post-Syrian era that most citizens trust. One recent analysis finds that it has become more representative, balanced, and capable, though it is still far from being able to secure the state’s monopoly on the use of force (Nerquzian, 2009, p. 31). In 2008 the LAF had a combined strength of about 54,000 men (Nerquzian, 2009, p. 33). The government ended mandatory conscription in 2007 and so the LAF is now composed entirely of voluntary recruits.

**UNIFIL**

UNIFIL was created by UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces following their invasion of Southern Lebanon and to assist the government in asserting control over the region (UNSC, 1978a; 1978b). Since its inception it has been accused of bias by both parties to the conflict and has been unable to provide tangible security in the south (ICG, 2006). During the 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation, UNIFIL remained behind Israeli lines and was largely prevented from fulfilling its mandate. In the wake of Israel’s rapid, unilateral withdrawal in 2000, the UN force confirmed the withdrawal and monitored violations. Lebanese security forces also deployed to the south but left control of the border area to Hizbullah (UNDPKO, 2006). Following the 2006 Hizbullah-Israel war, the Security Council increased UNIFIL’s maximum troop strength to 15,000. It was again mandated to support the deployment of Lebanese armed forces throughout the south, and to help ensure humanitarian access to civilians and the return of displaced persons (UNSC, 2006b, para. 11).

Hizbullah to launch its first operation in Shaba, killing three Israeli soldiers (Norton, 2000, p. 41). In response, Israel resumed violations of Lebanese airspace and waters. While tensions remained acute for the next six years, casualties on both sides were low. This was a period of “harassing fire, aggressive patrolling, and heated rhetoric” from both parties within informally agreed boundaries (Butler, 2006, pp. 57–58).

**The 2006 War**

In July 2006, Hizbullah initiated a series of attacks and cross-border incursions that killed a number of Israeli military personnel and civilians. Two IDF personnel were kidnapped and taken back to Lebanon for the purposes of prisoner exchange (Butler, 2006, p. 64). An unsuccessful Israeli rescue operation led to the deaths of five more IDF
soldiers. Israel then initiated a 34-day systematic bombing and ground campaign designed to completely destroy Hizbollah’s fighting capacity. The campaign failed to achieve its objective, however.

Israel reported 12 IDF and 43 Israeli civilian deaths as a result of the 2006 conflict. Fatalities in all of Lebanon were estimated at between 1,000 and 1,200, the ‘vast majority’ of which were probably civilians, and between 4,000–4,400 non-fatal injuries (HRW, 2007, p. 4; LHRC, 2009). Southern Lebanon’s infrastructure had also been decimated, and an estimated one million civilians were displaced (AI, 2006, p. 2). It was the deadliest engagement between Israel and Lebanon-based forces since the Israeli invasion of 1982.

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 marked the official end of the war. It called for a ‘full cessation of hostilities’ between Hizbollah and Israel, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the withdrawal of Hizbollah to the north of the Litani

Box 10.2 The arming of Hizbollah

By the time of the 2006 war, the UN Security Council had repeatedly called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and influence from Lebanon and the disbandment and disarmament of all militias. While Syria, a primary target of the UN resolutions, withdrew after international pressure and Lebanese protests prompted by the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, the Lebanese government took no steps to disarm Hizbollah.

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006 again emphasized ‘the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory’ and underlined the need for it ‘to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon’ (UNSC, 2006b, para. 3). It also prohibited the supply of arms, related material, technical training, and assistance to any entity or individual in Lebanon not authorized by the Lebanese government or UNIFIL (para. 15).

The primary source of Hizbollah’s weapons has always been thought to be Iran, operating with the cooperation of Syria and elements of the Lebanese government. Following Resolution 1701, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pledged to honour the embargo (Hoque, 2006). Only a week after the end of the war, however, Turkish authorities reportedly intercepted five Iranian cargo planes and a Syrian aircraft carrying rocket launchers and crates of C-802 anti-ship missiles, the same weapon that disabled an Israeli boat on the third day of the war. According to Nicholas Blanford, a long-time observer of Hizbollah, the group’s traditional conduit for arms is Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria, but ‘the party has devised alternative means of procuring weapons in the event of a closed land route’ (Blanford, 2008).

