Small Arms in Burundi
Disarming the Civilian Population in Peacetime

By Stéphanie Pézard and Nicolas Florquin

A study by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue Iteka with support from UNDP–Burundi and Oxfam–NOVIB
The Small Arms Survey

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About the Ligue Iteka

The Ligue Iteka was created in 1991 by a group of professionals from various fields, including academics, lawyers, and religious leaders. It was the first human rights organization to be legally recognized in Burundi, and the first to work openly on related issues.

The Ligue Iteka’s mission is to defend, promote, and protect the rights of human beings. Its current project areas include legal aid, the monitoring of repatriation, and small arms and light weapons. The Ligue Iteka has special advisory status with ECOSOC, is a member of the Inter-African Union of Humans Rights (UIDH), and is an affiliate member of the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH).

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Book Series


Contents

Copyright .................................................................................................................................. ii

The Small Arms Survey ........................................................................................................ iii

About the Ligue Iteka ........................................................................................................... iv

List of illustrations .................................................................................................................... xiii
Maps ........................................................................................................................................ xiii
Graphs ..................................................................................................................................... xiii
Tables ...................................................................................................................................... xiv

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... xv

List of abbreviations .............................................................................................................. xvii

Preface ................................................................................................................................... xx

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 1

Results of the study ............................................................................................................... 1
  The possession of arms by civilians .................................................................................... 1
  The availability of arms ....................................................................................................... 2
  The impact of arms and perceptions of security ............................................................... 3
  The need for civilian disarmament, and its associated risks ........................................... 4
  Recommendations for civilian disarmament ................................................................... 6

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 8

National context .................................................................................................................... 8

Partners in the study .............................................................................................................. 10

Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 10
  a) A survey of households in six provinces .................................................................... 10
  b) A two-day workshop with representatives of seven former armed groups .. 11
c) A series of discussions with representatives of the Burundian authorities, international organizations, and NGOs present in Burundi .................. 12
d) An analysis of statistical data from the Burundian authorities and from the United Nations security unit in Burundi and other UN organizations on the use of small arms and light weapons in security incidents .................... 12
e) An analysis of data from the NGO MSF-Belgium regarding the impact of small arms and light weapons on public health, and from the Ligue Iteka on human rights violations ................................................................. 12

I. Survey of the distribution of arms ......................................................... 14

I.A. The distribution of arms ................................................................. 14
   I.A.1. Distribution among civilians by province ...................... 14
   I.A.2. Arms held by members of former armed groups ............ 16

I.B. The production of arms and munitions .................................. 19
   I.B.1. Industrial production ..................................................... 19
   I.B.2. Craft production ......................................................... 19

I.C. Arms trafficking ........................................................................... 20
   I.C.1. The volume of traffic and arms seizures .................... 20
   I.C.2. Borders with the DRC, Rwanda, and Tanzania ............. 21
       The DRC ........................................................................ 22
       Rwanda .......................................................................... 25
       Tanzania ....................................................................... 25
       Other sources of arms .................................................. 26
   I.C.3. Routes taken .................................................................. 26
       Land routes ..................................................................... 26
       Air routes ....................................................................... 27
       Water routes ................................................................... 27

I.D. Legal transfers ........................................................................... 28
   I.D.1. Imports ..................................................................... 28
   I.D.2. Exports ..................................................................... 29

II. Impact and perceptions of the proliferation of arms ................. 30

II.A. The arms ................................................................................. 30
   II.A.1. History of the presence of arms in Burundi ............. 30
   II.A.2. Burundian attitudes to the possession of arms .......... 30
II.B. Violence and security ................................................................................................. 32
   II.B.1. The impact on public health ................................................................................ 32
   II.B.2. The impact on security ....................................................................................... 34
   II.B.3. The contexts of insecurity and the people involved ....................................... 41
       People involved in insecurity ...................................................................................... 41
       Insecurity related to the continuing civil war ......................................................... 46
       Insecurity relating to criminality ............................................................................... 46
       The problem of sexual violence ............................................................................... 48
       The security of the refugees ...................................................................................... 49

III. Institutional capacities and disarmament initiatives .............................................. 51
   III.A. Government .......................................................................................................... 51
       III.A.1. Legal framework .............................................................................................. 51
       III.A.2. National bodies involved in the fight against small arms ............................. 53
       III.A.3. Reorganization of the army and the police .................................................. 54
           From the FAB to the FDN ........................................................................................ 54
           The national police force ......................................................................................... 55
           Management and security of stocks ....................................................................... 55
   III. B. Other actors .......................................................................................................... 56
       III.B.1. Civil society ...................................................................................................... 56
       III.B.2. Regional obligations ......................................................................................... 56
       III.B.3. Assistance from the UNDP ............................................................................. 57
   III. C. Disarmament initiatives ..................................................................................... 58
       III.C.1. The demobilization of ex-combatants .......................................................... 58
           The DRR programme ............................................................................................... 58
           Arms collected ......................................................................................................... 60
       III.C.2. The disarmament of civilians ....................................................................... 64
           The Decree of 4 May 2005 on civilian disarmament ........................................... 65
           The disarmament of the Peace Guardians and the Militant Combatants ............ 66
           The disarmament of the Civil Self-Defence Groups ............................................ 69
       III.C.3. The people’s expectation of civil disarmament ............................................. 70
           Possible involvement in a disarmament programme ............................................. 70
           The surrender of arms is possible under certain conditions .................................. 72
           How can the civilian population be disarmed? ..................................................... 72
List of illustrations

Maps
Map 1  Burundi
Map 2  Percentage of respondents whose household includes at least one victim of an act of violence during the last six months, per district ( commune)
Map 3  Percentage of respondents who say that firearms are ‘never’ used in acts of violence, per district
Map 4  Percentage of respondents who say that they feel ‘not at all’ secure, per district
Map 5  Percentage of respondents who think that the possession of a firearm ‘helps to protect’, per district
Map 6  Percentage of respondents who would ‘totally’ accept taking part in a disarmament programme, per district

Graphs
Graph 1  Percentage of respondents who state that the majority of households or many households in their neighbourhood/ colline possess at least one arm
Graph 2  Respondents’ opinions about the possession of firearms
Graph 3  Number of admissions to the MSF-Belgium Minor Injuries Centre (CBL), 2002–05 (per month)
Graph 4  Causes of violence-related injuries among patients treated at the Minor Injuries Centre
Graph 5  Monthly distribution of admissions to the Minor Injuries Centre, per cause (2004–05)
Graph 6  Variations in the levels of violence per source, 2001–05
Graph 7  Number of security and criminality incidents recorded by the UN security unit, per province (2005)
Graph 8  Evolution in the number of incidents recorded by the UN security unit, 2001–05
Graph 9  Percentage of respondents per province who say that they do not feel ‘at all’ secure
Graph 10 Percentage of respondents per province who say that they have at least one victim of violence in their household
Graph 11 Percentage of respondents per province who say they have heard shots at least once a week
Graph 12 Use of firearms in acts of violence
Graph 13 Sources of insecurity identified by respondents
Graph 14 Percentage of respondents per province who identified the army or police as a source of insecurity
Graph 15 Perceptions of respondents about the effectiveness of public authorities in dealing with crime
Graph 16 Willingness to take part in a disarmament programme (percentage of respondents per province)
Graph 17 Reasons cited for participating in a disarmament programme
Graph 18 Institutions to which the civilian population would agree to surrender their arms

Tables
Table 1  Distribution of small arms (including grenades) in the hands of civilians by province, 2006 (estimate)
Table 2  Estimate of the number of arms in the hands of the various armed political movements (PMPA)
Table 3  Number of child soldiers demobilized per armed group
Table 4  Number of arms surrendered during the ‘direct integration’ process
Table 5  Provisional result of the DDR civilian disarmament programme
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members of Burundi’s government, civil service, army, and police force as
well as members of the diplomatic corps, international organizations, and
civil society.
List of abbreviations

AWEP A Association of West European Parliamentarians
CBL Centre pour blessés légers (Minor Injuries Centre)
Kamenge (MSF-Belgium)
CEDAC Centre d’encadrement et de développement des anciens combattants (Support and Development Centre for Ex-combatants)
CGL Conférence des Grands Lacs (Great Lakes Conference)
CNDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy)
CNDRR Commission Nationale chargée de la Démobilisation, de la Réinsertion et de la Réintégration des ex-combattants (National Commission with responsibility for the Demobilization, the Reinsertion and the Reintegration of Ex-combatants)
CPD Colonie des Pionniers du Développement (Pioneers of Development Group)
DDR Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
FAB Forces armées burundaises (Burundian Armed Forces)
FAC Forces armées congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces)
FAR Forces armées rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FAZ Forces armées zaïroises (Zairese Armed Forces)
FDD Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FDN  Force de défense nationale  (National Defence Force)
FNL  Forces nationales de libération
     (National Liberation Forces)
FPR  Front patriotique rwandais  (Rwandan Patriotic Front)
FROLINA  Front pour la libération nationale
          (National Liberation Front)
GoTB  Gouvernement de transition du Burundi  (Burundian Transitional Government)
GP  Gardiens de la paix
     (Peace Guardians (Allied civil defence militias))
GRIP  Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, Brussels
       (Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security)
HRW  Human Rights Watch
ISTEEBU  Institut de statistiques et d’études économiques du Burundi
         (Burundian Institute of Statistics and Economics)
MDRP  Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
       (World Bank)
MIAB  Mission Africaine au Burundi
       (African Mission in Burundi)
MSF  Médecins sans frontières  (Doctors without Borders)
Palipehutu–FNL  Parti de Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces nationales de libération
               (Hutu People’s Liberation Party—National Liberation Forces)
PMPA  Partis et mouvements politiques armés (armed parties and political movements)
PNB  Police nationale du Burundi
     (Burundian National Police Force)
PSI  Police de sécurité intérieure (Internal Security Police)
RECSA  Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region
       and the Horn of Africa
RPG  Rocket-propelled grenade (launcher)
TA SA-AVR  Technical Adviser on Small Arms and Armed Violence Reduction
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UGL</td>
<td>Unité de Garde Lacustre (Lake Surveillance Unit)</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNOB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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Preface

This report is based mainly on the results of a survey of a representative sample of Burundian households that was carried out between 23 November and 21 December 2005. Consequently, responses to survey questions and the analysis of these responses largely reflect the political situation that prevailed at the time. The armed group Palipehutu-FNL, in particular, was still active around Bujumbura. On 7 September 2006, Palipehutu-FNL and the Government of Burundi signed a ceasefire agreement in Dar es-Salaam. Since then, levels of violence seem to have dropped in areas that were previously affected by the conflict. While this trend remains to be reinforced by an overall peace agreement, it may have a positive effect on the perception of security among Burundians, especially among those who were most exposed to the final outbursts of violence at the end of the war in late 2005.
Summary

Burundi is emerging from a long civil war which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. One of the consequences of the war has been the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the civilian population, on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The government, civil society, and Burundi’s partners are aware of this problem and believe that lasting peace will not be restored while these arms remain in the hands of civilians.

