Small Arms Survey
A Project of the Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, Geneva

small arms survey 2014

women and guns

Highlights
Key findings and chapter summaries
About the Small Arms Survey

About the project
The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and current or recent contributions from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as from the European Union. The Survey is grateful for past support received from the Governments of Canada, France, Spain, and Sweden. The Survey also wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance it has received over the years from foundations and many bodies within the UN system.

The Survey sponsors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

Project objectives
The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are to:

- be the principal international source of impartial and public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence;
- serve as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists;
- monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms;
- support efforts to address the effects of small arms proliferation and misuse; and
- act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices.

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The Small Arms Survey 2014 considers the multiple roles of women in the context of armed violence, security, and the small arms agenda. The volume’s thematic section comprises one chapter on violence against women and girls—with a focus on post-conflict Liberia and Nepal—and another on the recent convergence of the small arms agenda with that of women, peace, and security. Complementing these chapters are illustrated testimonies of women with experience as soldiers, rebels, and security personnel. The ‘weapons and markets’ section assesses the potential impact of the Arms Trade Treaty, presents the 2014 Transparency Barometer and an update on the authorized small arms trade, and analyses recent ammunition depot explosions in the Republic of the Congo. In addition, it examines ammunition circulating in Africa and the Middle East, maps the sources of insurgent weapons in Sudan and South Sudan, and evaluates crime gun records in the United States.

The Small Arms Survey is produced annually by a team of researchers based in Geneva, Switzerland, and a worldwide network of local researchers. Policy-makers, diplomats, and non-governmental organizations have come to value it as a vital resource for topical analysis of small arms-related issues and armed violence reduction strategies.

Praise for the 2014 Survey from Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs:

‘In words and images, the Small Arms Survey 2014, with its usual analytical rigour, helps us understand the latest developments—and future possibilities—in arms control, peace, and security. I have no hesitation recommending it to all those interested in these vital topics.’

Key findings

Violence against women and girls (VAWG)

- Rates of domestic violence are higher wherever it is socially accepted as a justified response to household disputes.
- Attitudes that condone VAWG often pre-date conflicts, but they are reinforced during wars and often persist long past the formal cessation of hostilities.
- In Liberia, women are twice as likely as men to assert that a husband is sometimes justified in beating his wife, suggesting that many women have been socialized to accept domestic violence.
- In Nepal, the caste system, ethnic and economic cleavages, and the profile of the victim appear to influence the type and prevalence of VAWG. For example, women from marginalized groups are at a notably elevated risk of experiencing some type of victimization in their lifetimes.
- At the global level, development sector practitioners seek to change social norms that influence VAWG; these efforts are seen as an indispensable step towards improving the security of women and girls over the long term.

Women, peace, and security

- Until 2013, the UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) on women, peace, and security, aside from references to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), were silent on the topics of small arms and disarmament.
- Key actors have linked four mandates in the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security to small arms, namely the protection of civilians, including from sexual violence; women’s participation in peace and security decision-making; supporting local women’s peace and conflict resolution initiatives; and DDR.
- Recent UN monitoring frameworks on UNSCR 1325 include specific indicators and targets pertaining to small arms and disarmament.
- While one-quarter of existing national action plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 refer to small arms, they rarely operationalize this policy linkage by requiring concrete actions. Likewise, while national action plans on small arms occasionally mention women, they do not translate this into required actions.
- The Arms Trade Treaty and the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security and on small arms adopted in 2013 firmly connect these two international policy agendas.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

- The compromises necessary for agreement on the treaty text have left the ATT with few unqualified legal obligations.
- The ATT covers a broad range of transfer-related activities and items, but an absence of definitions and a lack of prescriptive detail may result in uneven and inconsistent implementation.
- The ATT makes a significant contribution to existing legal frameworks by introducing new standards for the international transfer of conventional arms. These gains are, however, more modest in comparison with existing small arms control measures.
- As the treaty applies to exporting and non-exporting states alike, the latter have been and will continue to be involved in ATT-related arms transfer discussions, as well as in the development of global norms to curb irresponsible arms transfers.
- The ATT process has raised the level of attention and scrutiny given to this issue at the global level and will undoubtedly continue to do so. This, in turn, has the potential to change state behaviour.
- While the ATT does not specifically refer to unauthorized retransfers, other instruments and good practice guidelines outline relevant measures. Guidance is scarce, however, on how to respond to suspected or detected cases of unauthorized retransfers.

Authorized small arms transfers

- In 2011, the top exporters of small arms and light weapons (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, the Russian Federation, South Korea, Belgium, China, Turkey, Spain, and the Czech Republic.
- In 2011, the top importers of small arms and light weapons (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, Thailand, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.
- The value of the global trade in small arms and light weapons almost doubled between 2001 and 2011, according to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). The category of small arms ammunition has seen the greatest increase (USD 959 million or 205 per cent).

Transparency in the small arms trade

- The 2014 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, Germany, Serbia, and the United Kingdom as the most transparent of the major exporters, while Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are the least transparent.
- Although overall transparency improved slightly since last year, with more countries improving or maintaining their level of transparency than not, the Barometer shows that more than half of the countries under review do not provide any information on licences granted or refused, despite the categories’ overall importance to transparency.
- The ATT offers an important opportunity to increase transparency of small arms transfers. Yet, to achieve this goal, ATT reporting needs to take its inspiration not only from the UN Register of Conventional Arms, but also from UN Comtrade and national arms export reports.

