Soldiers of the Forces Nouvelles wait for their chief in May 2009, prior to a ceremony in Bouaké marking the transfer of power from the comzones to government prefects.

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INTRODUCTION

On the eve of 2011, Côte d’Ivoire plunged into yet another deep political crisis. On the streets of Abidjan, the internationally recognized winner of the November 2010 presidential elections, former prime minister Alassane Ouattara, took refuge in the Golf Hotel. The incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, occupied the Presidential Palace, refusing to step down, while repeated clashes between security forces and political supporters in the capital claimed close to 200 lives in December 2010 (Munzu, 2011). The country ushered in the new year with two governments conducting business in parallel and operating in an atmosphere of mutual hostility and violence.

Among the factors influencing the wave of post-election violence is the failure to implement the security provisions of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA). The disarmament and demobilization of the rebels and the pro-ruling party militias, scheduled for completion two months prior to the elections, were far behind schedule. Meanwhile, the Integrated Command Center (ICC), a combined government–rebel force designed to serve as a pilot for the future ‘New Army’ and to provide security during the electoral process, has remained symbolic in nature, to the point that its existence is seriously jeopardized by the current political crisis.

The role of the military in Ivorian politics has become increasingly central since independence in 1960. Not only are today’s security forces involved in the current wave of violence, but control over them also represents an important factor in the ongoing political stand-off between Ouattara and Gbagbo. The security sector continues to be key to bringing the crisis to an end and reunifying the country, goals that depend to a large extent on a successful restructuring of the armed forces.

Since 2002, a ceasefire line has divided the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire into a rebel-held area in the north and the government-run south (see Map 7.1). The country is therefore subject to a very peculiar system of governance, with two security apparatuses, two treasuries, and two administrations. As such, Côte d’Ivoire presents a rare opportunity to study not only a complex process of post-conflict security sector reform, but also a dual system of security provision—by rebels on the one hand and an official state administration on the other. The main findings of the chapter include:

- Across Côte d’Ivoire, the population lacks confidence in its security forces; however, people within the Centre Nord Ouest (CNO) zone in the north exhibit a greater level of distrust in their Forces Nouvelles (FN) than do those living in the south with respect to the state security forces.
- The types of insecurity that prevail in the government-controlled area and the rebel-held zone are relatively similar, including banditry and resource-based conflict.
- Although the perception of insecurity in the rebel-run area is higher, civilians in the government zone are as likely to become victims of armed violence.
- While the majority of incidents of armed violence in the CNO zone are perpetrated with assault rifles, most incidents of armed violence in the government zone involve bladed weapons, followed by handguns and assault rifles.
The deficiencies of the security forces and the level of insecurity encourage civilians to provide their own security through community self-defence and vigilante groups, which in turn create new forms of insecurity. The private security sector has grown rapidly and without regulation.

So far, security sector reform efforts in Côte d’Ivoire have focused on the reunification of the security apparatus rather than on addressing the lack of democratic oversight, strategic objectives and professionalism, or logistical weaknesses of the security forces.

The creation of the new, unified armed forces has generated optimism comparable to that projected on the post-colonial military; however, 50 years later, new challenges have reduced the capacity of the military to be an ‘agent of modernization’.

The chapter begins with an outline of the political and security evolution of the country since its independence. It continues by analysing the two security sectors and their respective achievements as security providers. The chapter then explores the dynamics of insecurity in both zones and highlights the alternative civilian mechanisms that have been developed to address it. The final section of the chapter provides an assessment of the post-conflict reunification process of the national security sector and draws a parallel between the security transition at the time of independence and the current reform phase, which the country has timidly entered.

While the themes of security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), privatization of security, and regional peacekeeping dynamics have been widely explored in the context of English-speaking Africa, research on francophone Africa is less developed. Literature on the Ivorian security forces, for example, is scarce; not a single reference book is available on the Ivorian military or on the rebellion. The chapter therefore relies largely on field research carried out by the author in Côte d’Ivoire in February and March 2010 and draws on various methodological tools, including a national survey of 2,600 households, focus groups, and interviews conducted by the author with key informants. This chapter is intended to contribute to the developing literature on the topic.

THE PATH TO THE PRESENT

Since gaining independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has maintained strong ties with France, particularly in commerce and security. The tendency to rely on the former colonial power as the ‘guarantor of (its) sovereignty’ (Bagayoko, 2010, p. 16) through defence agreements, coupled with the determination of the political leadership to suppress any potential challenge to its authority, severely undermined the development of the military system of Côte d’Ivoire. Its limited operational capacity was clearly exposed in 2002, when rebels managed to seize control of a substantial part of the national territory. This section begins with a historical account of the crisis and then examines the evolution of the relationship between the military and the political leadership since independence.

A brief history of the crisis

In contrast to the majority of West African states and sub-Saharan French-speaking countries, Côte d’Ivoire experienced many years of political stability following its independence in 1960. The one-party system and the sizeable global market share of production and export of cocoa and coffee contributed to the country’s economic prosperity. Yet with the gradual erosion of the ‘Ivorian miracle’ brought on by economic recession in the 1980s and the succes-
sion of problems that followed the death of long-time president Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, severe political and community tensions emerged, rooted in fierce debates about ethnicity and identity.

Under the presidency of Henri Konan Bédié (1993–99), Houphouët-Boigny’s successor, the discourse of ethnic exclusion gave birth to the notion of *Ivoirité*, which sought to distinguish ‘true’ Ivorians from inhabitants of non-Ivorian origin (particularly from other countries of the sub-region). Tensions culminated in 1999 with the overthrow of Bédié in a military putsch that gave power to Gen. Robert Guéï for ten months (December 1999–October 2000). This
the beginning of a period of turmoil marked by further attempted coups and ‘the radicalization of political repression’ (Banégas, 2010, p. 367). The 2000 elections, in which Bédié (of the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire) and Alassane Ouattara (of the Rassemblement des Républicains) were barred from participating, were eventually won by Laurent Gbagbo (of the Front Populaire Ivoirien) after the other major candidate, Gen. Guéï, fled the country. Post-election violence claimed the lives of more than 200 and injured hundreds of people, the vast majority of whom were reportedly supporters of Ouattara’s party (HRW, 2001).

In September 2002, a group of 700 men, composed of soldiers exiled in Burkina Faso and others still serving in the Ivorian Army—the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI)—some of whom had participated in Guéï’s coup, launched a putsch to oust Gbagbo (ICG, 2003, p. 1). Having failed to capture Abidjan, the commercial capital, the mutineers retreated to Bouaké, formed the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, and seized control of several cities in the north of the country. The intervention of French troops under Opération Licorne (Operation Unicorn) thwarted a second attempt to capture Abidjan and the capital Yamoussoukro (ICG, 2003, p. 1). In November 2002, two other rebel groups emerged in the western part of the country, where they managed to seize control of several towns. Shortly afterwards, the three rebel groups joined to form the Forces Nouvelles, a movement that continues to control the CNO zone to this day. While the FN has a hold over roughly 60 per cent of the national territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1960</td>
<td>Independence from France; Félix Houphouët-Boigny becomes president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 October 1990</td>
<td>First multi-party elections are held; Houphouët-Boigny beats Laurent Gbagbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December 1993</td>
<td>Houphouët-Boigny dies and is succeeded by Henri Konan Bédié</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 December 1999</td>
<td>Bédié is overthrown in a coup d’état led by Gen. Robert Guéï</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2000</td>
<td>Gbagbo becomes president, defeating incumbent Guéï</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September 2002</td>
<td>Rebels seize control of the north following an attempted military coup to oust Gbagbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>As part of Opération Licorne, French troops deploy to intervene in the north-south conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 January 2003</td>
<td>Linas-Marcoussis Agreement: President Gbagbo and FN sign a compromise in Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May 2003</td>
<td>UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) is established to implement the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (UNSC, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July 2003</td>
<td>Government and FN sign an ‘End of War’ declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) replaces MINUCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>Ivorian loyalist forces attack French position in Bouaké; French troops destroy Ivorian military aircraft; UN imposes an arms embargo (UNSC, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–6 April 2005</td>
<td>Peacekeeping talks between government and rebels are held in Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 2007</td>
<td>Ouagadougou Political Agreement; Guillaume Soro, FN leader, becomes prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 2010</td>
<td>First round of presidential elections (already postponed six times since 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 2010</td>
<td>Second round of presidential elections: Gbagbo vs. Ouattara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December 2010</td>
<td>Electoral Commission declares victory for Ouattara (54 per cent of votes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December 2010</td>
<td>Constitutional Council declares victory for Gbagbo (51.45 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December 2010</td>
<td>Both candidates form respective governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 December 2010</td>
<td>First violent, post-electoral clashes between security forces and Ouattara supporters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Balint-Kurti, 2007, p. 16), the population density is much higher in the government-controlled areas in the south (RCI, 2009a, para. 291).

