Illegal electricity wiring running through the informal settlement, Imizamo Yethu, Cape Town, March 2010. © Ariadne Van Zandbergen
INTRODUCTION

On 27 April 1994 the first democratic elections were held in South Africa, marking the country’s official transition from more than 300 years of authoritarianism and institutionalized racism to a free and democratic society. In the 19 years since, the country has made progress in improving rule of law, governance, and public health. South Africa now ranks well above its neighbours in sub-Saharan Africa in economic and human development indicators (UNDP, 2011). Yet, despite localized economic growth, South Africa experiences persistently high levels of unemployment (an average of 25 per cent in 2000–12),

income inequality, systemic corruption, and unequal economic and social transformation. These challenges are so severe that they risk undoing recent gains.

Similarly, South Africa’s health outcomes remain much lower than those of other middle-income countries that are not at war—in fact, lower than in many poorer countries (Coovadia et al., 2009, p. 817). The nation continues to struggle with high levels of armed violence, with a homicide rate about four times the global average—among the world’s highest (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, pp. 51–53). Research suggests that persistently high levels of armed violence and underperformance in health and development are related (Bellis et al., 2010; OECD, 2009; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). South Africa appears to be a case in point.

This chapter explores South Africa’s dilemma, namely that its incremental progress and growth are undermined by ongoing and systemic armed violence and inequality. It applies the emerging optic of armed violence prevention, which focuses on understanding and addressing the contributing and inhibiting drivers of armed violence. The main conclusions include the following:

• Since 1994, homicide rates in South Africa have remained among the highest in the world despite a consistent decline.
• There appears to be a positive correlation between the partial implementation of the Firearms Control Act (FCA) of 2000 and a reduction in firearm homicides. Better implementation of the law could further reduce levels of firearm homicides.
• Despite stated commitments and a legal obligation to address armed violence, the South African Police Service (SAPS) still faces serious challenges related to reforming its own practices, including police use of force and firearms.
• Armed violence prevention efforts are undermined by the lack of data on the causes and circumstances of armed violence. Enhanced availability and public access to relevant data on armed violence would strengthen evidence-based armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) programming.
• The South African government’s national policies to address and reduce levels of inequality have shown only modest results. Based on evidence of a strong association between high levels of inequality and high levels of armed violence, inequality may be viewed as an important driver of armed violence in South Africa.
• AVRP programming in South Africa tends to focus on violence drivers, such as gender inequality and alcohol abuse. Outcome evaluations demonstrate that some of these efforts have positive impacts, but these remain small in scale.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first provides an overview of trends in armed violence since 1994, focusing on the most recent available data, covering 2011–12. It also draws on research from other contexts to highlight some of the factors that appear to contribute to or inhibit armed violence generally. The second section concentrates on factors that appear most relevant to the South African context and assesses national policies to prevent gun violence, policing challenges, and civil society armed violence prevention efforts. It closes with reflections on the possible directions for future research and prevention activities.

ARMED VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

From apartheid to democracy

This chapter uses the term ‘armed violence’ to mean ‘the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development’ (OECD, 2009, p. 13). This definition recognizes a broad spectrum of consequences, ranging from emotional trauma to death and injury. In the South African context, the current experience of armed violence cannot be properly assessed without understanding the country’s violent past.²

Map 6.1 South Africa

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South Africa’s history of violence is long and complex, extending back to the arrival of the Portuguese in the 1400s. Dutch colonists came in the 17th century, followed by the British. This period saw the violent abuse of the indigenous population and the establishment of the foundations of the systemic violence that would give rise to the apartheid system.

Under apartheid (1948–94), institutionalized discrimination forced black South Africans to live under inhumane conditions. As the struggle against this system intensified, the state embarked on a brutal path of repression against black South Africans and others who opposed it (TRC, 1998). The anti-apartheid struggle initially responded to this state-led violence with non-violent direct action, and later with armed resistance. Since the success of the anti-apartheid movement in 1994, the country has pursued transitional justice, prioritizing healing and reconciliation over retribution (Tutu, 2000). Nearly 20 years since the advent of the country’s democratic transition, the country still faces violence, but of a different nature.

Democracy brought not only political changes but also massive institutional upheaval. The entire government bureaucracy and infrastructure rapidly shifted from serving only about 10 per cent of the population to serving the entire population (Coovadia et al., 2009, p. 817). The previously excluded semi-independent ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, Transkei, and Venda were officially absorbed into the state, enlarging the population of citizens and the administrative responsibility of the state to serve them (Schönteich and Louw, 2001; SAHO, n.d.). It is no understatement to say the nation was reborn in 1994.

**Police-recorded homicides**

The transition has led to some remarkable gains in security. According to the SAPS and the Institute for Security Studies, homicides decreased from 66.9 per 100,000 in 1994 to 30.9 in 2011–12 (see Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, the current rate remains elevated by international standards; South Africa had the eighth-highest violent death rate among 186 countries and territories in 2011 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 53). Rates above 30 per 100,000—which the Geneva Declaration Secretariat labels ‘very high’—are typically observed in countries at war or with serious ongoing crises (p. 58).

**Figure 6.1 Homicide rate per 100,000, 1994–2012**

*Rate per 100,000 population*

The distribution of homicides across the country is uneven, however. Homicide rates in 2011–12 were highest in the areas of the Eastern and Western Cape provinces, followed by the ‘belt’ of Northern Cape, Free State, and KwaZulu Natal. In these five provinces homicide rates were above the national average, with a peak of 48 per 100,000 in the Eastern Cape. Lower rates were observed in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and North West, as well as Limpopo, where the rate was lowest, at 13.2 homicides per 100,000 (SAPS, 2012a).

In 2000 the SAPS stopped providing data on the percentage of homicides and other forms of lethal violence committed with firearms (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001, p. 237; Lamb, 2008; Burton et al., 2004, p. 22). Still, prior to 2007, South Africa submitted some relevant data to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime indicating that fewer than half of annual homicides were committed with a firearm (UNODC, 2011a, p. 114). Figure 6.2 shows the annual number of homicides recorded by the SAPS over the period 1995–2012 and the percentage committed with firearms, which dramatically increased between 1995 and 1998 (roughly from 40 to 50 per cent) and then stabilized at just under 50 per cent.