Mpila ammunition depot explosions

- On 4 March 2012, a series of explosions destroyed several military barracks in the Mpila area of Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo (RoC), killing at least 300 people, injuring more than 2,500, and displacing more than 120,000.
- According to ammunition technicians and EOD specialists familiar with the event, inadequate ammunition stockpile management is the root cause of the Mpila ammunition depot explosions.
- The ammunition types destroyed included a mix of pyrotechnics, small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, large-calibre projectiles, rockets, missiles, and aircraft bombs amassed haphazardly in the Mpila depot’s explosive storehouses.
- The unchecked expansion of the civilian population around an explosive storage area containing such types and quantities of ammunition places people at high risk in the case of an explosion.
- A partial estimate of the total damage and loss—mainly in terms of direct physical impact on the private sector—exceeds XAF 356 billion (USD 672 million).
- At the time of writing, post-explosion progress in stockpile management practices was slow, indicating a lack of buy-in from RoC authorities, as well as donor fatigue and wariness from potential sponsors.
Ammunition tracing in conflict zones

- An analysis of the characteristics of small-calibre ammunition documented since 2010 in seven countries and territories—Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria—shows that it was produced in 39 different countries.
- Production plants located in China and the Soviet Union (the territory now constituting the Russian Federation) account for the greatest share—a combined 37 per cent—of the ammunition samples. The prevalence of cartridges of Sudanese and Iranian manufacture is also noteworthy.
- More than three-quarters of the ammunition samples were Eastern Bloc-calibre cartridges, and more than half were produced during the cold war—highlighting the role of old ammunition in fuelling armed conflict and underlining the importance of reducing stockpile surpluses.
- The presence of newly produced ammunition in several countries illustrates how quickly this materiel can be diverted or retransferred to situations of armed conflict.
- The presence of different types of unmarked cartridges in all but one of the countries and territories under review raises new hurdles for arms monitoring efforts. Markings on certain packaging points to Ethiopia as the manufacturer of some of this ammunition, but in the other cases it is difficult to identify producers conclusively.

Weapons tracing in Sudan and South Sudan

- Non-state armed groups in Sudan and South Sudan have access to a variety of types and quantities of arms and ammunition, including civil war-era weapons, as well as newer Chinese and Sudanese weapons and ammunition.
- Investigators have documented newer (post-2000) Sudanese-manufactured small- and medium-calibre ammunition in large quantities among non-state armed groups in Sudan and South Sudan.
- The Government of Sudan’s stockpiles are the primary source of weapons to non-state armed groups of all allegiances in Sudan and South Sudan, through deliberate arming and battlefield capture.
- Investigations reveal that South Sudanese armed groups are in possession of an increasing number of weapons whose factory marks, including serial numbers, have been removed, a tactic designed to undermine identification and tracing.
- By responding to information requests from investigators, exporting states have shown a willingness to cooperate in the process of weapons and ammunition tracing in conflict zones.

Illicit weapons in the United States

- More than three-quarters (77 per cent) of the firearms seized from felons, drug traffickers, and gang members in the eight US cities and towns studied were handguns.
- At least 70 per cent of the seized handguns were semi-automatic pistols of various makes, models, and calibres—the most common type of firearm recovered from criminals in the municipalities studied.
- Seizure rates for handguns and long guns in the United States are the inverse of those in Mexico, where approximately 72 per cent of the seized weapons studied in the second phase of this project were long guns.
- Rifles accounted for only a small fraction of seized firearms: less than 12 per cent, with only about half of them semi-automatic models, including those commonly termed ‘assault rifles’. This is noteworthy given widespread civilian ownership of rifles in the United States and their frequent seizure from criminals in Mexico.
- Despite a ban on the importation of firearms from China, a large proportion of the seized semi-automatic rifles were Chinese-made.

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In War and Peace

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS

While the use of violence against women and girls (VAWG) as a ‘weapon of war’ has received widespread international attention, researchers have only recently begun to assess its prevalence in peacetime and transitioning societies. This chapter examines sexual and domestic violence—two pervasive forms of VAWG—both internationally and through the experiences of two countries emerging from conflict: Liberia and Nepal. The chapter pays particular attention to the influence of social norms as risk factors and touches on the role of guns in the context of violence against women. It also examines the challenges in responding to VAWG by reshaping underlying social norms in post-conflict environments.

Violence against women is a global phenomenon. A recent World Health Organization report on intimate partner violence in selected states finds that 36 per cent of women aged 15–69 worldwide have experienced some form of physical and/or sexual violence. Although official national data suggests significant variations across countries and regions, differing definitions and survey methodologies from country to country undermine cross-national comparisons. Around the world, social stigma, the fear of retaliation, and justifications of domestic violence often dissuade women from reporting violent incidents to the police, making the phenomenon difficult to quantify.

Domestic violence rates are higher wherever it is socially accepted as a justified response to household disputes.

By shaping the ways in which violent behaviour is incentivized through social approval or deterred through stigmatization, social norms can affect the prevalence of VAWG. According to a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the average rate of domestic violence in countries where it is highly accepted as a justified response to household disputes is more than double the average of countries where its acceptance is low.

In Liberia, sexual violence was a key feature of the country’s civil conflicts. Victimization surveys and data collected by the Government of Liberia indicate that sexual and domestic violence are still prevalent in Liberia ten years after the end of the civil war, despite tough laws prohibiting rape. Social norms acquired during the conflict, along with gender inequality dating from before the war, continue to influence post-conflict norms about rape in Liberia. Almost six out of ten surveyed Liberian women said a husband was justified in beating his wife under certain circumstances, while 44 per cent of all Liberians expressed the view that there was no such thing as ‘rape’ in marriage or other intimate relationships.

As in Liberia, hostile parties in Nepal’s ten-year civil conflict also used sexual violence as a weapon of war. Although persistent underreporting precludes a reliable quantification of present-day VAWG in Nepal, studies suggest that it remains widespread in the post-conflict era and that social norms are an important risk factor. At the family level, imbalanced power relations within a couple and the perception of violence as an acceptable corrective serve to fuel VAWG (see Table 1.1). Norms that establish the man as the titular head of household can inscribe a relationship of domination, with marriage granting a husband sexual rights over his wife.

Social norms that influence VAWG are also tied to notions of masculinity that project violence as the prerogative of men, and to guns as signifiers of masculinities.
Although much of the VAWG in Nepal and Liberia tends to involve unsophisticated instruments, such as crude or bladed weapons, or no instrument, gun violence targeting women and girls is also present. This form of VAWG sometimes results in injury or death, although it generally takes the form of threats or intimidation within the family, which is seldom reported.