The Small Arms Survey (Geneva, Switzerland) and the Ligue Iteka (Bujumbura, Burundi), supported by the UN Development Programme, Burundi (UNDP) and Oxfam NOVIB (Dutch affiliate of Oxfam) (The Hague, Netherlands), decided to carry out an exhaustive study of the problems associated with small arms and light weapons in Burundi. The aim of this project is to contribute to the formulation of policy that the government intends to introduce to combat the proliferation of these weapons. The study is based on a number of different methodological tools, including a survey of 3,000 households in six provinces, and an analysis of statistics from the UN, the Ligue Iteka, and MSF-Belgium (medical statistics from its Minor Injuries Centre (the Centre des Blessés Légers, or CBL). Further information was drawn from a two-day workshop in which ex-combatants affiliated to seven former armed groups took part.

Results of the study

This study has made it possible to assess more accurately the problems associated with the possession and use of firearms in Burundi, and to draw the following conclusions:

The possession of arms by civilians

- There were great surges in the numbers of arms held by the civilian population in Burundi during the civil wars in 1972 and 1993–94. Burundian
households in general are heavily armed, but there are significant differences between provinces (Bujumbura-Mairie and Mwaro representing the two extremes).

• Nearly 100,000 Burundian households are thought to possess small arms and/or light weapons. This finding appears to confirm the estimate made by the transitional government in May 2005 that 100,000 arms were being held illegally in Burundi (Niyoyita, 2005). This figure must, however, be viewed as a minimum, since some households may possess more than one weapon.

• The proliferation of arms among the civilian population is most marked in the capital. The provinces bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are also particularly badly affected. Bujumbura-Mairie is the province with the greatest variety of arms, particularly handguns, whereas weapons of war represent the bulk of stocks in other parts of the country.

• Burundians holding arms justify themselves by citing the need to ensure their own personal safety, as well as that of their family and property. Boosting their self-image or respecting tradition are hardly ever mentioned, which shows that it must be possible to influence demand for arms by improving the security conditions under which people live.

• Most of the arms that were in the hands of combatants during the conflict are still in circulation today. From the 35,000 people who have been demobilized (February 2006 figure), barely 6,000 arms have been recovered.

The availability of arms

• The countries bordering Burundi, particularly the DRC and Tanzania, represent considerable reservoirs of arms. During the civil war Burundians drew on these heavily, and may well do so again if the domestic security situation begins to deteriorate once more.

• In the light of this observation, it is all the more crucial to control the movement of goods across Burundi’s borders. At the present time, however, there is virtually no cooperation between the various authorities in charge of this problem, that is to say the army, the police, and customs.

• Regional cooperation on the issue of borders and border security is also lacking, although Burundi and her neighbours are confronted with the
same problems, particularly the existence of cross-border armed groups. It is to be hoped that the tripartite-plus initiative recently expanded to Burundi will help to focus more attention on these problems. In the context of the Nairobi Process, the ratification by Burundi on 15 March 2006 of the Nairobi Protocol and the willingness shown by the authorities to honour their commitments represents a significant step forward.

- The new remit of the army and the police following their reorganization must not cause us to lose sight of the value of a centralized register of arms listing information on all arms imported into Burundi and on their holders—including when government forces such as the army, the police, and customs are involved.
- The army does not have sufficient resources at the present time to destroy its obsolete or unusable arms under acceptable security conditions. The current method of arms disposal, by burning, carries the risk that the barrels may be recovered and reused in *mugobore.*

**The impact of arms and perceptions of security**

- Even after the ceasefire of November 2003, small arms and light weapons continued to create many victims. More than 1,000 people wounded by them were admitted to the one and only Minor Injuries Centre in Kamenge between January 2004 and December 2005.
- Small arms and light weapons are involved in the majority of violent incidents in Burundi. Eighty-five per cent of victims of violence admitted to the Minor Injuries Centre during the period 2004–05 had been wounded by such arms.
- There are few opportunities for victims of armed violence to receive treatment and after-care, mainly due to the high cost of public medical services and the closure of the Minor Injuries Centre.
- The security situation is generally perceived to be improving, as might be expected in a country now almost entirely at peace, and where elections in 2005 took place without major incident. But here, too, there are significant variations in the way security is perceived in different provinces.
- While the overall level of violence is falling, there is considerable variation between provinces. The number of violent and criminal acts recorded in
the capital and in Bujumbura Rural is particularly high, and has even risen slightly since 2003.

• The root cause of the sense of insecurity felt by ordinary people varies from one province to another. In Bujumbura-Mairie, crime is a major problem, whereas Bujumbura Rural still has to face the residue of civil war, with sporadic confrontations between the army and the Hutu People’s Liberation Party–National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu–FNL).

• Most criminal acts are committed with firearms, armed robberies coming top of the list of acts of violence against the civilian population. The increase in sexual offences, sometimes committed at gunpoint, is particularly worrying.

• There is a lack of confidence in the police and the army, who are perceived by some people as contributing to the general climate of insecurity.

• Ex-combatants seem to have reintegrated well into civilian life, and the population does not appear to show any particular suspicion or reserve towards them.

The need for civilian disarmament, and its associated risks

Conducted in six provinces, the survey shows that civilians have real expectations of effective action being taken by the government to bring about disarmament. These expectations arise partly from the disarmament of the Peace Guardians (Gardiens de la Paix (Allied civil defence)) and the Militant Combatants militias which was taking place while the survey was being carried out. An initiative launched by the governor of Muramvya to disarm civilians in his province showed that public sector workers who had arms in their possession were demanding BIF 100,000 (USD 100) in exchange—i.e. the same sum which had been allowed to the Peace Guardians and the Militant Combatants. The arms collections organized by the Centre for the Support and Development of Ex-combatants (Centre d’encadrement et de développement des anciens combattants, CEDAC), with the support of the Ligue Iteka, also show that people are perfectly willing to surrender hand-made guns (mugobore) and munitions, but not commercially manufactured weapons such as Kalashnikov or FAL rifles—of which there are, however, far more in the hands of the civilian population than there are mugobore.
In spite of the stated expectations of the various civilian populations, many respondents have emphasized that an ‘arms for money’ type disarmament programme might prove to be counter-productive, as those receiving payments would be able to use the money to buy more arms and hence perpetuate the illegal arms trade. For the same reason, it could be equally counter-productive to offer goods in exchange for arms (see for example the recent ‘arms for bicycles’ programme in the DRC), because people could resell them to get cash and buy more arms. Considering the number of arms in the nearby DRC, it is feared that the disarmament of Burundian civilians might create a market which would immediately be seized upon by arms dealers from these. If financial compensation were offered as part of a civilian disarmament programme, this would have to be lower than the current price of arms in the DRC and in Tanzania, in order not to cause or stimulate a revival in arms trafficking between these countries and Burundi. Disarmament would also have to be backed up by a serious effort to control the borders, but it is hard to see how such control could be enforced with existing resources, or how it could be sustained in the long term.

The prospect of civil disarmament also raises other fears: the continuing threat of violent attacks by the Palipehutu–FNL, fear of another war, and a general sense of insecurity could discourage people from giving up their arms. While acts of violence are still being committed in provinces such as Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, and Cibitoke, individuals holding arms will remain sceptical as to the wisdom of surrendering their weapons while the Palipehutu–FNL, which is still a threat, keep their own.

At Bujumbura-Mairie, continuing insecurity could lead some people to dispose of their weapons of war (assault rifles, grenades), but keep the pistols and revolvers they can use to defend themselves against criminals. According to a customs source, handguns are currently more sought after than Kalashnikovs, a preference reflected in the price.
Recommendations for civilian disarmament

Whatever approach is envisaged, any potential programme of civilian disarmament must take account of the distinctive features of the situation in Burundi as set out in this study:

- **Re-establish security as a preliminary to any arms collection initiative.** The disarmament of civilians must be achieved in tandem with clear efforts to re-establish a satisfactory security situation. Resolving the problem of the Palipehutu–FNL and tackling crime seriously will show people that the government is determined to make Burundi a safe place to live.

- **Set up an institutional and legal framework.** Efforts must be made within the institutional framework with the creation of a body able to devise and carry out disarmament missions and monitor the implementation of Burundi’s international obligations (such as the Nairobi Protocol). The technical Commission recently established to disarm the civilian population and combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons should be capable of fulfilling this role.

- **Target the provincial rather than the national level.** The level of security and the problem of arms proliferation vary from one province to another. There is no doubt that Bujumbura Rural and Bujumbura-Mairie will not be ready to disarm until there is an improvement in the security situation and an end to the threats that push the civilian population to keep their weapons or arm themselves. The situation in other provinces, like Bururi, Ruyigi, and Mwaro, on the other hand, is much more conducive to a successful disarmament programme. It would therefore be wise to develop pilot projects to test different approaches to collecting arms in areas where security has already been restored.

- **Make disarmament voluntary rather than enforced.** Voluntary disarmament can be presented as an amnesty period to be followed by compulsory disarmament. The failure of initial efforts to disarm following the adoption of the Decree of 5 May 2005 shows that no one will give up their arms in the absence of a sufficiently strong climate of confidence. From a strategic point of view, another fear is that certain sponsors may oppose compulsory disarmament and refuse to give financial support to such an initiative.8
From this perspective, an assessment of the voluntary disarmament initiative begun in April 2006 is urgently needed.

- **Back a public information and awareness campaign.** Laws must be translated into Kirundi. In a recent local disarmament initiative in Muramvya, the local heads of the Internal Security Police were involved in raising awareness of these issues among civil servants and local district administrators. Similar activities have also been initiated by civil society, particularly by ex-combatants’ associations who have organized collections of arms from the civilian population.

- **Boost confidence in institutions responsible for security.** Security incidents involving uniformed men could pose serious difficulties during any process of civilian disarmament, despite the enthusiasm shown by the public for the authorities to collect arms (an enthusiasm which seems to owe more to possible financial compensation than to any real confidence in the police and the army). Establishing a greater degree of confidence between the civilian population and the new military and police forces must be an important element in any disarmament strategy.