In June 2003, six months after the signing of the Linas–Marcoussis Peace Agreement in France (see Box 7.1), a buffer zone was imposed across the country and supervised by the Force Licorne in collaboration with soldiers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission and the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI). ECOWAS and MINUCI military personnel were subsequently integrated into the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which was deployed in 2004. Licorne remained under French command but was assigned a support role to UNOCI by UN Security Council Resolution 1721 (UNSC, 2006c).

In July 2003, a ceasefire was signed by both parties; since then, it has been breached repeatedly. In November 2004, for example, the loyalist forces—those who continue to support Gbagbo—launched an air strike on a French military base in rebel-held Bouaké, killing nine French soldiers. In retaliation, French troops destroyed the Ivorian military air fleet, which consisted of two Sukhoi aircraft as well as one MI-8 and five MI-24 helicopters (AFP, 2004), further deteriorating the Franco-Ivorian relationship. A few days later, French troops opened fire on a hostile crowd in Abidjan, killing several people and leading to violent anti-French riots, which hastened the departure of thousands of Western expatriates from the country. That same month, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the country (UNSC, 2004, para. 7).

While the period of actual armed conflict was relatively short—from September 2002 to July 2003—and did not affect all the regions, an estimated 3,000 people died and a further 750,000 were displaced (Duval Smith, 2010). A large part of the battles took place in the western part of the country, where people are still seriously suffering from the legacy of the conflict. Together with the region of Moyen Cavally, where ethnic tensions turned into deadly clashes after the 2010 presidential elections, Abidjan experienced the worst political violence in Côte d’Ivoire.

Politics and the armed forces

The Ivorian security apparatus emerged out of a peaceful transition from colonial power to the new independent government, rather than from a struggle for independence. Modelled on the French system, it was largely influenced by the French Fifth Republic’s interpretations of the balance of power. That model was characterized by very strong executive power and limited parliamentary control over the security sector, as clearly reflected in the Ivorian constitutional provisions of 1960 and 2000. The Ivorian president ‘is the guardian of national independence and of the sovereign integrity of the country’, is the Supreme Commander in Chief, and is authorized to take ‘exceptional measures’ in times of crisis (RCI, 2000, arts. 34, 47, 48). Some analysts claim that this institutional arrangement may encourage authoritarian rule (Bagayoko, 2010, p. 18; N’Diaye, 2010, p. 88).

Houphouët-Boigny maintained a modest army that he paid well to prevent any kind of challenge to his power. He also integrated certain higher-ranking officers into positions of administrative responsibility in the government and in state-owned companies (Conte, 2004, p. 11; Kieffer, 2000, p. 30). On succeeding Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, Bédié relied heavily on the police and the gendarmerie for support and marginalized the army. While Houphouët-Boigny had attempted to achieve a regional balance of military staff, Bédié reserved key positions for officers of his own ethnic group, the Baoulé from central Côte d’Ivoire. This further deepened the gap between the president and an army that was made up largely of people from the west and north of the country (Kieffer, 2000, pp. 33, 36). Security forces thus became increasingly divided into specific ethnic groups, reflecting the mounting identity-related tensions that were rippling through wider Ivorian society at the time. The frustration of the officers culminated in...
the putsch of 1999 (Kieffer, 2000, p. 36), marking the official entry of the military onto the political stage. During the period of military transition led by Gen. Guéï, there was a notable surge in the establishment of militias within the army, each of which reflected specific political sympathies (R. Ouattara, 2008, pp. 76–7).

After Gbagbo’s arrival in power, internal struggles and parallel chains of command continued to develop, exposed by several mutinies and the attempted coup of 2002. To suppress any further potential challenge to the regime, the president, of Bété origin, undertook a bétisation of key positions in the armed forces and sponsored the rapid promotion of young officers to ensure their loyalty (Boisbouvier, 2005). In order to cope with the military weaknesses and to confront the rebellion, the government resorted to private security actors such as foreign mercenaries (Banégas, 2010, p. 361). Furthermore, coercive power was increasingly being handed to both pro-government militias and state paramilitary forces; between 2002 and 2009, the size of the gendarmerie nearly doubled, from 8,000 to 15,000 (Mieu, 2009a) while their operating zone was divided in half along with the division of the country (see Map 7.1).

Other types of paramilitary forces also emerged. One is the Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité (CECOS), an elite unit of 600 personnel from different security forces; created by presidential decree in 2005, CECOS is commanded by a senior officer from the gendarmerie and armed with FANCI small arms and light weapons (Mieu, 2009a; RTI, 2010a). While CECOS was originally set up to fight organized crime, it has occasionally been assigned
other missions, such as providing security at elections or crowd control at demonstrations, illustrating the lack of a clearly defined mission for the security forces. Finally, as in most former French colonies, the Republican Guard—known as the Presidential Guard in some countries—is also an important asset of the regime. Though well equipped, it is not typically accountable to military authorities and therefore constitutes one of ‘the major symptoms of the system of competing security agencies and parallel chains of command which characterise the military in Francophone Africa’ (Bagayoko, 2010, p. 29).

The historically rooted rivalries among the different security forces are evident today; while the gendarmerie is regarded as loyalist, the military is still viewed by those in power as a potential threat to the regime (Bagayoko, 2010, p. 40). During the jubilee celebration of independence in 2010, President Gbagbo addressed the last part of his speech to the army officers attending the event, warning them: ‘If I fall, [the officers] fall, too. Some people think that a coup is easy! It is a building supported by several pillars. If you try to make it fall, pillars will fall, too’ (Gbagbo, 2010). The 2010 post-electoral crisis revealed how control over the army played an important role in the political stand-off between Gbagbo and Ouattara. It also showed that the better-armed and more highly trained ‘elite’ bodies of the security forces commanded by pro-Gbagbo officers—such as the Republican Guard, CECOS, and the presidential security teams—were crucial to his strategy of staying in power (Airault, Kouamouo, and Meunier, 2011).

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SECURITY SYSTEMS

Côte d’Ivoire has been divided in two since 2002 and has been subjected to a very peculiar system of security governance made of two distinct security mechanisms. The following sections examine the fragmentation of the security system and its impact on the capacity of the armed forces as security providers.

The decline of the state security sector

The economic recession and the politico-military crisis that the country has endured since 1999 have had an enormous impact on the security sector. Today’s security forces lack the capacity and ability to protect people and their assets; corruption and impunity are widespread; and the justice system is non-functional.

The security infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire is a near carbon copy of the French system. The main security providers are the army and law enforcement agencies—the police and gendarmerie (see Table 7.1). The police operate as a civilian force under the Ministry of the Interior, providing security in urban zones, while the gendarmerie operates as a military body under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence and is responsible for security in rural areas. Yet the mandates of the different bodies overlap and all conduct general policing tasks. In addition, the geographical boundaries that used to separate the police from the gendarmerie have vanished such that it is no longer uncommon to see gendarmes operating alongside police at urban checkpoints.

Previously, each force was supplied with different types of weapons; today these distinctions no longer apply. The crisis ensured a redistribution of weapons among the police, customs, and water and forestry guards, all of whom were armed with assault rifles in support of the army. These weapons are still carried by police on the streets, due in part to the lack of handguns, whose acquisition the 2004 embargo rendered illegal.

The political crisis has largely destabilized the state security sector and has weakened its capacity; security forces have fallen victim to institutional corruption and lack technical and material resources, training, and discipline.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body</th>
<th>Supervising ministry</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons and conventional weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons; air fleet not operational since 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms and conventional weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons and conventional weapons (Bagayoko, 2010, p. 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>17,000 (11% of whom are women)</td>
<td>Non-military</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and forestry</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms (R. Ouattara, 2008, pp. 81–82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Small arms (R. Ouattara, 2008, p. 81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECOS</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Mixed unit</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *This table presents the most recent available estimates for each security body.*


Following the collapse of the economy, military positions are now highly coveted and recruitment is largely based on nepotism (Kieffer, 2000, p. 34). The armed forces are seen as a refuge from unemployment and have thus undergone ‘socio-economic ethnicization’ (A. Ouattara, 2008, p. 165).

