Students demonstrate with toy rifles to demand that the Filipino government support the Arms Trade Treaty, Manila, March 2012. © Pat Roque/AP Photo
INTRODUCTION

In April 2013, cautious celebrations greeted the news that the United Nations General Assembly had finally adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The ATT has been hailed as a victory for women in that it will require states parties to take into account the risk of small arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence, such as domestic and sexual violence, before authorizing their transfer abroad. For women’s civil society organizations (CSOs) and disarmament CSOs, which have often joined forces, this marks an important achievement in the long struggle to prevent the misuse of small arms.

The years 2012–13 saw multiple causes for celebration, as the international women, peace, and security and small arms agendas have finally converged within international policy. The outcome of the 2012 Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action (PoA), the ATT, and the September 2013 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on small arms control each include specific language on gender-based violence or women’s participation. In parallel, the two 2013 resolutions on women, peace, and security both reaffirm the provisions in the ATT; the second of these, UNSCR 2122 of October 2013, contains a groundbreaking operative paragraph urging women’s full participation in controlling illicit small arms.

Such policy coherence was not always the case. Earlier international law and policies, such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PfA), set the stage for addressing the differing ways in which small arms affect and involve men, women, girls, and boys. Nonetheless, the first five UNSCRs on women, peace, and security, beginning with UNSCR 1325, made no mention of ‘small arms’, the ‘arms trade’, or ‘weapons’. Despite this crucial omission, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) states that ‘Resolution 1325 has also proven to be a decisive mandate for the field of small arms policy and practice’ (IANSA, 2008, p. 1). Actors ranging from the UN Secretary-General to disarmament non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have drawn policy, research, and advocacy linkages between the UN Security Council’s women, peace, and security agenda and small arms. In addition, a number of national-level action plans on women, peace, and security and small arms refer to aspects of the ‘other agenda’; for example, a national action plan on small arms may refer to the importance of women’s participation in community education to prevent the misuse of firearms.

This chapter describes the increasing convergence of the international women, peace, and security agenda and the small arms control agenda, highlighting the crucial role that women and women’s organizations have played in the process. It finds that:

- CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and PfA provide a strong normative basis for connecting the women, peace, and security and the small arms agendas.
• Until 2013, the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security, aside from references to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), were silent on the topics of small arms and disarmament.

• Key actors have linked four mandates in the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security to small arms, namely the protection of civilians, including from sexual violence; women’s participation; supporting local women’s peace and conflict resolution; and DDR.

• Recent UN monitoring frameworks on UNSCR 1325 include specific indicators and targets pertaining to small arms and disarmament.

• While one-quarter of existing national action plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (1325 NAPs) refer to small arms, they rarely operationalize this policy linkage by requiring concrete actions. Likewise, while national action plans on small arms occasionally mention women, they do not translate this into required actions.

• The ATT and the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security and on small arms adopted in 2013 finally firmly connect these two international policy agendas. National action plans on UNSCR 1325 and on small arms have the potential to be stronger and more effective by giving concrete expression to this policy convergence.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section provides an overview of women, peace, and security issues, including the origins of the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security and a summary of women’s roles in relation to small arms in the context of armed conflict. The second section analyses how the international policy framework on women, peace, and security has—and has not—addressed small arms, including through the seven UNSCRs on women, peace, and security, CEDAW, and the Beijing Declaration and Pfa. The third section considers how small arms feature in 1325 NAPs, 43 of which have been adopted to date; it examines the implementation of relevant parts of the 1325 NAPs of the Philippines and Senegal, whose provisions on small arms are the most detailed. It also explores how women, peace, and security issues have—and have not—been addressed in a number of national action plans on small arms. The final section then reviews how the women, peace, and security agenda has been embodied in recent developments in small arms law and policy, through the PoA, the ATT, and the UNSCR on small arms.

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY OVERVIEW

Origins of the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security
The 15 UN Security Council members unanimously adopted UNSCR 1325 on women, peace, and security on 31 October 2000 (UNSC, 2000). The words ‘groundbreaking’ and ‘landmark’ are often used to describe UNSCR 1325, with reference to both the topic and the process of developing the resolution. For the first time since its inception in 1945, the UN Security Council directly addressed the impact of armed conflict on women and their roles in establishing peace and security. In previous resolutions, only a few passing references had been made to women as either victims or members of ‘vulnerable groups’ (Cohn, 2007, p. 2). Today the resolution is being used not only to mainstream gender in the UN architecture on peace and security, but also by CSOs around the world to advocate everything from increased representation of women in government to support for psychosocial care for victims of sexual violence. Since UNSCR 1325, six more UNSCRs on women, peace, and security have been adopted.

The idea of raising the topic of women, peace, and security in the UN Security Council was first aired in discussions among NGOs in the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus during the 1998 UN Commission on the Status of Women
Two years later, six international NGOs created the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security for the specific purpose of advocating the passage of a UNSCR on this topic. These were: Amnesty International, the Hague Appeal for Peace, International Alert, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Women’s League for International Peace and Freedom. UNSCR 1325 is noteworthy in that it is one of the few if not the only resolution whose initial driving force was comprised of NGOs, which produced background research, engaged in lobbying, and drafted the text.

All six of the founding members were directly working on issues related to women and armed conflict, but only two explicitly focused on women and disarmament. Within the NGO Working Group, the Women’s League for International Peace and Freedom and the Hague Appeal for Peace, both of which have a long history of disarmament work, pushed for the initial draft of UNSCR 1325 to include references to the international arms trade and the importance of disarmament. However, these topics were rejected by other Working Group members as ‘too political’ (Cohn, 2007, p. 12). Self-censorship among the NGOs thus partially accounted for the end result of a resolution with no mention of ‘small arms’, the ‘arms trade’, or ‘weapons’. Box 2.1 discusses ‘men, peace, and security’, another set of issues arguably missing from the text.
Nevertheless, the NGO Working Group, in consultation with women’s organizations from conflict and post-conflict contexts and in partnership with the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), saw the resolution as a way to mandate the UN peace and security structure to address the horrifying impact war was having on women and the barriers they faced in taking a seat around the peace negotiation table (Cohn, 2007, p. 11). These concerns are clearly reflected in the final language of UNSCR 1325 and have shaped the discourse surrounding the resolution. The subsequent six UNSCRs on women, peace, and security each have their own origin story, some linked to CSO advocacy and others driven by UN member state priorities.

**Women, war, and small arms**

The UNSCRs on women, peace, and security seek to address the realities faced by women and girls in armed conflict and post-conflict contexts. In reality, they cover a limited range of women’s actual roles, needs, and priorities. Armed conflict creates an environment of extreme vulnerability to many different forms of violence and deprivation. Yet, armed conflict also creates space to transcend traditional gender roles, as men, women, girls, and boys may take on new roles as combatants, heads of household, community leaders, and peace activists. When it comes to small arms, women have, among other roles, taken up arms as combatants, smuggled weapons across borders, and organized local and national disarmament initiatives.

Beyond the issue of access to DDR, women as perpetrators of armed violence have garnered relatively little attention on the international women, peace, and security agenda in comparison to other roles, such as victims of armed violence or peacemakers. Often sensationalized in the popular media, female combatants and women or girls associated with fighting forces are the norm in armed conflicts throughout the world. From Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, and Liberia to Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Syria, women and girls have taken up weapons and served as combatants, including as perpetrators of human rights violations. In Nepal, for instance, women composed 20 per cent of Maoist army personnel; in Colombia, women constituted 30–35 per cent of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; and 33 per cent of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front were women, including 13 per cent of frontline fighters (UNMIN, 2008; Drost, 2011; Freedom House, 2011). Women and girls have also taken on essential support functions such as cooks, spies, paramedics, teachers, couriers, mechanics, drivers, and porters.