- **Strengthen the capacity of the police and customs services to combat arms trafficking.** Arms trafficking, which has diminished since the Arusha Accord, could well resume if, having given up their arms, people felt the need to defend themselves once more. Better coordination between the various agencies (the police, customs, the navy), as well as the creation of structures for dialogue between Burundian agencies and their counterparts in neighbouring countries (mainly the DRC and Tanzania), would be welcome.
**Introduction**

Burundi is emerging from a long civil war which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. One of the consequences of the war has been the proliferation of firearms within the civilian population on a hitherto unprecedented scale in the country’s history. The government, civil society, and Burundi’s partners are aware of this problem and believe that lasting peace will not be restored while these arms remain in the hands of the civilian population. From this perspective, a civilian disarmament strategy needs to be developed based on a clear and precise understanding of the problems associated with small arms and light weapons in Burundi.

**National context**

The signing on 28 August 2000 of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, then, on 16 November 2003, of a general ceasefire agreement between the transitional government of Burundi and the main rebel movement, the CNDD–FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces pour la défense de la démocratie)), marked the end of a ten-year crisis that caused the deaths of 300,000 people and displaced nearly a fifth of the country’s population (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004, para. 26 and 30). The African Mission in Burundi (Mission Africaine au Burundi (MIAB)) ensured compliance with the provisions of the Arusha accord and maintained peace and security in Burundi for a year; it also prepared for the forthcoming demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants by carrying out various tasks such as finding them billets in advance. The mission was replaced in May 2004 by UNOB (United Nations Operation in Burundi), whose mandate covered monitoring the transition to democracy, the security of elections, the DDR process, and the control of the flow of arms. The transitional period in Bu-
rundi came to an end in August 2005, with the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, former head of the CNDD–FDD and member of the transitional government, to the Presidency of the Republic, and the installation on 30 August 2005 of a government made up of Hutu and Tutsi ministers in almost equal numbers, in accordance with the new constitution adopted by referendum in February 2005.

The first moves towards civilian disarmament were made by the transitional government and by UNOB; these initiatives involved ex-combatants, some of whom were demobilized, and others integrated into the new army, the FDN (National Defence Force (Force de la Défense Nationale)), and also the militias (the ‘Peace Guardians’ and the ‘Militant Combatants’).

It is nevertheless difficult to assess whether this disarmament can be considered a success, given the number of arms recovered in the course of operations; all the evidence suggests that a great many small arms remain in the hands of the civilian population, whether ex-combatants, former militiamen, or ordinary civilians who armed themselves during the war for their own protection—and who have kept their weapons to defend themselves from attack by the last rebel group still active, the Palipehutu–FNL, or by criminals, the crime rate having been on the increase since the outbreak of the war.

There is currently no reliable estimate for the number of arms in circulation in Burundi, nor of their types, their origin, or the uses to which they are put. Estimates of the number of illegal arms in circulation range from 100,000 (Niyoyita, 2005) to 300,000 (assault rifles, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs) (United Nations Security Council, 2005a, para. 171). It is nevertheless impossible to know from which sources these estimates are derived.

In addition to straightforward statistics on the arms themselves, it is essential to obtain information on the owners: who they are, why they need an arm, and above all, whether they would be prepared to get rid of it. On what conditions would they agree to give up their arm, and to whom would they be prepared to surrender it? The answers to these fundamental questions will form the basis of any realistic strategy to disarm the civilian population. This study was undertaken with the hope of helping to provide such answers.
Partners in the study
The Small Arms Survey (Geneva, Switzerland) and the Ligue Iteka (Bujumbura, Burundi), supported by the UNDP and Oxfam-Netherlands/NOVIB (The Hague, the Netherlands), have conducted an exhaustive study into the problems associated with small arms in Burundi. The aim of the project is to contribute to the formulation of a policy to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which the government intends to introduce.

Methodology
This study, for which field work began in November 2005, is based on the following methodological tools:

a) A survey of households in six provinces
This survey, which was conducted in 3,060 households in the provinces of Bujumbura-Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Cibitoke, Mwaro, and Ruyigi, focused on various issues, principally perceptions of security related or unrelated to arms, an assessment of the quantity of arms in circulation, and the feasibility of disarming the civilian population. The survey, consisting of a questionnaire in two versions, one in French, the other in Kirundi, was carried out between 23 November and 21 December 2005. The provinces chosen were selected for the following reasons:

• Bujumbura-Mairie: for its strategic importance as the country’s capital.
• Bujumbura Rural: because of the continuing conflict between the government and the last rebel group, the Palipehutu–FNL.
• Bururi: relatively little affected by the conflict, Bururi is nevertheless believed to have a relatively high proportion of arms in circulation due to the political tensions which have characterized the history of the province.
• Cibitoke: this province was chosen for the same reasons as Bururi, and because firearms still fuel a fairly strong sense of ‘residual’ insecurity.
• Ruyigi: bordering on Tanzania, this province was chosen for similar reasons to Bururi.
• Mwaro: this province acts as a ‘witness’, to the extent that it has experienced few firearms-related incidents. The inclusion of Mwaro enables us to see
whether the responses collected from households in this province are consistently different to those collected in other provinces with greater security problems.

The households surveyed were chosen on the basis of demographic information dating from 1998 and 2002, and made available by the Burundi Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut de statistiques et d'études économiques du Burundi (ISTEEBU)). Emmanuel Nindagiye, a statistician at the Institute, drew up a random sample of six sous-collines per district\(^2\), which gave a total of 312 sous-collines to study. Ten households were chosen at random in each sous-colline. In the case of Bujumbura-Mairie, the base unit chosen was the enumeration area of each urban district.

\(b)\) A two-day workshop with representatives of seven former armed groups

This workshop was organized by CEDAC with the support of the Ligue Iteka. An ex-combatants’ association founded in Bujumbura in September 2005, CEDAC now has branches in every province of Burundi. The workshop addressed issues such as the availability of arms and munitions, the monitoring and use of arms within armed groups, perceptions of security and the possession of arms, and the disarmament process for ex-combatants. There were eight participants, all ex-combatants and members of CEDAC, who came originally from the following combatant groups: CNDD–FDD, Palipe-Agakiza (Party for the Liberation of the (Burundian) People-Agakiza (Parti Libérateur du Peuple Burundais-Agakiza)), Kaze-FDD (Kaze-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Kaze-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie)), FNL-Icanzo (National Liberation Forces-Icanzo (Forces nationales de libération-Icanzo)), CNDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy (Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie)), FROLINA (National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale)), and FAB (Burundi Armed Forces (Forces armées burundaises)). The workshop was led by Mr Eric Niragira of CEDAC. Mr Celcius Barahinduka and a note taker, both from the Ligue Iteka, and the authors of this report were also present during the discussions.
c) A series of discussions with representatives of the Burundian authorities, international organizations, and NGOs present in Burundi

Between 29 January and 4 February 2006, the two researchers from the Small Arms Survey (Nicolas Florquin and Stéphanie Pézard) were able, with the assistance of Mr Mody Berethe of the UNDP–Burundi and Mr Celcius Barahinduka of the Ligue Iteka, to speak to representatives of the Burundian authorities (the government, the army, the police, the CNDDDR (National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation, et Réinsertion)), as well as members of international organizations (UNOB, UNICEF, UNHCR), the diplomatic corps, NGOs present in Burundi (the Ligue Iteka, MSF-Belgium, Lucopafe), and a private security firm.

d) An analysis of statistical data from the Burundian authorities and from the United Nations security unit in Burundi and other UN organizations on the use of small arms and light weapons in security incidents

The United Nations security unit in Burundi has been writing weekly reports on security incidents since July 2000. More than 4,500 security incidents have been recorded in this way. The United Nations Operation in Burundi has its own databases on incidents linked to the conflict as well as to crime and human rights violations, which have been analysed for the year 2005.

e) An analysis of data from the NGO MSF-Belgium regarding the impact of small arms and light weapons on public health, and from the Ligue Iteka on human rights violations

MSF-Belgium has made available to the team the medical statistics on patients admitted to the Minor Injuries Centre in Kamenge between 2001 and 2005. These statistics make it possible, among other things, to determine the type of arms responsible for injuries. The data in the different annual reports of the Ligue Iteka has also been analysed.
Box 1

**Definition of small arms and light weapons**

In this report, the Small Arms Survey uses the terms ‘small arms and light weapons’ in the broad sense to denote small calibre weapons designed for civilian and military use, as well as light weapons of a military type. The definition in the Report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons covers the following categories (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1997, para. 26):

- **Small arms**: automatic revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, machine pistols, assault rifles and light machine guns.

- **Light weapons**: heavy machine guns, hand-held, under-barrel and mounted grenade-launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile, and anti-tank rocket launchers, portable anti-aircraft missile launchers, and mortars of a calibre less than 100 mm.

Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term ‘small arm’ is used to denote both small arms and light weapons, as well as their ammunition (and grenades), whereas the term ‘small calibre weapon’ refers specifically to this particular category of weapon.
I. Survey of the distribution of arms

I.A. The distribution of arms

I.A.1. Distribution among civilians by province

There is currently no reliable estimate of the number of arms in the hands of civilians in Burundi, nor of their types, their origin, or the uses to which they are put. Various figures have been suggested: a figure of 100,000 illegal arms (assault rifles, grenades, and RPGs) in the hands of Burundian civilians was advanced by the transitional government in May 2005, at the time of the adoption of the decree on the disarmament of civilians (Niyoyita, 2005). The higher figure of 300,000 arms was put forward by the UN panel of experts on the DRC in its report of 25 January 2005 which notes that in Burundi ‘insecurity is aggravated by the fact that approximately 300,000 arms are currently in the hands of various military groups taking part in the peace process, not to mention the militias, the local defence forces, and the insurgents’ (UN Security Council, 2005a, para. 171). This information has been repeated in the reports of the UN Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi (UN Security Council, 2005b, para. 30), and by the UN Economic and Social Council’s Special Advisory Group on Burundi (UN Economic and Social Council, 2005, para. 5). It is nevertheless impossible to know from which sources this estimate is derived.