During the 2006 war, Hizbollah fired approximately 3,970 surface-to-surface rockets (Rubin, 2007, p. 10). The origin of smaller, 107 mm and 122 mm rockets is difficult to determine conclusively; the 70-year-old designs are widely manufactured. More distinctive are the larger rockets—some weighing several tons—of which at least 457 were fired into Israel in 2006. Based mostly on Chinese designs, these are produced in Iran and Syria (Rubin, 2007, p. 11). Uzi Rubin reports that Hizbollah initially received Syrian-made 220 mm and 302 mm rockets, with ranges of 70-100 km. Later, Iranian-made 240 mm Fadjr-3 and 320 mm Fadjr-5 rockets were transferred through Syria. Larger versions with ranges of more than 200 km are suspected (Rubin, 2007, pp. 4-5).

Other reports have indicated that Hizbollah possesses Russian-designed or-manufactured anti-tank systems (RPG-29 and Metis-M) and French-made Milan missiles, in addition to less reliable Russian Katyushas and Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 missiles (Bazzi, 2006). It should be noted that Russian-labelled equipment may originate in any of several sympathetic Russian client states.

The clearest evidence of supply relationships comes from weapons uniquely produced in a single country. Hizbollah is reportedly in possession of several dozen Iranian Želzal rockets, with a range of 120 miles and capable of carrying 1,300 lbs of explosives (Bazzi, 2006; Prier, 2008). Thus Iranian surface-to-surface rockets are important as evidence of an arms relationship otherwise largely kept covert.

Hizbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah routinely emphasizes the scale of the group’s arsenal, which appears to have grown considerably in recent years. In 2005 Nasrallah claimed Hizbollah possessed 12,000 rockets; in 2006, he claimed 20,000; in 2007 the number had grown to 33,000 rockets that could ‘reach deep into Israel’ (Rubin, 2007, p. 5; AP, 2007). He is more discrete about suppliers.

Israeli spokesmen have reported that Hizbollah is retransferring Iranian-made 122 mm, 20 km-range rockets to Hamas in Gaza (Fishman, 2008). These presumably are the rockets that began to hit Israeli cities further from the border—notably Ashkelon—in late 2008.
River, and the co-deployment of Lebanese and UNIFIL forces in the south (UNSC, 2006b). The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on non-state groups in Lebanon (see Box 10.2).

Despite the end of open warfare, the factors that led to conflict persist, including disputes over territory and the involvement and interests of foreign supporters. Both Hizbollah and Israel continue to be in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The Israeli government has claimed its right to continue to collect reconnaissance from fly-overs and has threatened overwhelming retaliation for any further attacks on its territory. At the same time, Hizbollah has reportedly embarked on a ‘massive, unprecedented recruitment, training, and rearmament campaign’ in preparation for what it expects to be the inevitable next military engagement with Israel (Blanford, 2008).

For these reasons the post-conflict label is hard to apply to Southern Lebanon. Both parties remain in a state of high readiness, have suggested that future conflict is likely, and continue to call for the destruction or elimination of one another. There is no ‘peace process’ to serve as a guide for conflict resolution, generally a prerequisite for moving from war to peace. While several countries, led by the United States, have begun to support the reform of Lebanon’s state security apparatus as a means of counter-balancing Hizbollah’s semi-autonomy (Worth and Lipton, 2008), it is not clear how this effort will play out in the south of the country.

**THE SOUTHERN LEBANON ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT**

To understand both the immediate and the ongoing effects of the 2006 war on Southern Lebanese civilians, a representative sample of households in Southern Lebanon was surveyed about their experiences during and after the war. Civilians often bear the brunt of armed conflict in ways that leave lasting personal, economic, educational, and psychological effects. An attempt was made to assess some of these impacts using standardized survey tools in the hope that the findings could be used to raise awareness about the current needs of the South Lebanese population. Box 10.3 describes the survey methodology while Box 10.4 discusses the sample demographics.

**Study findings**

The following sections present some of the principal findings of the Southern Lebanon Armed Violence Assessment. The chapter focuses on arms and security issues, including public attitudes towards gun ownership and the government regulation of civilian weapons and non-state armed groups.
Box 10.3 Survey methodology

Sampling
This survey utilizes a modified cluster sampling methodology. Cluster sampling is typically used to identify clusters of households within towns and villages, but here it was used to identify the towns and villages themselves. Various techniques, including random sampling, were employed to select households within each town or village. This method helped overcome the lack of accurate demographic and population data for Southern Lebanon.