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**Box 2.1 What about men, peace, and security?**

There have been many valid conceptual critiques of the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security. In particular, their focus on women rather than gender has been both lauded and lambasted. In total, UNSCR 1325 contains 33 references to ‘women’, 13 to ‘girls’, 11 to ‘gender’, 3 to ‘children’, and 2 to ‘civilians’; it only uses the term ‘male’ once and makes no reference to ‘men’ or ‘boys’. Defenders claim that the focus on women redresses the past invisibility of women as both victims and actors and reflects the needs and priorities identified by grassroots women’s organizations in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It is also viewed as a pragmatic approach to ensure that women are not ‘lost’ in the efforts to mainstream gender, including when it comes to funding allocation.

On the other hand, this approach has been criticized for essentializing women as either victims or peacemakers and brushing over the importance of context-based, complex gender relations that shape both women’s and men’s roles and needs during and after conflict. As the gender roles of men and women are constructed in opposition to each other, simply focusing on women’s roles may actually perpetuate the insecurity women experience by failing to look at the gendered root causes of violent behaviour, and overlooking how understanding and bringing about changes in male gender roles—that is, masculinities—can be an effective tool for violence prevention.

In addition, by making men invisible in the peace and security context, the resolutions fail to acknowledge the diversity of roles men play, not just as perpetrators of violence but as activists for peace and as victims of war. For example, in Liberia a survey found that 33 per cent of male combatants and 7 per cent of male non-combatants had experienced sexual violence, and around the world men are a vast majority of victims of small arms violence, constituting 90 per cent of firearms casualties (Feuerschütz, 2012, p. 13; WHO, 2001, p. 3). CSOs have drawn attention to the importance of engaging with men on peace and security issues, in particular in the field of small arms, and the topic of ‘men, peace, and security’ has recently started to gain traction (USIP, 2013).
Just as with men and boys, in some contexts women and girls have largely joined voluntarily, as in Colombia and Sri Lanka, while in other contexts girls were often forcibly recruited, as in Liberia. Forcibly recruited girl combatants face the prevalent threat of sexual violence, including rape and so-called ‘AK-47 marriages’, which are the equivalent of sexual slavery (Schroeder, Farr, and Schnabel, 2005, p. 17). Women and girls can thus end up in a position of being simultaneously a perpetrator and a victim of armed human rights violations.

‘Civilian’ women also act in support of armed combatants—whether by providing moral support, encouraging community mobilization, offering food, funds, safehouses, or medical attention, producing arms, or smuggling weapons and ammunition. In Nigeria the militant organization Boko Haram has recruited women as arms couriers to smuggle AK-47s and improvised explosive devices under their traditional religious clothing; the women carry these loads as though they were babies on their backs (Onuoha, 2013). In Syria, women have also been involved in smuggling arms from one region to another in support of the Free Syrian Army (Cheikhomar and Austin, 2013).

During and following conflict, women, men, boys, and girls face multiple forms of violence and deprivation as direct and indirect consequences of small arms prevalence and misuse. Research in Cambodia, for example, has
demonstrated that, if small arms are not removed following the cessation of conflict, they may be directed towards the civilian population or may be used in interpersonal violence (ICRC, 1999, pp. 9–11). Sex-disaggregated data that allows a rigorous assessment of differential impacts of armed violence in conflict on men, women, boys, and girls is scarce due to the general difficulties of data collection in such contexts, as well as the under-reporting of gender-based violence due to social taboos and stigmatization.

Nonetheless, examples of direct small arms violence faced by women during and after war include domestic and sexual violence, injury, and murder. Rates of domestic violence are high during armed conflict and increase in its aftermath, with women suffering the brunt of this form of violence (Farr, 2006, p. 46). Multiple research studies confirm that the increased availability of guns during the conflict in Northern Ireland meant more dangerous forms of violence in the home (McWilliams, 1998, p. 131). The International Rescue Committee observed a similar trend in 2011 in Côte d’Ivoire, where during the armed conflict rates of reported domestic violence rose by 43 per cent (IRC, 2012, p. 7). Numerous studies have also documented the link between small arms and sexual violence (Farr, Myrttinen, and Schnabel, 2009; AI, 2012b). In a 2013 report on Syria, interviewed refugees cited rape as the main reason their families fled the conflict, and women and girls who had been attacked noted that it was primarily committed by armed men (IRC, 2013, pp. 2, 6). In the countries with the highest rates of femicide (the killing of a woman), which include Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala, more than 60 per cent of femicides perpetrated in 2004–09 involved the use of a firearm (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 131). In addition, women are robbed, traumatized, trafficked, displaced, and forced into marriage or prostitution at gunpoint (Kalitowski, 2006; FEIM et al., 2011). Indirect consequences of armed violence on women include taking on the role of head of household when a partner is killed, taking care of injured family members, and the inability to access work, education, and health care due to the threat of armed violence.

Women are not only perpetrators and victims of small arms violence, but also have proven to be key players in preventing it. From lobbying at the UN to initiating local youth programmes, women have been at the forefront of many international and national initiatives to remove small arms from their communities, at times evoking UNSCR 1325 and making the link to broader peace and security concerns. For example, in Mali in the early 1990s, women talked their male family members into giving up their weapons, and at times brought weapons hidden by men to collection sites (Farr, Myrttinen, and Schnabel, 2009, pp. 343–44). In the late 1990s, women in Albania were a strong force in sensitizing their communities to the dangers of weapons and mobilizing community members to hand in guns (pp. 336–37). Women also play a crucial role in local policy-making and small arms monitoring activities. In 2010, 100 pastoralist women from the frontier Indigenous Network in Kenya submitted a petition and a regional plan on firearms control to the government, listing local arms markets, smuggling routes, and arms traffickers (Masters, 2010).

INTERNATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AND SMALL ARMS

UNSCRs on women, peace, and security

Together, the seven UNSCRs on women, peace, and security constitute an international policy framework and an important platform for action and advocacy for civil society. Table 2.1 contains a brief outline of the contents of each UNSCR on women, peace, and security. Regardless of whether they are legally binding for states, as a CEDAW Committee member has emphasized, they are:
This international agenda has three main focus areas: the protection of women’s and girls’ human rights in armed conflict and post-conflict settings, in particular the protection from sexual violence; the full and equal participation of women in peace and security; and gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. To this end, the resolutions include specific mandates directed at different actors, including UN member states, the UN Secretary-General, all parties to armed conflict, all actors involved in peace agreements, civil society, and regional bodies.

Though none of the five first UNSCRs on women, peace, and security specifically mention ‘small arms’, the ‘arms trade’, or ‘weapons’, they do include four mandates that actors ranging from the UN Secretary-General to arms control advocates have linked to small arms, namely the protection of civilians from human rights abuses, including sexual

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<tr>
<th>Resolution number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Overview of contents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1325</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Calls for increased representation of women in conflict prevention and management, including as peacekeepers. Mandates incorporating a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, including DDR and peace agreements. Calls for the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>Demands an end to all acts of sexual violence against civilians during armed conflict. Urges preventive and responsive actions, including training programmes, enforcing military discipline, vetting armed and security forces, consultation with women's organizations, equal access to justice, and prosecution of perpetrators.</td>
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<td>1888</td>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Also focuses on prevention and response to sexual violence in armed conflict. Requests the establishment of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict and UN women’s protection advisers in peacekeeping missions. Urges legal and judicial reform at the national level and support to victims.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>Urges women’s participation in all stages of peace processes, including political and economic decision-making. Requests the UN Secretary-General to increase the number of gender advisers as well as female UN Special Representatives and envoys. Calls for gender mainstreaming in all post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>Also focuses on prevention and the response to sexual violence in armed conflict. Requests the UN Secretary-General to establish monitoring, analysis, and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2106</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>Also focuses on prevention and the response to sexual violence in armed conflict. Emphasizes the important role women and women’s organizations play in addressing sexual violence and links sexual violence to HIV/AIDS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2122</td>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>Focuses on implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda across the Security Council’s work, with an emphasis on women's leadership and participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Calls for a high-level review of UNSCR 1325 implementation in 2015.</td>
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violence; women’s participation in peace and security decision-making; supporting local women’s peace and conflict resolution initiatives; and DDR.