**Fatal injury data**

Other data sources complement the picture of levels of gun violence, though they must be consulted with caution. The National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) collects data on fatal injuries from medico-legal laboratories and state forensic laboratories (NIMSS, 2009b, p. 2). The information includes the intent and the mechanism of injuries, coded using the International Classification of Diseases-9 system, as well as demographic information of victims, such as age and sex (NIMSS, 2009b, p. 2). Yet, because NIMSS coverage has changed over time—from 15 mortuaries in 5 provinces in 2000 to 62 mortuaries in 7 provinces in 2008—national trend analysis has become impossible (p. vii). The current coverage is estimated at 39–52 per cent of all injury deaths (p. vii).
Despite these limitations, NIMSS data provides a snapshot of intentional gun deaths at the national level for 2008 (the latest available data). Firearms are involved in 30 per cent of homicides documented by NIMSS (see Figure 6.3). More than half of all homicides (52 per cent) and homicides committed with firearms (54 per cent) involved victims aged 20–34; men are six times more likely to be killed than women (NIMSS, 2009b).

NIMSS provincial data shows declines in violent deaths, both firearm-related and by other methods, in Gauteng and Mpumalanga from 2008 through 2010, but rates remain very high at 43 and 26 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. The proportion of deaths committed with firearms declined by almost five per cent in both provinces, yet the use of sharp (bladed) weapons rose slightly in Gauteng and increased by 8 per cent in Mpumalanga (see Figure 6.4).7

CONTRIBUTING AND INHIBITING FACTORS

Recent multi-disciplinary research on armed violence—as advanced by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development initiative, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Programme, and others—has generated a measure of consensus about the drivers of armed violence as well as its inhibiting factors. The emerging framework, rooted in violence prevention concepts and practice, has gradually influenced the policies and programmes of states and development assistance donors. While the field has benefitted from contributions and...
expertise from areas as diverse as security sector reform, peace-building, criminology, and arms control, it has been particularly guided by the public health approach and the social-ecological model.

The public health approach is premised on the understanding that strategies to prevent other negative health outcomes—such as lifestyle-related disease, motor vehicle injuries, falls, and burns—can be usefully applied to prevent violent injuries, including intentional violence. The social-ecological model provides a complementary tool for identifying risk and resilience factors by distinguishing four different ‘levels’ of influence—individual, relationship, community, and societal (see Table 6.1). The model sees violence and violence prevention as ‘the product of [these] multiple levels of influence on behaviour’ (Krug et al., 2002, p. 12).

Armed violence prevention is a relatively new field, and much of the debate and discussion among researchers and practitioners draws on and adapts the public health approach and social-ecological model, which have traditionally been applied to violence prevention more broadly. For example, armed violence literature and discourse modifies the public health conception of risk and protective factors, using a more general notion of contributing and inhibiting factors. This adaptation is prompted by the recognition that armed violence is both ‘a cause and consequence of a range of risk factors such as horizontal inequalities, poverty, socio-political exclusion, and governance challenges’ (OECD, 2009, p. 28). While the discussion below assumes that violence and armed violence share many of the same contributing and inhibiting factors, more research is needed to disentangle these phenomena and identify the specific factors that are most relevant to each category.

While not exhaustive, Table 6.1 captures the breadth of factors that can be taken into account in efforts to reduce and prevent armed violence. Of the contributing and inhibiting factors identified above, at least five distinct elements of armed violence prevention can be distilled. These are introduced briefly below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Contributing factors</th>
<th>Inhibiting factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual factors</td>
<td>Substance abuse</td>
<td>Positive self-esteem</td>
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<td></td>
<td>History of or exposure to violence; psychosocial trauma</td>
<td>Access to psychosocial support</td>
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<td>Relationship factors</td>
<td>Poor parent-child bonding</td>
<td>Safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and parents or caregivers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Association with delinquent peers, such as gang membership</td>
<td>Association with positive peer groups</td>
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<td>Community factors</td>
<td>Social isolation</td>
<td>Access to social support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>High levels of unemployment</td>
<td>Access to economic opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High density of alcohol outlets</td>
<td>Limited availability of alcohol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Availability of weapons</td>
<td>Limited access to lethal means</td>
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<td>High rates of gun ownership</td>
<td>Rigorous gun licensing procedures</td>
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<td>Societal factors</td>
<td>Ineffective criminal justice system</td>
<td>Effective criminal justice system</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Social norms that accept violence</td>
<td>Social norms that do not tolerate violence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unequal gender relations</td>
<td>Values that promote gender equity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policies that perpetuate economic, social, and political inequalities</td>
<td>Policies that promote economic, social, and political equality</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legacy of violence; emergence from armed conflict; mistrust within society</td>
<td>Social cohesion and trust</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Resource scarcity and competition</td>
<td>Basic needs met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little to no information about the nature and extent of armed violence</td>
<td>A functioning armed violence monitoring system</td>
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**Armed violence legislation.** Evidence from middle- and high-income countries suggests that the effective implementation of legislation and regulations to limit access to lethal means can reduce armed violence (Bellis et al., 2010). To take only one example, in the Colombian cities of Bogotá and Cali, the enforced ban on carrying firearms on weekends after paydays, on holidays, and on election days contributed to a significant drop in homicide rates in both cities (Villaveces et al., 2000).

**Policing practices.** Evidence from high-income countries suggests that policing strategies that promote community engagement can contribute to reductions in youth homicides and firearm assaults (Bellis et al., 2010). Stringent rules on the use of force and firearms by police, firearm equipment and training standards, weapons storage, and police oversight mechanisms have also been associated with violence reduction.9

**Government socio-economic policy.** The extent to which government policies promote social, political, and economic equality can strongly influence levels of violence. The link between income inequality and homicide rates has
been documented in the international crime and violence prevention literature (Hsieh and Pugh, 1993, p. 198). As Wilkinson notes, ‘the most well established environmental determinant of levels of violence is the scale of income differences between rich and poor’ (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 1).

**AVRP programming.** Well-designed and -implemented programming that focuses on one or more of the contributing or inhibiting factors has shown promise in reducing armed violence. WHO has identified ten key prevention strategies that could help to reduce armed violence (WHO, 2008, p. 3). Table 6.1 covers many of these strategies, including: strengthening relationships between children and caregivers; developing life and social skills; promoting gender equality and addressing cultural norms that support violence; reducing access to and harmful use of alcohol; reducing access to lethal means; disrupting illegal drug markets; and reducing inequalities (p. 27).