The sampling method involved four distinct stages:

- **Stage one:** The first stage entailed the selection of towns. Southern Lebanon’s three largest towns—Tyre, Marjayoun, and Bint Jbeil—were automatically included, and 50 other smaller towns were added using a probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling method. The PPS determinations employed pre-2006 geo-coded digital satellite maps and the most recent electoral rolls as a proxy for population distribution.

- **Stage two:** The towns were demarcated using Global Positioning System (GPS) boundaries with random GPS points generated within them. If a GPS point coincided with a building containing a household, that building was automatically selected for the study.

- **Stage three:** If the GPS point did not coincide with a building containing a household, all buildings within a 20-metre radius of the GPS point were counted and one selected randomly. When a GPS location was not within 20 metres of a building, that point was removed from the sample. If a multi-household building (e.g. apartment block) was identified, the interviewer determined the number of households in the building and randomly selected one using prepared sets of random numbers. If a targeted dwelling was unoccupied, interviewers attempted to locate the former residents.

- **Stage four:** A primary respondent was selected within each household. All adults in the household had an equal probability of being selected. The interviewer recorded the total number of adults aged 18 and over living in the household on 11 July 2006, when the Israel–Hezbollah war began, and chose the person with the most recent birthday (at the date of the interview). If the selected adult was not present, attempts were made to interview that person at a later date.

Sample size
Based on population estimates generated by electoral roll data, a sample of 400 households was sought for the town of Tyre, and 200 each for Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil. For each of the smaller towns the figure was 16. This approach yielded a total of 1,600 locations in the sample. Nevertheless, Hezbollah security personnel prevented interviewers from conducting the survey in Bint Jbeil and El Khyiam, which brought the total number of households surveyed to 1,388.

The study primarily sought to identify the proportion of people suffering some impact from the 2006 war. It was expected, conservatively, that this would be 20 per cent of those surveyed. Given these expectations, a +/- 2 per cent confidence interval (CI) was calculated based on a confidence level of 95 per cent. In an effort to obtain a conservative sample size, it was assumed that the intraclass correlation coefficient was 1 (i.e. if a house is bombed, all members are affected). Then, using the standard formula

\[
SE(p) = \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}}
\]

and assuming the observed proportion of a variable would be roughly 20 per cent, with a sample size of 1,600 households, the standard error (SE(p)) would be 1 per cent for a completely random sample, and the 95 per cent CI would be +/- 2 per cent. The precise impacts of the multi-stage sampling method and the clustering effects of selecting all members of a household were not known beforehand. In order to take account of these uncertainties, the CI was doubled to +/- 4 per cent.

Interviewers and questionnaire
Arabic-speaking interview teams with at least one year paid interviewing experience were dispatched to the selected households. The primary respondent answered a series of questions on his (or her) own behalf and that of household members.

Another set of questions, including psychometric assessments to measure symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, were asked only of this adult.

The survey instrument (questionnaire) had six distinct sections: household demographics, experiences during and after wartime, history of human rights violations, gun ownership and attitudes, a screening for post-traumatic stress disorder, and a quality of life assessment. Interviews began on 13 March 2008 and concluded on 16 May 2008.
The first section of the questionnaire reviewed the demographic characteristics of the household. It used a series of questions from the household survey that the International Labour Organization employs as part of its International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, one of two standardized surveys used to assess child labour practices. The second section was taken directly from the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, a checklist developed by the Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma for purposes of measuring the impacts of an earlier traumatic event. The next section of the survey was designed to establish the human rights history of the respondent and other household members. The questions that appeared here were taken directly from the Port-au-Prince Human Rights study used by the authors in 2005 to assess eight types of human rights violations, including murders, physical assaults, sexual assaults, illegal detentions, property crimes, death threats, and threats of physical injury or sexual assault (Kolbe and Hutson, 2006). Many of the questions in the section on gun ownership and attitudes were adapted from the Middle East North Africa Action Network on Small Arms (MENAANSA) survey regarding weapons and community security in Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Sudan (MENAANSA, 2006).

### Death and Injury

More than half of survey respondents reported human rights abuses and other traumatic events during the war; 17.9 per cent stated that they had been in a life or death situation. Fifteen respondents (1.2 per cent) said that someone in their family had been killed, while 3.4 per cent said they themselves had been seriously injured in the war. IDF actions were blamed for all war-related deaths (11 of the 23 deaths that were reported). Based on these results, it is estimated that 1,000 (+/- 600) individuals were killed in Southern Lebanon as a result of the 2006 war. This figure is in the range of previous estimates from NGOs, the media, and the Lebanese government. It does not include war-related deaths that occurred elsewhere in Lebanon.