The household survey makes it possible to calculate the relative distribution of arms across the six provinces polled. The answers to the question, ‘How many homes in your colline/neighbourhood own firearms?’ bring out marked variations between provinces in the proportion of arms owned. The capital emerges as the province where civilians hold the greatest number of arms: 16.1% of those polled state that arms are owned by many or most households. There is also a relatively high number of households in posses-
sion of arms in the Western provinces and those bordering the DRC—Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, and Cibitoke. Arms are much less widely available in the centre and east of the country: only 2.3% and 1% of those questioned in Mwaro and Ruyigi state that many or most homes in their neighbourhood own arms. These results suggest that the proliferation of small arms is greatest in the western part of the country, whereas there are considerably fewer arms in circulation in the centre and east.

On the other hand, given the sensitive nature of these questions—and the relatively low response rate—it is not possible to determine from the replies received what proportion of households own arms. On the basis of the qualitative interviews the team held with ex-combatants and Burundian officials, it is reasonable to think that between one household in four and one in twenty possesses arms, depending on the province. The sources make clear that these estimates take into account all small arms as defined by the UN (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1997), as well as grenades. They also confirm the results of the survey: the rate of possession of firearms among civilians is higher in urban areas and in provinces bordering the DRC and those that were most seriously affected by the conflict.
On the basis of this information, it is possible to estimate the ratio of arms possession per household in each province. The capital comes out of the survey as the most heavily armed province with the maximum ratio of one armed household in four. The median ratio of one armed household in ten applies to the five provinces in the west and south of the country: Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Cibitoke, and Makamba. The minimum ratio of one armed household in twenty applies to the provinces in the centre, north, and east of the country.

Once multiplied by the number of households per province, these ratios suggest that nearly 100,000 Burundian households have at least one weapon, which is out of proportion with the number of individuals holding a gun licence, estimated at between 3,500 and 4,000 people (aggregate total since 1960). These estimates therefore tend to confirm the figure of 100,000 illegal arms put forward by the transitional government in May 2005.

It is important to emphasize that the type of arms in the hands of civilians varies from province to province. The household survey shows that while Kalashnikovs and grenades are the weapon types most present in Bujumbura, the capital city stands out as the only province where handguns (pistols and revolvers) are held. In other provinces, Kalashnikovs and grenades are the main types of weapons available.

**I.A.2. Arms held by members of former armed groups**

It would seem that, in spite of the DDR programme, some ex-combatants have kept their arms in an individual capacity (see Section III on disarmament). Yet there seem to be few ‘collective caches’ organized by former groups in case of a resumption of hostilities. The few arms caches which have been discovered generally contain Kalashnikov, FAL, and R-4 assault rifles, Makarov or Tokarev pistols, and grenades. Some combatants kept their arm and hid it so that they could use or sell it should the need arise. Sometimes, even during the war, arms recovered on the ground were not declared or returned to the group, but hidden by the combatants who had found them so they could be used again if needed—if, for example, they lost their own (groups sometimes executed members who lost their arm). Grenades, too,
Table 1

Distribution of small arms (including grenades) in the hands of civilians by province, 2006 (estimate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Ratio of arms per household</th>
<th>Minimum number of arms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bubanza</td>
<td>57,738</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>5,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bujumbura-Mairie</td>
<td>62,728</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>15,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bujumbura Rural</td>
<td>109,662</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>10,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bururi</td>
<td>84,017</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>8,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cankuzo</td>
<td>35,683</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>1,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cibitoke</td>
<td>75,102</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>7,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitega</td>
<td>133,398</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>6,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karuzi</td>
<td>73,471</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>3,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayanza</td>
<td>109,421</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>5,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirundo</td>
<td>116,635</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>5,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makamba</td>
<td>49,447</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>4,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muramvya</td>
<td>55,109</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>2,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyinga</td>
<td>110,180</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>5,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwaro</td>
<td>51,445</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>2,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngozi</td>
<td>125,001</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>6,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutana</td>
<td>52,778</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>2,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruyigi</td>
<td>65,260</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>3,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,367,075</strong></td>
<td><strong>1/13</strong></td>
<td><strong>99,699</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Number of households: ISTEEBU, 2004; ratio of arms per household: interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006; interview with official Burundian sources, Bujumbura, February 2006.

were sometimes hidden and kept by combatants as it was easy to claim to have used them.²¹

In February 2006, from the 35,000 demobilized ex-combatants (including the Peace Guardians and Militant Combatants), a total of barely 6,000 arms had been recovered (see Section III). This ratio of one arm to six ex-combatants seems much lower than the quantity of arms the armed groups had
during the conflict. Estimates of the percentage of former combatants who may have kept one or more arms and be holding them illegally varies widely, fluctuating between 10 and 99 per cent. This illustrates the uncertainty experienced by ex-combatants themselves in relation to the quantity of arms which may have been kept by their peers. The arms in the hands of ex-combatants are mainly weapons of war: assault rifles (Kalashnikov, FAL), pistols, and grenades.

In addition to those who were ex-combatants in the strict sense of the term, some civilians received arms during the war: the Peace Guardians (ci-

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of members 2003</th>
<th>Arms ratio 2003</th>
<th>Number of arms (estimate, 2003)</th>
<th>Arms collected</th>
<th>Arms not collected (estimate, 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNDD–FDD</td>
<td>18,924</td>
<td>6 arms per 10</td>
<td>11,354</td>
<td>4,901</td>
<td>6,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaze-FDD</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>4 arms per 10</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL-Icanzo</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1 arm per 10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palipe-Agakiza</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>2 arms per 10</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>9 arms per 10</td>
<td>1,962</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frolina</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>6 arms per 10</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Guardians</td>
<td>19,338</td>
<td>1 rifle per 10, 1 grenade per person</td>
<td>2,000 rifles, 20,000 grenades</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militant Combatants</td>
<td>9,963</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups for civil self-defence</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1 arm per 10</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palipehutu–FNL</td>
<td>500–1,000</td>
<td>6 arms per 1025</td>
<td>300–600</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>300–600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11,500</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
villians armed and organized by the government to could protect their collines and neighbourhoods) and the Militant Combatants (villians armed by the rebels).

I.B. The production of arms and munitions

I.B.1. Industrial production
There is no industrial production of arms or munitions in Burundi. Burundians wishing to obtain arms legally, generally order them from abroad.26

I.B.2. Craft production
On the other hand, firearms called mugobore are made by hand. These consist of a barrel inserted into a wooden structure, and are most widely used in Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke.27 These weapons can take different shapes but are usually long and heavy.28 The mugobore mainly use the same ammunition as assault rifles like Kalashnikovs and FALs; the firing mechanism consists of an elastic band and an iron pin, and there is no device to eject the cartridge, which is removed with an iron rod.29 These weapons are not very efficient at a range of more than ten metres, but it seems relatively easy to find
someone who makes them. In contrast with Tanzania and the DRC, there is, however, no hand-made ammunition in Burundi. Before the conflict, mugobore were generally used for criminal acts; they have been produced in far greater numbers since the outbreak of the war, and there are now a great many in the country.

I.C. Arms trafficking
During the war, rebel groups obtained their arms from various sources. Asked where their arms came from, several ex-combatants said that they had bought them (either locally or abroad) or, less commonly, had captured them from the enemy. It also seems that in certain cases, arms were resold to the rebels by members of FAB. Another local source of supply for the rebels were dealers who bought the ammunition, Kalashnikovs, and pistols in Bujumbura—as a general rule, arms were more readily available in towns than in the countryside—on behalf of the armed group. A large number of arms were obtained outside Burundi, mainly in the countries bordering it such as the DRC, Tanzania, and Rwanda.

I.C.1. The volume of traffic and arms seizures
Statistics on the type of arms confiscated from criminals are held at the headquarters of the national police force; the most common are handguns, Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, and grenades. The police also collects the arms seized. Meanwhile, the army’s intelligence service (the G2) says that every month it receives between 40 and 60 arms, recovered during clashes with the Palipehutu–FNL or seized from the population. They are sent to the logistics division for storage.

As can be expected in a post-conflict period, the available information shows a decline in the arms trade in the country. All sources agree that the price of arms has fallen sharply in recent years, the price of an AK-47 assault rifle having fallen, on average, from nearly USD 250 during the war to less than USD 100 now. This price reflects the imbalance, which is normal in post-conflict periods, between the large number of arms available (the offer) and the small number of buyers (the demand), due to the stabilization of the
situation. The market is therefore much quieter today: people who have arms are keeping them, but few wish to buy.\textsuperscript{42}

The household survey confirmed the general finding: more than 37\% of respondents said that the number of arms in their province had fallen, while only 5\% thought that the number had increased.

In other words, arms trafficking is less profitable in Burundi now than it was during the war. However, the price of arms is even lower in the neighbouring DRC (with an average price of USD 75 for an assault rifle), and in consequence there are opportunities for trafficking from that country. A study carried out in 2004 in the Burundian security and legal services in order to estimate prices on the illegal arms market found that, ‘with respect to assault rifles and revolvers, the lowest prices seem to be found in the province of Cibitoke and the highest prices in the province of Bujumbura Rural. This could be explained by the fact that fighting first stopped in Cibitoke, while it was still going on in Bujumbura Rural, and, in consequence, demand (and therefore prices) could be higher in the latter province than elsewhere in Burundi’ (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 22). The fall in traffic therefore reflects market saturation more than the disappearance of the structures on which it was based. The offer is certainly there, it is demand which seems to have fallen; but this situation could change rapidly if the existing political stability does not last.

\textit{I.C.2. Borders with the DRC, Rwanda, and Tanzania}

The illegal importing of arms into Burundi seems to have declined since the political situation stabilized and trafficking became less lucrative. There are, however, good reasons to think that the trade has only slowed down, and that the networks which allowed large quantities of arms to enter Burundi during the civil war still exist.

Interviews carried out in 2004 with the Burundi security and legal services show that arms held illegally come mainly from the DRC and from Tanzania (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 20). In the same study, interviews carried out among the civilian population in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke, and Bubanza show that nearly a third of people interviewed who admitted to having owned an arm during the last five years said that they bought it in a
neighbouring country. The arms themselves came mainly from the DRC, Tanzania, and Rwanda. 26% of respondents said that they bought their ammunition in a neighbouring country, mainly the DRC and Rwanda (Ntibarikure, 2006, pp. 23–25).