Attitudes that condone VAWG often pre-date conflicts, but they are reinforced during wars and often persist long past the formal cessation of hostilities.

The experiences of Liberia and Nepal highlight why efforts to change discriminatory norms have become a recurring theme in discussions of femicide and other types of violence against women. At the global level, interventions are challenging the social norms that support VAWG; these can be integrated into other approaches, such as improved data collection, legal reform, economic empowerment, and increased provision of VAWG response services. But societies emerging from conflict face particular challenges with respect to VAWG, and efforts to alter attitudes that support VAWG in those contexts take time and require more complex programming.

Projects to counter discriminatory social norms are also being integrated into efforts to control small arms. Thanks primarily to the advocacy of women’s groups, the international normative frameworks on small arms control and women, peace, and security have become linked. At the advocacy level, the VAWG component is becoming more prominent in arms control campaigns that try to achieve greater security for both men and women.

To be most effective, initiatives aimed at changing social norms around the use of violence must be informed by research. Thus, research efforts need to be strengthened to collect accurate data on VAWG in post-conflict environments and to obtain better information about the roles that guns may play in VAWG. The further evolution and dissemination of good practices for collecting data and conducting surveys on VAWG in challenging environments could improve not only the quality of data, but also its comparability across regions.

### Table 1.1 Men’s attitudes towards VAWG in 2011, in selected districts, by type of VAWG (n=1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of VAWG</th>
<th>Attitudes that directly or indirectly support VAWG in Nepal</th>
<th>% of respondents who agree*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten.</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If a woman does something wrong, her husband or partner has the right to punish her.</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A woman should tolerate violence in order to keep her family together.</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual violence</td>
<td>A woman cannot refuse to have sex with her husband.</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When a woman is raped, she is usually to blame for putting herself in that situation.</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If a woman does not physically fight back, it is not rape.</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son preference</td>
<td>Not having a son reflects bad karma and a lack of moral virtue.</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A woman’s most important role is to produce a son for her husband’s family.</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fathering a male child shows you are a real man.</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Out of 100 per cent; the remaining percentage disagreed with the statements. The survey interviewed men aged 18–49. The sample included 400 households from urban areas and 600 from rural ones in three districts in Nepal: Saptari, Gorkha, and Dang.
Converging Agendas
WOMEN, PEACE, SECURITY, AND SMALL ARMS

In April 2013, women’s organizations were among those celebrating the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by the UN General Assembly. The ATT has been hailed as a victory for women; it will require states parties to take into account the risk of small arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence, such as domestic and sexual violence, before authorizing their transfer abroad. Indeed, 2012–13 saw international policy concerning women, peace, and security and small arms finally converge. This owes much to the work of women and women’s organizations, in collaboration with the broader civil society arms control movement.

This chapter:

- provides an overview of women, peace, and security issues, including the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on women, peace, and security, and women’s diverse roles as users, victims, and challengers of small arms during and after armed conflict;
- analyses how the international policy framework on women, peace, and security has—and has not—addressed small arms;
- considers how small arms feature in national action plans (NAPs) on implementation of UNSCR 1325 and how women, peace, and security issues have been addressed in NAPs on small arms; and
- outlines how the women, peace, and security agenda has been embodied in recent developments in small arms law and policy, and how small arms issues have correspondingly been reflected in recent UNSCRs on women, peace, and security.

Recognition and exclusion

During and following conflict, women and girls are often direct victims of small arms violence: domestic violence, sexual violence (including that associated with forcible recruitment into armed groups), injury, and murder. Indirect consequences include taking care of injured family members and an inability to access work, education, and health care. Yet armed conflict can also create spaces to transcend traditional gender roles. While some women and girls willingly smuggle weapons or take up arms as combatants, others become community leaders at the forefront of local, national, and international initiatives to control arms.

The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a key policy framework for women’s equality, explicitly links the arms trade to armed violence and outlines how women are both victims of armed violence and actors for arms control and disarmament.
Nonetheless, in 2000, when the Security Council took the groundbreaking step of adopting a resolution on women, peace, and security, UNSCR 1325, it mentioned disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), but not ‘small arms’, the ‘arms trade’, or ‘weapons’. Until 2013, follow-up UNSCRs on women, peace, and security were likewise silent on these topics.

UN monitoring frameworks on UNSCR 1325 include indicators on small arms and disarmament.

Research and activism by civil society organizations (CSOs) has demonstrated the relevance of UNSCR 1325 to small arms policy and practice. CSOs, UN agencies, the UN Secretary-General, and the UN Committee that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) have linked mandates in the UNSCRs on women, peace, and security to small arms, notably with respect to:

- the protection of civilians, including from sexual violence;
- women's participation;
- support for local women's peace and conflict resolution; and
- inclusive DDR.

National implementation

At the national level, progress in harmonizing policy concerning small arms control and women, peace, and security has been limited. One-quarter of the 43 1325 NAPs that were adopted before the end of 2013 refer to small arms; however, they rarely operationalize this policy linkage by requiring concrete actions. Nor do any of the 1325 NAPs refer to the need for arms regulation itself to be gender-responsive, for instance through provisions to prevent the threat or use of small arms in domestic violence.

The 1325 NAPs of Senegal and the Philippines have the most detailed provisions on small arms. In Senegal, it appears that this has helped to drive action to address domestic violence in firearm regulation. In the Philippines, the development of new firearms legislation demonstrates that sustained focus by CSOs is needed to keep women on the small arms agenda.

NAPs on small arms only occasionally mention women—such as by referring to the importance of women’s participation in community education—and rarely translate this into required action. In a number of countries, however, domestic violence has been prioritized in the licensing of civilian small arms and other protocols, with some success.

Linking up the international policy frameworks

On the international level, normative convergence of the women, peace, and security and arms control agendas began in 2012, when the outcome of the 2012 Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action referred to women's participation and victimization. The text of the ATT, adopted the following year, requires a risk assessment for gender-based violence prior to any export of arms. The UNSCR on small arms of September 2013 emphasizes women’s participation in combating their illicit transfer and misuse.