**Data and monitoring of armed violence.** Studies have shown that ‘effectively reducing and preventing armed violence requires diagnosing its patterns and understanding its nature, extent and associated harms’ (Bellis et al., 2010, p. 4). Available evidence suggests that the establishment of armed violence monitoring systems has positively contributed to armed violence reduction efforts. Reliable data is needed for effective monitoring and evaluation of armed violence reduction programming.

The following sections discuss how these five elements of armed violence prevention have been developed and applied in the South African context.

### ARMED VIOLENCE LEGISLATION

**The Domestic Violence Act and the Firearms Control Act**

Following the end of apartheid the government undertook an array of legislative reforms to bring the country’s laws into alignment with the new democratic framework and to signal a break with the past. The drafters of the South African Constitution of 1996 ensured a departure from apartheid-era jurisprudence by giving prominence to the right to life and security of the person, codified in various laws. Two wide-ranging laws form the cornerstone of the government’s legislative approach to armed violence reduction: the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) of 1998 and the Firearms Control Act of 2000.

The DVA establishes the legal framework for the detection, reporting, and prosecution of domestic violence. At the time of drafting, a number of submissions were made to highlight the role of firearms in situations of domestic violence (Combrinck et al., 1998). The drafters of the legislation incorporated these concerns by making special provision for the removal of a firearm as part of the court’s powers to issue a protection order (RSA, 1998b, ss. 7(2)(a); 9(1–2)). The use of the instruction ‘may’ in the Domestic Violence Bill was strengthened to ‘must’ in the final Act, placing a clear obligation on the SAPS to remove a firearm or dangerous weapon in situations of domestic violence (RSA, 1998a, s. 7(1); 1998b, s. 9(1); INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE).

The FCA replaced the apartheid-era Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969. The promulgation of the FCA was the result of a lengthy public consultation process involving a cross-section of interested parties (Kirsten, 2008). Like the DVA, the final text of the FCA was influenced by the public submission process. Many of the key AVRP provisions in the legislation are the result of effective lobbying from groups, including ones that focus on violence against women.
and child safety. Implementation of the FCA was phased in from 2000 to 2004; however, critics have argued that further implementation is needed, especially with respect to the work of the central regulatory authority, as discussed in the next section.

The FCA requires both firearm registration and owner licensing for all gun owners in South Africa. Under the FCA, prospective gun owners must first obtain a competency certificate following training at an accredited training facility. The law also stipulates that applicants meet certain requirements; they must be at least 21 years old, they must submit proof of being a ‘fit and proper person’ of ‘stable mental condition’, and they may not be ‘dependent on any substance which has an intoxicating or narcotic effect’ (RSA, 2000, ch. 5, ss. (9)(2)(a)–(e)). Convictions in a range of offences disqualify prospective applicants; these include firearm misuse and violence, sexual abuse, fraud, alcohol and drug abuse, sabotage, terrorism, public violence, arson, intimidation, rape, and kidnapping (ss. (9)(2)(f)–(o)). Competency certificates are valid for five years and must be renewed (s. 10 (2)). In addition to the renewal process, other provisions in the Act allow for a person to be declared ‘unfit to possess a firearm’ in the event of a domestic violence charge or conviction or after expressing an intention to inflict harm (to him- or herself or someone else), among other conditions (ss. 102–05).

The FCA requires that all firearms be properly stored in an approved gun safe (RSA, 2004a, ss. 67(1–4); 86(1)(12)). Guns may be carried in public but ‘must be completely covered’ and the person carrying should be able to ‘exercise effective control’ over the firearm (RSA, 2000, ch. 9, s. 84(2)). FCA-mandated penalties for violating any of the requirements range from fines to imprisonment for periods from two to 25 years, depending on the offence (RSA, 2000, Schedule 4).

According to research published by South Africa’s Medical Research Council, the FCA has made a positive contribution to reducing armed violence. In a 2010 South African Medical Journal article, Abrahams, Jewkes, and Mathews review NIMSS data to assess whether there was a significant difference between the rates of firearm homicides and non-firearm homicides for the period 2001–04 (Abrahams, Jewkes, and Mathews, 2010, pp. 586–88). The authors find that, ‘although a decline in both homicide rates is shown, there is a significantly faster decline for the firearm homicide group’ (p. 588). Without establishing strict causality, the authors identify a correlation between the reduced firearm homicide rates and the gradual implementation of the FCA (p. 587).

A follow-up study published in 2012 confirms this assessment. It compares femicide rates for the years 1999 and 2009, finding a significant decrease in gun-related femicides, with ‘529 fewer women killed by gunshot in 2009 compared to 1999’ (Abrahams et al., 2012, p. 3; INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE). As in the earlier study, the authors find a strong association with the FCA. Other research has suggested additional benefits in reduced firearm violence targeting children (Campbell et al., 2011; Alvazzi del Frate, 2012). If implementation of the FCA is further enhanced, as many have suggested, there may be further positive results to accrue.

**Implementation challenges**

A central critique of the FCA relates to the inadequate functioning of the regulatory body within the SAPS that oversees firearm-related administration and monitoring. The mandate of the Central Firearms Register (CFR) is clearly set out in the Act (RSA, 2000, ch. 17, ss. 123–27). After complaints from both gun control and pro-gun lobby groups, the minister of police established a task team to investigate problems with the CFR and advise on remedial action (SAPS, 2010b). The gun lobby’s complaints highlighted delays in acquiring a firearm licence, while gun control groups complained that the CFR did not conduct physical inspections of prospective gun owners’ premises. The findings of
the task team reveal some cases of firearm licences being awarded without due process and, in some instances, licences being awarded for prohibited firearms, such as AK-47s (Civilian Secretariat for Police, n.d.). Over and above alleged corruption and fraudulent licensing, the task team report criticizes the CFR data system as inherently flawed, pointing out that it does not allow for any meaningful quantitative assessment of South African firearm stockpiles (Civilian Secretariat for Police, n.d.).