Since 2013, policy-makers and advocates no longer need to read between the lines of UNSCR texts to make the linkage between women, peace, and security and small arms. UNSCRs 2106 and 2122 both make overt references to small arms, citing the AIT and, for the first time, including an operative paragraph encouraging women’s participation in small arms action.

**Protection from human rights abuses, including sexual violence**

Although they include clear language on the protection of civilians, the first five UNSCRs on women, peace, and security lack any direct wording linking small arms with human rights abuses. However, the reports of the UN Secretary-General on women, peace, and security do recognize this linkage, in particular as concerns the perpetration of sexual violence. Prevention of and the response to sexual violence in conflict has been given particular prominence within the international women, peace, and security agenda, with both the United States and the United Kingdom championing the issue in the UN Security Council. To date, the Security Council has adopted four resolutions specifically focused on sexual violence: UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1960, and 2106, and in response the UN Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2010. The Special Representative chairs the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action), a coordinating mechanism for the activities of 13 UN entities.

The UN Secretary-General’s 2011 report on women, peace, and security clearly states that ‘gender-based violence is more prevalent and more severe when guns are readily available’ (UNSC, 2011a, p. 15). In his October 2012 report, the UN Secretary-General goes even further: ‘The availability and limited control of small arms and light weapons continue to facilitate gender-based crimes, such as rape and other forms of sexual abuse and violence’ (UNSC, 2012, para. 35). Likewise, in his March 2013 annual report on sexual violence in conflict, he notes the exacerbating influence of the proliferation of small arms in relation to sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur (UNSC, 2013a, paras. 34, 72). The UN Secretary-General also encourages member states, donors, and regional organizations to improve data collection and analysis on the linkages between the widespread availability of illicit small arms and conflict-related sexual violence, and to put in place effective arms control measures (para. 130(e)).

This call to action does not appear to have been translated into UN practice. For instance, UN Action’s field activities to address sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Darfur do not seem to have included a focus on small arms. The UN Mission in DRC’s *Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence*, developed in 2008–09, is intended to address sexual violence in a holistic manner. It highlights ensuring equal access by women and men to disarmament programmes and including procedures to assist survivors of sexual violence going through disarmament. However, the strategy does not acknowledge that disarmament is a factor in preventing sexual violence, nor does it include broader measures to remove small arms from communities (UN Action, n.d.b).

The most recent UNSCR on sexual violence in conflict, UNSCR 2106 of June 2013, is thus significant in that it makes note of the ATT (discussed below) in its preamble:

*the provision in the Arms Trade Treaty that exporting States Parties shall take into account the risk of covered conventional arms or items being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children* (UNSC, 2013b).

This is the first UNSCR on women, peace, and security to explicitly mention arms. UNSCR 2106 does not, however, request any specific actions by UN agencies or states to address small arms in relation to combating human rights abuses, including sexual violence.
**Women’s participation and supporting local women’s peace initiatives**

NGOs working on small arms have taken UNSCR 1325’s call for UN member states to increase the representation of women in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution as a mandate to increase women’s participation in small arms policy-making processes (Dube, 2010, p. 4). This interpretation was strengthened by the 2010 and 2012 UN General Assembly Resolutions on ‘women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control’. The controversial 2012 resolution urges member states, subregional and regional organizations, and the UN to promote the representation of women in all decision-making processes related to disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, particularly with respect to the prevention and reduction of armed violence and armed conflict (UNGA, 2012b).

As a follow-up to this resolution, in 2013 the UN Secretary-General sought the views of member states on its implementation. The replies submitted by Argentina, Australia, the European Union, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland specifically mention their national and regional plans to implement UNSCR 1325 as helping to increase the number of women in decision-making positions within the field of disarmament. Additional activities mentioned in the report include supporting women’s participation in regional and international negotiations on the ATT and PoA and lobbying for the inclusion of references to gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325 in these policies (UNGA, 2013b).

Another linkage between the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security and small arms has been made in response to Article 8(b) of UNSCR 1325, which urges all actors involved in negotiating and implementing peace agreements to support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution. The UN Secretary-General, in his 2002 study on women, peace, and security, makes this connection, noting that formal peace processes generally include ‘global disarmament’; that women are key actors in informal peace processes that include disarmament; and that ‘women around the world have continued to pursue the goal of disarmament, including [. . .] strengthening controls over the production and sale of conventional arms’ (UN, 2002, pp. 53–54).

With the passing of UNSCR 2122 in October 2013, the importance of women’s participation in disarmament was explicitly acknowledged for the first time within the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security. This resolution includes an operative paragraph urging ‘Member States and United Nations entities, to ensure women’s full and meaningful participation in efforts to combat and eradicate the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons’ (UNSC, 2013d, para. 14). Though this mandate narrowly focuses on illicit transfer and misuse, the specific wording on small arms included in a UNSCR on women, peace, and security is a significant achievement and bodes well for increasing acceptance of the relevance of small arms control efforts to the international women, peace, and security agenda.

**Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration**

Perhaps the most overt linkage between the first five UNSCRs on women, peace, and security and small arms are the DDR-related mandates that call for the different needs of female and male ex-combatants to be taken into account. Not only does the process of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-combatants involve collecting and disposing of small arms, but this wording has also been broadly interpreted by the 2002 UN Secretary-General study on women, peace, and security to encompass other weapons-collection activities. Discussions around gender and DDR have largely focused on making DDR processes accessible and suited for female ex-combatants and women and girls associated with fighting forces. To this end, the UN has appointed gender advisers, implemented programmes targeting female ex-combatants, provided gender training to DDR personnel, and developed policy guidance on gender and DDR, such as the UN Integrated DDR Standards and UNIFEM Standard Operating Procedures on Gender and DDR (UN, 2006; UNIFEM, 2004).
The UN Secretary-General’s 2002 study sets the precedent for a wider interpretation of UNSCR mandates on DDR that is directly related to small arms, namely community-level weapons collections programmes. The study clearly states that community disarmament initiatives are ‘of great importance to women because of heightened threats to their personal security with the proliferation of weapons in post-conflict situations’ and lauds women and girls for their active participation in weapons collection programmes (UN, 2002, p. 129). The study also specifically acknowledges that consultation with community-level women’s groups and women can provide important information regarding attitudes towards the weapons within the community, traditional mechanisms to respond to the problem of high numbers of weapons, and, potentially, the identification of weapons caches and trans-border weapons trade (p. 131). Finally, the study includes a concrete recommendation for action, to recognize and utilize the contributions of women and girls in weapons collection programmes and ensure that they benefit from these programme incentives (p. 138).

The fact that the 2002 UN Secretary-General’s study on women, peace, and security—which was mandated in UNSCR 1325—recognizes that small arms proliferation poses a security risk to women and highlights their active role in disarmament has been crucial in solidifying the linkage between the women, peace, and security agenda and small arms. It opened the door to the inclusion of activities on small arms and gender in UN reporting on women, peace, and security. For instance, the UN Secretary-General’s 2006 report on the implementation of the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security notes that the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs provided training to parliamentarians in Latin America and the Caribbean on mainstreaming a gender perspective into national firearms legislation (UNSC, 2006, p. 7). With the two latest UNSCRs on women, peace, and security including specific wording related to small arms, this linkage may be more strongly reflected in future UN action and reporting on implementation.

Indicators offer a global monitoring framework that can link UNSCR 1325 and small arms.

**Monitoring, evaluation, and indicators**

A common critique of the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security is that they lack accountability mechanisms to incentivize and monitor states’ implementation. UNSCR 1325 does not include any mechanisms aside from reporting by the UN Secretary-General (Bastick and de Torres, 2010, p. 3). UNSCR 1889 goes a step further by requesting the UN Secretary-General to develop a set of global indicators to track the implementation of UNSCR 1325, which could serve as a common basis for reporting by United Nations entities, other international and regional organizations, and member states (UNSC, 2009, para. 17).