In parallel, the two resolutions on women, peace, and security of 2013 reaffirm the provisions in the ATT; the second of these, UNSCR 2122, contains a groundbreaking operative paragraph urging women’s full participation in eradicating the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms. The CEDAW Committee’s general recommendation on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations—released in 2013—calls for arms control to prevent gender-based violence.

International law obligations on the prevention of violence against women are applicable to small arms control.

These are piecemeal but important achievements. Regional and national strategies on UNSCR 1325 and on small arms have the potential to be stronger and more effective by giving concrete expression to this policy convergence, for example by focusing on preventing domestic violence, removing arms from communities, and consulting with women’s CSOs. Women’s networks and organizations have been, and can continue to be, partners in policy and legislative development, and in small arms reduction and education processes. They will no doubt play a key role in monitoring the concrete action and robust accountability needed.
The world has decided to finally put an end to the free-for-all nature of international weapons transfers, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserted when the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) opened for signature on 3 June 2013. The central aim of the treaty is to establish the highest possible common international standards to regulate the international trade in conventional arms.

To date, UN member states have demonstrated broad support for the ATT, suggesting that they see it as a game changer. But as the excitement following the adoption subsides, the question becomes: what does the ATT do and what will it change?

The negotiation of the ATT was a complex and ambitious undertaking. The process aimed to reconcile humanitarian objectives with commercial and security considerations in a disarmament forum, while balancing the interests of arms suppliers and recipients alike. The ATT is, inevitably, an imperfect document that reflects the compromises necessary to achieve agreement.

ATT impact will depend on more than words on a page.

The question of what difference the ATT will make in practice depends on the extent to which states apply the treaty’s obligations and recommendations. A willingness to implement the treaty is apparent from the number of states that have already started the process of reviewing their existing national frameworks to determine what needs to be done to comply with the ATT; in some instances, states are already translating the ATT into national legislation. Furthermore, many states have expressed an intention to take a progressive approach to their interpretation of the treaty, noting that it creates a ‘floor, not a ceiling’.

The ATT has raised awareness of the importance of transfer controls and opened up discussions on and scrutiny of the arms trade. The participation of non-exporting states in a global regulatory system—which the ATT offers—means that those that have traditionally not been in the exporters ‘club’ but that more frequently experience the adverse effects of irresponsible arms transfers will have a legitimate forum in which to raise their concerns and work to improve ATT standards.

That said, the ATT also has the potential to detract attention from ongoing processes, such as the UN Programme of Action and the Firearms Protocol, as states turn their focus—and donors turn their wallets—to ATT implementation and compliance. There are many overlaps and opportunities for synergies between the ATT and these existing processes, but there is also a danger that UN member states will perceive the ATT as replacing, or at least taking priority over, implementation of other commitments.

This chapter evaluates the standards established by the treaty and considers what its provisions mean for arms transfer practices. It reviews the provisions of the ATT, situates the treaty within the current arms transfer control framework, and assesses its potential impact on state practice.

Its main conclusions include:

- The compromises necessary for agreement on the treaty text have left the ATT with few unqualified legal obligations.
- The ATT covers a broad range of transfer-related activities, as well as items, but an absence of definitions and a lack of prescriptive detail may result in uneven and inconsistent implementation.
- The ATT makes a significant contribution to existing legal frameworks by introducing new standards for the international transfer of conventional arms. These gains are, however, more modest in comparison with existing small arms control measures.
• Given the universal scope of the treaty, non-exporting states have been and will continue to be involved in ATT-related arms transfer discussions as well as in the development of global norms to curb irresponsible arms transfers.

• The ATT process has raised the level of attention and scrutiny given to this issue at the global level and will undoubtedly continue to do so. This trend, in turn, has the potential to change state behaviour.

The process towards an ATT has demonstrated impressive political momentum among states and civil society alike. The perceived success of that process can be expected to have positive political effects. The ATT has already had an impact on the level of awareness of, and attention to, arms transfer decisions. Whether it translates into more responsible decision-making in the longer term, and fewer arms deliveries into the wrong hands, depends on several factors, including states’ long-term commitment to converting words on paper into concrete action.

The ATT cannot be expected to stop all arms exports that breach treaty norms. But it does promise greater scrutiny of arms transfer decisions by the international community. It has provided a universal benchmark against which all transfer decisions will be assessed and a framework within which all states can engage on the issue of responsible arms transfers. The ATT negotiations and the implementation process that is just beginning have shone a light on an issue routinely considered a matter of ‘national security’. Until now.
Trade Update

TRANSFERS, RETRANSFERS, AND THE ATT

Given the complex dynamics of the small arms trade, the impact of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is difficult to predict. Yet this chapter, building on the considerable advances made in our understanding of the small arms trade in recent years, examines some of the factors that will determine the treaty’s future impact on transfers, retransfers, and transparency. The chapter presents the annual review of the small arms trade and the 2014 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer.

The value of the global trade in small arms and light weapons almost doubled between 2001 and 2011, according to UN Comtrade.

**Authorized small arms transfers**

Since 2001, the Small Arms Survey has provided annual information on authorized small arms transfers. The main findings of a review of a decade’s worth of UN Comtrade data include:

- The value of the global trade in small arms and light weapons almost doubled between 2001 and 2011 (from USD 2.38 billion to USD 4.63 billion), according to UN Comtrade.
- As shown in Figure 4.2, the category of small arms ammunition saw the greatest increase—a hike of 205 per cent—between 2001 and 2011 (from USD 468 million to USD 1.43 billion).

The chapter also provides an overview of the top exporters and importers of small arms and light weapons in 2011:

- The top exporters of small arms and light weapons (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, the Russian Federation, South Korea, Belgium, China, Turkey, Spain, and the Czech Republic.