Two studies have identified problems in the implementation of the DVA’s requirement that guns be removed from the homes of domestic abusers and those facing protection orders. The first study, conducted in 2000–01, examines applications for protection orders at one urban and one semi-urban court. The study finds that, although 25 per cent of the applications referred to firearms, orders for police to remove the weapons were made in only 2 per cent of urban cases and 1 per cent of semi-urban cases (Schneider and Vetten, 2006). The second study, conducted in 2006–07 in rural and peri-urban areas, also examines applications for protection orders (Vetten et al., 2009). It reveals that fewer than five per cent of final protection orders requisitioned the removal of weapons, even though 37 per cent of the applications stated that a weapon had been used during an incident of abuse to either threaten (63 per cent) or hurt (50 per cent) the applicant (TLAC and Ceasefire Campaign, 2009, p. 9).

Another problem area relates to the implementation of FCA-defined firearm-free zones. These zones are areas in which guns are prohibited and where it is a criminal offence to keep or carry a firearm or ammunition (RSA, 2000, s. 140). In alignment with this provision and in response to a spate of shootings at schools, the then minister of safety and security issued an official notice of ‘intention to declare all schools and other learning institutions, including institutions for higher education and Universities, as firearm-free zones, in terms of section 140 of the Firearms Control Act, 2000’ (RSA, 2004b). To date, however, not one school has actually been declared a firearm-free zone, despite repeated calls from civil society (Gun Free South Africa, 2010).

**POLICING PRACTICES**

**Use of force and firearms**

The SAPS is legally mandated to play a role in preventing and reducing crime and violence in South Africa. Although police leadership has translated this mandate into commitments to address armed violence, the strength of these commitments has been uneven since 1994.

Immediately following the political transition, a range of reform mechanisms were put in place to foster democratic policing practices and signal a break with the apartheid-era mode of policing (Cawthra, 1992; Bruce, 2002). In terms of AVRP, these include SAPS commitments to good practice in the use of force and firearms. Because apartheid-era policing was marked by the excessive use of force with little to no accountability or oversight, reform efforts placed a premium on establishing legislative obligations to control and limit police use of force and improve police oversight and accountability for abuses (Tait and Marks, 2011).

In post-apartheid South Africa, police use of force and firearms is governed by the SAPS Act (No. 68 of 1995), the FCA, and the Criminal Procedure Act (No. 51 of 1977). This legal framework places an obligation on the state and on police to protect citizens and exercise caution and restraint when using force. The SAPS Act articulates this obligation clearly: ‘Where a member who performs an official duty is authorised by law to use force, he or she may only use the minimum force which is reasonable in the circumstances’ (SAPS, 1995, s. 13(3)(b)). In addition, particular legislative provisions concern safe storage of firearms and types of weapon and ammunition to be used, all with the
intention of limiting irresponsible use of firearms and unnecessary use of force (RSA, 2000, s. 120(3)(a–b); Operational Response Services, 2004; State President’s Office, 1994, s. 9(2)).

For example, the Criminal Procedure Act governs the use of force in effecting an arrest. Following an incident in 1999 in which a civilian shot and killed a fleeing burglary suspect, the law was challenged in the courts and was eventually found to fall short of constitutional muster (CCSA, 2002). The Constitutional Court ruled that the Criminal Procedure Act needed to be amended to reflect more clearly the principles of proportionality and least degree of force possible in effecting arrests. The proposed amendments were debated in Parliament and ultimately included in the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill (B26-2012).

The SAPS has internal accountability mechanisms as well as two external oversight bodies that are mandated to ensure compliance with legislation and the human rights standards enshrined in the constitution. The oversight bodies are the Civilian Secretariat for Police and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). Among other roles, IPID is tasked with investigating every case of irregular discharge of a SAPS firearm (IPID, 2012a, s. 6).

Uneven reform

While the 1994–99 period saw a strong push to institutionalize democratic policing practices, this momentum has not been sustained, and some have argued that positive efforts have even been reversed since 1999 (Rauch, 2000; Bruce, 2012b). At the leadership level, two of the four post-apartheid national police commissioners were found guilty of fraud and corruption between 2009 and 2011. In addition, the head of SAPS Crime Intelligence was suspended in 2011 after being charged with murder and fraud. There are also criminal investigations under way into the activities of an elite unit within the SAPS known as the ‘Cato Manor Hit Squad’. Thirty SAPS members from the Cato Manor unit are facing charges of murder, theft, defeating the ends of justice, and unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition (Hofstatter, Afrika, and Rose, 2011; Nair, 2012).

A disconnect has also been apparent between the legislative commitments to democratic policing and statements by police and other government leaders (Bruce, 2012b). In 2008 Deputy Minister of Safety and Security Susan Shabangu made headlines when she addressed an anti-crime summit and instructed police:

> You must kill the bastards [criminals] if they threaten you or the community. You must not worry about the regulations. [...] You have been given guns, now use them. I want no warning shots. You have one shot and it must be a kill shot. If you miss, the criminals will go for the kill (Hosken, 2008).

Shabangu’s statement was endorsed a few days later by President Jacob Zuma, who has used similar rhetoric in the past (Webb, 2008). The current minister of police, Nathi Mthethwa, and former national police commissioner Bheki Cele have also used inflammatory language. Soon after taking office, Mthethwa called on police to ‘teach those people a lesson—to fight fire with fire’ (Hartley, 2008). Cele gained notoriety when he entered office and suggested that the laws governing police use of force be changed (Goldstone, 2009). In addition to introducing ‘shoot to kill’ rhetoric, Mthethwa and Cele also reinstituted the military ranking system, which had been a marker of the apartheid-era police (SAPS, 2010a). This behaviour suggests that the old mentality and approach to policing remain ingrained.

Since 2011, the SAPS has come under growing public scrutiny of its use of force and firearms. In April 2011, for instance, police beat and shot a schoolteacher during a protest march in Ficksburg in the Free State Province; the teacher subsequently died (Mail and Guardian, 2011; Daily Maverick, 2011). The public outcry following the Ficksburg shooting led the South African Human Rights Commission to investigate. In November 2012, the Human Rights
Commission released its report, which concludes that the SAPS had used excessive force, had violated the applicable legislative prescriptions, and had failed to deploy sufficiently trained and equipped members. The report recommends that the SAPS improve training of its members in the management of public gatherings (SAHRC, 2012).