In his 2010 report, the UN Secretary-General presents the indicators developed by the Technical Working Group on Global Indicators for Resolution 1325. In total, 26 indicators were developed and arranged under the headings of prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery. Under the category of protection, indicator 17 clearly demonstrates that, even though it continues to be a heatedly debated topic, it is now increasingly possible to address small arms in the context of the international women, peace, and security agenda. The indicator—the existence of national mechanisms for the control of small arms and light weapons—seeks to track the presence and gender sensitivity of mechanisms and structures to regulate small arms. The indicator can be measured using data on the existence of a national coordination agency on small arms and the number and type of small arms available per 10,000 population (UNSC, 2010, p. 8).

As of late November 2013, these indicators had not yet been reported upon. However, they have the potential to provide a global monitoring framework that clearly links UNSCR 1325 and small arms. A civil society initiative to develop and monitor indicators on women, peace, and security has not included a specific indicator on small arms, despite mentioning women, small arms, and the ATT in the section linking UNSCR 1325 to key policy debates (GNWP, 2012).
Finally, at the institutional level, the *UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace, and Security: 2011–2020* includes outputs and targets designed to assess implementation in 2015 and 2020 (UN, 2011). Out of 22 outputs listed, two specifically mention small arms or disarmament. Output 3.2.1 is for the UN to provide support and capacity to strengthen gender-responsive mechanisms for the control of small arms. The target for 2014 is that 75 per cent of UN-sponsored and -led disarmament and arms control programmes mainstream gender throughout programme design and delivery (for 2020, the target is 100 per cent). Output 1.1.3 is that UN-supported disarmament, non-proliferation arms control, and armed violence prevention and reduction activities include consultation and active involvement of women’s leaders and groups. The targets for 2014 and 2020 are inclusive and effective consultation and involvement of women leaders and groups in 50 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively, of UN-supported disarmament activities. If implemented, these targets would link up small arms with the women, peace, and security agenda at the levels of state and UN implementation.

**CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action**

The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and PfA form the backbone of the international policy agenda on women, peace, and security. They established the conceptual basis for this agenda, with both policies and their reporting processes addressing women, peace, and security, including making the link to small arms. Furthermore, CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and PfA both have regular and comprehensive reporting mechanisms. It is curious that, considering their relevance to women, peace, and security, these policies are often sidelined in discussions on this agenda.

As of 1 November 2013, 187 states were parties to CEDAW, a legally binding instrument that requires states to adopt appropriate legislation and other measures to prohibit discrimination against women and to establish legal protection for the equal rights of women. States parties to CEDAW are required to report regularly on the progress of their implementation to the UN CEDAW Committee. During the course of the negotiations on the ATT, the CEDAW Committee actively underscored the gender dimensions of the arms trade—and its links to conflict-related sexual violence, domestic violence, and violence against protestors or actors in resistance movements (CEDAW Committee, 2012). Committee members have pointed out that small arms must be regulated if states are to prevent forms of violence such as domestic violence and sexual violence, as required under Article 2, and to ensure women’s participation in public life, as required under Article 7 (Patten, 2012, pp. 4–5).

Accordingly, in some of its recent concluding observations on state reports, the CEDAW Committee has urged governments to better regulate small arms. For example, in its March 2013 concluding observations to the Government of Pakistan, the Committee expressed deep concern over the widespread illicit trade and sale of small arms and their use against women in the context of internal armed conflicts. It analysed this as a ‘failure of the State party to comply with its due diligence obligation, under article 2 of the Convention, to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such acts of gender-based violence’ and urged Pakistan to ‘[e]nact legislation strictly regulating the trade, sale and possession of small arms, and sanction violations thereof severely’ (CEDAW Committee, 2013a, paras. 13, 14(d)). In its subsequent session, the CEDAW Committee voiced similar concerns about the impact of small arms on the security of women in the DRC, urging the government not only to regulate the arms trade effectively and control the circulation of illicit small arms, but also to consider ratifying the ATT (CEDAW Committee, 2013b, paras. 9(i), 10(h)).

In its October 2013 general recommendation on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations, the CEDAW Committee states that arms control is necessary to prevent gender-based violence and calls for the
ratification and implementation of the ATT (CEDAW Committee, 2013c, paras. 29, 33(e)). The CEDAW Committee’s engagement with small arms regulation in this manner clearly demonstrates the applicability of international law obligations on discrimination and prevention of violence against women to small arms control.

The Beijing Declaration and PfA built upon the initial mandates of CEDAW and broadened the focus from non-discrimination to promoting the equal rights of women by establishing an agenda for women’s empowerment. It was the outcome document of the UN-convened Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995. It focuses on 12 critical areas, including armed conflict, and lists hundreds of actions to be taken by governments, financial and development institutions, and NGOs, including women’s groups. Although it is not legally binding, UN member states report on their implementation of the Beijing Declaration and PfA every five years and NGOs often submit shadow reports. The CSW reviews the reports and issues official recommendations.

It was not a coincidence that initial discussions linking women, peace, and security to the UN Security Council took place in the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus of the CSW. The aim of this Caucus was to review the implementation of the Beijing PfA’s chapter on women and armed conflict. The chapter contains specific wording linking women and disarmament, acknowledging that women’s NGOs have called for a reduction in the international trade, trafficking, and proliferation of weapons. It also highlights that women living in poverty, particularly rural women, suffer because of the use of arms and that ‘the negative impact on development of excessive military expenditures, the arms trade, and investment for arms production and acquisition must be addressed’ (UN, 1995, art. 138). This description is followed up with strategic objective E.2: ‘Reduce excessive military expenditures and control the availability of arms.’ In order to meet this objective, governments are tasked with appropriately reducing excessive military expenditure, including trade in arms, as well as combating illicit arms trafficking (art. 143). At a more general level, the critical area on women and armed conflict also highlights women’s under-representation in peace and security decision-making and calls for their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts (art. 134).

Unlike the text of the first six UNSCRs on women, peace, and security, the Beijing Declaration and PfA explicitly link the arms trade to armed violence and outline how women are both victims of armed violence and actors for arms control and disarmament. The UNSCRs on women, peace, and security have clearly drawn both content and language from CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and PfA, but in many ways they have depoliticized the message. Critical engagement on the issues of poverty, terrorism, occupation, and disarmament are essential parts of the discussion on women and armed conflict in the Beijing Declaration and PfA but remain largely absent from the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security. The international agenda on women, peace, and security will need to reclaim CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and PfA to address women and small arms comprehensively.

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AND SMALL ARMS

Control of small arms, while guided by international and regional norms, actually occurs at the national and sub-national level through domestic legislation, regulations, and practice. Accordingly, many of the policy objectives and obligations embodied in the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security require national-level action to be realized. This section outlines, first, how states have implemented the international women, peace, and security agenda through
national and regional action plans. It then examines the manner in which small arms have been addressed in 1325 NAPs, with short case studies on the Philippines and Senegal. The section then offers a more limited examination of how women, peace, and security issues are addressed in national action plans on small arms, highlighting some of the shortcomings in the plans reviewed.

1325 national action plans

As previously mentioned, UNSCR 1325 and the following women, peace, and security resolutions primarily address the UN system. They do nonetheless urge UN member states to take action in a number of areas. In 2002, both the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council encouraged member states to develop action plans with goals and timetables to implement certain aspects of UNSCR 1325 (UNSC, 2002a, action 15; 2002b). By 2005, this had crystallized into a call for all UN member states to develop a national action plan (1325 NAP) or other national-level strategies to ensure implementation of UNSCR 1325 (UNSC, 2005). Since 2006, the CEDAW Committee has also consistently referred to UNSCR 1325 in its concluding observations on states’ reports, and has at times urged states to develop a 1325 NAP.3

Although the uptake was initially slow, as of November 2013 43 of 193 states had adopted a 1325 NAP (PeaceWomen, n.d.; see Table 2.2). In some cases these plans also address subsequent resolutions, for example UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in conflict. The first 1325 NAPs were adopted by European donor states and aimed to guide development assistance in addressing the needs and promoting the participation of women in conflict-affected states. Since 2007, a number of conflict-affected states have also adopted 1325 NAPs. While most of the states with 1325 NAPs are in Europe, North America, and Africa, the group comprises a mix of donor/developed, post-conflict, developing, and transitional states. Nepal and the Philippines are the only Asian countries with 1325 NAPs, and Chile is the only South American country.

