


# Small Arms Survey 2011

## STATES OF SECURITY



In examining various aspects of the provision of security, the *Small Arms Survey 2011* considers the growth of the private security industry and its firearms holdings worldwide; the use of private security companies by multinational corporations; the use of emerging weapons technology among Western police forces; and legislative controls over the civilian possession of firearms in 42 jurisdictions around the world. Case studies provide original research on ongoing security challenges in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, and Madagascar. This edition also presents the 2011 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, an estimate of the annual authorized trade in light weapons, and a review of developments related to small arms control at the United Nations.

The *Small Arms Survey* is produced annually by a team of researchers based in Geneva, Switzerland, and a worldwide network of local researchers. Policy-makers, diplomats, and non-governmental organizations have come to value it as a vital resource for topical analysis of small arms-related issues and armed violence reduction strategies.

Praise for the 2011 *Survey* from J. Brian Atwood, Chair of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development:

'The case studies and analysis contained in the *Small Arms Survey 2011* will benefit policy-makers, researchers, and all those concerned with understanding and responding to modern security and development challenges.'

### Key findings

#### Private security companies

- Based on a review of 70 countries, the *Small Arms Survey 2011* estimates that the formal private security sector employs between 19.5 and 25.5 million people worldwide. The number of private security personnel has grown at a fast pace since the mid-1980s and exceeds the number of police officers at the global level.
- Private security companies (PSCs) hold between 1.7 and 3.7 million firearms worldwide, an estimate based on extrapolations from reported inventories. If undeclared and illegally held weapons were to be included, the global PSC stockpile would undoubtedly be higher.
- Globally, PSC firearm holdings are just a fraction of the stockpiles held by law enforcement agencies (26 million) and armed forces (200 million).
- While several states ban the use of small arms by PSCs, private security stockpiles in some conflict-affected areas amount to more than three weapons per employee.
- Outside of armed conflict settings, PSCs are most armed in Latin America, with ratios of arms per employee about ten times higher than in Western Europe.
- PSCs working in Afghanistan and Iraq have been equipped with fully automatic assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and, in some cases, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, raising questions about their stated 'defensive' roles.
- The rapid growth of the private security sector has outpaced regulation and oversight mechanisms. International initiatives to tackle regulatory gaps remain in their infancy.
- The progressive blurring of distinctions between private and public security forces challenges the assumption that multinational corporations (MNCs) can turn to PSCs to bypass public security forces with a poor human rights record.
- While legal and non-binding mechanisms exist to hold MNCs accountable for their use of private security, significant obstacles to using them remain in place.
- Standards of good practice regarding MNC use of private security have begun to emerge, primarily through the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. No systematic research has been done on their implementation, however, and signatories face few consequences for failing to uphold agreed principles.

#### Trade in light weapons

- The annual trade in light weapons is estimated to be USD 1.1 billion. This includes USD 755 million for anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs), USD 102 million for man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and USD 257 million for four types of non-guided light weapons.

- The international trade in MANPADS appears small. Only 18 of the 74 countries under review imported any MANPADS between 2003 and 2009, and only 12 imported more than 100 units. Given data limitations, however, these figures are probably underestimates.
- The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to significant increases in the procurement of anti-tank guided weapons. For example, the UK's imports of Javelin ATGWs from 2005 to 2009 exceeded total imports for the years 2000 to 2004 by 5,331 units—a 4,000 per cent increase.

### **Transparency**

- The 2011 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Serbia, and Romania as the most transparent of the major small arms and light weapons exporters.
- The 2011 Barometer identifies Iran and North Korea as the least transparent major exporters, with both scoring zero.

### **Top exporters and importers**

- In 2008 the top exporters of small arms and light weapons (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Austria, South Korea, Belgium, the Russian Federation, Spain, Turkey, Norway, and Canada.
- In 2008 the top importers of small arms and light weapons (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, France, and Pakistan.

### **Police use of emerging technology**

- While Western European police agencies still predominantly use 9 mm handguns for public order policing, US law enforcement agencies are procuring larger-calibre handguns and semi-automatic rifles to counter armed criminal violence.
- The latest generation of 'less-lethal' weapons allows police officers to engage targets that are farther away and provides them with more flexibility in the use of force across the spectrum from non-lethal to lethal.
- Use-of-force policies have not kept up with the procurement of some weapons technology by police organizations.