Prior to the release of the Commission findings, the SAPS’ use of force made international headlines when police opened fire on striking miners, killing some 34 and wounding 78 at the Lonmin-owned Marikana mine (Polgreen, 2012; Bruce, 2012b). The incident led to the establishing of an official commission of inquiry into the events (DOJCD, 2012). While the scale of the Marikana incident warrants attention, the problem of excessive and unjustified use of police force has been documented in numerous other cases prior to Marikana.15

**Police shootings**

Recent IPID data shows a sharp increase in fatal police shootings, from 282 in 2005–06 to 460 in 2011–12 (IPID, 2012b; Bruce, 2012a). The number of people fatally shot during police investigations has also increased, from 9 in 2005–06 to 34 in 2011–12 (IPID, 2012b). Very few of these shootings have been prosecuted. In the 2011–12 reporting period, the IPID made 162 recommendations for prosecution of SAPS members for deaths as a result of police action; only 18 of those recommendations resulted in convictions (IPID, 2012b, pp. 32, 38). The frequency and scale of excessive use of force points to a fundamental and systemic problem within the SAPS (Bruce, 2012b).

In addition to incidents of excessive use of police force on duty, there are also growing concerns about off-duty police officers using their service firearms in domestic violence and murder-suicide. In fact, these kinds of incidents became so frequent as to lead to an official investigation in 2009. The results show that, in 80 per cent of the cases investigated, the murder weapon was an SAPS member’s service firearm (ICD, 2009, p. 19).16 The study attributes the high prevalence of femicides committed by SAPS members to the high stress levels involved in their day-to-day working conditions and notes the lack of psychosocial support available for SAPS members (pp. 21–31). The report singles out the easy access to firearms as ‘the most worrying factor in femicides committed by SAPS members’ (ICD, 2009, p. 39; INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE).
Firearm proficiency also appears to be an issue in the SAPS’ ability to inculcate good practice in the use of force and firearms. SAPS members’ firearm proficiency came under public scrutiny in March 2012, when the media cited a leaked internal audit report stating that SAPS members were not competent to use firearms. The report finds that, of the more than 157,700 armed SAPS members who participated in firearms training, nearly 27,400 members had failed firearms proficiency tests (Govender, 2012). The broader SAPS training process has also received criticism for its heavy-handed and militarized approach, which has been linked to the generalized problem of police brutality (Gumede-Johnson, 2011).

At the community level, public confidence in the SAPS has varied over time but has generally improved. While only 38 per cent of respondents to the National Victims of Crime Survey said they were satisfied with the police in 1998, the satisfaction rating had risen to 62 per cent by 2012 (Statistics South Africa, 1998; 2012b, p. 31). But support is uneven, and some communities are deeply unsatisfied. For example, residents and civil society organizations from the Khayelitsha area in the Western Cape lobbied the government to establish a commission of inquiry into the allegations of police inefficiency and the general breakdown in relations between the community and the police (SJC, 2012). Community members were eventually successful, and a commission was established in September 2012 (Western Cape Government, 2012a). This victory was short-lived, however. Immediately after the commission was set up, the national minister of police lodged a court application to halt its work (SAPS, 2012b).

GOVERNMENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY

The inequality–armed violence link

The psychosocial consequences of inequality are thought to play an important role in driving violence, including armed violence, in South Africa (CSVR, 2008; Ward et al., 2012, p. 217). Inequality generates feelings of ‘insecurity and inadequacy as well as frustration, hopelessness and anger’ (CSVR, 2008, p. 4); these can influence violent behaviour.
Bruce traces the roots of this phenomenon to apartheid and the way black South Africans internalized institutionalized racism; he suggests that the resulting low self-esteem has been compounded by ongoing social and economic inequality in the post-apartheid period, confirming feelings of inferiority, powerlessness, and marginalization (Bruce, 2006, p. 34). In addition to these ‘internalized’ factors, other research suggests that inequality between areas of wealth and poverty also drives crime and violence (O’Donovan, 2011, p. 32).

The government has initiated a range of developmental policies with the intention of addressing the deep socio-economic inequalities that resulted from the apartheid era. These have emphasized access to essential services such as health, education, sanitation, housing, water, and communication (NPC, 2012). Socio-economic measures have included the creation of the Industrial Development Corporation, the Job Fund, and the New Growth Path Framework. Other policy initiatives intended to reduce inequality include the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill, and the Green Paper on Land Reform. Government socio-economic policy has also focused on assisting the most vulnerable groups in society through a massive social grant system that provides pensions, foster care, child support, and disability grants to roughly 16 million people (SASSA, 2012). The next section reviews socio-economic improvements achieved in the post-apartheid era, while describing where gains remain limited.

**Socio-economic gains**

According to the most recent census data, South Africans are significantly better off materially than at the time of the last census ten years earlier (Statistics South Africa, 2012a). In 2001 approximately 18 per cent of people who were at least 20 years old had reported no schooling; by 2011, that figure had shrunk to less than 9 per cent (Statistics South Africa, 2012a, p. 7). Moreover, 46 per cent of South Africans reported having access to piped water in their homes, while another 27 per cent had access to piped water in their yards. Sixty per cent said they had flush toilets, and nearly 85 per cent were using electricity for lighting (pp. 8–10). Refuse was removed by a local authority at least once a week for about two-thirds of the population (Statistics South Africa, 2012c, p. 97). These figures represent significant material improvements.

A report compiled by the South African government and the United Nations Development Programme suggests that the country is on track to meet Millennium Development Goals 1 and 2: combating extreme poverty and hunger and achieving universal primary education (RSA, 2010). Yet South Africa is lagging behind in terms of reaching other Millennium Development Goals, most notably regarding child and maternal mortality, both of which have worsened (RSA, 2010, pp. 59–73; AUC et al., 2012, p. 68). The National Committee on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths reports that, for each year in the period 2005–07, 1,400 mothers died in the neonatal period, representing a 20 per cent increase in maternal deaths in comparison with the period 2002–04. Meanwhile, an estimated 60,000 children die each year in South Africa. For the period 2005–09, malnutrition and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) were the main underlying causes of child mortality (Department of Health, 2009; CoMMiC, 2011).