Racketeering and bribery, frequent at security checkpoints, have been identified by the Chamber of Commerce in Abidjan as among the primary causes of a rise in the general costs of living. This criminal activity reduces the competitiveness of Ivorian products and encourages the diversion of international goods to other ports. Racketeering also brings with it serious security implications as agents neglect their primary missions to engage in it; the activity is also associated with violence against women and racism and discrimination against foreigners (Touré, 2008, p. 10). Finally, when security forces demand bribes for completing their tasks, the concept of security as a public good is undermined. The inhabitants of Abidjan, for example, generally have to pay CECOS to respond to their calls for assistance.

While the security sector fails to protect the population, the security of the country as a whole is not assured either. Although the Liberian conflict ended in 2003, customs authorities have not yet redeployed their forces to the central-western border, as this would require the provision of important logistical and financial resources.
the northern border are also non-existent and cross-border cooperation in the sub-region remains limited. Cross-border trafficking, including of weapons, fuels the instability of the country.

While the mandate and performance of the security forces require urgent review, so does the entire justice system. In Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, there was one tribunal for every two million people and one magistrate for every 40,000 inhabitants (RTI, 2010b). The lack of tribunals, coupled with high fees, widespread corruption, and a low level of public awareness of relevant laws, repeatedly calls into question the population’s access to justice (RCI, 2009a, p. 25). The result is a greater reliance on traditional mechanisms of justice and mediation. One provincial chief says that ‘modern justice is too expensive and slow’; people regularly seek his rulings on cases of adultery, land conflict, and acts of violence.15

Further, prisons within the government zone are overcrowded and lack security. For example, although Abidjan’s Centre for Detention and Correction was designed to hold approximately 1,500 detainees, it held more than 5,100 inmates by 2009 (LIDHO, 2010, p. 2). In addition, custody periods can be long, with people often waiting several months before going to court.14 According to the penal authorities, 176 inmates escaped from 22 detention centres in the government zone in 2009 (RCI, 2009b).
The Forces Nouvelles

Since 2002, the Forces Nouvelles have dominated the northern part of the country, which is divided into ten zones, each controlled by a military commander called a comzone (commandant de zone). In 2004, the FN counted around 25,000 armed members (ICG, 2004, p. 25). According to the census conducted by the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation (Programme national de réinsertion et de réhabilitation communautaire) in 2009, FN strength is approaching 33,000 people, including both combatants and non-combatants. These figures are most probably inflated, as is common in similar post-conflict settings where non-state armed groups seek to gain greater political leverage and positions in the army in the event of integration with the national security forces. Indeed, only one-third of the 33,000 Forces Nouvelles members would be able to fight; the majority are too young, too old, or otherwise unsuitable to fight as combatants (ICG, 2009, p. 10).

The FN authorities comprise a civilian secretariat and a general staff that control the FN Armed Forces (Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles, FAFN). The ten comzones constitute the FN’s ‘military powerbase’ (UNSC, 2009, para. 35). Under his command, each comzone has a ‘small private army’ whose role it is to maintain territorial control over each zone (UNSC, 2009, para. 36; see Table 7.2). A total of 3,000 soldiers make up these different teams (ICG, 2009, p. 10).

While the comzones and their respective security outfits are specific to the FAFN, the configuration of the rebel forces in Côte d’Ivoire is to some extent based on the FANCI model. Indeed, FANCI soldiers who defected and formed the FAFN were able to share their knowledge of the regular army; they have comparable military ranks, their arsenals are very similar (see Box 7.2), and the FAFN often use former FANCI barracks and armouries as their own. Moreover, the FN system for the provision of security is almost exclusively based on the military. Yet it seems that the FN police
and gendarmerie may not serve much more than a symbolic purpose, namely to give the impression of a regular, functioning security presence.

Since the FN never intended to secede from the country, the movement has not created a new legislative apparatus. While the FN secretariat is made up of different ‘cells’, including justice, education, and environment, it appears to be inefficient. For example, it is impossible to obtain administrative documents such as birth certificates or to apply for a gun licence. In contrast, the FN economic system is reasonably organized; the central treasury of the FN administers an efficient taxation system on trade and transport and cities such as Korhogo represent genuine economic centres that attract foreign investment, in particular from Burkina Faso and Mali.

The judicial system has also suffered from the division of the country, which has left many of the security and judicial structures non-functional. Despite the partial redeployment of administrative and judicial authorities to the north of the country in 2010, the FN continues to settle disputes and dispense justice (UNOCI, 2009, p. 16). Many focus group participants in Odienné reported that whenever they faced a problem, they first went to the district chief and, if he was unable to resolve the issue, they turned to the FN brigade. One participant explained: ‘The FN brigade sends people […] but you pay a price. You know there’ll be no prison sentence so things will be “settled”.’

In the region of 18 Montagnes, one FN commandant de secteur (comsecteur) commented that:

> We are doing everything we can to keep people safe, and we are keeping criminals locked in cells until the prison reopens. The comzone used to help us to transfer people to Bouaké, where there is a prison, but it’s not easy because you need a truck, fuel, and personnel.

Table 7.2 The ten comzones and their ‘small private armies’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Comzone</th>
<th>Alias</th>
<th>Military unit name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bouna</td>
<td>Morou Ouattara</td>
<td>Atchenqué</td>
<td>Atchenqué</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Katiola</td>
<td>Touré Hervé Pélikan</td>
<td>Vetcho/Che Guevara</td>
<td>Bataillon mystique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bouaké</td>
<td>Chériif Ousmane</td>
<td>Guépard</td>
<td>Les Guépards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mankono</td>
<td>Ouattara Zoumana</td>
<td>Zoua</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Séguéla</td>
<td>Ouattara Issiaka</td>
<td>Wattao</td>
<td>Anaconda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Losseni Fofana</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Cobra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Touba</td>
<td>Traoré Dramane</td>
<td>Dramane Touba</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Odienné</td>
<td>Ousmane Coulibaly</td>
<td>Ben Laden</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Boundiali</td>
<td>Koné Gaoussou</td>
<td>Jah Gao</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Korhogo</td>
<td>Martin Kouakou Fofié</td>
<td>Fofié</td>
<td>Fansara 110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNSC (2009, p. 16)

We are doing everything we can to keep people safe, and we are keeping criminals locked in cells until the prison reopens. The comzone used to help us to transfer people to Bouaké, where there is a prison, but it’s not easy because you need a truck, fuel, and personnel.

In the region of 18 Montagnes, one FN commandant de secteur (comsecteur) commented that:

When it gets to our level, we come to an amicable agreement. We have no criminal procedure. The civilian prison is not open because there is no criminal procedure, so we ‘relocate the problem’, for example, by escorting people to the border.
Box 7.2 Weapons used by government and rebel forces

A significant number of the weapons in the armouries of the Ivorian defence and security forces are French, evidence of the two countries' long history of military cooperation. Indeed, up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, France was Côte d'Ivoire's main commercial partner for military materiel (see Table 7.3). In the aftermath of the cold war, former Soviet states found themselves in possession of important stockpiles of surplus materiel and conflict zones in West Africa offered a lucrative market (Berman, 2007, p. 4). Expert reports confirm that military equipment has been imported into the country in violation of the arms embargo of 2004.

The FAFN arsenal is comparable to that of the state security forces. With the partition of the country in 2002, the FAFN rebels not only laid their hands on armouries in the CNO zone, but also seized weapons left on the battlefield and guns left behind by police officers, gendarmes, and FANCI, who had abandoned them as they fled from the north to the government-held area. Some differences in arsenals indicate that the FAFN may have acquired weapons from alternative sources. Specifically, Russian, Sudanese, and two other unidentified types of ammunition have been found in FAFN stocks, accounting for a large part of their 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition (UNSC, 2009, paras. 138, 144). The fact that the serial numbers have been removed from thousands of assault rifles in their possession suggests that a foreign state may have been involved in arming the rebels (UNSC, 2009, para. 130). In terms of quantities, however, ‘despite a lack of airpower, state security forces have overwhelming superiority in arms, ammunitions and military equipment over the Forces nouvelles’ (UNSC, 2009, para. 32).

Finally, both sides suffer from weak stockpile management; several explosions of armouries have been reported and weapons have been diverted from stocks in the north and in the south in the past few years (RASALAO-CI, 2008; Abidjan.net, 2010). Visits to different armouries in 2010 showed that basic security rules were not respected and facilities were in poor condition. Reunification of the armed forces would demand significant efforts in terms of securing and managing stockpiles.