A number of regional and sub-regional organizations have also developed policies to facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at the regional and national levels. These include the regional action plan of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), strategies and indicators of the European Union, regional action plans for the Great Lakes and the Pacific, and the regional strategy on women and peace and security of the League of Arab States.

### Table 2.2 States with 1325 NAPs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year adopted</th>
<th>Country (year revised)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Denmark (2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Norway (2011)</td>
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<td>Sweden (2009)</td>
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<td>Netherlands (2011)</td>
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<td>Switzerland (2010)</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Finland (2012)</td>
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<td>Iceland (2013)</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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Note: * As of January 2014. Source: Global Gender Program (n.d.)
Not only can 1325 NAPs be a useful tool for translating the specific obligations of UNSCR 1325 into coherent policy and strategic responses, but they can also help civil society to hold their governments accountable. A 1325 NAP aims to build awareness and ownership of women, peace, and security commitments among different national actors, and to strengthen coordination, accountability, and monitoring and evaluation of a government’s activities regarding women, peace, and security. While they generally address the prevention of gender-based violence and the need for an increased representation of women in decision-making, the NAPs vary as to whether and how they address such issues as the inclusion of local women in peace processes, DDR, security sector reform, and small arms (Gumru and Fritz, 2009, p. 218).

States have engaged with UNSCR 1325 as emblematic of a range of aspirations and commitments related to gender, women’s empowerment, and security, often going beyond the specific UN member state obligations set out in the UNSCRs in their 1325 NAP. In almost all countries with a 1325 NAP, there has been active civil society participation in its development and monitoring.

As with other gender policies, in many countries 1325 NAP implementation is weak. This is often due to a combination of a lack of institutional buy-in, a lack of accountability mechanisms and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and inadequate budgetary allocation (GNWP, 2013a, pp. 2–4). As of October 2012, only seven countries had published dedicated budgets to meet their women, peace, and security commitments (UNSC, 2012, para. 6).

Nonetheless, in a number of countries, adopting a 1325 NAP has led to concrete, positive outcomes. In Nepal, for instance, the 1325 NAP has facilitated the allocation of specific budgetary resources for women, peace, and security activities; partnership between government, civil society, and other development partners; an increased emphasis by the police and military on implementation of obligations under UNSCR 1325; and the setting of quotas for women’s participation (GNWP, 2013b). In the Philippines, the 1325 NAP has helped women to gain access to peace processes (GNWP, 2013a, p. 2).

### 1325 NAPs and small arms

Despite the absence of direct reference to small arms in UNSCR 1325, one-quarter of the 1325 NAPs recognize the link between women or gender and small arms issues (see Table 2.3). Issues highlighted include the likelihood that women and girls are affected by small arms violence, and the importance of involving women in the control of small arms. With the exception of Liberia, the Philippines, Senegal, and Uganda, however, current 1325 NAPs do not actually commit to any action to enact or support small arms regulation, or they do so in a vague way that is difficult to measure. Nor do any of the 1325 NAPs refer to the need for arms regulation itself to be gender-responsive, for instance through provisions to prevent the threat or use of small arms in domestic violence (see Box 2.2). Based on a review of the 43 1325 NAPs, Table 2.3 cites references to small arms issues, aside from those related to DDR.¹

Has the mention of small arms in 1325 NAPs made a difference in lawmaking, community education mechanisms, or disarmament programming? Since many of the 1325 NAPs have only recently been adopted and because their implementation has been poorly monitored, it is not possible to draw any generalizable conclusions. Instead, implementation of the small arms commitments in the 1325 NAPs of the Philippines and Senegal are examined below. These countries are chosen because: 1) their 1325 NAPs contain detailed provisions on small arms; and 2) since adopting their NAPs, these countries have developed gun control laws. This allows for an examination of what impact the linking of the women, peace, and security and the small arms agendas in national policy has had.
Australia 2012

Australia also supports [...] international work on matters that link closely with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. This includes work on [...] small arms control (Australia, 2012, p. 10). Through its engagement in multilateral disarmament conventions, Australia raises the profile of gender issues and works for the inclusion of women in relevant processes around conventional weapons control. For example, Australia highlights the importance of involving women in the control of small arms and light weapons due to their specific impact on women and girls in conflict situations (p. 40).

Belgium 2009

Belgium pays attention to the specific position of women and children in the context of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, since women and children frequently are the first victims of violence committed with these weapons. Belgium supports the 2001 UN Action plan on the fight against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and promotes the proposal of an international treaty on the arms trade. Such a treaty should contain proper criteria for the export of arms, avoiding that arms could be exported to countries marked by conflicts, internal instability or the non-respect of human rights (Belgium, 2009, p. 13).

Denmark 2008

Denmark will, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strive to: [...] Support the role of female leaders in community training and education on weapons, demobilisation and responsibility (Denmark, 2008, p. 26).

Germany 2012

The Federal Government is working toward integrating a gender perspective into international efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms. Following the end of a conflict, small arms often remain available and affordable and increase the risk of both domestic and sexual violence. The Federal Government makes sure that its project work to combat illegal small arms also takes in consideration gender-specific issues, and in particular secures the involvement of women in the control of small arms.

Germany heads the ‘Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures’ (GIS). This group provides a forum for exchange through project work and political measures, with the aim of supporting implementation of the United Nations’ Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which regularly deals with gender-specific issues. The Federal Government examines projects dealing with the control of small arms with regard to their gender-based relevance, thereby underlining the significance of this aspect (Germany, 2012, p. 14).

Ireland 2011

Ireland is involved in a range of [...] small arms and light weapons (SALW) risk education [...] initiatives (Ireland, 2011, p. 12).

Liberia 2009

Strategic Issues: Government promotes women’s full participation in all conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict recovery processes at community, county, national and sub-regional levels. [...] Outputs: [...] Trained women living close to border areas better able to identify and address [...] small arms issues. Indicator: [...] Reduced reporting of [...] small arms incidents (Liberia, 2009, pp. 31-32, 35).

Norway 2006

Where Norway is involved in security sector reform and arms control measures, the difference between women and men in terms of vulnerability must be taken into consideration (Norway, 2006, p. 15).

Norway will also seek to ensure that the gender perspective is taken into account in humanitarian disarmament and efforts against armed violence, for example in connection with the clearance of unexploded ordnance and support to victims. We will also support efforts that highlight how the living conditions of women and girls are affected by easy access to weapons and widespread armed violence. This will entail strengthening the implementation of SCR 1325 and women’s participation in processes relating to disarmament and control of conventional weapons.
### Priority area 3

**Post-conflict situations and peacebuilding**

Norway will seek to increase the participation of women in peacebuilding and post-conflict situations, and to strengthen the gender perspective in reconstruction processes.