Only one respondent disclosed being raped and only two individuals reported incidents of physical assault not associated with bombings, one by the IDF and one by ‘an old husband’. There may have been under-reporting of sexual assault given that all of the female interviewers resigned during the first week of interviews due to their husbands’ concerns about security, and so participants were interviewed by all-male research teams. Moreover, the literature indicates that victims of sexual abuse are routinely reluctant to disclose such violations, even when interviewed by women (Lunde and Ortmann, 1992).

Injury as a result of the war was more common. Survey results indicate that 0.9 per cent of all individuals suffered significant physical harm as a result of the war, representing 4.7 per cent of total households. It is estimated, therefore, that 5,800 (+/- 1,400) people were injured as a direct result of the war. Estimates of the number of war casualties are probably too low, however, as interview teams were not allowed to enter Bint Jbeil, reportedly a hard-hit location.

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*A woman mourns for family members killed as a result of the 2006 war, Harœes, August 2006. © Zbora Bensemra/Reuters*
One problem that was widely covered by the media during the war was the bombing of private homes. Since the advent of the war, 21.9 per cent of surveyed households reported being homeless for a period of time. More than half of the households surveyed, 57 per cent, reported some form of property damage or loss. Of the 807 incidents disclosed during the interviews, 97 per cent were attributed to actions by the IDF (80 per cent of total incidents were caused by bombs or missiles). The survey results also reveal that 3.3 per cent of households suffered property damage as a result of earthquakes. It is estimated that 69,000 homes (+/- 3,700) were damaged or destroyed because of the war.

After the war, financial assistance was provided by government agencies, NGOs, and political organizations. Of those households in the study that reported property damage, 81 per cent said they received compensation for their loss. Of these, 71 per cent received money from the Amal-affiliated Council of the South (Majlis al-Janoub), while 39 per cent received funds from Hizbollah or Jihad al-Binaa, Hizbollah’s reconstruction arm.

The religious affiliation of primary respondents was: Shi’ite (84.8 per cent), Sunni (9.5 per cent), Maronite (3.3 per cent), Catholic (1.6 per cent), Greek Orthodox (0.6 per cent), Druze (less than 0.1 per cent), and other (0.2 per cent). Of those surveyed, 0.6 per cent refused to answer this question.

Property damage

Political party and militia support

Although Hizbollah and allied parties (the March 8 political coalition) have dominated recent elections in the south, it is unclear how much popular support the various
political parties have in the region. Elections are not a valid indicator of support in any part of the country since Lebanese electoral law and administrative rules restrict people from changing their voting district from where they were born to where they currently reside (Salamey and Tabar, 2008). In addition, political polls have generally relied only on registered voters, not the population at large, excluding certain groups that are, in effect, disenfranchised (e.g. Palestinian refugees and undocumented workers). Lebanese political parties have a vested interest in claiming they have strong popular support. Lebanon has a confessional government, much like the power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland. If political parties can demonstrate that they are popular, they can claim a greater share of political power (e.g. ministerial posts) and government resources.

When asked whether they identified with or supported a particular political party, respondents were allowed to state any political party or organization without being prompted; this was an open-ended question, specifically designed to avoid guiding the respondent in his or her response. Less than 2 per cent of households refused to answer when asked their political affiliation. Just over 60 per cent of respondents stated that their household was not affiliated with a political party at all. Of the 40 per cent who reported supporting a political party, slightly more than 80 per cent supported ‘the resistance’, Hizbollah, or ‘opposition parties’. Just over ten per cent supported Amal. The term ‘resistance’ refers to the defence of Lebanese interests against Israel, including the return of disputed border territory (Shaba Farms); it often means Hizbollah, which has been closely associated with the resistance in recent years.

Some caveats in interpreting survey results in this area are required. First, as noted earlier, interview teams were not allowed to enter Bint Jbeil and El Khyiam. Both of these towns are considered Hizbollah strongholds, so the study’s estimates of support for the party are probably biased downwards. Secondly, Hizbollah and its allies may enjoy a degree of support for certain actions the party (or its militia wing) undertakes, such as resistance against Israel, that is not expressed as support for the party. Strong support for Hizbollah’s social services arm may also affect responses to the question of political affiliation. Hizbollah’s invasion of West Beirut in May 2008, criticized by many across Lebanon’s political spectrum, appears to have had minimal influence on study findings as almost all of the interviews had been completed by the time the violence erupted.