Table 7.3 Key state security weaponry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>Handguns</td>
<td>MAB pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>ARM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Type 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Type 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAS 49/56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAT 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIG 540 and 543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AKM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AK-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General-purpose machine guns</td>
<td>Heavy machine guns</td>
<td>NSV 12.7 mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DSHK 12.7 mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPV 14.5 mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Automatic grenade launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MANPADS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author interview with a member of the UN Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009), Abidjan, February 2010
Perceptions of security forces

Human rights organizations in Côte d’Ivoire have repeatedly denounced the atmosphere of impunity in the country. They cite, on the one hand, weak logistical capacity, ethics, and professionalism within the security sector and, on the other, a general reluctance on the part of the population to report crimes, exposing a widespread lack of confidence in the security apparatus.

The national survey and focus groups conducted in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 have revealed that the population harbours contradictory feelings towards the security forces. A significant part of the population has no trust in the security forces; nevertheless, people generally advocate an increase in the number of security posts throughout the territory as the first step in combating insecurity and illicit weapons circulation.

The low standing of the security forces may be influenced by the abuses committed by both the government and FN forces during the conflict that erupted in 2002. According to Amnesty International, both sides committed serious human rights violations, particularly against women (AI, 2008, p. 24). The decision of the parties not to set up a transitional justice mechanism to deal with the violations committed during the war has contributed to the widespread sense of impunity.

In fact, there is a fundamental lack of confidence in the security forces across the entire territory. Only 45 per cent of those in the government zone who responded to the household survey would report having been the victim of violent crime to the security forces in the hope that something would be done (see Figure 7.1). In the CNO zone, the percentage is significantly lower at 27 per cent, with almost the same percentage of respondents choosing to leave their fate ‘in God’s hands’. While a lack of trust in the security authorities clearly discourages people from reporting acts of criminality, the survey reveals that the long distances that separate people from their nearest security posts, especially within the CNO zone, is also a major discouraging factor.

For those who participated in the focus groups in the CNO zone, the security situation has largely deteriorated since the eruption of the war and the subsequent partition of the country. When household survey participants living in the CNO zone were asked about ways of combating the illicit circulation of weapons, the most popular responses were to ‘complete DDR’ (28.2 per cent, n=604) and ‘redeploy state authority’ (16.8 per cent, n=604). Many participants

Figure 7.1 Responses to victimization

Responses (percentage) to the question ‘What course of action would you take if you had been the victim of a violent crime?’ in the government zone (n=1,782) and in the CNO zone (n=658)

Source: Murray (2010)
in the north also expressed hope for an improved security situation once state security forces had restored control over the rebel-held areas.

The results of the national household survey show that the most trusted authorities nationwide are traditional ones—the chiefs in particular—as they are generally identified as being more efficient and accessible than security forces (Murray, 2010).

**INSECURITY IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE**

The crisis and the resulting weak security governance have provided fertile ground for armed violence and criminality to flourish. This section compares the scope and types of insecurity in the government- and rebel-held zones. It assesses the validity of the commonly held assumption that insecurity—both real and perceived—are greater in areas held by the rebels.

**Figure 7.2 Principal concerns**

Three principal concerns cited by the respondents to the national survey in the government zone (n=1,808) and in the CNO zone (n=673)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concern</th>
<th>Government zone</th>
<th>CNO zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to drinking water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High prices of goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of health facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of education facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Murray (2010)
Insecurity: a primary concern for the population

An analysis of the data acquired from the 2010 national household survey identifies insecurity as one of respondents’ primary concerns, along with a lack of access to basic needs such as drinking water, electricity, and food (see Figure 7.2). Yet, while insecurity is the second most frequently cited problem in the government zone, it ranks fifth for those in the CNO zone. Respondents in the CNO zone primarily reported concerns related to access to water, electricity, a lack of road and transport facilities, and the need for hospitals and medical supplies. Indeed, since independence, the northern part of the country has benefited far less from investment; public infrastructure there has suffered greatly from the partition of the country and the absence of any public administration (RCI, 2009a, pp. 21–23).

People living within the CNO zone do not generally identify insecurity as one of their primary concerns; nevertheless, the overall sense of insecurity is higher in the CNO zone than it is in the government zone, especially outside the home (see Figure 7.3).

The ‘victimization’ section of the survey indicates that people are as likely to fall victim to armed violence in the government-run areas as in those held by rebels. As in many other countries, criminality is higher in towns and cities than in the countryside. With an estimated six million inhabitants, Abidjan experiences types of criminality common in big cities (RCI, 2009a, p. 64; see Table 7.4).

Both of the major hotspots in terms of insecurity are in the southern part of the territory: Abidjan and the Moyen Cavally. Western Côte d’Ivoire, which suffered more from the war and its aftermath than other parts of the country, is divided into the two regions of 18 Montagnes (rebel-held) and Moyen Cavally (state-held). Insecurity appears to be particularly high in Moyen Cavally (ICG, 2010a, pp. 10–11); the region has a high incidence of violent armed highway robberies around Guiglo and aggravated burglaries in towns (HRW, 2010, pp. 31, 34). Moyen Cavally’s security situation is threatened by active armed militias and by tensions between communities of different origins. Weapons are in high circulation and law and order is almost non-existent (p. 6). The region is also one of the main producers of cocoa, wood, and coffee and is therefore a major hub for the transport of cash and goods, which attracts highway criminals.

Figure 7.3  Perceptions of insecurity

Percentage of respondents who said that they ‘did not feel at all secure’ by location (inside the home or outside), period (day or night), and zone (government zone: n=1,823; CNO zone: n=673)

Source: Murray (2010)
Criminal statistics are scarce in Côte d’Ivoire, making it difficult to build any comprehensive security picture. Indeed, while there is a comparatively large amount of institutional data on Abidjan, the only available data in the CNO zone comes from UN agencies. The UN Police, for example, collates criminal statistics from its 21 stations across the country. While their monitoring system does not provide an exhaustive record of criminal activity, it is nevertheless able to identify trends. As such, it indicates that the incidence of crimes is particularly high in Abidjan and in the western part of the country (see Table 7.5).

### Types of insecurity

Côte d’Ivoire is subject to many types of insecurity that are common in post-conflict countries that have not yet completed their transition to peace: economic and criminal violence, sexual violence, post-war displacements and disputes, political violence, and violence related to law enforcement (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 53). Types of insecurity found in the government zone do not differ significantly from those found in the rebel-held area. The typology of insecurity presented here draws on results from the household survey as well focus groups.

**Banditry.** Available institutional data and the national survey identify banditry as the primary source of insecurity. Armed robbery—including theft at home and outside, and organized armed banditry—represents a plague in Côte d’Ivoire; even though the phenomenon existed well before the war, the conflict certainly exacerbated it. The difficult economic situation, the security vacuum, and the unrestricted circulation of weapons all influence the incidence of crime. The nature of criminal acts committed within the government zone mirrors, to a considerable extent, those

### Table 7.4 Crimes reported to the Criminal Police in the district of Abidjan, 2004–09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crimes</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of crimes</td>
<td>5,045</td>
<td>5,479</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>3,472</td>
<td>3,267</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>22,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary homicides</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft—all categories</td>
<td>4,409</td>
<td>5,294</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>19,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed robberies or violent robberies</td>
<td>3,539</td>
<td>4,653</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>15,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed burglaries</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on private vehicles</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>2,312</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>7,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on taxis</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>5,740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Criminal Police (2005–10)

### Table 7.5 Acts of armed violence reported to UN Police stations in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abidjan</th>
<th>Western zone*</th>
<th>Eastern zone*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed robberies</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “UN Police-designated western and eastern zones are mixed areas controlled by both government and rebel forces.

Source: UNPOL (2009)
committed in the CNO zone; basic theft is the most frequently reported crime in both zones, followed by highway robberies (see Figure 7.4).

When individuals who had reported a member of their household as a victim of armed violence in 2009 were asked about the types of weapons used in those acts, participants in the CNO zone indicated that assault rifles were primarily used (65 per cent of cases, n=113). In the government zone, where 29 per cent (n=350) cited assault rifles, bladed weapons (50 per cent) and handguns (38 per cent) were reported more used.

**Gender-based violence.** According to several organizations working in this area, sexual and gender-based violence takes various forms in Côte d’Ivoire, from domestic violence to female genital mutilation (FGM), human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and sexual violence. While examples of all of these can be found in both the north and the south of Côte d’Ivoire, there are two main distinctions to be noted: cases of FGM are much more prevalent in the northern territories than in the southern areas and armed sexual violence committed in gangs seems to be particularly prevalent in the south-western part of the country, as an extension of highway robberies. In the western part of the country in particular, the population complains about the absence of security forces.