**Figure 4.2 Changes in traded values for six categories of small arms and light weapons based on UN Comtrade (USD million*), 2001-11**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammunition (≤12.7 mm)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>238</td>
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Notes: * All values are expressed in constant 2011 US dollars; all figures have been rounded to the nearest million.
## Table 4.7  Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2014, covering major exporters*

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Note: The online version of the Transparency Barometer incorporates updates and corrections, all of which affect states' scores as well as their rankings for those years, the online edition rather than the printed version should be considered definitive. The 2014 Barometer includes countries that qualified as a major exporter at least once during the 2001-2012 calendar years. The scoring system for the 2014 Barometer remains the same as in 2013. The Barometer’s seven categories assess: clarity, timeliness, comprehensiveness, and the level of detail provided on actual deliveries, licences granted, and licences refused.

Explanatory notes:

Note A: The 2014 Barometer is based on each country’s most recent arms export report, made publicly available between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2013.

Note B: The 2014 Barometer takes account of national submissions to the UN Register from 1 January 2012 to 31 August 2013, as well as national submissions to the UN Register from 1 January 2012 to 31 August 2013.

Note C: The fact that the Barometer is based on three sources—national arms export reports, UN Register submissions, and UN-Comtrade data—creates the potential for some overlap in countries’ sources. Barometer scores reflect the information provided to each of the three sources. The same information is not credited twice, however.

Country-specific notes:

1. Serbia published a national arms export report in 2013 that listed all activities in 2012.
2. The US annual report refers to the State Department’s report on direct commercial exports, and the report on foreign military sales, which is prepared by the US Department of Defense.
The top importers of small arms and light weapons (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, Thailand, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.

Profiling unauthorized retransfers
An unauthorized retransfer is a type of diversion in which the arms are retransferred by the authorized importer or end user to an end user in another state (unauthorized re-export) or within the same state, in violation of commitments made by the authorized importer or end user prior to export. Unauthorized retransfers can lead to the same negative consequences as other types of diversion. Since 2011, considerable media attention has focused on unauthorized retransfers of arms and ammunition to Libyan and Syrian non-state armed groups.

The chapter highlights several international and regional instruments and good practice guidelines that outline measures that exporting and re-exporting states can take to prevent unauthorized retransfers. The best preventive measure remains the denial of an export licence if the risk of unauthorized retransfers is high. Post-delivery controls are an under-utilized measure.

Switzerland, Germany, Serbia, and the United Kingdom are the most transparent countries.

Guidance is scarce on how to respond to suspected or detected cases of unauthorized retransfers. National practices that have proven effective in responding to such cases could usefully be codified into multilateral measures and best practice documents.

If the ATT is to make a difference in this area, states parties will have to make it clear that they understand their responsibilities under the ATT to include the prevention of unauthorized retransfers. Sharing experiences, information, and best practices via ATT reporting mechanisms and Conferences of States Parties would help a wide range of states to utilize the treaty to this end.

The 2014 Transparency Barometer
The chapter includes the 2014 Transparency Barometer, which assesses the transfer reporting practices of the 55 countries that have been major exporters at least once since 2001. This edition looks at reports on export-related activities carried out in 2012. The 2014 Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, Germany, Serbia, and the United Kingdom as the most transparent of the major exporters, while Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are the least transparent (see Table 4.7).

One-third of the countries have improved their scores compared to last year, and one-quarter have the same score, resulting in a slight overall improvement. However, more than half of the major exporters do not provide information on licences granted or refused.

Transparency on small arms transfers under the ATT
Promoting transparency in the international arms trade is one of the declared purposes of the ATT. To meet this goal, the ATT requires states parties to make available an annual report on authorized and actual exports and imports of conventional arms, including small arms. The ATT does not indicate what specific types of information should be provided in the annual report; however, in view of reporting burden concerns, the treaty allows states parties to submit the same information that they provide to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

If the ATT is to fulfil its goal of enhanced transparency in the international arms trade, states parties will need to draw inspiration from other frameworks for small arms transfer reporting, such as UN Comtrade and national arms export reports. ATT reporting practices that stop at the UN Register would fall well short of what is possible and feasible.

A standardized reporting template will probably be one of the first items that ATT states parties consider once the treaty enters into force. The template should reflect good practices relating to the provision of information on descriptions of items and end users in the UN Register and national arms export reports. Other steps can be taken to further reduce reporting burdens and utilize synergies with other UN frameworks. For example, the subcategories of UN Comtrade category for ‘arms, ammunition, parts and components thereof’ could be synchronized with the ATT arms categories, enabling states to provide their UN Comtrade data for ATT reporting.
Countdown to Catastrophe
THE MPILA AMMUNITION DEPOT EXPLOSIONS

On 4 March 2012, a series of explosions destroyed several military barracks in the Mpila area of Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo (RoC). The blasts devastated two densely populated districts of the capital, claiming hundreds of lives, injuring thousands, and displacing well over 100,000 people.

A number of warning signs were ignored or simply not recognized.

The Mpila explosions provide a tragic example of how inadequate ammunition management practices can have a severe impact on the local population and the economy. The international community swiftly contributed significant emergency funding and coordinated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and humanitarian relief activities with non-governmental organizations. The magnitude of the event and its immediate consequences drew considerable media coverage and triggered efforts to tackle the underlying problem of poor stockpile management. Since then, however, national priorities and international donor funding have moved on. Yet the root causes of the explosions have still not been properly addressed, nor have their broad socio-economic consequences been fully remedied.

The explosions had macroeconomic effects throughout the country.

This chapter complements the findings of an EU-commissioned evaluation of the effectiveness of the post-blast clearance and risk education activities in and around Mpila. It builds on the EU evaluation report, published in March 2013, but widens the perspective to focus on: (i) the long-term ammunition procurement and stockpiling practices that led to the explosions, and (ii) the direct and indirect consequences of the blasts on the city’s population, the country’s finances, and government policy.
Among the chapter’s main findings are the following:

- In a matter of minutes, the explosions killed at least 300 people, injured more than 2,500, and left more than 121,000 homeless. The number of dead probably far exceeds 300 since the Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not officially report military fatalities.

- According to ammunition technicians and EOD specialists familiar with the event, inadequate ammunition stockpile management is the root cause of the Mpila ammunition depot explosions.