Post-traumatic stress and quality of life

Post-traumatic stress and quality of life

Post-traumatic stress and quality of life

Only the primary respondent was given the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. Of particular note, nearly 60 per cent of primary respondents stated that they experienced a recurrent thought or memory of a hurtful or terrifying event related to the conflict either ‘sometimes’ or ‘a lot’. Also of particular concern, 3.5 per cent said they had difficulty performing work or daily tasks either ‘sometimes’ or ‘a lot’.

The quality-of-life findings suggest that survey respondents were relatively satisfied with most aspects of their day-to-day lives. Particularly surprising was that, despite the recent war, most responded positively regarding their current sense of safety: only 3 per cent were unhappy or extremely unhappy in this regard. Safety was ‘very’ or ‘extremely important’ to 94.3 per cent of respondents. There appears to be a significant gap between the insecurity that Southern Lebanese, as a whole, have experienced in the recent past and their individual perceptions of insecurity in 2008. The rearming of Hizbollah and continuing tensions with Israel do not seem to have affected their opinion of the current security situation.

Security

Security

Attitudes towards security varied according to the question but showed a strong preference for state security institutions. With respect to local security and crime, survey respondents indicated they were most likely to turn to the Lebanese police for assistance. As shown in Table 10.1, 91.5 per cent of respondents said the Lebanese army should,
ideally, be responsible for security. Almost 90 per cent felt that improving the capacity of the police or other government security services would make their community safer. By contrast, only 23.6 per cent thought that expanding UNIFIL’s presence on Lebanon’s border with Israel would enhance community safety.

Political beliefs did not strongly alter attitudes on security. Of those supporting a political party, 89.9 per cent stated that the army should be responsible for overall security, compared to 92.4 per cent of those who were not affiliated with a party. There was a somewhat greater difference of opinion between supporters and non-supporters with regard to local security and crime. If personally threatened with violence, 85.4 per cent of party supporters stated that they would go to the police, compared to 92.7 per cent of non-supporters. In relation to stolen property, these tendencies were reversed, with 82.4 per cent of party supporters, versus 68.2 per cent of non-supporters, indicating they would seek police assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.1 Security and gun control: responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First person you address/call if an important asset of yours is robbed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First person you address/call if someone threatened to hurt or kill you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First person you address/call if someone threatened to hurt or kill you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideally, who do you think should be responsible for security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you for or against stricter government control on civilian weapons?**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the capacity of police/security services would make my community safer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased UN presence monitoring the border with Israel would make my community safer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Palestinian refugees left Lebanon, it would make my community safer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent peace agreements between Israel and Lebanon would make my community safer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Percentages may not total 100 because responses such as ‘I don’t know’ and ‘I refuse to answer’ were excluded.
** Note that 49.2 per cent of party supporters either ‘did not know’ or ‘did not care’ about this issue. Of the non-party supporters, 28.8 per cent expressed such sentiments.
The odds ratios presented in Table 10.2 illustrate some important differences between party and non-party supporters in relation to security. For example, as just noted, both groups, by large margins, said they would first seek assistance from the police if threatened with injury or death. Nevertheless, party supporters were more than eight times more likely than non-supporters to indicate that they would first turn to community elders. In essence, while both supporters and non-supporters heavily favour the police in such situations, party supporters are much more likely, when selecting another actor, to choose community elders.

Of all respondents, 56.5 per cent agreed that the departure of Palestinian refugees from the country would make them safer. Survey respondents, by an overwhelming margin, did not think that a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel would improve their security (4.4 per cent asserting it would versus 85.4 per cent stating it would not). There was little difference between party supporters and non-supporters in this regard (4.6 per cent and 4.2 per cent agreement, respectively).

**Gun ownership/policy**

When asked if they thought owning a weapon would make their family safer, 41.9 per cent of respondents stated it would make them either ‘much safer’ or ‘a little bit safer’. Despite this, when asked a series of questions about their personal gun ownership, only 4.7 per cent admitted to owning a weapon. Many survey participants were evidently reluctant to disclose such information. In several cases, guns were visible in the home during the interview, but the respondent insisted that they did not have any weapons.
Anecdotal evidence such as this, coupled with other research, suggests that the survey findings are probably a gross undercount of gun ownership. South Lebanese consider the topic of guns and gun ownership politically sensitive and, with some exceptions, are reluctant to discuss it with others. Among the respondents who did admit to owning a weapon, only 26.4 per cent stated that they had an arms licence. Among those who said they did not own a weapon, 50.2 per cent stated they did not need one, with 21.7 per cent stating that they did not like guns (multiple responses were allowed). Most respondents said they would not know where to acquire a weapon if they wanted one. The second-most common response was ‘the black market’, with 5.0 per cent stating this source.