The table in the appendix, prepared from information supplied by former combatants, gives an idea of the source of the various arms held by the armed groups. It shows that the availability of arms in the three countries neighbouring Burundi, namely the DRC, Tanzania, and Rwanda, and the porosity of the borders, provide ideal conditions for creating regional arms trafficking networks. The porosity of the borders is explained partly by the country’s geography: the land is marshy in places and often forested, and many police and customs officers would be required to keep the main crossing points under surveillance. In practice, only the major routes are subject to controls, which is insufficient to prevent arms entering the country.43

The DRC
While Burundi was considered as a possible source of supplies for the foreign armed forces based in South Kivu in the DRC by the UN group of experts reporting on this country (United Nations Security Council, 2005a, para. 171), the opposite is even more true. In spite of the United Nations embargo on the Congolese provinces of North and South Kivu, the east of the DRC (especially South Kivu) continues to be one of the regional centres for the illegal trafficking of arms (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 27). Apart from bordering on Burundi and Tanzania, which makes it a favourite crossing point, South Kivu also harbours many, sometimes heavily armed, groups, most of which are not subject to any control by the government in Kinshasa, such as the FDLR (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (Democratic forces for the liberation of Rwanda)), the Interahamwe, the ex-FAC/ex-FAZ (Forces armées congolaises/zairaises (Congolese/Zairese armed forces)), the Ban-yamulenge combatants, and the Maï-Maï (Nasibu Bilali, 2005). It also seems that during the first Congo war (1996–97), when Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power, a large number of arms were recovered by the victors and sold, either by the soldiers themselves or by intermediaries.44

A large number of arms have been found in the eastern provinces of the
DRC, in particular around Uvira, Kiliba, Sange, and Luvungi (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 29). Members of armed groups which exploit the natural resources of the DRC, especially gold mines, run major trafficking networks. They exchange the gold for arms in Tanzania, bringing them into the east of the Congo via Lake Tanganyika (Nasibu Bilali, 2005). Having crossed through the DRC, some of the arms end up in the hands of the Palipehutu–FNL which picks them up in the border areas of the DRC and Burundi (Ruzizi plain or Rukoko forest) (Ntibarikure, 2006). Alongside these organized networks, there are independent traffickers who are often former members of armed groups, whether the Maï-Maï, ex-FAZ, or the Interahamwe. The groups themselves sell arms to each other: the FAC, for example, have sold arms to the Maï-Maï and to other groups. The large number of arms available is confirmed by a study carried out by the Brussels-based organization, GRIP (Groupement de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (Group for research and information into peace and security)), which shows that it seems to be easier for the Congolese to get hold of arms than it is for Burundians: 37.5% of persons interviewed on the Congolese side of the border say that they know where to obtain a firearm, if necessary, against only 16.6% on the Burundian side (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 24).

Large numbers of arms and ammunition still in Burundi were obtained during the war in the DRC. Many Burundian armed groups used the DRC as a rear base. It was easy for them to obtain arms there, particularly through various armed Congolese groups. In certain cases, the arms were simply leased from other fighting groups in the Congo in order to be used in Burundi, in exchange for palm oil or rice. The Burundian rebels also obtained arms in exchange for cows stolen in Burundi; these could be exchanged against Kalashnikovs. Sometimes the mere threat of theft was sufficient; the farmers preferred to give the rebels money or arms equivalent to a few cows, to prevent them from plundering the whole herd. The members of the CNDD–FDD also recovered arms abandoned by deserters from the Congolese army, or obtained them from soldiers who, not having been paid, were willing to exchange their arms for other goods. Finally, they benefited from the fact that the DRC, unlike Burundi, manufactures arms industrially.

The DRC is still used today as a rear base for the Palipehutu–FNL. Mem-
bers of this group are present on both sides of the border and obtain arms from old stocks belonging to the FAC; it seems that they also recruit refugees there. Some Congolese combatants seem to have sold arms to other groups. Arms are trafficked around the Congolese border in both directions, more so since the end of the war in Burundi. According to a report by the group of experts reporting on the Congo, ‘... ex-combatants tend to sell surplus arms at the beginning of the disarmament process. This large quantity of uncontrolled arms constitutes a possible source of supply for the foreign armed forces based in South Kivu, and we have learnt of cases of arms being sold by Burundian soldiers on the other side of the border’ (United Nations Security Council, 2005a, para. 171).

Members of the Palipehutu–FNL are not the only ones to make use of this large illegal market on the other side of the border. According to the above-mentioned GRIP study, when interviewees were asked, ‘where could you find a firearm if necessary?’, nearly two-thirds of people questioned in Burundi in provinces bordering the DRC replied, ‘in a neighbouring country’. On the Congolese side, on the other hand, fewer than half the people questioned replied in this way. These results seem to indicate that Burundians count more on the cross-border traffic and Congolese more on local sources. The availability of arms can also be seen in the number of days required to procure one in case of need: Congolese estimate 18 days on average, against 40 days for Burundians (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 24). According to the replies given to this investigation, the average price of arms also seems to be slightly lower in the DRC than in Burundi (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 25).

The DRC is a local market, but is also used as a transit point for arms that come from much further afield; according to a witness, before 1996 South African arms were brought through the airport at Kavumu in South Kivu before crossing into Burundi (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 20). The ex-FAR (Forces armées rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)) also used arms obtained in South Africa, using them for a certain amount of time in the DRC before selling them on.

The strategic importance of the DRC, which is 84 times larger than Burundi and whose border is about 16 km from the capital, Bujumbura, means that a regional solution to the arms problem must be envisaged: Burundian
stability depends, to a large extent, on its powerful neighbour. Until the central government of the DRC takes back control of its natural resources, there will remain sources of financing for rebels wishing to procure arms.52

Rwanda
In comparison with the DRC, Rwanda is not a potentially important source of arms for Burundi.53 However, it was an important source in the past, when the Interahamwe militia and the ex-FAR soldiers, fleeing before the advancing Front patriotique rwandais (Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR)), penetrated the northern provinces of Ngozi and Kirundo in 1994–95.54 The provinces in the north and north-east of Burundi were, however, the first to be pacified at the end of the war, and they do not seem to suffer from major problems of insecurity. Arms do, however, pass between Rwanda and the DRC, particularly as a result of the incursions of the Rwandan army into its neighbour’s territory.

Tanzania
Tanzania, on the other hand, is definitely a source of arms. The majority of the arms held by the Palipehutu–FNL apparently come from this country. They enter Burundi via Lake Tanganyika to be unloaded in ports such as Minago, Rumonge, Karonda, Mugina, and Nyanza Lac (Nasibu Bilali, 2005). The arms are hidden in sacks of goods and in some cases authorities with responsibility for monitoring the lake are willing to turn a blind eye, due either to corruption or to the fear of reprisals on the part of Palipehutu–FNL (Nasibu Bilali, 2005). There is also a clear lack of the human and material resources that would be required to keep the 120 km of the lake’s shoreline under surveillance (see I.C.3) (Nasibu Bilali, 2005).

In the past, Tanzania was a major source of illegal arms for rebel factions in Burundi, and for rebel factions in Rwanda and the DRC (Guardian, 2003). The region of Kigoma was used as a rear base by many Burundian rebel groups.55 The proliferation of small arms in the regions of Kigoma and Kagera seems to have contributed to the increase in armed violence and the insecurity of communities (Guardian, 2003). According to a former member of FROLINA, which had a base in the Kigoma region, in that area the group
The arms obtained in Tanzania were mainly Kalashnikovs; however, machine guns and grenades could also be found. Two Kalashnikovs could be bought for one cow. Sometimes, transactions were the other way round; an analysis of the illegal arms markets in Kigoma shows that some Burundian and Congolese rebels were exchanging arms for food (Chirimi, 2003).

Other sources of arms
Other potential sources of arms seemed to have been explored. In 1999, for example, Hutu rebel leaders attempted to buy arms (and bombs, mines, food, uniforms, and boots) in Zimbabwe (Reuters, 1999). In the same year, a cargo of arms (mainly assault rifles and grenades) from China, intended, it seems, for Burundi, was intercepted by the Ugandan authorities in Malaba (New Vision/Africa News Service, 1999). According to a Human Rights Watch report, several countries—including China, France, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, the United States, and Zaire—provided the parties to the conflict in Burundi with military aid (in the case of the United States and France, until 1996 only). Angola, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire were also used as transit areas for arms intended for Burundi (HRW, 1998).

South Africa was particularly involved in sending arms and providing military assistance to the warring parties in Burundi. It seems that arms (assault rifles, anti-tank mines, grenades) from private sources in South Africa were delivered to CNDD combatants (Johannesburg Mail & Guardian, 1997). In 1996, a newspaper revealed that former members of the South African secret services and senior members of UNITA (Union nationale pour l’indépendance totale de l’Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)), particularly, were involved in the trafficking of arms to Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire (Radio Nacional Network, 1996).

I.C.3. Routes taken
Land routes
Burundian customs have fourteen land border posts for a border 974 km long, with the DRC to the east, Rwanda to the north, and Tanzania to the
south and east. According to sources within the customs service, arms trafficking is particularly serious in the valley of the Ruzizi and through the Rukoko forest, which border on the DRC. In spite of this situation, cooperation between the Burundian customs service and their counterparts in the Congo is limited, or even non-existent—and this is also true of their relations with the Tanzanian customs service. Even within the Burundian authorities charged with monitoring borders, the information available is split between different departments: it seems for example that trafficking data held by customs is not sent to the police.

**Air routes**
The airport at Bujumbura has a customs post; however, surveillance is carried out mainly by the police with responsibility for air transport, borders, and foreigners (PAFE), which is part of the new national police force, rather than the customs service.

**Water routes**
Lake Tanganyika is a major crossing point for trafficking, including arms trafficking. Burundi has 120 km of shoreline which stretches from Bujumbura in the Nyanza-Lac sector, to the south of the country. Arms, which come from the DRC or Tanzania, enter Burundi on pirogues.

The navy now has responsibility for policing the lake to stop arms trafficking, using two types of unit: waterborne units (Unité de Garde Lacustre (Lake surveillance unit) (UGL)) and coastal units, which are being set up. The UGL have only two boats with which to police the lake. The role of the lake patrols seems to be limited to dissuasion, with seizures being rare. In fact, according to a military source, it seems that no case of arms trafficking has been reported since the units were created. Boats that enter Burundian territorial waters must declare their registration, the identity of the crew, the contents of the cargo, and the tonnage measurement; once in port, they are searched by customs search officers.