**Goals:** Local women participate in decision-making processes in post-conflict situations and peacebuilding efforts

**Activities:** [. . .] Help to strengthen the integration of SCR 1325 into processes relating to disarmament and control of conventional weapons, including clearance of unexploded ordnance and assistance to victims

**Timeframe:** 2011-13

**Ministry:** MFA (Norway, 2011, pp. 14–16).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year adopted</th>
<th>Relevant text</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td><strong>Action point:</strong> Develop, enact and implement policies that ensure protection and security for women affected by armed conflict, especially IP [indigenous] and Moro women; <strong>Result statement:</strong> The enactment of policies (including legislation) that protect the security of women in conflict situations, especially IP and Moro women; <strong>Indicators:</strong> [. . .] Adoption of mechanisms to regulate the transfer and use of the tools of violence in armed conflict, particularly small arms and light weapons; <strong>Target period of completion:</strong> 2011 (Philippines, 2010, pp. 5–6).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Portugal interprets resolution 1325 in a comprehensive manner, which includes [. . .] internal promotion of the coherence and implementation of national policies of disarmament and control of light weapons, of public safety, and of the fight against gender-based violence in defence of human rights, including those of women, young women, and girls (Portugal, 2009, p. 5; DCAF translation from the Portuguese).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Senegal</strong></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td><strong>Objective 12:</strong> Implementation of operational structures and mechanisms to strengthen the physical security and the protection of women and girls. <strong>Actions:</strong> Analyse the phenomenon of small arms and light weapons trafficking. Strengthen the mechanisms to control the flow of small arms and light weapons. The type and quantity of small arms and light weapons. <strong>Indicators:</strong> National mechanisms for the control of small arms and light weapons. The national mechanisms for the control of small arms and light weapons will be evaluated on the basis of the following elements: the presence of a national coordination structure for the control of small arms; [and] the number and type of small arms per 10,000 inhabitants. [. . .] <strong>Actors:</strong> Ministry of the Armed Forces; Mouvement contre les Armes Légères en Afrique de l’Ouest/ Senegal (MALAO); National coordination cell of the Armed Forces on the control of small arms and light weapons; the Committee to Combat Violence Against Women, etc. (Senegal, 2011, pp. 36–37; DCAF translation from the French).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Systematic measures are not yet in place that would help eradicate violence against women, overcome gender stereotypes, limit the use of firearms and solve other problems posing a threat to peace and security (Serbia, 2010, p. 54).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uganda</strong></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>[T]he situation in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) is very complex and greatly exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Uganda, 2008, p. 9). The conflicts in Uganda have among other factors been caused by; [. . .] The misuse of the gun, which has caused insecurity, impunity of armed forces, human rights abuse, criminalisation, proliferation of small arms (pp. 14–15). [. . .] Uganda is also signatory to: [. . .] the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000); the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (pp. 19–20). <strong>Strategic Objective:</strong> Build community and institutional capacity to ensure the elimination of [gender-based violence] in society [. . .] <strong>Result Indicator:</strong> [. . .] Regional mechanisms in place to combat the problem of arms trafficking and illegal acquisition of arms (pp. 65, 70).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Women hold signs that refer to Sepur Zarco, a military base where sexual slavery took place during the country’s conflict, during a demonstration for the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Guatemala City, November 2012. © Johan Ordonez/AFP Photo

**Box 2.2 Targeting domestic violence in small arms regulation**

Domestic violence prevention and response is part of the women, peace, and security discourse, even if not explicitly mentioned in the UNSCRs. A number of 1325 NAPs include activities directed at domestic violence.

Women have for many years underscored the use of legal and illegal guns in domestic violence—be it in intimidation, injury, or murder. In 2009, IANSA launched a global campaign entitled ‘Disarm Domestic Violence’ to lobby for laws to prevent perpetrators of domestic violence from accessing guns. Firearm laws can take account of domestic violence in a variety of ways, such as by:

- prohibiting an individual subject to a domestic violence restraining order or with a domestic violence conviction from purchasing or possessing a firearm;
- empowering police to remove firearms from the home when responding to a domestic violence incident;
- empowering courts to require perpetrators of domestic violence to surrender their firearms;
- requiring current and former spouses to be questioned and/or notified before a gun licence is issued;
- requiring background checks to be conducted before any gun sale; and
- requiring safe storage and separation of guns and ammunition (Frattaroli, 2009, p. 9; BPCR, 2008, p. 27).

Where such reforms have been adopted, for example in Australia, Canada, some of the United States, and South Africa, gun homicide rates for women have dropped dramatically (AI, IANSA, and Oxfam International, 2005, p. 14; Abrahams et al., 2012, p. 3).

**Implementation of 1325 NAP small arms commitments in the Philippines**

Amnesty International Philippines finds that almost 60 per cent of documented human rights violations over the past decade involved the use of small arms and light weapons, with the Philippines ranked tenth in the number of deaths caused by gun homicides in the world (AI, 2012a). The Small Arms Survey has estimated privately owned firearms holdings in the country at 5.3 million (Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 99).

A number of women’s CSOs lobbied vigorously for their government to support the ATT and argued for small arms issues to be included in the 1325 NAP (Galace, 2010). CSO consultations with communities underscored the importance of reducing small arms proliferation to protect women from sexual, domestic, and other gender-based violence. On this basis, civil society proposed a separate action point in the 1325 NAP for the creation and enforcement of laws regulating the possession of small arms, with the following indicators:

- research on women victims of gun violence is undertaken and publicized;
- training on women’s human rights is added as a requirement before a licence or renewal of licence is issued to gun owners, manufacturers, or distributors;
- guns surrendered by rebel returnees are destroyed and not recirculated; and
- the firearms registration system is improved.

The government agency responsible for implementing the 1325 NAP argued that the language on small arms was not germane to a 1325 NAP and proposed its deletion. The compromise reached was that small arms
regulation is not a separate action point, but an indicator—‘Adoption of mechanisms to regulate the transfer and use
of the tools of violence in armed conflict, particularly small arms and light weapons’—under a more general action
point, namely ‘Develop, enact and implement policies that ensure protection and security for women affected by
armed conflict, especially IP [indigenous] and Moro women’ (Philippines, 2010, pp. 5–6). While the indicator is not
as gender-responsive as had been hoped, women’s civil society did achieve a concrete commitment by the govern-
ment to adopt mechanisms to regulate the transfer and use of small arms.

In May 2013, the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act was signed into law. Firearms licences
may only be granted to applicants who have not been convicted of any crime involving ‘moral turpitude’; have passed
a psychiatric test; and have not been convicted and are not accused in a pending criminal case for a crime punish-
able with a penalty of more than two years (Calica, 2013). While these requirements might help deny a licence to a
person with a conviction for domestic violence, there are no explicit provisions in this regard in the Act. Representatives
of women’s CSOs have regretted that civil society was not consulted in developing the law, commenting that ‘those
who developed the legislation were not aware that it was mandated under the 1325 NAP’ and that the 1325 NAP did
not help women to gain access to the process.\(^5\)

In August 2013, police invited three civil society representatives, along with gun owners’ associations, to partici-
pate in a stakeholders hearing and consultation meeting on the Act’s implementing rules and regulations. This was an
opportunity for women to make comments and suggestions regarding the standards of individuals who conduct the
neuro-psychiatric and drug tests to meet the licensing requirements; the number of sectors and occupations exempted
from needing a permit to carry a gun; and the lack of criteria provided for who can be given a licence to possess
multiple firearms. Women civil society representatives also suggested that an applicant’s prior history of domestic
violence, including incident reports and protection orders, be considered when issuing a licence to further protect
women from violence involving firearms at the hand of their partners (WE Act 1325, 2013). As of September 2013,
these implementing rules and regulations were reportedly ready to be submitted to the chief of the Philippine
National Police for approval (Suerte Felipe, 2013); however, the CSO representatives had not received any response to
their proposed amendments. Women’s CSOs envision lobbying for amendment of the law; they continue to use the
1325 NAP to lobby for a voice in small arms policy.\(^6\)

Implementation of 1325 NAP small arms commitments in Senegal

The Small Arms Survey estimates that there are some 230,000 civilian-held firearms in Senegal (Small Arms Survey,
2007, ch. 2, annexe 4). Senegalese CSOs have for many years drawn on the normative strength of UNSCR 1325 to
engage women in arms control. Le Mouvement contre les Armes Légères en Afrique de l’Ouest (MALAO), for example,
has led awareness-raising programmes for women in communities in the conflicted Casamance region of Senegal,
helping them to develop strategies and identify incentives to convince people to hand over their weapons, and
training them on weapons safety and collection. Likewise, Senegalese women’s CSOs have lobbied for ratification of
the ECOWAS Convention on small arms and the ATT (Panapress, 2008).