Responses to questions on gun policy were mixed. Of the respondents, 47.1 per cent said they thought greater control over legal firearms licences would make their communities safer. When asked about collecting illegal guns, 42.0 per cent agreed that this, too, would enhance community safety. Overall, a significant percentage of individuals said that security could be improved by outlawing armed militias, enforcing gun regulations, and pursuing other arms control initiatives among civilians. If their satisfaction with their safety is as high as they claim, most respondents ought not to view such changes as potentially important to their overall safety. That they do may mean that political considerations are at play. Supporters of opposition parties are significantly less likely to back gun control efforts, with non-aligned and pro-government respondents viewing such initiatives much more positively.

Support or non-support for any political party also appears to influence attitudes regarding guns and gun regulation, with non-party supporters far more likely to favour regulation. Of those who did not identify with a specific party, more than half (55.4 per cent) ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that greater control of legal firearms licences would make their communities safer; only about one-third (32.0 per cent) of party supporters held the same view. When asked whether harsher punishment for illegal weapons possession would improve community safety, non-party supporters were much more likely to ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ (55.7 per cent vs. 35.1 per cent of those who supported a party). Non-party supporters were also more likely to agree that collecting illegal guns from their owners would make communities safer (50.3 per cent vs. 27.8 per cent). When asked whether outlawing armed groups would enhance community safety, 46.2 per cent of non-supporters concurred, compared to 25.1 per cent of party supporters (19.9 per cent of non-supporters strongly agreed with this statement against only 2.5 per cent of party supporters).

DISCUSSION

In highly politicized environments it is often difficult for outsiders, or even insiders, to acquire a clear understanding of public opinion. Election results tell only part of the story, while political polls may not represent the population as a whole. Regardless of whether it is intentional, the misrepresentation of public attitudes by political actors is common and can soon take on the quality of received wisdom. Unquestioned assumptions about public attitudes towards security may, in turn, inform policies and actions that have harmful consequences for stakeholders—or that can backfire on security actors.

Based on direct contact with the public under controlled conditions, household surveys provide one means of clarifying the views of community members about their own security, their trust in state and non-state actors, and their outlook for the future. The results of such studies sometimes call for a reassessment of prior assumptions. The Southern Lebanon Armed Violence Assessment gave the people of the region an opportunity to speak on matters of direct consequence to them. What they said suggests that some correctives to widely held beliefs may be warranted.
**Security and armed groups**

Shortly after the Southern Lebanon Armed Violence Assessment had been completed, a second study sought to gauge opinion on arms and security issues in Lebanon. This study, conducted by Charney Research in July 2008 for the International Peace Institute (IPI), assessed attitudes in the whole country, not just Southern Lebanon. Participants rated Hizbollah’s ability to provide security much lower than that of the Lebanese government. Almost two-thirds of respondents (65 per cent) thought that the Lebanese government could ‘provide security and stability in [their] neighborhood’, while only 34 per cent believed that Hizbollah could. The figure for the Lebanese army was 93 per cent. In addition, more than three-quarters (76 per cent) believed that only the army, ‘not any of the non-governmental groups’, should bear arms. The occupation of West Beirut by Hizbollah and its allies in May 2008 appeared to have had a negative effect on public attitudes towards the group, with 58 per cent stating that it was unjustified, compared to 40 per cent in favour. Fifty-nine per cent said they thought the events of May 2008 had weakened Hizbollah’s political popularity (Charney Research, n.d.).

Given strong Shi’ite representation in the south, one would have expected the attitudes towards security and armed groups expressed in the Southern Lebanon Assessment to have differed from those of the IPI survey. Shi’ites were thought more supportive of ‘armed resistance’ against Israel. Because active participation in the resistance generally entails gun ownership and—in the current situation—a relationship with Hizbollah, it was believed that Shi’ite southerners would be less inclined to support the intervention of governmental institutions in security matters. In addition, Southern Lebanese generally have more direct contact with UNIFIL and more experience with Israeli bombardment; it was expected that both these factors would influence attitudes about security provision.