Apart from the navy, other organizations police the lake: the customs service, which is responsible for goods and which has three posts in the ports of Bujumbura, Rumonge, and Nyanza-Lac; the police with responsibility
for air transport, borders, and foreigners (PAFE); and the naval police, operational in the port area. Nevertheless it seems that coordination between these various authorities is not all it might be; quarterly meetings which used to take place have been abandoned since the war. Furthermore, there is no mechanism for meetings or cooperation between the actors in the various countries around the lake: Burundian, Congolese, and Tanzanian forces would all benefit from coordinating their efforts and activities.

I.D. Legal transfers

I.D.1. Imports

According to Comtrade (UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database), imports of arms into Burundi—as reported voluntarily, but without any obligation or verification, by the importing and exporting countries—have been low in recent years. Nevertheless, imports were more significant at the end of the 1990s: in 1997, USD 168,000 worth of equipment in the ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and other’ category were imported into Burundi from Turkey and nearly USD 70,000 worth of ‘parts and accessories for military arms’ were imported from Denmark. In the following year, ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and others’ with a value of USD 516,000 were exported, once again through Turkey, to Burundi. In 2000, Poland exported nearly USD 1 million worth of ammunition for small-bore arms to Burundi. Other loads were also exported from various other countries during the eight years surveyed (from 1997 to 2004), but their value was less than USD 10,000.

Burundian officials say that they have never found NATO-type arms in Burundian territory. The Burundian army has many obsolete or worn-out arms and would like to acquire a new generation of more efficient weaponry. Until recently, it was the general staff of the army which issued import licences for the military forces (the army and the gendarmerie (militarily organized national police force)), and also for the ordinary police and the customs service. A recent reform authorizes the ordinary police force to import the arms and ammunition it needs directly. This reform brings to an end the single register of arms held up to now by the general staff of the army,
which it would be useful to replace with a joint FDN–PNB\textsuperscript{74} (National Defence Force–National Police Force of Burundi (Force de défense nationale–Police nationale du Burundi)) register.

I.D.2. Exports
Burundi does not officially export arms.
II. Impact and perceptions of the proliferation of arms

II.A. The arms

II.A.1. History of the presence of arms in Burundi
Before the 1970s, the proliferation of small arms in Burundi was not a problem. The Burundian civil population began to acquire arms during the crisis in 1972, when the Hutu rebellion and the subsequent repression caused tens of thousands of deaths and pushed nearly 300,000 people to leave the country, mainly for Tanzania (ICG, 2003, p. i). A second wave of arms acquisition took place from 1993–94\textsuperscript{75} with major purchases being made in 1996 in particular.\textsuperscript{76} These waves of acquisition by the civil population partially explain the problems of criminality now facing Burundi.\textsuperscript{77}

II.A.2. Burundian attitudes to the possession of arms
According to a survey of attitudes, when asked why people (other than soldiers and police officers) in their neighbourhood/colline possessed arms, respondents cited the desire for personal protection (33.7% over all the six provinces) as the main reason, especially in Bujumbura-Mairie where this reason was cited by 48.7% of persons interviewed. The desire to protect one’s family was also much higher in Bujumbura-Mairie than in the other provinces, being cited by 34% of respondents in the capital against less than 10% in each of the five other provinces. Tradition, social pressure, and reasons of prestige hardly figure among the explanations as to why the population holds arms. These results seem to confirm those of the survey published by GRIP in 2006 of around 300 people in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke, and Bubanza. The great majority of the 138 people interviewed in 2004 who admitted to possessing an arm, cited the need for personal protec-
tion, the protection of goods or of the family, as justification (Ntibarikure, 2006, p. 24).

It is interesting to note that the population as a whole seems to have a rather negative image of arms. When people were asked if firearms ‘help to protect’ or were ‘dangerous’, more than three-quarters of respondents, in all provinces combined, chose the latter. The number of people who thought that arms were more dangerous than reassuring was very high in Bujumbura Rural (80.9 %) and very low—in comparison with other provinces—in Bujumbura-Mairie (58.8 %), which may come as a surprise, as both these provinces have major problems of armed violence (relating to the continuing civil war in Bujumbura Rural and a high level of criminality in Bujumbura-Mairie). The fact that citizens of Bujumbura-Mairie constitute nearly a third (of the respondents) who view firearms as protection confirms the fact that these people are more inclined to arm themselves for personal protection (see above), while the population of Bujumbura Rural, who live in a war zone, possibly see themselves more as potential victims of the rebels and have little hope in (the value of) an individual armed response. This also explains why

Graph 2

Respondents’ opinions about the possession of firearms (per cent)

Source: Nindagiye, 2006
the survey of households shows that handguns (pistols and revolvers, which are often perceived as protective arms) are available only in the capital and not in the five other provinces studied.

II.B. Violence and security

II.B.1. The impact on public health

Armed violence has a particularly dramatic impact on the health of Burundians, many of whom are not able to access medical services. Burundians unable to pay their medical bills can be ‘imprisoned’ in the country’s hospitals, without receiving the necessary care, until their families have sufficient money to get them out (FIACAT, 2005; MSF-Belgium, 2004). Faced with this alarming situation, on 23 December 2005 Françoise Ngendahayo, the minister with responsibility for national solidarity, ordered these unfortunate patients to be discharged (Netpress, 2005). The position of those suffering from bullet wounds in Burundi nevertheless remains worrying, particularly due to the closure of the MSF-Belgium Minor Injuries Centre, which offered free care for many victims of armed violence until February 2005.

The research team was not able to see Burundian hospitals’ admissions registers. However, it is unlikely that the data reflects the real health situation, as the majority of Burundians do not have access to public health infrastructures.

The statistics obtained from the Minor Injuries Centre in Kamenge (district on the edge of Bujumbura), however, reveal certain trends. The centre, which was opened by MSF-Belgium in 1995, treated those injured in the war free of charge and almost continuously from 1995 to February 2006, when it closed. Not having a real operating theatre, it was only able to treat those suffering from minor injuries; patients requiring surgery were taken to a hospital. The centre gathered statistics about patients admitted between August 2000 and December 2005. The data for 2000 and 2001 can hardly be considered representative: the centre was forced to operate in semi-secrecy for security reasons until 2001, and it was only after 2002 that it was widely known among the population. Most of the patients treated by the Minor Injuries Centre were
from Bujumbura Rural, a major conflict zone that did not have a hospital. The other wounded generally came from Bujumbura-Mairie, Bubanza, and Cibitoke.\textsuperscript{79} Data on the causes of injuries, particularly per type of arm, are available for 2004 and 2005.

Graph 3

**Number of admissions to the MSF-Belgium Minor Injuries Centre (CBL), 2002–05 (per month)**

![Graph](https://example.com/graph.png)

*Source: MSF-Belgium, 2001–05*

The Minor Injuries Centre statistics show a continuous decline in the number of patients from the beginning of 2004, even if the number of admissions remains high after that date: in 2004, the centre treated 760 new victims of violence, against 538 in 2005 (MSF-Belgium, 2001–05). This trend suggests that peace was restored to some extent after the ceasefire of 16 November 2003. However, this observation must be qualified. Two spikes of violence, the first relating to the massacre of refugees in Gatumba in August 2004, and the second due to tensions surrounding the local elections in June 2005, coincided with a large number of admissions to the Minor Injuries Centre.\textsuperscript{80}

Thanks to the available data it is possible to distinguish between the various arms that caused the 1,298 injuries due to violence that were treated at the Minor Injuries Centre in 2004 and 2005. Nearly 60% were bullet wounds.
Grenades were responsible for 22% of admissions. If mines and mortars/shells are added, we find that 85% of all violent injuries admitted to the Minor Injuries Centre were caused by small arms. Given that some of the most seriously wounded patients died before arriving at the Centre, these results suggest that an even higher percentage of the violence in Burundi is committed using small arms. Only 15% of injuries treated were inflicted by physical force or with knives.

Small arms are also clearly responsible for spikes of violence. The monthly distribution of admissions to the Minor Injuries Centre shows that the number of injuries caused by knives or physical force remained stable and relatively low from month to month. The variations in the number of patients admitted were therefore due entirely to variations in the frequency of injuries caused by bullets, grenades, mortars, and mines. This shows that small arms are the weapons most used during spikes in the violence.

II.B.2. The impact on security
Various sources confirm the relative return to security since the end of 2003, as suggested by the Minor Injuries Centre statistics. Graph 6 compares the
Graph 5

**Monthly distribution of admissions to the Minor Injuries Centre, per cause (2004–05)**

Source: MSF-Belgium, 2001–05

The household survey also confirms this trend towards greater security. In the six provinces covered by the survey, the feeling of security has clearly increased in the last two years. In Cibitoke, Bururi, Mwaro, and Ruyigi, more than 90% of respondents considered the situation more secure now than it
was two years ago. The increase in security is lower but nevertheless still important in Bujumbura-Mairie (80.8%). However, it is much less marked in Bujumbura Rural (63%), reflecting the fact that the war continues in this province with the presence of the Palipehutu–FNL. 6.1% of people interviewed in Bujumbura-Mairie and 12.1% of those interviewed in Bujumbura Rural even consider that the security situation has got worse over the last two years.

These perceptions, combined with the relative improvement in the security situation over the last two years, show that the situation is still difficult in several provinces. The UN security unit reports, for 2005, a significant number of incidents in the capital and in Bujumbura Rural; the other prov-
inces particularly affected by security incidents are Ngozi, Bubanza, and Gitega (see Graph 7). While the number of incidents recorded in the rest of the territory varied from year to year, but was overall lower than in 2003, it remained stable or increased in Bujumbura Rural and in the capital (see Graph 8).

The results of the household survey confirm these disparities. In Bujumbura Rural, for example, the majority of respondents (31.5%) do not feel ‘at all’ secure, and only 14.8% feel ‘totally’ secure. The situation in Bujumbura-Mairie is also worrying, although less so. Here the percentage of respondents
who feel ‘not at all’ or ‘only a little’ secure exceeds the percentage of those who feel ‘very’ or ‘totally’ secure (41.6% against 34.7%). However, the security situation seems to be fairly good in Cibitoke, Bururi, Ruyigi, and especially Mwaro, where more than 50% of respondents say they feel ‘totally’ secure. With respect to the question of how secure people feel, men and women replied in almost exactly the same way, which seems to show that each individual feels equally vulnerable or safe.

The distribution of households where at least one member has been a victim of violence (Graph 10) shows some differences, with less variation between the provinces. Once again, however, the rates are very low in Bururi, Mwaro, and Ruyigi (less than 8%) and higher in Bujumbura-Mairie and Bujumbura Rural (13.8% and 13.2% of respondents, respectively).