Gun control CSOs participated in the process of developing Senegal’s 1325 NAP, which was adopted in 2011. The
1325 NAP makes clear commitments to address small arms, calling for analysis of the phenomenon of arms trafficking
and strengthening the mechanisms to control arms flows. In December 2011 the National Commission against the
Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (which includes CSOs as members) adopted a
national action plan on small arms and light weapons. State authorities have validated the small arms NAP and the
Ministry of the Armed Forces is charged with mobilizing the resources for its implementation (Bathily, Keita, and Labou, 2012, p. 15). Unfortunately, the plan has not been publicly distributed so it is not possible to assess whether the 1325 NAP is reflected in the contents. Senegal also signed the ATT in April 2013.

Addressing the need for analysis identified in the 1325 NAP, MALAO published a study on arms trafficking in Senegal in December 2012. The study underlines the related human costs, including rape and domestic violence, and identifies inadequate enforcement of existing laws and their lack of harmonization with the ECOWAS Convention as key problems. Relevant authorities are also collaborating with CSOs to construct a database of information on violence and firearms from police, hospitals, and the judicial system.

With regard to control mechanisms, the National Commission has been undertaking a review of the legal framework on firearm ownership, and new legislation is expected by the end of 2013. This includes at least two provisions that address concerns about firearms being used in domestic violence. First, an investigation that includes seeking the opinion of the applicant’s partner (man or woman), if applicable, must be carried out before an applicant may be granted a firearms permit. Second, no person who has been accused of or prosecuted for acts of domestic violence may be granted a permit. These provisions were introduced into the law upon the insistence of CSOs, including women’s groups. Although some CSOs are frustrated by the slow pace of implementation of the 1325 NAP commitments, it does appear that in Senegal recognition of small arms issues in the 1325 NAP has helped to drive action to address gender issues in firearm regulation.

Small arms NAPs and gender

National plans of action on small arms are not the focus of this chapter, and a comprehensive review of all existing plans has not been undertaken. However, it is notable that some small arms NAPs have made specific reference to the use of arms in violence against women, the differing perspectives of men and women on arms, and the potential for women to be actors in small arms policy.

In Kenya, CSOs working on women’s issues were consulted in the development of the small arms NAP. The plan suggests that awareness raising programmes should take into account the different perceptions of men and women. In Uganda, the Ministry of Gender was involved in developing the small arms NAP. The preparatory population surveys in Kenya and Uganda, both of which attempted to be representative in terms of gender and other characteristics, collected sex-disaggregated data (Kenya, 2006; Uganda, 2007). Kosovo’s 2010–12 small arms NAP includes as one of its nine key objectives: ‘Promote participation of women (civil society and other groups) in development and implementing of [small arms and light weapons] control policies, violence prevention and disarmament strategies’ (Kosovo, 2009, p. 9). In all three cases, however, neither involving women nor collecting sex-disaggregated data is included in the actual programme of activities and associated indicators that constitute the action plan.

The DRC’s small arms NAP for 2012–16 acknowledges that small arms are misused in rape, attempted rape, and domestic violence. Its recommendations call for civilian disarmament programmes that take into account the differing perceptions of men and women and their varying levels of trust in institutions; they also urge community women to be engaged in educating the public about the NAP (DRC, 2011, pp. 31, 49, 51). However, again, none of these gender-responsive recommendations is included in the actual log frame of activities and indicators to implement the NAP. A representative of a women’s CSO stated in 2011 that ‘there is no gender perspective’ in DRC’s National Commission to fight small arms and light weapons (WILPF, 2011, p. 9).
Experience has shown that, when gender commitments such as those above are not made measurable through the use of indicators, are not monitored, and are not anyone’s specific responsibility, they are rarely implemented. In the context of a small arms NAP, moreover, it may be of particular concern that few of the officials responsible for its monitoring and implementation are likely to be gender experts or adept at using indicators in a gender-responsive manner. Box 2.3 suggests ways in which a small arms NAP could ensure that commitments embedded within the international women, peace, and security agenda are concretely incorporated.

**THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ON SMALL ARMS: MAKING THE LINKS**

In 2012–13, the UN Security Council and UN member states finally recognized that binding commitments are needed to ensure that small arms controls address the particular needs and roles of women. This recognition took hold largely because of the energy and commitment of networks of national and international women’s organizations in lobbying for the PoA and the ATT to address gender-based violence. Their work also influenced the CEDAW Committee, discussed above, the UN Secretary-General, and the Security Council. The Security Council adopted the first UNSCR on small arms that refers to women in September 2013.

**The UN Programme of Action**

The PoA, adopted by UN member states in 2001, acknowledges the negative impact of the illicit trade in small arms on children, women, and the elderly (UN, 2001, preambular para. 6). Perhaps to counter the portrayal of women as ‘hapless victims, rather than as key resources in combating armed violence’ (Dehesa and Masters, 2010, p. 4), for the first PoA Review Conference in 2006, the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms issued ‘guidelines for gender mainstreaming for the effective implementation of the PoA’ that drew upon the experiences of CSOs in the Caribbean, Latin America, South Asia, and elsewhere. These guidelines were updated for the PoA’s 4th Biennial Meeting of States in 2010 with the support of IANSA, producing a comprehensive document that clearly links implementation of the PoA with the women, peace, and security agenda in relation to arms trafficking, DDR, national and regional structures, and the involvement of civil society (UNODA and IANSA, 2010). But the template for states to report on their implementation of the PoA, issued around the same time, does not facilitate reporting on how these linkages are made in national legislation.

### Box 2.3 Ways to address women, peace, and security issues in a small arms NAP

- Involve women’s CSOs, survivors of armed violence, experts on gender and small arms, and the government ministry responsible for women and/or gender in the process of developing the small arms NAP.
- Explicitly acknowledge international commitments under the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security, CEDAW, and the Beijing Declaration and PTA, as well as national legislation and policy related to gender and women.
- Require that all research and data collection in relation to small arms and the implementation of the small arms NAP be sex- and age-disaggregated.
- Identify concrete activities to reduce the use of arms in domestic and sexual violence against women, girls, men, and boys. Include indicators such as: 1) the percentage of domestic homicides and injuries involving arms; and 2) the level of armed violence against women, girls, men, and boys.
- Specify that community education initiatives must address women, girls, men, and boys and target their different perceptions of small arms.
- Identify women’s CSOs, female elders, and community women (as appropriate) as potential partners for disarmament and education activities.
- Commit to developing and implementing a process to assess the risk that any arms exports might be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against men, women, girls, or boys (see the section on the ATT).
IANSA and other NGOs continued to lobby for the small arms and women, peace, and security agendas to be better integrated, including at the 2012 PoA Review Conference. Progress was finally achieved in the Review Conference’s Declaration, which underscores the need to involve women in efforts to combat illicit trade in small arms, and the 2012–18 implementation plan for the PoA, in which states undertake to:

facilitate the participation and representation of women in small arms policymaking […] and to explore means to eliminate the negative impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on women (UNGA, 2012a, para. II.2.i).8

The Arms Trade Treaty and gender

On 2 April 2013, the General Assembly adopted the text of the ATT. During the preceding decade, a range of CSOs had campaigned together as ‘Control Arms’ for a robust and effective ATT. Women’s groups and organizations were an important part of this campaign, notably as part of the IANSA Women’s Network, and lobbied for the ATT to include binding measures to prevent gender-based violence, and to ensure women’s participation in the implementation of the treaty.9 Masters describes as a key moment for NGOs, UN diplomats, and delegates alike the concurrence of the CSW and the first meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group on an ATT, in March 2009. IANSA women organized a joint event with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs that linked the themes of both meetings, helping to put women on the ATT’s agenda.10 Yet, despite sustained advocacy from women’s groups throughout the ATT negotiations,
inclusion of the term ‘gender-based violence’ proved controversial to the end. Several states took issue with the terms ‘gender’ and ‘gender-based violence’, arguing that they had no agreed legal definition.