**Persistent challenges**

South Africa’s uneven performance in reaching the Millennium Development Goals is not the only indication that the country continues to struggle with high levels of inequality. Indeed, its level of inequality is often cited as one of the highest in the world, based on its Gini coefficient ratings (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 18; Bloomberg Businessweek, 2012). The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, with 0 reflecting perfect equality and 100 reflecting high levels of inequality. Since 1994 South Africa has had a Gini rating within the range of 56.59 to 63.14 (Trading Economics, 2012a).
The country’s high levels of inequality are emphasized by South African sources. In 2010 the South African government established the National Planning Commission to undertake a critical review of the country’s progress and to develop a plan for the next 20 years. In 2011 the Commission identified nine key challenges ‘in fighting poverty and inequality and in achieving the objectives set out in [the] Constitution’ (NPC, 2011, p. 1):

- too few South Africans are employed;
- the quality of education for poor black South Africans is sub-standard;
- poorly located and inadequate infrastructure limits social inclusion and faster economic growth;
- South Africa’s growth path is highly resource-intensive and hence unsustainable;
- spatial challenges continue to marginalize the poor;
- the ailing public health system confronts a massive disease burden;
- the performance of the public services is uneven;
- corruption undermines state legitimacy and service delivery; and
- South Africa remains a divided society (NPC, 2011, pp. 9–29).

Two markers cut across these challenges: income inequality and education inequality. Household income diverges significantly by race group. According to 2011 census data, the household income reported by whites grew faster than that of any other racial group, and white households reported bringing in almost six times the average income of black households (Statistics South Africa, 2012a; 2012d). This income disparity is also discussed in the most recent World Bank South Africa Economic Update, which suggests that the richest 10 per cent of the population earn 58 per cent and the poorest 10 per cent of the population earn just 0.5 per cent of national income (Im et al., 2012).

Education inequality is a matter of growing public concern in South Africa. Popular media campaigns highlight the persistent disparities regarding access to textbooks, toilets, and electricity. These claims are borne out in research. Each year the University of Cape Town’s Children’s Institute produces a ‘Child Gauge’ to assess progress among the country’s young people. The 2012 Child Gauge concludes that, unless the inequality situation changes dramatically, many of the apartheid-era inequalities will be reproduced (Children’s Institute, 2012). Even as access to education has improved, the quality of education remains uneven, with historically black schools still lagging behind in terms of equipment, infrastructure, and teaching capacity. This discrepancy was illustrated when, in 2009, all sixth graders (ages 11–13) in the Western Cape took standard numeracy tests; whereas 60 per cent of the schoolchildren in former ‘white’ schools passed, only 2 per cent in black township schools did so (Isaacs, 2012).

**CIVIL SOCIETY AVRP PROGRAMMING**

AVRP programming is an important component of reducing and preventing armed violence. As noted earlier in this chapter, research has identified a range of contributing and inhibiting factors that can be approached through AVRP (OECD, 2011). For example, studies have found that there is a strong connection between easy access to alcohol and increased risk of armed violence (Ramsoomar and Morojele, 2012; WHO, 2006; Sánchez et al., 2011). In response to this finding, various programmes have been developed in South Africa and globally to reduce armed violence by limiting access to alcohol. The international experience demonstrates that it is possible to develop programmes that can effectively tackle the key drivers of armed violence, but that the long-term sustainability and efficacy of these programmes ‘requires investing in institutional capacity, infrastructure and good governance’ (Bellis et al., 2010, p. 5).
Men participate in a community march opposing violence against women, Gugulethu, February 2012. © Sonke Gender Justice
In 2009 the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation undertook an audit to gauge the extent of armed violence programming in South Africa. It investigated the work of 58 programmes doing armed violence prevention work in South Africa as part of a broader exercise of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development to assess promising practices in armed violence prevention and reduction programming in a variety of contexts (Bruce, Kirsten, and Masuku, 2009; Eavis, 2011). The audit identifies direct programmes—those that ‘seek to address the instruments, actors, and institutional environments enabling or protecting against armed violence, e.g. arms collection [and] the demobilization of armed groups’ (Eavis, 2011, p. 12). It distinguishes those direct programmes from the indirect approaches, which include efforts that ‘address proximate and structural risk factors giving rise to armed violence, e.g. youth programming schemes [and] targeted education interventions’ (p. 12).

The audit reveals that the majority of the surveyed organizations were engaged in ‘indirect’ programming. That is, they did not frame their work as armed violence reduction specifically, but rather in terms of the risk factors their work seeks to address. Of the 58 organizations interviewed, only eight were involved in ‘direct’ AVRP programming (Bruce, Kirsten, and Masuku, 2009, p. 2).

The findings suggest that organizations are paying attention to key risk factors and social determinants of armed violence. Study respondents identified the following risk factors (in descending order of importance): gender-based discrimination; marginalized youth; legacies of violence; trauma; rising inequality; availability of weapons; family or parenting role model issues; norms, beliefs, and practices that perpetuate violence; substance abuse; inequitable conceptions of masculinity; lack of early childhood development; and domestic violence (Bruce, Kirsten, and Masuku, 2009, p. 28).

While most of the organizations interviewed reported including monitoring and evaluation components in their programmes, the monitoring was mostly at the activity level, without sufficient attention to the outcomes and impact of the programmes (Bruce, Kirsten, and Masuku, 2009, pp. 30–33). Three exceptions emerged. Two of them—‘Stepping Stones’ and ‘One Man Can’—have demonstrated tangible results in addressing the gender norms that drive violence. A third, recently piloted alcohol reduction intervention called ‘Booza TV’ is also showing positive results. Brief descriptions of all three follow:

### Stepping Stones

The Stepping Stones programme is a 50-hour intervention that uses participatory learning approaches ‘to equip participants to build better, safer, and more gender equitable relationships’ (Jewkes, Wood, and Duvvury, 2010, p. 1075). Topics include gender-based violence, behaviour motivation, and risk-taking (p. 1075). The programme has been implemented in 40 countries and translated into 13 languages. According to a randomized control trial of the programme as implemented in South Africa, ‘Stepping Stones instilled a clear and new perception of risk and desire to avoid it’ (p. 1083). Another evaluation uses a cluster randomized controlled trial and finds that:

Stepping Stones significantly improved a number of reported risk behaviours in men, with a lower proportion of men reporting perpetration of intimate partner violence across two years of follow-up (Jewkes et al., 2008, p. 1).

### One Man Can

The Sonke Gender Justice Network’s One Man Can campaign has been noted as an example of emerging best practices in promoting gender equality (OECD, 2011, p. 28). Sonke is an NGO that works across the African continent to build the capacity of government, civil society organizations, and populations to achieve gender equality, prevent gender-based violence, and reduce the spread of HIV and the impact of AIDS. One Man Can—Sonke’s flagship intervention—is ‘a broad campaign that tries to mobilize men to become involved in civil movements around gender, violence, and health’ (Sonke, n.d.a). The campaign utilizes traditional forms of activism, such as marches, workshops, drama, song, video, sport, and art, to raise awareness on gender equality. The aim of One Man Can is to ‘support men and boys to take action to end domestic and sexual violence and to promote healthy, equitable relationships’ (Sonke, n.d.b).