- The quantity of ammunition originally contained in the depots before the blasts is unknown, yet EOD teams destroyed more than 200 tonnes of UXO—representing more than 39 tonnes in net explosive content—during the subsequent clearance efforts between March 2012 and April 2013.

- The ammunition types destroyed, which were not recent, included a mix of pyrotechnics, small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, large-calibre projectiles, rockets, missiles, and aircraft bombs amassed haphazardly in the Mpila depot’s explosive storehouses in the late 1970s and 1980s, during the RoC’s internal conflicts in the 1990s, and during subsequent disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes.

- The unchecked expansion of the civilian population around an explosive storage area containing such types and quantities of ammunition places more people at higher risk in the case of an explosion.

- The total impact of the explosions was partially estimated—mostly in terms of direct physical damage to the private sector—at more than XAF 336 billion (USD 672 million). Broader economic impacts were significant and long-lasting, with macroeconomic repercussions felt throughout the country.

- The tragedy was preventable. Prior to the explosion, a number of warning signs were ignored by the international donor community or, in the case of the Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces, or FAC), simply not recognized due to its lack of stockpile management expertise.

- At the time of writing, post-explosion progress in stockpile management practices was slow, indicating a lack of buy-in from RoC authorities, as well as donor fatigue and wariness from potential sponsors.

The research used a wide range of mostly internal documents obtained during the initial EU-funded evaluation, including reports from the FAC, international and non-governmental organizations, and the EOD coordination centre. The Survey complemented these sources with (i) follow-up interviews with a broad range of field actors, (ii) expert background papers, (iii) data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, (iv) Survey research, including the Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites project, and (v) other open source and media reports. The Survey also submitted more than 1,700 ammunition photos to an EOD specialist for identification of ammunition types.

This chapter begins by looking back. A chronological description of the Mpila ammunition depot explosions—and their root causes—leads to a discussion on the types and quantities of ammunition that were in the depot prior to the explosion, as well as the probable origins of this ordnance. The second section details the impact of the explosions on the local population and infrastructure, government finances, and the country’s socio-economic development. The third and final section highlights the opportunities the RoC had to avoid the explosion, the country’s multilateral commitments for stockpile management, and future perspectives.
Across Conflict Zones

AMMUNITION PROFILING

Investigators, researchers, war reporters, and activists are increasingly documenting ammunition found in or transferred to areas that are experiencing armed conflict. Photographs of ammunition markings and packaging taken on location, as well as shipping documents retrieved from various sources, provide a wealth of information on the countries and dates of manufacture of war materiel. In some cases, these efforts also allow ammunition to be traced back to the initial recipient as well as to subsequent intermediaries.

This chapter analyses the characteristics of small-calibre ammunition—that is, of calibres of less than 20 mm—documented since 2010 in seven countries and territories: Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria. Drawing on a data set of 560 samples of such ammunition, the chapter analyses the diverse types of cartridges circulating across the seven case studies, with a particular focus on calibre, production facility, and date of manufacture. It also explores what these profiles can reveal about the production, procurement, and transfer of ammunition.

The chapter’s key findings include:

- Facilities located in 39 countries produced the surveyed ammunition. Production plants located in China and the Soviet Union account for the greatest share of the ammunition samples. The prevalence of cartridges of Sudanese and Iranian manufacture is also noteworthy.
- More than three-quarters of the ammunition samples were Eastern Bloc-calibre cartridges, and more than half were produced during the cold war—highlighting the role of old ammunition in armed conflict and underlining the importance of reducing stockpile surpluses.
- The presence of newly produced ammunition in several countries illustrates how quickly this materiel can be diverted or retransferred to situations of armed conflict. A total of 29 samples of ammunition observed in Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria were produced since 2010.
- The presence of different types of unmarked cartridges in all but one of the countries and territories under review raises new hurdles for arms monitoring efforts.

It is important to note that the producing countries identified in this chapter are not necessarily responsible for transferring the ammunition to the conflict environments and actors under study. Indeed, producers may have exported the ammunition legally to these or other countries before it was retransferred without their knowledge and used in conflict, or diverted to non-state armed groups or illicit markets. Information on producers is nevertheless important in generating a baseline of the ammunition in circulation, which in turn may facilitate the identification of unusual or new ammunition flows over time and across borders. Moreover, identifying producers is often a necessary first step in establishing the full chain of custody of ammunition transfers to areas affected by conflict.

While the majority of types of ammunition reviewed in this chapter date from the cold war era, this pattern appears to be shifting, as various other types of ammunition now also circulate in conflict-affected environments. Cartridges manufactured since 2000 were available in all the countries and territories under review barring Somaliland. As many as 29 samples of ammunition were produced after 2009—meaning at most two years before they were found in the surveyed conflict environments. Chinese and Sudanese ammunition constitute the bulk of the
samples of this new ammunition. Domestically produced ammunition is in use in the battlefields of Sudan and Syria. Overall, the data suggests a more diverse profile for conflict ammunition than was previously assumed.

**Unmarked ammunition was uncovered in six of the seven countries and territories under review.**

The country/territory profiles also make it possible to identify single types of ammunition that are circulating in multiple locations. While the data set contains only few such cases, they reaffirmed some of the above findings—such as the seemingly increased importance of certain types of Chinese and Sudanese ammunition in conflict-affected situations (see Map 6.1). They also point to broader patterns of ammunition transfer. In fact, in several cases, efforts to map and monitor ammunition over time provided the first evidence of clandestine or destabilizing transfers of specific types of cartridges.

The presence of unmarked cartridges, in several cases of unknown origin, in most of the conflict zones under review raises new hurdles for monitoring work. As the chapter also points out, patchy reporting by states on their authorized transfers severely limits the utility of existing databases and complicates research on the possible provenance of conflict ammunition. More systematic reporting, data collection, and information sharing, as well as the use of more sophisticated ammunition recognition and tracing techniques, will be critical to improving our understanding—and our ability to track—conflict ammunition in the years to come.
Conflict between state and non-state forces continues in Sudan and South Sudan, despite multiple peace agreements. In late 2013, a number of anti-government militias were engaged in vigorous insurgencies in South Sudan; meanwhile, separate branches of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) were fighting rebellions on two fronts in the Sudanese states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and the Darfur conflict continued.