In fact, the results of the Southern Lebanon Assessment show some remarkable similarities to those of the country-wide IPI survey. In particular, the people of the south stated a strong preference for state security institutions, with the Lebanese army and police consistently cited as preferred security providers. This was true irrespective of the respondent’s political affiliation. On one point, however, there is a marked difference between the two studies. Most of those interviewed for the Southern Lebanon Assessment appeared quite sceptical of UNIFIL’s peacekeeping potential, indicating, by a margin of two to one, that they did not think that an increased UN presence on the border with Israel would improve community safety. The IPI study, by contrast, showed 80 per cent support for the UN peacekeeping force (Charney Research, n.d.).

The Southern Lebanon Assessment challenges another common belief. Although it is often assumed Hizbollah is broadly popular among southerners, it appears that support for non-state armed groups in general—and Hizbollah in particular—is at least partially overestimated. The actions of Hizbollah or other non-state armed groups in the region may not reflect the will of most southerners.

**Gun ownership and use**

The ownership of small arms in Lebanon, and Southern Lebanon in particular, has a long history. Political instability over the course of many generations, with its attendant violence, has fostered a lingering perception of insecurity in the Lebanese population. The Lebanese civil war of 1975–90, the inability of the Lebanese state to protect its citizens, and the persistence of militias in the region have all encouraged individuals to hold arms for protection. As described elsewhere in this chapter, violence remains a feature of the Lebanese political landscape, fuelling arms acquisition by private citizens and militias. Media reports in the run-up to the 2007 presidential election, for example, indicated that arms purchases had risen sharply amidst increasing sectarian tensions (Blanford, 2007).
It seems likely that the weapons ownership rate of 4.7 per cent, measured in the Southern Lebanon Assessment, is a substantial underestimate. This figure contrasts with the 37.5 per cent of MENAANSA focus group participants who said that their household owned one or more guns (MENAANSA, 2006, p. 53).\textsuperscript{20} It is also at odds with observations made during the Southern Lebanon study of (unacknowledged) weapons in the home. While the Southern Lebanon Assessment does not cast much light on levels of gun ownership in the south, it does reveal significant support for stricter government control of civilian weapons, as well as the outlawing of non-state armed groups. Responses to questions on gun policy varied according to the question and the political affiliation of the respondent. Supporters of opposition parties were the least likely to back gun control efforts, with non-aligned and pro-government respondents viewing them much more favourably. Similar divisions were found between supporters of any political party and non-supporters, with the first group expressing the greatest scepticism. Both sets of respondents agreed, however, that strengthening the Lebanese police and other security institutions would improve the security of their communities.

The reluctance of many opposition supporters to embrace the regulation of civilian weapons or the prohibition of non-state militias reflects political divisions in the south and the country as a whole. Hizbollah, whose flag features a Kalashnikov, has long argued that its independent military capacity is essential to the armed struggle against Israel. It has consistently stated that it intends to keep its weapons and, moreover, launched its takeover of West Beirut in May 2008 in response to government moves to shut down its military communications network.

In this context, one surprising—and important—finding of the study is that, whatever their political inclinations, the people of Southern Lebanon express strong support for government security institutions. That would suggest that additional support for Lebanese security institutions is warranted. At the same time, the population’s doubts regarding UNIFIL’s relevance to regional security suggests that the international community’s faith in peacekeeping may, in this case, be misplaced. Nevertheless, the contrasting views on weapons regulation underline a critical fact of Lebanese life, namely that the country remains prey to political instability. Until the root causes of political violence are addressed, many in Southern Lebanon appear reluctant to submit their weapons to governmental control. For the moment, the declared faith in public security providers has its limits.

**CONCLUSION**

The people of Southern Lebanon have survived protracted sectarian conflict, Israeli occupation, and, in the summer of 2006, a devastating war. Independent reports of widespread property damage and some 1,000 deaths in the south are supported by the findings of the Southern Lebanon Armed Violence Assessment. The study also helps to shed light on shared views on arms and security. Hizbollah remains a defining element in this equation, but the Southern Lebanon Assessment reveals that the opinions and experiences of the people of the region are somewhat more diverse than previously assumed.