A 2009 assessment of One Man Can documents significant changes in the short-term behaviour of participants in the weeks following the workshops, with 50 per cent reporting taking action to address gender-based violence in their communities (Colvin, Human, and Peacock, 2009, p. 127). Another evaluation finds that participants reflected improved perceptions on gender equity following their involvement in One Man Can activities (Dworkin et al., 2012, p. 115).

### Booza TV

Booza TV is a multimedia campaign that challenges social norms around drinking (Booza TV, n.d.). The campaign consists of a series of six 30-minute edutainment documentaries that cover different topics relating to alcohol norms. The film clips feature interviews with academics, law enforcement personnel, students, local celebrities, and bar staff. The aim of Booza TV is to ‘encourage a well-informed debate about alcohol abuse and what to do about it’ (Western Cape Government, 2012b). The results from pilot screenings of the series are positive, indicating ‘the series [is] effective in challenging the views, attitudes and opinions of viewers’ (Western Cape Government, 2012b).
South Africa’s AVRP programming has been uneven over time. During the apartheid era, civil society energy was focused almost exclusively on ending apartheid. In the years following apartheid some of this energy fed into violence prevention efforts, including AVRP. For example, the very first firearm amnesty was held in December 1994; although it lasted only 24 hours, it led to the recovery of some 900 firearms and raised awareness of the issue (Kirsten, 2008, p. 33). Subsequent amnesties in 2004–05 and 2010 recovered about 100,000 and 42,000 guns, respectively (South African Parliament, 2012; Kirsten, 2007).

The past 19 years have seen a shift in the focus and character of South African civil society. The reasons for this shift are partly contextual and partly donor-driven, as changes in the socio-political environment helped to shape donor priorities. South Africa has enjoyed substantial donor support since 1994, especially in the areas of health—specifically with respect to HIV and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or AIDS—and, more recently, education. Yet violence prevention strategies, and AVRP programming in particular, have largely been under-funded (Habib and Maharaj, 2008). Notwithstanding the limited funding pool, the violence prevention sector has advanced in terms of advocacy, programming, and building an evidence base (Bruce, Kirsten, and Masuku, 2009).

In general, however, civil society efforts remain small-scale and focus on ‘indirect’ armed violence risk factors, such as alcohol abuse and gender inequality (see Box 6.1 previous page). Some have shown promise, while others remain unevaluated in terms of their impact on armed violence. Yet funding shortages prevent successful projects from being scaled up and untested interventions from being monitored. Given the scale of armed violence in South Africa and its negative effects on development, however, investment in prevention could make good economic sense in the long term.
Access to disaggregated data on violent incidents can help to inform armed violence research and prevention efforts. Such access relies partly on ongoing data collection of incident details, including the type of weapon used, the time of death or injury, sex of victim and perpetrator, and their blood alcohol levels at the time of death or injury. Based on demonstrated violence prevention successes, WHO has called for improved quality and access to data and monitoring on armed violence. The organization emphasizes surveillance as an important priority in its 2002 *World Report on Violence and Health* and reiterates that point in its Global Campaign for Violence Prevention Plan of Action (Krug et al., 2002; VPA, 2012).

In South Africa, however, homicide data generated by the SAPS and NIMSS remains the primary indicator of armed violence levels. While the reporting of both agencies places South Africa ahead of most other African countries, many relevant violent event characteristics remain unrecorded or unpublished. The question of quality and access to better health and injury data needs to be viewed against the massive changes brought about by the transition to democracy. The transformation of the public sector has had an impact on the existence, collection, recording, and, ultimately, reliability of data. Quality and transparency remain challenges in both police and health data systems.

Police homicide data is not disaggregated and has been subject to allegations of manipulation prior to release (SAPA, 2011b). The lack of disaggregated police homicide data means that it is not possible to know, for example, characteristics of victims and perpetrators, the context and location of incidents, or how many homicides were committed per weapon type.

At the same time, the quality of data generated by the current cause of death registration system is compromised due to uneven coverage. Public access to the data is also restricted. Ideally, the entities that serve as data custodians would respond to reasonable data requests from violence prevention practitioners. It appears that capacity constraints currently make this impossible.

The lack of coordination between the Department of Health and the police also affects mortuary data quality. In April 2006 the South African government shifted the running of mortuaries from the SAPS to the Department of Health (*Mail and Guardian*, 2012). This transfer has resulted in poor coordination of data and, ultimately, a discrepancy between police and mortuary data. In practice, this means that autopsy reports from the mortuary do not reach the investigating police officer; the quality of investigations is compromised as a result. A 2012 report on child homicide notes that post-mortem investigations were conducted by the health authorities but that the information did not lead to further police investigation, with the

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### Box 6.2 The value of better data for programming

The utility of strong data and monitoring for armed violence prevention has been convincingly illustrated. One prominent example is the Cure Violence model (formerly known as CeaseFire) from the United States. Cure Violence views violence as a learned behaviour that can be prevented using disease and injury control methods. Concentrating interventions on communities that are most severely affected by violence, the model uses data to identify and detect potentially violent events, interrupt and intervene in situations that are likely to result in a shooting or killing, and change the behaviour and social norms that perpetuate violence.

An evaluation of the programme roll-out in Chicago shows that it contributed to reductions in armed violence (shootings) and was associated with clear declines of actual and attempted shootings, with drops ranging from 17 to 24 per cent in surveyed areas (Skogan et al., 2008, p. 17). A more recent roll-out in Baltimore is associated with ‘5.4 fewer homicide incidents and 34.6 fewer nonfatal shooting incidents during 112 cumulative months of intervention’ (Webster et al., 2012, p. 41).