To shed light on the types, origin, and supply patterns of arms and ammunition to non-state armed groups, the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan launched the Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk in 2011. The project has built on and adapted techniques pioneered by UN embargo panel investigations, applying a multi-step process of weapons identification, mapping, and verification.

While Sudan and South Sudan are home to an abundance of legacy weapons from the civil war era, many of which originated in former Eastern Bloc countries, this chapter focuses on more recently produced weapons, including arms and ammunition manufactured in China and Iran, as well as Sudanese-produced weapons and ammunition. The vast majority of the weapons documented with rebel groups originated in Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) stockpiles.

Field inspections in Sudan and South Sudan have noted a large variety of Chinese equipment, including assault rifles, general-purpose and heavy machine guns, RPG-7-pattern rocket launchers, automatic grenade launchers, antitank missiles, various types of rockets, and small-calibre ammunition. Armed opposition groups in Darfur and South Kordofan, as well as rebel and tribal militias in South Sudan—as well as the SAF—all had varieties of Chinese weapons in their possession. According to data reported to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), China was the largest supplier state, accounting for 58 per cent of reported transfers to Sudan of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, and ‘conventional weapons’.

Military ties between Iran and Sudan have also grown strong over the years. According to UN Comtrade, Iran was the source of 13 per cent of Khartoum’s self-reported arms imports in 2001–12. These have included RPG-7-pattern launchers, No. 4 anti-personnel landmines, mortar rounds and tubes, as well as 7.62 × 39 mm and 12.7 × 108 mm ammunition. Many types were observed in the hands of South Sudanese rebel forces, the SPLM–N in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, as well as with SAF.
Sudan has become a significant producer of arms and ammunition in Africa, and the Survey has observed domestically produced Sudanese arms and ammunition in significant quantities with Sudanese forces, among armed groups in Darfur and South Kordofan, with South Sudanese insurgents, and in several other conflict zones outside of Sudan and South Sudan. While the government-owned Military Industry Corporation (MIC) claims to manufacture a wide range of small arms and ammunition, as well as armoured vehicles and main battle tanks, the Survey has documented a narrower range, including machine guns, mortars, various rockets, and small arms ammunition.

The Survey’s Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk project has revealed that non-state armed groups in Sudan and South Sudan rarely obtain their weapons directly from foreign states; instead, they tend to receive materiel from local sources. Some of the arming has been deliberate, as in the case of Khartoum’s arming of Southern rebel commanders—who have, in turn, passed on weapons to tribal militias.

Non-state armed groups also acquire weapons from state forces through battlefield capture. Some groups are more successful at this than others. With decreasing support from external actors, a coalition of rebels in Sudan—the Sudan Revolutionary Front—has maintained a sizeable arsenal through its military victories against SAF. In South Kordofan, the SPLM–N captured hundreds of thousands of rounds of small- to medium-calibre ammunition as well as more than a dozen vehicles and tanks from SAF in 2012. While the SPLM–N in Blue Nile has been somewhat less successful at capturing military equipment than their South Kordofan counterparts, they too have seized significant quantities of SAF weapons during battle. In most instances, these weapons not only correlate with the materiel that the SPLM–N captured in South Kordofan, but also match the equipment captured from SAF in Darfur and that found in the hands of Southern militias in South Sudan.

Sudanese government stockpiles have proved to be the main source of military hardware for insurgent groups.

In general, then, Sudanese government stockpiles have proved to be the main source of military hardware for insurgent groups. But Southern insurgent groups have also captured arms and ammunition from the SPLA. In 2012–13, David Yau Yau’s militia secured large numbers of weapons and their associated ammunition as a result of its battlefield successes against the SPLA in Jonglei. These weapons included heavy machine guns, mortars, and several vehicles.

Investigators are increasingly documenting newer-model weapons with removed serial numbers and markings.

Much has been learned in Sudan and South Sudan, but much remains unknown. The particulars of the supply chain—the specific actors involved, their motivations, and potential rewards—require further study. Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan also faces new challenges. Perhaps the most difficult is the increase in newer-model weapons documented with removed serial numbers and markings. Such removal may be a response to investigations into the custody chain of newly arrived weapons. While this practice makes tracing much more difficult—although not impossible—it is also a clear indicator of illicit supply.
On the Record

ILlicit Weapons in the United States

During the crack epidemic in the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s, a steady stream of movies, television shows, and songs depicting gang life and drug violence in US cities captured the popular imagination. Among the most startling of these images were drive-by shootings: teenaged gang members spraying blighted city neighbourhoods with bullets fired from automatic weapons. These scenes—and the assumptions that underpin them—continue to shape public perceptions of urban violence in the United States today. But how accurate are these images? Are automatic rifles and machine pistols as widely used by drug traffickers and gang members as commonly assumed? If not, what weapons do they rely on, and are they the same as the weapons acquired by other criminals?

Semi-automatic pistols are the actual ‘weapons of choice’ of US criminals.

This chapter seeks to answer these questions through an analysis of data on firearms and other weapons recovered by US law enforcement authorities. It is the third instalment of the Small Arms Survey’s multi-year study on illicit small arms and light weapons, which seeks to improve public understanding of illicit weapons by obtaining and analysing previously unreleased data from official (government) sources.

To this end, the Small Arms Survey obtained records on more than 140,000 small arms and light weapons taken into custody by police in eight US cities and towns. The records shed light on weapons seized from groups of concern, including felons, drug traffickers, and gang members.