**Resource-based conflict.** Land is a perennial focus of dispute in Côte d’Ivoire. Tensions over resources are common within families and communities in every part of the country (Chauveau, 2000, p. 99); the most extreme manifestations can occasionally turn into deadly clashes. While the spotlight may be on the fertile western part of the country, site of serious violence and ethnic tensions both before and during the crisis, the remainder of the country has not escaped resource-based conflict. In the CNO zone, for example, tensions between farmers and cattle breeders revolve around access to water and land (Diallo, 2007).

**Violence linked to the electoral process.** The series of violent events sparked by the electoral disputes of February 2010 destroyed the relative calm that had settled over the country following the signing of the OPA. Riots flared up in many towns after the dissolution of both the electoral commission and the government; in some places the security forces brutally crushed these uprisings, leaving 13 people dead and more than 100 injured (including at
least 76 civilians and 18 members of the state security forces (UNOCI, 2010a, p. ii). Both the north and south of the country also experience other forms of political violence, including arbitrary detentions of political activists and clashes between members of different political parties (UNOCI, 2009, pp. 4, 6). Political violence climaxed in Côte d’Ivoire in December 2010 in the south of the country during the immediate post-electoral period, when more than 170 people were killed and many more injured in five days (AFP, 2010b).

Security forces as vectors of insecurity. Both sets of security forces committed significant human rights violations during the crisis (AI, 2008, p. 22). Even though the level of violence is significantly lower than during the conflict, national and international human rights organizations regularly denounce the violations committed by state and rebel security forces and the impunity they enjoy (HRW, 2010, p. 21).35

The state forces—army, gendarmerie, and police—all report to the military tribunal; data released by this institution provides an account of the kind of crimes committed by members of the state security forces. Between 2002 and 2008, 1,448 cases of significant human rights violations were established by the military tribunal, including rapes, homicides, grievous bodily harm, and illegal confinement. In addition, the tribunal has dealt with 9,014 offences against personal property, including racketeering, theft, swindling, and abuse of trust (Djipro, 2009; Kohon, 2009). This data reflects only reported cases in the government-held area; the reality is likely to be much worse. As noted above, a lack of trust in the security forces deters civilians from reporting most crimes to the police; with respect to crimes committed by the security forces, reporting is probably even more infrequent.

Evidence indicates that security forces use force in a disproportionate manner. Statistics from the national Criminal Police reveal that between 2006 and 2009 security forces in Abidjan and the surrounding areas killed 416 bandits,
more than 30 per cent of whom were killed by CECOS (Criminal Police, 2007–10). This figure is almost twice as high as the number of reported homicides committed by civilians in Abidjan during the same period (Criminal Police, 2007–10). The types of weapons used by law enforcement agencies are of concern as well; the director of the National Police asserted that assault rifles were not appropriate for police missions as they cause ‘immeasurable damage’. In its 2009 report, the National Human Rights Commission of Côte d’Ivoire denounced the ‘ease’ with which the state security forces used firearms as having ‘nothing to do with their concern to protect human life in the heart of the action’ (CNDHCI, 2010, p. 14). The suppression of the demonstrations in February 2010 and December 2010 are good examples of this.

Many of the same types of abuses are perpetrated in the FN-held part of the country; however, some drivers of violence are specific to the area. UNOCI’s Human Rights Section reports on cases of illegal occupation of homes, homicide, extortion, arbitrary arrest, and mistreatment (UNOCI, 2009, pp. 6–10). The near absence of any judicial system—evidenced by the lack of tribunals and the closing of most prisons—has encouraged the FN to expedite justice. CNO zone survey respondents identified demobilized FAFN members among the main perpetrators of armed violence. Specifically, 32.4 per cent cited ex-combatants as primary perpetrators of armed violence, second after bandits (67.9 per cent, n=564).

Finally, the exploitation of resources in the northern part of the country is also a cause of violent tensions. Over the past two years, competition within the FN has repeatedly led to deadly local clashes (Zobo, 2009; AFP, 2010a). Some observers refer to the comzones as ‘war lords’ who reign over natural resources and are reluctant to end the crisis as it would result in a loss of revenue and status (UNSC, 2009, paras. 34–35).

COPING MECHANISMS: RESORTING TO NON-STATE SECURITY PROVIDERS

The security vacuum, in terms of both national defence and domestic order, encourages individuals and indeed whole communities to use their own means of countering insecurity. A wide range of coping mechanisms and armed actors have emerged, calling into question the state monopoly on force and the role of arms control measures. To some extent, these initiatives constitute new sources of insecurity. This section looks at the different types of non-state security providers.

Community self-defence: vigilantes and mob justice

The large distances between security posts and the inefficiency of the security forces have led communities to organize vigilante groups and to dispense mob justice. Vigilantes emerged long before the crisis; today they are responsible for security in villages or urban areas in every region in Côte d’Ivoire (R. Ouattara, 2008, p. 83). They are often equipped with firearms and usually hail from the community that they are charged to protect. Village vigilantes occasionally work in collaboration with the nearby security forces; the village chief provides a list of group members to representatives of the security forces.

Despite their ostensible role in providing community security, authorities have condemned certain elements of these armed groups for abuses, such as the administration of arbitrary justice. Mob justice is indeed widespread in Côte d’Ivoire (Galy, 2004, p. 118); however, it seems that the practice is more prevalent in the more urbanized government zone, where traditional authorities play a lesser role (see Figure 7.5). This finding highlights that where they are prevalent, traditional authorities continue to represent an important regulatory force.
**The dozos—traditional hunters**

*Dozos* are a traditional brotherhood of hunters; like other traditional hunters in the West African sub-region under Mandé influence (Hellweg, 2006, pp. 466–67), they claim to possess mystical powers and to be tasked with protecting the population. They are sometimes organized into vigilante groups and employed by communities. *Dozos* generally consider it part of their identity to carry a weapon and therefore reject calls for gun licences. A census conducted in 1999 provided an estimate of at least 42,000 hunters with 32,000 rifles among them (Basset, 2004, p. 43; see Box 7.3).

*Dozos* mainly belong to social groups from northern Côte d’Ivoire and were credited with playing a significant role in maintaining public order and fighting criminality during the recession of the 1990s, making them relatively popular (Basset, 2004, p. 32). When criminality rose, villages formed their own vigilante groups and urban communities called on the *dozos* to protect their districts (Basset, 2004, p. 31; Badou, 1997). The association representing them at that time campaigned, in vain, for the *dozos* to be awarded the status of ‘auxiliary security forces’ (Badou, 1997).

Throughout history, political leaders have either marginalized the *dozos* or attempted to assimilate them and benefit from their popularity (Basset, 2004, p. 39). In 2002, numerous *dozos* joined the rebellion (Hellweg, 2006, p. 467), controlling small towns and villages and preventing infiltration by loyalists.

Today, many *dozos* continue to work as guardians throughout the country. In Moyen Cavally, the *dozos* also guard and protect communities where the majority of inhabitants are originally from the north (ICG, 2010a, p. 11). Others are also employed by private security companies (Kouamé, 2009). Yet certain *dozos* have been known to abuse their positions, for example by arresting people arbitrarily and mistreating them (UNOCI, 2009, pp. 1, 6).

**The militias**

The outburst of hostilities in 2002 spawned the creation of a multitude of militias in the southern part of the country, particularly in the south-west and in Abidjan. These bands have evolved within the *galaxie patriotique*, a system of groups that support the ruling party of President Gbagbo, and ‘intersect depending on the spirit of the moment’ (Les milices bors Abidjan, 2009). There are two main types of militias: the armed militias of the western part of the country and the groups of ‘young patriots’ based in Abidjan, usually armed with bladed and blunt weapons.

The 20,000-strong militias from the west of the country (ICG, 2009, p. 1) were armed and funded by the ruling party and trained by state security forces whom they supported during the civil war and who helped them defend.
the south (Banégas, 2008, p. 7; ICG, 2010a, p. 11; Konadjé, 2008, p. 8). These militias also received the support of combatants from the anti-Charles Taylor Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (Ero and Marshall, 2003, p. 96). In 2005, the most important Wé militias from the west[^41] formed the Force de Résistance du Grand Ouest (Resistance Forces of the Great West).