Preliminary efforts are under way to replicate the Cure Violence model in Cape Town, but it is too early to assess the programme’s full scope or effects.
result that perpetrators were not apprehended (Mathews et al., 2012). For these reasons, the overall assessment of the state of data and monitoring on armed violence in South Africa is decidedly mixed. While public access to data on crime and violence had improved, Safety and Security Minister Steve Tshwete announced a moratorium in 2000 on the release of crime statistics (Burton et al., 2004, p. 22). Since the lifting of the moratorium in 2001, the quality of and access to both police and health data has also improved. But the challenge remains that the lack of data on the causes and circumstances of armed violence prevents more targeted policies and programming and better evaluation efforts (see Box 6.2). This dilemma has been well articulated by researchers and academics but has yet to translate into a change in the status quo (Small Arms Survey, 2008; CSVR, 2007; Ward et al., 2012).

**CONCLUSION**

It has been argued that armed violence and systemic poverty and inequality are linked and that countries that experience entrenched forms of armed violence risk getting trapped in cycles of under-development. This review suggests that the chances of breaking out of the cycle of armed violence and under-development are improved when efforts are made on both fronts. Improving socio-economic equality addresses some of the conditions that give rise to violence and can pay dividends in improved health, well-being, and security. It is incumbent upon the state to reflect this fundamental relationship in policy and programming.

South Africa has seen significant gains in armed violence reduction. Homicides, including gun homicides, have been in steady decline since 1994, and national legislation appears to be partly responsible, though further action is needed. Some socio-economic indicators are similarly improving. But South Africa’s income inequality and homicide rates are still among the world’s highest, and available evidence suggests that inequality remains an important driver of armed violence (CSVR, 2008, pp. 36–50).

While the SAPS should be central in armed violence prevention efforts, its ability to serve this function has been constrained by a range of serious internal problems. Apartheid-era policing practices have been suppressed but not fully transformed, and significant work remains to ensure that the SAPS serves to reduce, rather than exacerbate, levels of armed violence. Implementing further reform and enforcement procedures related to police use of force and firearms is an important step the government can take in this regard.

More broadly, perceptions of corruption, misconduct, and a lack of transparency across a number of state agencies persist. By publishing disaggregated fatal and non-fatal violence data annually, the government can demonstrate commitment to transparent democratic norms. Doing so would also assist researchers and health professionals in developing firearm violence-specific interventions and evaluating existing programmes that focus on contributing factors for violence, such as alcohol abuse and gender inequality. Such measures are more than symbolic in a country that remains deeply divided and where the weight of history is heavy.

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVRP</td>
<td>Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Central Firearms Register</td>
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ENDNOTES

1  This average figure is calculated using South African labour force survey data (Trading Economics, 2012b).
2  For comprehensive accounts of South Africa’s history, see the seven reports compiled by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, n.d.). The Commission was tasked with investigating ‘the causes, nature and extent’ of individual gross human rights violations perpetrated in South Africa between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994 (TRC, 1998, p. 57).
3  Single data is collated from four sources: post-mortem reports, SAP 180 forms, chemical pathology laboratory results, and criminal justice system reports (NIMSS, 2009b).
4  This World Health Organization classification system, now in its tenth revision (2007), is the global standard diagnostic tool for epidemiology, health management, and clinical purposes. See WHO (n.d.).
5  Percentages are based on cases for which the age of the victim was known. Age was unknown in 7 per cent of the cases (NIMSS, 2009b, p. 8).
6  According to NIMSS, age-standardized injury mortality rates were calculated using population data from the 2001 national census (NIMSS, 2012a, p. 12; 2012b, p. 16).
7  The intent of injury was undetermined in 31.4 per cent of the cases. One-third of the victims were in the 20–34 age group and another third were in the 35–54 age group.
8  See Small Arms Survey (2008) for more on the public health approach to armed violence and the concepts of risk and resilience.
9  For a full discussion on police use of force and firearms, see Small Arms Survey (2004).
10  Two notable examples are the Cure Violence (formerly CeaseFire) model and the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit (Cure Violence, n.d.; VRU, n.d.; VPA, n.d.). See Box 6.2 for more details on the Cure Violence model.
11  Author telephone interview with a member of the task team, Pretoria, 2 November 2012.
12  Jackie Selebi was national police commissioner in 2000–08. He was discharged from his duties in 2009 in the wake of corruption charges. In 2010 he was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 15 years in prison (Smith, 2010). Selebi’s successor, Bheki Cele, was national police commissioner from 2009 to 2011, when he was found guilty of fraud and tender irregularities. He was dismissed the same year (BBC, 2012).
13  In March 2011 crime intelligence chief Richard Mdluli was charged with the murder of his former lover’s husband (SAPA, 2011a). In September 2011 he was charged with fraud and corruption for allegedly using SAPS funds to purchase luxury vehicles (Prince, 2011).
14  Zuma is also known for singing the liberation struggle song, A wuleth’ Umshini Wami (Bring Me My Machine Gun), in public appearances (Foster, 2009).
15  In October 2009 a hairdresser was mistaken for a hijacker and shot and killed by the SAPS (Otto, 2009). In November 2009 a three-year-old boy was shot and killed by SAPS while sitting in a car that contained a pipe the police thought suspicious (Berger, 2009). In April 2011 a woman was shot and killed by a SAPS member as she mistakenly bumped into a police vehicle while trying to reverse out of a parking bay (Laing, 2011).
16  Storing a service weapon at home represents a breach of section 98(5)(b) of the FCA, which states that SAPS members should return their weapons at the end of their shift (RSA, 2000, s. 98(5)(b)). Yet respondents in the 2009 study argued that a firearm that had been returned after a shift could easily be stolen from the police station (ICD, 2009, p. 30).
17  See Terreblanche (2002) for a thorough account of how apartheid entrenched inequality in South Africa.
19  The NGO Equal Education campaigns for quality education for all. One of the campaigns calls on the South African government to implement minimum norms and standards for school infrastructure in all schools in the country. See the online petition at Equal Education (n.d.).
20  Two case studies—Diadema in Brazil and Cali in Colombia—illustrate how reducing alcohol availability helps to reduce homicide rates. See Duaílíbi et al. (2007) and Sánchez et al. (2011).
21 The only African countries that carry out emergency room surveillance activities on a regular basis are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uganda (Gilgen, Krause, and Muggah, 2010, p. 17).

22 These characteristics include the type of firearm used in assaults, the location of violent events (home, street, public place), and the relationship between victim and perpetrator.

23 The NIMSS website bears the following note: ‘Important notice: Due to current human resources pressures the Crime, Violence and Injury/Safety and Peace Promotion Research Unit is unable to process requests for data and customised reports’ (MRC, n.d.).


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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