### **National regulation of civilian firearms possession**

- A fundamental distinction can be made between jurisdictions that regard civilian firearm ownership as a basic right and those that treat it as a privilege.
- Almost all states reviewed in the *Small Arms Survey 2011* prohibit or restrict civilian access to weapons that they consider ill-suited to civilian use.
- The vast majority of reviewed states have a system of licensing in place to prevent certain types of civilians from owning firearms. In making their assessments, however, many use considerable discretion, rather than following specific criteria.
- Many reviewed states register firearms or maintain a record of firearms owned; these states tend to have centralized systems of registration.
- Most reviewed states require civilians to have a 'genuine reason' for owning a weapon.
- Some reviewed states permit the possession of firearms for self-defence, while others explicitly refuse licence applications for such purposes.

### **Case study: Côte d'Ivoire**

- Research conducted in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 shows that contrary to common assumptions, state security providers do not perform much better than the rebels.
- Across Côte d'Ivoire, the population lacks confidence in its security forces; however, people within the Centre Nord Ouest (CNO) zone in the north exhibit a greater level of distrust in their Forces Nouvelles than do those living in the south with respect to the state security forces.
- The types of insecurity that prevail in the government-controlled area and the rebel-held zone are relatively similar, including banditry and resource-based conflict.
- Although the perception of insecurity in the rebel-run area is higher, civilians in the government zone are as likely to become victims of armed violence.

- While the majority of incidents of armed violence in the CNO zone are perpetrated with assault rifles, most incidents of armed violence in the government zone involve bladed weapons, followed by handguns and assault rifles.
- The deficiencies of the security forces combined with the level of insecurity have encouraged the emergence of a wide range of coping mechanisms, including community self-defence and vigilante groups, which in turn create new forms of insecurity. In addition, the private security sector has grown rapidly and without any form of regulation.
- Firearms possession is widespread and, unlike in other countries in the region, close to half of the population primarily considers firearms a means of protection.

#### **Case study: Haiti**

- Haiti lacks both human resources and infrastructural capacity to police its country. Its ratio of 1.05 police officers for every 1,000 inhabitants is among the lowest in the world.
- Household survey data generated since 2004 suggests that security has improved in Haiti over the past decade and has continued to improve since the 2010 earthquake. Police involvement in criminal activity, as reported by crime victims, decreased sharply after the transition to an elected government in 2007.
- Findings from surveys show that, in 2010, more than two-thirds of the general population would turn first to the police if faced with a threat to their person or property.
- The distribution of firearms in Haiti may be much lower than commonly believed. In 2010, just 2.3 per cent of Port-au-Prince area households reported owning firearms.
- In 2010, more than three-quarters of all respondents—both in the general population and residents of internally displaced person camps—said that more control over the issuing of firearms licences would make their communities safer.
- Despite considerable challenges in advancing police reform over the past decade, popular confidence in the Haitian National Police has increased since the earthquake.

#### **Case study: Madagascar**

- Madagascar's security sector is characterized by severely underpaid and ill-equipped regular forces, far too many high-ranking officers, and a mushrooming of special intervention units with questionable mandates.
- Madagascar's armed forces have been embroiled in struggles over political power and economic access to the country's wealth of resources since the 1970s.
- Collusion between elements of the country's security sector and both foreign and domestic business interests has sharply intensified since the political crisis of early 2009. In the resulting security vacuum, armed criminality is on the rise, rural banditry has expanded, and Madagascar is gaining in importance as an international trafficking hub.
- The state administration has encouraged the organization of neighbourhood watch initiatives and village self-defence groups; it has also turned a blind eye to the operations of highly aggressive indigenous private security companies that hunt down rural bandits.

#### **The UN small arms process**

- The UN small arms process has become increasingly structured, with biennial meetings, expert meetings, and review conferences now scheduled for the UN Programme of Action on small arms (PoA).
- A lack of commitment to the PoA and International Tracing Instrument on the part of many states is clear, underlined by the continued inability to agree on any type of formal, independent evaluation of implementation.
- The Arms Trade Treaty negotiations may be facing the same resistance to effective international arms control that the PoA has encountered to date.

#### **For more information, please contact:**

Small Arms Survey, Avenue Blanc 47, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

**t** +41 22 908 5777 • **f** +41 22 732 2738 • **e** sas@smallarmssurvey.org • **w** www.smallarmssurvey.org

Publication date: July 2011 • Paperback: ISBN 978-0-521-14686-9 • Hardback: ISBN 978-0-521-19712-0

**Copies may be purchased via [www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org) and online bookstores, including on [www.amazon.com](http://www.amazon.com).**

**Review copies available on request.**