Despite peace agreements stipulating that they should be disarmed and dismantled—through the ‘disarmament and dismantlement of militias’ (DDM) programme—before the elections, the militias are still armed, posing a serious threat to security in the post-electoral period (ICG, 2009, p. 1). ‘The chains of command are still intact’, affirmed the head of one of the main militias, adding that ‘even if a member has been disarmed, he still considers himself part of a self-defence group’[^42]. So far, the DDM programme is far from being a success (see Box 7.4). The absence of economic opportunities causes frustration among groups of young people at risk; indeed, almost 90 per cent of militia members are reportedly 24–35 years old ([Les milices hors Abidjan](#), 2009). Several civil society organizations have suggested that there is a link between the prevalence of armed violence in the western part of the country and the presence of numerous armed young people with no source of income.[^43] Within this context, observers have also pointed to the abject poverty of militia members (Banégas, 2008, p. 15; UNSC, 2009, para. 112).
Today, the militias claim to play their part by punishing criminals, protecting the population from potential attack by the FN, and defending them against *allochtones* (Ivorians from other regions) and *allogènes* (foreigners). The immediate post-electoral period in 2010 witnessed serious ethnic tensions resulting in deadly clashes between militia members and *allogènes*. Some analysts have attributed the failure to dismantle the militias to the government’s strategy of retaining these forces in case of future conflict with the FN (UNSC, 2009, para. 121).

The *galaxie patriotique* also includes urban groups of young people such as the Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes (Pan-African Congress of Young Patriots, COJEP). In 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the group’s leader, Charles Blé Goudé, for calling for violence against foreigners and UN staff and for directing and participating in acts of violence committed by street militias (UNSC, 2006a). Human rights organizations have also denounced violent acts committed by the Ivorian Student Federation (FESCI) and the impunity that its members enjoy. While these groups do not generally carry firearms, they represent a real threat as a vast force that can be mobilized quickly and that are potentially difficult for the international peacekeeping forces to contain or suppress in case of confrontation.
Private security companies

While some private security companies (PSCs) had already appeared by the 1970s, the insecurity caused by the political crisis and civil war has been a driving force for the expansion of the sector. Indeed, since the wave of violence that targeted Westerners in 2004, the sector has grown rapidly and without regulation. Côte d’Ivoire has witnessed an increasing privatization of its security sector, which now includes more than 400 companies employing more than 55,000 people and accounting for more than XOF 50 billion (USD 100 million) in revenue in 2008 (Kan, 2009). PSCs are located in every region of Côte d’Ivoire but the overwhelming majority are found in the southern urbanized regions of the country. The primary responsibilities of these PSCs include the protection of private houses, shops, companies, and banks, as well as the guarding of mines and the provision of bodyguards.

PSCs fill part of the security vacuum; the principal companies are better equipped in communications and transportation than the police and are therefore able to react faster and more efficiently (Mieu, 2009b). While PSCs have the right to possess non-lethal weapons, legislation stipulates that only cash-in-transit personnel and bodyguards (two types of staff that only a few Ivorian PSCs provide) are entitled to carry firearms. Nevertheless, most PSC personnel carry various kinds of firearms illegally, given that PSCs make more of a profit by providing the services of armed security guards than unarmed ones. Illegal weapon carrying persists largely due to a lack of logistical capacity and the reluctance of the authorities to enforce the law. Indeed, while it is difficult to identify the owners of the PSCs, it is clear that some politicians and former military officers are among those involved in this very profitable business (Kougniazondé, 2010, p. 12).

Box 7.3 Civilian weapons ownership

Arms possession in Côte d’Ivoire is widespread and is to a large extent considered ‘traditional’, particularly in rural zones where hunting is a primary means of subsistence. Hunting is particularly popular in the savanna region, in the CNO zone. Unlike other countries of the region, such as Liberia or Burundi, where the majority of the population regards weapons as a source of danger (Gilgen and Nowak, 2011; Pézard and de Tessières, 2009, pp. 108–09), close to half of the sample interviewed in Côte d’Ivoire (n=2,424) consider firearms primarily a means of protection (49.3 per cent).

A lack of accurate data makes rates of ownership difficult to estimate; between 1989 and 2010, the authorities only issued 2,598 gun licences. Fieldwork suggests that firearms are much more widespread and that the vast majority are held illegally. While people from the CNO zone identify hunting as the primary motivation for gun carrying, insecurity and criminal activities together are strong motivating factors in the government-run area (see Figure 7.6).

Figure 7.6 Motivations for gun carrying

First answer given (percentage) to the question ‘What are the principal reasons why people in your locality (except security forces) carry firearms?’ in the government zone (n=1,602) and in CNO zone (n=605)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government zone</th>
<th>CNO zone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Banditry</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Murray (2010)
International forces

As a result of the defence agreements signed by France and Côte d’Ivoire after independence, the ineptitude of the Ivorian security forces, and the deployment of various peacekeeping forces during and after the crisis, foreign troops continue to play a key role in ensuring the security of Côte d’Ivoire. As the recently appointed commander of the Force Licorne explained: ‘The mission of the impartial forces is to secure the country and facilitate the process of normalization’ (ONUCI-FM, 2010). Specifically, these ‘impartial forces’ have been supporting the Ivorian forces in ensuring the security of the electoral process. Indeed, due to a lack of resources, the joint government–rebel ICC has not been able to deploy 8,000 personnel as planned (ICG, 2009, p. 10). These shortcomings and the volatile atmosphere in the run-up to the elections encouraged UNOCI to strengthen its presence from 8,650 to 9,150 military and police personnel in 2010 (UNSC, 2010, para. 1).

A TWO-STEP PROCESS: RESTRUCTURE THEN REFORM

The security sector in Côte d’Ivoire has attracted intense international attention. In line with the security provisions of the OPA, the government, the rebels, and international stakeholders are currently engaged in the process of reunifying the national security sector; however, while the OPA sets the framework for the rehabilitation of the sector, it does not provide the basis for thorough SSR. The following section examines the process of reunification of the security sector and looks at the hopes projected on the future New Army.
Reunification of the national security apparatus

The OPA defines a series of measures that aim to bring an end to the conflict and reunify the country. These conventional post-conflict initiatives include the organization of free and transparent democratic elections, the integration of rebel fighters into the new national security forces, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the remainder of the rebel forces and militias, as well as the restoration of state authority across the nation. Yet three years since the signing of the OPA, little progress has been made in implementing the clauses that were intended to lead Côte d’Ivoire towards peace.

Towards new defence and security forces

In 2007, the working group for restructuring and reforming the army was created. Composed of different actors from the rebel and state security sectors, it is tasked with restructuring the armed forces and paving the way for SSR (UNDP, n.d.). While the group conducted an assessment of the security sector in 2010, a national reform strategy has yet to be designed; current initiatives focus mainly on the technical reunification of the forces.50 The OPA outlines the precise steps of the reunification process. Some measures have been adopted, such as the deployment of a combined government–rebel unit (the ICC), which is charged with implementing the restructuring of the armed forces (RCI, 2007, art. 3.1.1); the harmonization of ranks; and the cantonment of some FAFN to be integrated in the national army. Nevertheless, several obstacles threaten to disrupt the process.
One issue concerns the mixed composition of the ICC, which serves as a pilot for the future reunification of the army. While providing security during the 2010 elections allowed the two armies to foster cooperation, the process was not entirely smooth, not least because both lacked trust in the peace process. While the FAFN were supposed to contribute half of the 8,000 ICC personnel, they provided fewer than 2,000 men. The International Crisis Group posits that the FAFN fear that injecting such a large number of men into the combined unit would weaken their capacity (ICG, 2010a, p. 14). Secondly, the development of the ICC has been hindered by a lack of finance and logistical resources (CNDHCl, 2010, p. 11). The units spread across the country lack vehicles and equipment, most notably anti-riot gear, which is essential for handling potential civil unrest linked to the electoral process.51

Yet the most alarming problem is the disparity in treatment between the FAFN and members of the state security forces working in the same units. Soldiers are still dependent on their own hierarchies, which means that the state soldiers receive a salary while the FAFN do not. ‘For the time being, we’re not receiving the allowances that we were promised and so we’re relying on our comzone, who gives us food’,52 explained one FAFN soldier who served as part of a combined ICC unit operating in the CNO zone. This imbalance in treatment is the source of much frustration and does little to foster the spirit of camaraderie that is so essential during this crucial period of transition.53 As one FAFN soldier put it: ‘It’s a symbolic mission—a strong gesture to show the country and the international community that we are united.’54
Nevertheless, the population is generally supportive of the ICC; focus group participants repeatedly expressed their desire to see the ICC take on policing missions. Many regard ICC agents as more disciplined and less corrupt than other security forces, partly because they do not appear to have set up checkpoints for extortion.\footnote{60}

Finally, not everyone stands to benefit from the reunification of the country and the establishment of the New Army. Indeed, it is in some people's interest to obstruct the process. Both rebel and government authorities collect a large amount of tax from cocoa production and trade. Comzones in particular are likely to have much to lose from the reunification as they currently produce and export resources, levy taxes on the transport of goods, and control the political administration of their zones (UNSC, 2009, para. 36). Global Witness estimates that between 2004 and 2007 the FN authorities collected more than USD 30 million in cocoa proceeds (Global Witness, 2007, p. 4). As previously noted, the comzones run well-armed private armies\footnote{61} and potentially constitute one of the main obstacles to the reunification of the country. The 'reintegration package' for the comzones and their security team is still under discussion; incentives seem difficult to identify. Both Gbagbo and Ouattara avoided the topic in their 2010 political campaigns (ICG, 2010b, p. 7).