The final text was cautiously welcomed by NGOs as the first treaty that recognizes the link between gender-based violence and the international arms trade. The ATT’s preamble notes that civilians, ‘particularly women and children’, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence. The operative provisions require exporting states to assess the risk that the weapons being transferred could be used ‘to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children’ (UNGA, 2013a, art. 7(4)). States are to deny an arms export if there is an ‘overriding risk of any of the negative consequences’ listed in Article 7(1), including serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (UNGA, 2013a, art 7; ARMS TRADE TREATY). As many acts of gender-based violence constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law or human rights law, or undermine peace and security, they should be captured by this requirement to deny an export (Green et al., 2013, p. 553).

Generally, for the ATT to make a difference for women, states parties will need to develop robust processes by which to assess the risk that weapons could be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or violence against women—and then act to deny arms export authorizations if such risks arise. Many questions remain as to how this risk assessment will be undertaken, who will do so, and how women and women’s organizations will

An Iraqi man mourns the death of his wife who was killed following an attack, claimed by Al-Qaeda, on the Syrian Catholic Church, Baghdad, November 2010. © Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP Photo
be consulted (Dharmapuri, 2013). The development of guidelines for ATT implementation will thus need to involve experts on the treatment of gender-based violence in international law (Green et al., 2013, p. 559). While the ATT gathers the 50 ratifications it needs to enter into force, women’s organizations and others have an opportunity to work on such issues in order to translate the ATT’s important—yet still vague—protections against gender-based violence into tangible reality.

**The UNSCR on small arms**

Intense civil society lobbying for a gender-responsive ATT may have led the UN Secretary-General to emphasize women’s experiences of armed conflict in his 2011 report to the Security Council on small arms (UNSC, 2011b). The Secretary-General’s subsequent August 2013 report on small arms contains a section dedicated to sexual violence in conflict, reconfirming that ‘an abundance of uncontrolled weapons and a context of lawlessness lead to increases in gender-based violence, which includes rape, abduction into sexual slavery and trafficking’ (UNSC, 2013c, para. 20). The report encourages the Security Council’s informal expert group on the protection of civilians to consider these linkages (paras. 19–23).

In September 2013 the Security Council adopted its first thematic resolution exclusively dedicated to small arms and light weapons. The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (of which IANSA is now a member) lobbied to ensure that connections with women and gender were made and a number of the issues they raised were incorporated into UNSCR 2117 (NGOWG, 2013). The preamble of that resolution notes the disproportionate impact of small arms on violence perpetrated against women and girls, and that the presence of small arms exacerbates sexual and gender-based violence. The operative text urges states, UN entities, and (sub)regional organizations to do more to facilitate ‘women’s full and meaningful participation in all policymaking, planning, and implementation processes to combat and eradicate the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse’ of small arms (UNSC, 2013e, para. 12). It repeats calls found in the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security for DDR to take into account the particular needs of women and children associated with armed forces and armed groups, to provide for such women’s full access to DDR programmes, and for those planning DDR to consult with women’s CSOs (para. 12).

However, the Security Council missed the opportunity, highlighted by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, to specify that UN sanctions regimes and monitoring criteria should take account of gender considerations. Nonetheless, the recognition of the crucial contributions of women to small arms control is important and will be a further tool for women to leverage access to national and international processes.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter introduces the international women, peace, and security agenda, grounded in UNSCR 1325, and maps its synergies with small arms control. Examination of women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict contexts reinforces the critical need for international policies and, more importantly, national-level initiatives to take into account the multiplicity of roles women, men, boys, and girls play in relation to small arms violence, use, and control. Even though CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and PfA set a precedent for international policies on women to begin to address these issues, the first five UNSCRs on women, peace, and security make no reference to ‘small arms’, the ‘arms trade’, or ‘weapons’. Despite this lacuna within the official text of these resolutions, the UN Secretary-General...
and CSOs have made clear arguments for why small arms control is relevant to the provisions focusing on the protection of civilians, participation of women, supporting local women’s peace and security initiatives, and DDR.

A true convergence of the two agendas on a normative level only began in 2012, after many years of NGO activism. With respect to small arms, the outcome of the 2012 PoA Review Conference refers to women’s participation and victimization, the 2013 ATT requires a risk assessment for gender-based violence prior to any export of arms, and the UNSCR of September 2013 emphasizes women’s participation in combating the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms. In relation to women, peace, and security, the UNSCRs of June and October 2013 both contain language on the ATT; the latter includes an operative paragraph on ensuring women’s participation in eradicating the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms. Also in 2013, the CEDAW Committee asked member states to enact small arms laws to prevent violence against women and their general recommendation on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations calls for arms control to prevent gender-based violence. These are important but piecemeal achievements that could be the basis for progressive regional and national policies. They reinforce the ongoing work of NGOs to raise awareness of the impacts of small arms on men, women, girls, and boys—NGOs whose research, projects, and activism can support the development and implementation of such policies.

At the national level, progress in harmonizing policy concerning small arms control and women, peace, and security has so far been very limited. Just one-quarter of 1325 NAPs contain references to small arms, but rarely do they translate them into action. Even where action is mandated, as the development of the Philippines’ new firearms legislation demonstrates, sustained focus by civil society is nonetheless needed to keep women on the small arms agenda. In a number of countries, however, domestic violence has been prioritized in the licensing of civilian small arms and other protocols, with some success.

Focusing on preventing domestic violence, removing arms from communities, and consulting with women’s CSOs are proven ways in which small arms controls can be strengthened by a women, peace, and security perspective. Women’s networks and organizations have been, and can continue to be, partners in policy and legislative development, in the monitoring of implementation, and in small arms reduction and education processes. Indeed, the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security—and now the UNSCR on small arms—call for women to be full participants in all aspects of small arms control. Now that the international policy framework linking small arms with women, peace, and security is growing in substance and visibility, concrete action and robust accountability are needed at the national and local levels to ensure implementation.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1325 NAP</td>
<td>National action plan for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<td>CSW</td>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
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<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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</table>
WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

MALAO  Mouvement contre les Armes Légères en Afrique de l'Ouest
NAP    National action plan
NGOs   Non-governmental organizations
PfA    Platform for Action
PoA    United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
UN Action United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

ENDNOTES

2   This assertion is based on a review of the ‘field updates’ published on the UN Action website, the most recent of which covers to August 2010 (UN Action, n.d.a).
3   The Committee has urged states such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Lebanon, Myanmar, Serbia, and Timor-Leste to develop an 1325 NAP.
4   The intention of this discussion is to focus on how 1325 NAPs may contribute to the control of small arms. The references to DDR in 1325 NAPs primarily focus on women’s access to DDR programmes, and particularly on ensuring that women who are not arms-bearers can access such programmes. Thus, DDR references have not been included.
5   Correspondence from Jasmin Nario-Galace, national coordinator, Women Engaged in Action on 1325 and Steering Committee, Philippine Action Network to Control Arms, 30 September 2013.
6   This section draws on correspondence from Jasmin Nario-Galace, national coordinator, Women Engaged in Action on 1325 and Steering Committee, Philippine Action Network to Control Arms, 30 September 2013.
7   This section draws upon a telephone interview with Georges Ndiaye, executive director, MALAO, 8 November 2013.
8   See also UNGA (2012a, para. I.14).
9   See, for example, IANSA (2009) and AI (2012b).
10  Correspondence from Sarah Masters, former coordinator of the IANSA Women’s Network, 17 October 2013.
11  The phrase ‘women and children’ is used here as this is the language in the text of the ATT. Placing women and children in the same category has been criticized as both incorrect, since women and children have different legal statuses, and discriminatory, since it infantilizes women by equating their experiences, needs, and capacities with those of children. See IANSA (2011).
12  In 2003, the Security Council had adopted a declaration on ‘Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mercenary Activities: Threat to Peace and Security in West Africa’, which makes no reference to gender, women, or UNSCR 1325 (UNSC, 2003).

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