The types of violence cited by respondents are, in decreasing order, and for all provinces, armed robbery, gangs, alcohol-related nuisance, fights, and
Graph 9

**Percentage of respondents per province who say they ‘do not feel at all’ secure**

Source: Nindaguye, 2006

Graph 10

**Percentage of respondents per province who say that they have at least one victim of violence in their household**

Source: Nindaguye, 2006
murders. Armed robbery is particularly frequent in Bujumbura-Mairie, while murders are most prevalent in Bujumbura Rural, reflecting the different threats (criminal or rebel) that affect these two provinces. Gangs head the list of those responsible for the violence suffered by people known to the respondents in the provinces of Bururi, Mwaro, and Ruyigi.

In the places where the feeling of insecurity is predominant, it seems to be strongly associated with the use of small arms. As Graph 11 shows, shots are heard more frequently in Bujumbura-Mairie and Bujumbura Rural, with the capital having a particularly high score.

These two provinces also seem to be the places where violence is committed most often with firearms: 32.4% of respondents in the capital and 40.3% of respondents in Bujumbura Rural said that violence was often or always committed with small arms, against only 18.6% for the whole sample (see Graph 12).
II.B.3. The contexts of insecurity and the people involved

People involved in insecurity
In all the provinces, except Bujumbura Rural, gangsters are cited by a high proportion of respondents as a source of insecurity, while rebels, unsurprisingly, head the list in Bujumbura Rural. The rebels are also a source of anxiety in the two other provinces where troubles persist, Bujumbura-Mairie and Cibitoke (30.9% and 31.7% of respondents, respectively, cited them as a source of insecurity).

Soldiers and the police are classified after rebels as a source of insecurity. This reveals a worrying situation, in which forces supposed to ensure the security of the population represent, on the contrary, a source of insecurity. Depending on the province, sometimes it is the police and sometimes the army which has the highest score (see Graph 14). In provinces still torn by
civil war, and where there is a strong military presence, it is the army more than the police which represents a source of insecurity: soldiers are cited by nearly a third of respondents in Bujumbura Rural (against 8.8% for the police) and by 13.1% of the population in Cibitoke. This also applies in Ruyigi, but at very low rates which cannot be compared with the two other provinces. In the three other provinces, police inspire less confidence than soldiers, with a

Note: The figures represent the percentage of respondents who gave the reply cited. The total is more than 100 as the respondents could choose several replies.

Source: Sources of insecurity identified by respondents
particularly worrying situation in the province of Bururi, where 20.7% of respondents say that they consider the police to be a source of insecurity.

Paradoxically, it seems that the police and the army also represent a source of security (Graph 15). Asked about their feelings regarding the effectiveness of the police and army in dealing with crime, a majority of respondents in all provinces surveyed replied ‘very’ (effective). This feeling is particularly strong in Cibitoke, Mwaro, and Ruyigi (more than 50% of respondents) and only a little less so in Bujumbura Rural and Bururi (between 40% and 50% of respondents). The exception is Bujumbura-Mairie, where replies are much more evenly distributed: one respondent in ten chose the options at the top and bottom end of the scale (‘not at all’ or ‘totally’), while one in four replied ‘slightly’ or ‘very’, and one in five ‘fairly’.

These results highlight the persistence of the problem of criminality in Bujumbura, and mixed feelings about the effectiveness of the law enforce-
ment agencies. In the case of Bururi, the police and the army are thought to be very effective in dealing with crime but are also considered to be an important source of insecurity. These apparently contradictory results may possibly be explained by the fact that this province has seen serious land ownership disputes since the exile, in 1972, and then return of part of its population.\(^8^1\) Both the police and soldiers in Bururi are sometimes personally involved in land ownership disputes, which explains why they can be thought to be effective in carrying out their functions and also arouse distrust.\(^8^2\) This situation is aggravated by the fact that a large number of police officers in Bururi were armed by the government of the time, and some of them, apparently, were involved in organized crime, creating a feeling of insecurity among the population.

**Graph 15**

**Perceptions of respondents about the effectiveness of public authorities in dealing with crime**

![Graph showing perceptions of respondents about the effectiveness of public authorities in dealing with crime.](image)

**Note:** Each column shows the percentage of respondents who gave that reply.

**Source:** Nindagije, 2006
Meanwhile ex-combatants are rarely cited as a source of insecurity. As they are more numerous in Bujumbura-Mairie, it follows that that is where they are most often cited (6.6% of respondents). In the other provinces, they are cited by less than 3% of the population. This finding is reassuring, as it shows that ex-combatants are not stigmatized by the population, which is not particularly wary of them. It also shows that, in popular perception, ex-combatants are not equated with gangsters, and that problems of criminality not linked with them. The situation is a little different, however, in the case of the militias. These are cited as a source of insecurity by a large proportion of the population (relative to other provinces) in Bururi (9.7%)—where, as we have seen, they are particularly numerous—and in Cibitoke (8.6%). In the four other provinces they are cited by less than 4% of the population surveyed.

The integration of ex-combatants in the FDN is seen by a majority of the population (55.1% of respondents) as a factor which helps improve security. This feeling is shared by the majority in all the provinces, with particularly high rates in Ruyigi (72.6%), Mwaro (69.4%), and Cibitoke (63.2%). In addition, very few individuals are sceptical about the usefulness of integrating ex-combatants in the FDN, with the option ‘not at all’ (useful) receiving the lowest number of replies (apart from ‘don’t know’). The integration of ex-combatants is therefore well perceived overall and considered as useful in improving the security of the whole population. Their disarmament in particular was welcomed: 80.8% of respondents say that they feel ‘totally’ or ‘rather more’ secure since certain ex-combatants were disarmed, with very high scores in Cibitoke, Bururi, Mwaro, and Ruyigi. Therefore there seems to be a real association between disarmament and improved security.

Among the other sources of insecurity cited, family members and neighbours were given an abnormally high score in Bururi and, to a lesser extent, in Mwaro (2.3% and 3.7% respectively for family and neighbours in Bururi, and 1.5% for each group in Mwaro, against 0.2% and 0.8% for all of the six provinces). Nevertheless, these scores remain low overall. Finally, security companies do not seem to constitute a threat to anybody: they are only cited, overall, by 0.4% of the population, with a maximum of 1.2% in Bujumbura-Mairie, where they are also more numerous.
Insecurity related to the continuing civil war
The results of the survey, which show that police officers and soldiers are often cited as sources of insecurity, highlight the fact that, in spite of the recent overhaul of the police and the army, many problems remain, sometimes involving acts of violence against the population (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2006). This violence is more frequent in provinces still torn by civil war, such as Bujumbura Rural, where many among the population suffer both rebel reprisals if they refuse to cooperate and reprisals by the army if they give in to the racketeering and threats made by the Palipehutu–FNL. Members of the FDN have also been guilty of extortion, arbitrary arrests, and attempted murder of presumed members of the Palipehutu–FNL (UNOB, 2006a).

It is alarming that a third of the population of a province at war (Bujumbura Rural) cites the soldiers who are supposed to end the conflict and protect the population, as a source of insecurity. This general distrust of the security forces may also explain why a large part of the population holds arms and relies on self-defence to protect themselves, their goods, and their families. Finally, these results confirm the reports that some police officers and soldiers are involved in certain criminal acts, and also human rights violations.83

Insecurity relating to criminality
The results of the survey also show that criminality is the primary source of insecurity in all the provinces (63.5% of respondents citing ‘gangsters’ as a source of insecurity, followed a long way behind by ‘rebels’, cited by 38.1%).

The province of Bujumbura Rural, where sporadic fighting between the rebels of the Palipehutu–FNL and government forces continues, is quite understandably the only province to think that rebels are a more serious source of insecurity than gangsters. During the interviews, many people stressed the degree of criminality in Burundi since the end of the war, particularly in Bujumbura-Mairie. According to another source, this type of criminality increases regularly.84 These testimonies are echoed in a report by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, dated 2004, which noted ‘(…) acts of gangsterism and a climate of impunity, in addition to the corruption which appears to have got much worse in recent years’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004, para. 24). Furthermore, the fact that the
Palipehutu–FNL is still active, which means that the war is not over, has led to chaos. It seems that many acts of gangsterism are carried out under cover of the Palipehutu–FNL, with some criminals passing themselves off as members of the rebel group in order to hold to ransom and terrorize the population. 85

Many sources have established a link between the problems of criminality that Burundi is suffering and the excessive number of arms held by the population, as numerous offences are committed with firearms. 86 According to the director of a private security company, approximately a quarter of the incidents which his officers have to deal with involve the use of an arm. 87 Grenades are often used in acts of violence; for example, they caused 22% of injuries treated at the MSF-Belgium Centre in Kamenge. This can be explained by the fact that grenades are, without doubt, the easiest arms to conceal on account of their small size. Also, a man in possession of a grenade who does not wish to return it to his military superior or the authorities in charge of DDR, can always claim to have used it, and keep it for himself. 88

The police keeps up-to-date crime statistics, which are sent to its information centre. 89 The most serious offences, particularly those involving the use of a firearm, are recorded in a day-to-day security file. 90 The information is sent to the headquarters of the national police force. 91 Police sources confirm that most criminal acts (thefts, armed robberies, settling of scores) are committed with firearms. 92 Police statistics indicate that aggravated thefts (which, according to police sources, involve a firearm in eight cases out of ten) represent on average between a quarter and a fifth of all offences recorded. This amounts to between 30 and 60 cases per month for the criminal police (police judiciaire) alone. However, the merger in November 2005 of the criminal police, the police dealing with internal security, the border police (PAFE), and the former members of the gendarmerie has made it possible to have a better view of all cases (which used to be dealt with by each police division (unité)), which amount to about 100 aggravated thefts per month. This represents about 80 cases of theft involving a firearm per month, across the whole territory. 93

This insecurity relating to criminality has created a vicious circle, as it encourages people to arm themselves. According to police sources, a large proportion of shopkeepers and public sector employees in Burundi are
armed. In some cases they acquired arms in order to protect themselves; in others, the arms were distributed by the authorities when civil defence groups were set up.\textsuperscript{94} In order to protect themselves and their possessions, some individuals do not hesitate to acquire powerful weapons such as assault rifles.\textsuperscript{95} It is important to note, in this context, that it is in Bujumbura-Mairie, the province which is most affected by criminality, that people are least likely to think that the public authorities are effective in dealing with crime (26.3\% of respondents replied ‘very’ (effective) against 44.2\% for the whole of the six provinces).