**Strengthening the judicial system**

Not only do Ivorian authorities have to oversee the restoration of the judicial administration throughout the territory, but they also have to address the current internal deficiencies of the system. Supported by the European Commission, the Ivorian government is in the process of preparing a new policy on the sector that includes reinforcing judicial actors (supporting the National Institute of Legal Training and the National Police Training College); strengthening the efficiency of certain legal departments (through computerization of procedures and modernization of infrastructure);
fighting corruption; facilitating access to the judicial system (by restructuring courts and legal aid); and improving prison conditions, including in youth detention centres (European Commission, 2009).

Since the OPA, the Ivorian authorities have timidly advanced towards the goals of reuniting the security forces and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary. National and international stakeholders are focused on quick-fix measures that are meant to address immediate security threats, including the integration of rebel elements into the New Army and the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. Yet the OPA does not only call for a technical overhaul of the armed forces, but also insists on reaching longer-term security objectives. The construction of a security system that is ‘committed to integrity and republican values’ (RCI, 2007, part III) and capable of assuring both the protection of the people and the security of the territory will require significant financial resources, technical know-how; and, above all, strong political will to break free from the past.

Fifty years on: a second security renewal?

In post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire, the period of reunification seems an appropriate time for a review and overhaul of the security system. An efficient, legitimate system that respects human rights is one of the keys to the normalization of the country. To some extent, the enthusiasm behind the New Army echoes the optimism that moulded the post-colonial armies as agents of modernization in the independence period (Janowitz, 1964). As this chapter demonstrates, however, the role of the Ivorian military as a modernizer has proved very limited. Expected reforms do not appear to address the core deficiencies that face the security sector in any way.

The security sector today is crippled by some of the same deficiencies that emerged after independence, including limited democratic control over the armed forces and a lack of strategic objectives. Fifty years later, the reform dynamic faces additional challenges: the existence of two armed forces in one country, a reduction in the quality of personnel, weak capacities, divisive ethnic and regional tensions exacerbated by post-electoral conflict, a lack of consensus on political leadership, and an inability to deliver public security. Today, security forces can almost be described as predatory.

In the aftermath of independence, the army was considered a force for social modernization due largely to the ‘modernity’ of the institution itself (Lavroff, 1972, p. 988). In light of the decline in the quality of recruitment and training of soldiers during the crisis and the rise of nepotism and corruption, this description no longer applies. While it is possible to draw parallels between the role of the nation-builders of the 1960s and the central role that the military is expected to play in national reconciliation, today’s divided, post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire faces an increased level of ethnic and regional tensions. In addition, the balance of power has changed. Whereas Houphouët-Boigny had neglected the army—which didn’t represent a base for his power—his successors increasingly relied on the military.

The ongoing political crisis has shown that control over the military continues to be a very important guarantee of power. The state forces are pivotal in the political struggle between Ouattara and Gbagbo and may even determine the eventual outcome of the crisis; while the incumbent is trying to keep control over the military, Ouattara claims that an increasing number of FANCI officers are supporting him (Le Panafricain, 2010). Finally, as in many other countries, the experience of civil war represents an important development in terms of the military budget, personnel, and equipment, making the army much larger and perhaps more difficult to sidestep, which may influence the power-sharing relationship between the political and military leaderships.
CONCLUSION

Although the armed conflict ended more than five years ago, the ongoing ‘no war, no peace’ situation continues to have an enormous impact on the security of the country. People generally feel unsafe, insecurity is widespread and varied, and the inadequacy of the security sector only reinforces this sense of insecurity. The crisis has not only affected the security provision in the rebel-held area but also in the southern, government-held part of the country. While the capacity of the security forces is generally more trusted in the south, the state forces do not perform much better than the rebels; resorting to private security actors as a coping mechanism is common in both zones. To a large extent, both sets of armed forces face the same deficiencies: violations of human rights are widespread, corruption is high, democratic oversight is lacking, accountability is poor, and resources are insufficient.

Security sector reform is a key element of post-conflict institutional engineering and the need for such reform in Côte d’Ivoire is indisputable. The current situation calls for more than a simple reshuffling of ranks, however; the authorities need to devise a genuine reform strategy that goes beyond the pre-crisis status quo. This would involve the adoption of an integrated approach and a wider definition of the security sector—one that also takes into account the judiciary and non-state security actors, such as PSCs.

While reform must eventually take place, the post-2010 election turmoil has put the sensitive initiative on hold. The ongoing post-electoral crisis brings with it additional challenges: it will have a detrimental impact on the SSR process by further reducing the level of trust between the two sides and intensifying the population’s lack of confidence in the security forces. The violent repression of civilian demonstrations is further polarizing the political system and reducing the chances of a compromise. Perhaps most worrisome, the political stalemate has increased the politicization of the armed forces and removed any democratic oversight of the military. The process of redefining political-military relations in Côte d’Ivoire is some way off.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>APDH</td>
<td>Action pour la protection des droits de l’homme</td>
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<td>CECOS</td>
<td>Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Centre Nord Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consecteur</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles commandant de secteur (sector commander)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comzone</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles commandant de zone (zone commander)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDM</td>
<td>Disarmament and dismantling of militias</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAFN</td>
<td>Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>FANCI</td>
<td>Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female genital mutilation</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles</td>
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<td>FLGO</td>
<td>Les Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Integrated Command Center</td>
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ENDNOTES

1 The national household survey was commissioned by the Ivorian National Commission against the Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons with the financial and technical support of the UN Development Programme. It was designed and administered by the Small Arms Survey in February 2010. Note that the views expressed in this chapter are those of the Small Arms Survey and are not necessarily those of the National Commission or the UN Development Programme.

2 The author organized 12 focus groups (made up of 10–15 people each) in the regions of 18 Montagnes, Denguélé, Lacs, Lagunes, Moyen-Cavally, Vallée du Bandama, and Zanzan. Focus groups addressed issues related to perceptions of security and security providers, armed violence, the prevalence and use of weapons in the community concerned, non-state armed groups, and possible solutions to the problems of armed violence and the illicit circulation of firearms. More than 70 key informant interviews were conducted by the author in the government-held zone and in the CNO zone with high-ranking officers and other members of the security forces, the FAFN, and heads of armed militias, as well as representatives of civil society organizations, public health workers, traditional hunters, ex-combatants, and official and traditional authorities.

3 ‘La radicalisation de la répression politique’ (author’s translation).

4 Yet violence also existed in the political sphere prior to this period; indeed, the presidencies of Houphouët-Boigny were themselves marked by political violence (Banégas, 2010, p. 367).

5 Bédié, Ouattara, and Gbagbo were also the main presidential candidates in the 2010 elections.

6 Authorities have been very reluctant to allow inspections of Republican Guard installations by the UNOCI Embargo Cell or the UN Group of Experts. Since the implementation of the embargo, these bodies have not been granted access to the Republican Guard’s armouries, in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC, 2009, paras. 49–53). As far as weapons are concerned, the Republican Guard is likely to be particularly well equipped due to its status as an elite and privileged corps.

7 ‘Si moi je tombe, ils tombent aussi. Il y en a qui croient qu’un coup d’Etat est facile! C’est un édifice qui a plusieurs poteaux. Si tu le fais tomber, tes poteaux tomberont aussi’ (author’s translation).

8 Author interview with the director of the National Police, Abidjan, February 2010.

9 The arms embargo and the subsequent lack of ammunition contributed to the deficit of appropriately trained new officers (author interview with representatives of the security forces, Côte d’Ivoire, February 2010).

10 Checkpoints cost the Ivorian private sector USD 300–600 million per year and affect the price of consumer goods; for one, the price of coal, which is delivered to Abidjan from relatively nearby, quadruples between the factory and the city (Reuters, 2010).

11 Focus group, Abidjan, February 2010.

12 Author interview with a customs inspector, National Customs Office, Abidjan, March 2010.

13 Author interview with a province chief, February 2010.

14 Author interview with the head of a human rights organization, Abidjan, February 2010.

15 See PNRRC (n.d.).

16 In contrast to 2002, when estimates put the figure at around 800 people (Florquin and Berman, 2005, p. 239), in 2010 it was estimated that 467 FAFN personnel were ex-FANCI and therefore entitled to retroactive pay like other government troops in 2007, following the signature of the peace accords (Labertit, 2010).