The main findings of this chapter include the following:

- The majority of the firearms seized from felons, drug traffickers, and gang members in the eight US cities and towns studied were handguns, accounting for 77 per cent of firearms recovered from these groups (see Table 8.5).
- At least 70 per cent of the seized handguns were semi-automatic pistols of various makes, models, and calibres—the most common type of firearm recovered from criminals in the municipalities studied.
- Seizure rates for handguns and long guns in the United States are the inverse of those in Mexico, where approximately 72 per cent of the seized weapons studied in the second phase of this project were long guns.
- Rifles in the US sample accounted for less than 12 per cent of the firearms studied, and only about half of the rifles were semi-automatic models, including those commonly termed ‘assault rifles’.
- US-designed AR-15-pattern rifles—often referred to as the most popular rifles in the United States—were seized at less than half the rate of Kalashnikov- and SKS-pattern rifles.
- Despite a ban on the importation of firearms from China, a large proportion of the seized semi-automatic rifles were Chinese-made.
- The number of seized machine guns was negligible.
- Light weapons constitute a very small percentage of weapons taken into custody by police departments in the United States. Those that are recovered tend to be old, improvised, inert, or incomplete.

A detective with the Los Angeles Police Department gang unit searches the apartment of an arrested drug dealer, April 2010. © Robert Nickelsberg/Getty
The US data also contrasts sharply with records on weapons seized in some other parts of the world, where rifles are the predominant type of firearms recovered by authorities. These differences highlight the heterogeneity of regional and national markets for illicit weapons, which are shaped by many different factors, including regional stability; the security of government arsenals; the civilian market; and the objectives, resources, and sophistication of consumers of illicit weapons in the different regions studied.

Rifles accounted for less than 12 per cent of the firearms studied.

There are also several similarities between the criminals and armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, the Philippines, Somalia, and the United States, including their affinity for Kalashnikov- and SKS-pattern rifles. In the United States, these rifles account for approximately 32 per cent of semi-automatic rifles identified by make or model that were seized from felons, drug traffickers, and gang members. In Mexico, Kalashnikov-pattern rifles were seized even more frequently, accounting for nearly one-third of all seized rifles (not just semi-automatic models). Kalashnikov- and SKS-pattern rifles accounted for 70 per cent of rifles seized in Afghanistan and more than 90 per cent in Iraq and Somalia. The prevalence of Kalashnikov- and SKS-pattern rifles is not surprising given that they are inexpensive, plentiful, and reliable.

Also significant is the extremely small number of large-calibre rifles and machine guns recovered by police in the United States. Only nine .50 calibre rifles were seized from felons, drug traffickers, or gang members, and some of them were antique-style muzzle-loading rifles. Few fully automatic pistols and rifles are identified in the data, and many of the firearms included in this category appear to be semi-automatic variants of automatic weapons.

While the data compiled for this study sheds important light on illicit weapons in the United States, significant gaps remain. Much of the data on firearms linked to violent crime is too vague or ambiguous to distinguish the firearm used by the perpetrators from other weapons taken into custody. The records also include little information on the proximate source of the weapons or the chain of custody leading up to their seizure by police. With some exceptions, the data reveals little about the individuals from whom the weapons were seized. Access to more of this information would improve public understanding of illicit weapons, how they enter the black market, and the illegal end users that seek them out, with potentially significant implications for current and future efforts to reduce the illicit acquisition and use of small arms and light weapons in the United States.

### Table 8.5: Firearms seized from gang members or linked to gang activities, 2007–12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon type</th>
<th>Houston</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Handguns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derringers</td>
<td>8 1</td>
<td>3 &lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols, semi-automatic</td>
<td>464 59</td>
<td>262 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols, other</td>
<td>3 &lt;1</td>
<td>4 &lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols, unclear and unspecified</td>
<td>4 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>142 18</td>
<td>152 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>621 79</td>
<td>421 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rifles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolt-action</td>
<td>16 2</td>
<td>2 &lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic</td>
<td>43 6</td>
<td>10 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic</td>
<td>5 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11 1</td>
<td>1 &lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear and unspecified</td>
<td>1 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85 11</td>
<td>13 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shotguns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic</td>
<td>5 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>62 8</td>
<td>23 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear and unspecified</td>
<td>2 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69 9</td>
<td>23 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Machine guns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Machine guns’</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Machine pistols’ and ‘submachine guns’</td>
<td>2 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other firearms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air guns, starter guns, stun guns</td>
<td>4 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and unspecified firearms</td>
<td>1 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 &lt;1</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total firearms linked to gang members or gang-related activities</strong></td>
<td>782</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding of sub-totals.
‘In words and images, the Small Arms Survey 2014, with its usual analytical rigour, helps us understand the latest developments—and future possibilities—in arms control, peace, and security. I have no hesitation recommending it to all those interested in these vital topics.’

—Angela Kane
United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

‘The Small Arms Survey 2014 offers important insights into how and why armed violence continues to plague the lives of many women and girls around the world—along with some of the options we have for building a safer future.’

—Zainab Hawa Bangura
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

About the Small Arms Survey 2014

The Small Arms Survey 2014 considers the multiple roles of women in the context of armed violence, security, and the small arms agenda. The volume’s thematic section comprises one chapter on violence against women and girls—with a focus on post-conflict Liberia and Nepal—and another on the recent convergence of the small arms agenda with that of women, peace, and security. Complementing these chapters are illustrated testimonies of women with experience as soldiers, rebels, and security personnel. The ‘weapons and markets’ section assesses the potential impact of the Arms Trade Treaty, presents the 2014 Transparency Barometer and an update on the authorized small arms trade, and analyses recent ammunition depot explosions in the Republic of the Congo. In addition, it examines ammunition circulating in Africa and the Middle East, maps the sources of insurgent weapons in Sudan and South Sudan, and evaluates crime gun records in the United States. The chapters are:

- In War and Peace: Violence against Women and Girls
- Converging Agendas: Women, Peace, Security, and Small Arms
- Women behind the Gun: Aiming for Equality and Recognition
- Breaking New Ground? The Arms Trade Treaty
- Trade Update: Transfers, Retransfers, and the ATT
- Countdown to Catastrophe: The Mpila Ammunition Depot Explosions
- Across Conflict Zones: Ammunition Profiling
- Signs of Supply: Weapons Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan
- On the Record: Illicit Weapons in the United States

About the project

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology and collaborates with a network of partners in more than 50 countries.

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