While survey respondents reported, as of May 2008, high levels of satisfaction with their quality of life and sense of personal safety, as a group they were cautious on the question of government gun control, including the prohibition of non-state militias. Many pro-government and non-aligned participants said they supported such measures; among adherents of opposition parties, including Hizbollah, this was more exceptional. For now, many southerners appear to favour minimal interference from government in the private ownership of arms. Yet at the same time, whatever their
political inclinations, survey respondents indicated they looked primarily to government security institutions, specifically the Lebanese army and police, to provide security. This support came at the expense of non-government militias, including Hizbollah’s military wing, and the international peacekeeping force UNIFIL. Although Southern Lebanon has long been characterized as a Hizbollah stronghold, its people appear to have more confidence in state security institutions than previously believed.

Notwithstanding widely held beliefs about their popularity among the people of the south, the study also reveals that the support enjoyed by armed non-state actors, most importantly Hizbollah, is probably overestimated. The extent of the party’s influence over the social, economic, and political life of Southern Lebanon should not be underestimated, but it cannot be assumed that its actions reflect the will of most southerners.

The people of Southern Lebanon stand at a critical juncture. Despite recent upheavals, many in the region support the regulation of civilian gun ownership and the banning of non-state armed groups. There is even greater—almost unanimous—support for state security institutions, including the Lebanese army and police. Aspirations, perhaps, for a better future, one in which the Lebanese state can provide security for all its citizens. As of early 2009, Lebanon was calm, yet pro-government and opposition forces remained at odds. Tensions with Israel also persisted, fuelled by reports that Hizbollah has rearmed since the 2006 war. In Lebanon, as in so many ‘post-conflict’ countries, insecurity clouds the horizon. 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Confidence interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENAANSA</td>
<td>Middle East North Africa Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENDNOTES

1 See UNSC (2004a; 2006a).
2 The study was conducted in the Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun, and Tyre districts.
3 For a complete account of the methodology, sampling, and calculations, along with the full text of the questionnaire, contact author Royce Hutson at <roycehutson@wayne.edu>.
4 Maps were provided by Google Earth Plus and MAPS Geosystems, Inc.
5 Voter rolls in Lebanon are based on place of birth, not current place of residence. It was assumed that any error this generated would be variable across all towns, rather than systematic, and thus was not considered to present significant bias.
6 In this way, the researchers sought to control for sampling bias that would arise if displaced families were systematically excluded from the study. In the event, attempts to make contact with former residents proved unsuccessful; 43 of the targeted households were unoccupied.
7 Target sample sizes did not always match actual sample sizes. In a number of smaller towns, interviews were conducted with fewer than 16 households; in others, more than 16 were surveyed. The final n (sample size) was 1,355 as data gathered from 33 households was considered unreliable.
8 For more on sampling techniques for household-based child labour surveys, see ILO (2008).
9 For more on the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, see HPRT (n.d.).
10 A total of 15 respondents stated that a family member had been killed in the war, but 4 of these were eliminated because they did not seem to be war-related. The non-war deaths were caused by accident or illness unrelated to the war.
11 The Lebanese government’s Higher Relief Council estimates that there were 4,409 injuries for all of Lebanon in 2006 (LHRC, 2006).
12 There was a slight oversampling of women; they were ten per cent more likely to be primary respondents (p=0.001).
13 For the purpose of reporting household income, Lebanese pounds have been converted into US dollars (using the exchange rate of LBP 1,500 = USD 1).
14 During 2006, Lebanese citizens received USD 5.7 billion in remittances, making up 25.2 per cent of the gross domestic product (IFAD, 2007, p. 16).
15 In the Southern Lebanon Armed Violence Assessment, respondents defined ‘homelessness’ for themselves. No estimate of the number of internally displaced families in Southern Lebanon exists; however, the Lebanon Higher Relief Council estimates that during the war about 974,000 individuals were displaced throughout the country (LHRC, 2009).
16 The percentages add up to more than 100 per cent as many households (36 per cent) received money from more than one donor.
17 For an example of one such poll, see the results of the Fifth Survey of Lebanese Public Opinion (LOAC, 2008). This survey found only modest support overall for Hizbollah, even among Shi‘ites, 50 per cent of whom stated that Hizbollah best represented them, 22 per cent of whom indicated that Amal best represented them, and 17 per cent of whom identified ‘no one’.
19 See MENAANSA (2006, p. 34).
20 Participants in the study comprised residents of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and Southern Lebanon. See MENAANSA (2006, pp. 33–34).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Principal authors
Royce Hutson, Athena Kolbe, Bernadette Stringer, Ted Haines, Harry Shannon, Imad Salamey