17 See the organizational chart of the FN secretariat (FN, n.d.).

The following militias were created at the beginning of the conflict in Moyen Cavally: les Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO), le 
s'interpénètrent en fonction de l'intérêt du moment' (author's translation).

Auxiliaries des forces de l'ordre' (author's translation).

Author interviews with security authorities, Côte d'Ivoire, February 2010.

See endnote 10.

‘Les chaînes de commandement sont encore là. Même si l'élément a été désarmé il se pense encore parti d'un groupe d'autodéfense' (author's 
translation). Author interview with the head of one of the major militias of the west, Guiglo, February 2010.

On fait tout pour que les personnes soient hors d'état de nuire, on garde les criminels en cellule jusqu'à ce que la prison ré-ouvre. Avant le 
comzone donnait les moyens pour transférer les gens à Bouaké où il y a une prison, mais c'est pas facile car il faut un engin, du carburant et 

‘Quand ça vient à notre niveau, on règle à l'amiable. Nous n'avons pas de procédure juridique. La prison civile n'est pas ouverte parce qu'il n'y 
a pas de procédure pénale. Donc ‘on déplace les problèmes'; par exemple, on escorte la personne jusqu'à la frontière' (author's translation).

Author interview with a conseuteur, 18 Montagnes region, February 2010.

In April 1961, a few months after the declaration of Ivorian independence, France signed defence agreements with Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and 
Dahomey (modern Benin), stipulating, among other things, that France would provide 'the assistance required for the establishment of their 
armed forces' (RCI et al., 1961, art. 6). Four years later, France and Côte d'Ivoire drew up a convention detailing the logistical support the former 
would provide to the latter, including the sale of military equipment. See RCI Presidency (n.d.).

For more information on this, see the reports of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire (SCC, n.d.).

Interview with Gen. Bakayoko, FAFN Chief of Staff, Bouaké, February 2010; interview with the director of the National Police, Abidjan, February 2010.

Author interviews with representatives of the main human rights organizations in Côte d'Ivoire—Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l'homme (LIDHO), 
Réseau ouest-africain pour l'éducation de la paix (WANEP), Mouvement ivoirien des droits humains (MIDH), and Action pour la protection des 
droits de l'homme (APDH)—Abidjan, February–March 2010; focus group with representatives of civil society, Bouaké, February 2010.

Author interviews with representatives of the main human rights organizations in Côte d'Ivoire—LIDHO, WANEP, MIDH, and APDH—Abidjan, 
February–March 2010; focus group with representatives of civil society, Bouaké, February 2010.

Other answers included: 'conduct sensitization campaigns' (12.7 per cent), 'strengthen the number of security posts' (11.4 per cent), and 'rein-
force border control' (7.5 per cent).

Armed violence is defined as 'the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, 
community, or state, that undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development' (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 2).

Eighteen per cent (n=673) of respondents in the CNO zone and 20 per cent (n=1,819) in the government zone reported that at least one member 
of their household had been the victim of an act of armed violence in 2009. ‘Household' was understood by respondents as ‘people who live 
under the same roof'.

The Criminal Police (Police criminelle) is a special unit that deals with major crimes. These figures probably under-represent the actual levels of 
violence. For example, the homicide rate in Abidjan in 2009 would be 0.77 per 100,000—if the city's population of six million people (RCI, 2009a, 
p. 64) were taken into account; that figure seems unusually low. According to estimates provided by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, West 
African countries generally experience a homicide rate closer to 20 per 100,000 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 70).

The poverty rate has shot up in the last ten years, from 33.6 per cent in 1998 to 48.9 per cent in 2008 (RCI, 2009a, p. xi). The north of the 
country is more deeply affected, with four out of five people classified as poor. Unemployment is high and affects young people in particular. 
Nearly one-quarter of 15–24-year-olds are unemployed (RCI, 2009a, para. 282); according to criminal statistics, they are responsible for much of 
the country's banditry.

Author interviews with several different human rights organizations based in Abidjan, February 2010; author interview with representatives of the 
Duekoué Social Centre, February 2010. See also the annual report of the Ivorian National Commission on Human Rights (CNDHCI, 2010) and 
the reports of the Human Rights Section of UNOCI (UNOCI, 2009; 2010a).

In spite of the 1998 law against FGM, a UNICEF study shows that the practice is still widespread in Côte d'Ivoire, with the national figure for 
circumcized women at 36 per cent. In the north and west of the country, where the populations practice FGM as a matter of tradition, the rate 
approaches 90 per cent (UNICEF, 2008).

Focus group, Duekoué, February 2010; focus group, Bangolo, February 2010.

The compilation of the electoral list triggered a strong social reaction. It was not only the right to vote that was at risk, but also access to an 
oficial Ivorian identity, which brought with it access to land ownership, jobs within the civil service, and the free circulation of people, par-
ticularly at checkpoints. These tensions were linked to the concept of Ivoirité, which had fuelled the dynamics leading to the conflict.


See endnote 10.

Author interview with the director of the National Police, Abidjan, February 2010.

Author interviews with security authorities, Côte d'Ivoire, February 2010.

‘Auxiliaires des forces de l'ordre' (author's translation).

‘S'interpénètrent en fonction de l'intérêt du moment' (author's translation).

The following militias were created at the beginning of the conflict in Moyen Cavally: les Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO), le 
Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire (MILCOI), l'Alliance Patriotique du Peuple Wé (Ap-Wé), l'Union des Patriotes 
pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest (UPFGO), and les Forces Spéciales pour la Libération du Monde Africain (FS Lima) (Banégas, 2008, pp. 3–4).

‘Les chaînes de commandement sont encore là. Même si l'élément a été désarmé il se pense encore parti d'un groupe d'autodéfense' (author's 
translation). Author interview with the head of one of the major militias of the west, Guiglo, February 2010.
43 Focus group with representatives of civil society, Guiglo, February 2010.
44 Author interview with a militia member, Abidjan, March 2010.
45 Group discussion with heads of militias, Guiglo, February 2010.
46 Author interview with representatives of different Ivorian human rights organizations, Abidjan, February 2010.
47 In November 2004, French soldiers opened fire outside Abidjan’s Hôtel Ivoire on a hostile crowd made up largely of ‘Young Patriots’, killing several people. The event made headlines in the international media. Human rights organizations accused French soldiers of losing control of the situation and shooting at unarmed people (ICG, 2005, p. 80).
48 Author interview with the head of the private security and cash-in-transit unit, Direction de Surveillance du Territoire (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance), Abidjan, March 2010.
49 Author interview with the head of the private security and cash-in-transit unit, Direction de Surveillance du Territoire, Abidjan, March 2010.
50 Author interview with a representative of the cabinet of the prime minister, Abidjan, February 2010.
51 Author interview with a senior military officer of the ICC, Yamoussoukro, March 2010.
52 ‘Pour le moment on a toujours pas reçu les primes qu’on nous avait promises et donc on dépend du comzone qui nous donne de la nourriture’ (author’s translation).
53 Author interview with the head of an ICC unit, 18 Montagnes, February 2010.
54 ‘C’est une mission symbolique, un geste fort pour montrer au pays et à la communauté internationale que nous sommes unis’ (author’s translation).
55 Author interview with a representative of the cabinet of the prime minister, Abidjan, March 2010.
57 According to the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation, 5,000 additional militia members are yet to be screened (PNRRC, 2010).
58 Focus group with civil society representatives, Bouaké, March 2010; focus group, Duékoué, February 2010.
59 Author interview with a senior military officer of the ICC, Yamoussoukro, March 2010. In theory, DDR beneficiaries can choose between a reinsertion project or XOF 500,000 (USD 1,000) as a ‘final settlement’.
60 Focus group, Bangolo, February 2010; focus group, Danané, February 2010.
61 In October 2009, the report of the UN Group of Experts noted that some of the comzones were rearming themselves (UNSC, 2009, para. 122).
62 Author interviews with representatives of the security forces, Côte d’Ivoire, February and March 2010.
63 Military expenditures more than doubled between 1997 and 2009, rising from XOF 171 million (USD 300,000) to more than XOF 369 million (USD 700,000), or 1.5 per cent of the gross domestic product in 2009 (SIPRI, n.d.). While it is difficult to identify the exact strength of the army, different sources show that both the police and the gendarmerie have doubled in size in the past ten years (UNDP, 2010; Mieu, 2009a).

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Principal author

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