The problem of sexual violence
While rates of criminality are falling, crimes involving sexual violence have markedly increased: 1,675 rapes were reported in 2004, against 983 in 2003 (Ligue Iteka, 2005, p. 50).\textsuperscript{96} The household survey shows that among respondents who say that their household includes at least one victim of violence, in one case out of ten the crime was a rape, with the rate being nearly twice as high in Bujumbura Rural. The abnormally high rate of rape in Bujumbura Rural seems to be directly linked to the continuing conflict in that province. In some provinces, such as Ruyigi, rapes are often committed under armed threat, especially from hand-made rifles or mugobore (Rackley, 2005, pp. 20–21).

The statistics should not, however, conceal the fact that it is difficult to assess how far this is due to an increase in the number of rapes committed or an increase in the number reported to the authorities. Edward B. Rackley, the author of a recent study on small arms and armed violence, writes that ‘all the women interviewed stressed the fact that rape has existed for a long time in Burundi and dates from the pre-war period, but it is only in the last five years that the extent of the problem has been made public. This is due, we were told, to the joint efforts of local and international organizations and women’s associations to educate and increase awareness among the majority, with an increase in medical and psychological assistance for the victims’ (Rackley, 2005, p. 21). Even if the social stigmatization persists to a great extent,\textsuperscript{97} more and more women complain and seek medical aid, and associations of Burundian women provide help for the victims.
Nevertheless, it is also quite plausible that there has been a real increase in the number of cases of sexual violence. This seems to be linked to the fact that Burundi is now in a post-war situation: victims are often people thrown into a precarious situation by the war, such as war widows or orphans. A report by the Economic and Social Council noted that ‘due to the war, 30% of Burundian households are led by women (...) More than 600,000 others [children] are war orphans’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004, para. 27).

The security of the refugees
The worst security incident to have occurred in a refugee camp in Burundi was the massacre, on 13 August 2004, of more than 150 refugees at Gatumba, near the border with the DRC. According to witness accounts, ‘most [of the assailants] carried individual firearms, but they also had at least one heavy weapon. Some of them were child soldiers’ (HRW, 2004, p. 14). Among the 152 people who died, 138 were Banyamulenge and 14 Babembe; these figures, along with various witness accounts, indicate that the Banyamulenge were specifically targeted (HRW, 2004, p. 18). Responsibility for the massacre was claimed by the Palipehutu–FNL, which said that the camp was harbouring individuals who were preparing attacks against them.

The total number of security incidents which occurred around refugee camps in 2005 has been estimated at 395. These incidents include arbitrary arrests and detention, rapes, and murders. Often involving firearms, they result from disputes between civilians or between the police and civilians.

On the other hand, it seems that no incidents have yet occurred that would suggest the presence of firearms within the refugee camps. If combatants and ex-combatants are able to receive humanitarian assistance, they are not authorized to set up home in refugee camps, where security is provided by the Burundian army and police. It is nevertheless probable that there are arms inside the camps. The Gasorwe camp in Muyinga, for example, shelters Rwandan asylum seekers who are suspected of being used as FDLR combatants. A certain number of precautionary measures are therefore taken inside the Gasorwe camp: the refugees are searched, people are monitored on entry and exit, and the camp must be fenced in order to prevent infiltration.
is also a fear that armed Congolese groups might come and seek recruits in this camp or the camp at Gihinga (Mwaro).\textsuperscript{105} It seems that such recruiters have been seen in the north of Burundi, and a member of the Interahamwe was arrested in Gatumba.\textsuperscript{106}
III. Institutional capacities and disarmament initiatives

III.A. Government

III.A.1. Legal framework

Burundi’s legislation on arms dates from 1971, when Decree-Law no. 1/091, introducing rules governing firearms and ammunition, was passed (Republic of Burundi, 1971), along with an implementing measure, Presidential Decree no. 1/092. This law is very restrictive: only the army is authorized to import arms (Republic of Burundi, 1971, article 5) along with individuals who have a licence to carry an arm (article 6). These latter individuals must, however, have ‘special, justified reasons’ (article 6 of the Decree-Law), such as, for example, shopkeepers who have to carry large sums of money and need to protect themselves, or individuals who have been subject to threats. Some senior members of the UPRONA party (Party of Unity and National Progress of Burundi (Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès National du Burundi)) (the sole party at the time) and law officers and judges were also authorized to hold arms. Before the law was passed there were ‘arms sales centres’, which have since disappeared.

Everything relating to the circulation of arms is now centralized by the Ministry of Defence, via the G2. It issues gun-carrying licences and keeps track of how many there are. Before issuing a licence, it checks with the logistics division that the arm relating to the licence application has not come from military stocks. Furthermore, anyone wishing to hold an arm must apply for an arm import licence before they can apply for a licence to carry an arm. This is explained by the fact that there are no arms producers or dealers in Burundi, and that therefore nobody is supposed to be able to procure an arm on Burundian territory. According to a military source, the number of
licence applications is increasing. The policy is to issue licences particularly to individuals who already have an arm, with the idea that this will make it possible, at least, to identify them—which could prove useful in the context of any future operation to disarm the civilian population.\(^{113}\) Between 1960 and 2005, between 3,500 and 4,000 individuals were issued with licences to carry an arm.\(^{114}\) These licences have been issued since 1960 but it was only in 1982 that the authorities began to record the details of the individuals to whom the licences were issued.\(^{115}\) Now the number of the arm and the name of the licence holder and his address are recorded, but there is no coordination with the Minister of Justice to investigate the past of individuals who apply for licences.\(^{116}\) The licences apply to all types of firearms, including weapons used in warfare. ‘Arms that would make it possible to use ammunition belonging to the armoury of the armed forces and ammunition suitable for arms belonging to the same armoury’ are banned (Republic of Burundi, 1971, article 7). It seems that there are very few hunting rifles in circulation.\(^ {117}\)

Work to update the law of 1971, which contains many provisions that are now obsolete, is currently under way.\(^ {118}\) The purpose of the revision is also to bring it into line with the Nairobi Protocol, which was not at all the case previously: out of 57 points, dealing with questions as diverse as the possession of arms, the use of arms, arms trading, and illegal trafficking, that were examined by the GRIP, 50 were ruled not to comply with the Protocol (Huybrechts and Berkol, 2005). Work has been undertaken by the UNDP and the AWEPA (Association of West European Parliamentarians for Africa) to harmonize Burundian laws with the standards laid down in the Nairobi Protocol and with Rwandan and Congolese legislation.\(^ {119}\) Various meetings took place between members of parliamentary delegations from Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda in order to continue the work of bringing the legislation into compliance and in order to finalize the ratification of the Protocol. To this same end, a plan was adopted to set up an interparliamentary friendship group to deal with small arms and light weapons (GIPA), aiming particularly to improve cooperation between the three countries. In the case of Burundi, a draft bill, largely inspired by the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol, was being finalized in 2006.\(^ {120}\)

In general, the population seems to know that there is a law which prohibits the illegal possession of arms: 85.1% of interviewees say that they are
aware of this law, with little variation from one province to another. However, few seem to expect these same laws to combat the illegal ownership of arms: when people were asked about the best way to bolster the fight against this problem, only a third suggested applying the existing laws strictly, while 38.7% suggested adopting new laws. Cibitoke and Bujumbura Rural are the provinces where people are most favourable to this latter option. On the other hand, increasing the powers of the judiciary and police garnered little support (12.2% and 12.8% respectively throughout the six provinces), which indicates a lack of confidence in the capacity of these institutions to combat the arms problem in Burundi.

III.A.2. National bodies involved in the fight against small arms

The institutions charged with combating the proliferation and circulation of small arms have had few resources up to now. Various proposals have been made by the UNOB and the UNDP with a view to improving the coordination of their activities. An important change occurred on 29 April 2006 with the creation of a technical commission for the disarmament of the civil population, whose role will be to assist the government in designing and implementing a national policy to deal with this problem.

Burundi set up a national focal point on small arms in May 2003. Based at the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cooperation, this focal point was primarily involved in the discussions relating to Burundi’s international and regional obligations (UN Action Programme and the Nairobi process).

Its work also involved drafting a biannual report on small arms. It was not, however, involved in the disarmament itself, and did not have any contact with the CNDRR (National Commission with responsibility for the Demobilization, the Reinsertion and the Reintegration of ex-combatants (Commission Nationale chargée de la Démobilisation, de la Réinsertion et de la Réintégration des ex-combattants)). Finally, it lacked resources and did not have a permanent secretariat. It was to remedy these gaps that a technical commission for the disarmament of the civil population and the fight against the proliferation of small arms (Republic of Burundi, 2006) was set up on 29 April 2006. This commission, which operates under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and of Public Security (article 5) rather than the Ministry...
of External Relations, to which the old national focal point was responsible, ‘is tasked with devising and implementing the national programme for the disarmament of the civil population and the monitoring of Burundi’s international obligations with respect to the reduction of small arms’ (article 2). It must ensure technical cooperation between all the actors involved in the fight against arms (article 4). It consists of a chairman (who is also the coordinator of the national focal point), a deputy chairman, four members who form a permanent secretariat, and 11 other non-permanent members who represent the various institutions involved in the fight against the proliferation of small arms (Republic of Burundi, 2006). This commission has to play a centralizing role, taking responsibility for all aspects of disarmament, including increasing public awareness, collection (of arms), and the monitoring of regional initiatives.

It remains to be seen how far the commission, whose creation is undeniably a step in the right direction, will be able to fill gaps which currently exist within certain institutions. At the Ministry of Justice, for example, it seems that no one is in charge of the issue. With respect to the police, while crime statistics are kept up-to-date and criminal acts involving firearms recorded, there seems to be a belief that the issue of controlling the circulation of arms is a matter for the Ministry of Defence.

III.A.3. Reorganization of the army and the police

From the FAB to the FDN

The DDR programme must allow the former FAB to be restructured as a new entity, the FDN, whose creation was confirmed by Law no. 1/022 of 31 December 2004. The FDN must have 30,000 members, split equally between Hutus and Tutsis (UNOB, 2005a), but this is only the first phase of the restructuring. The various parties and armed political movements (partis et mouvements politiques armés (PMPA)) have received about two-thirds of the places reserved for Hutus, and places have been distributed among the former armed groups (CNDD–FDD, Kaze-FDD, Palipe-Agakiza, FNL-Icanzo, CNDD-Nyangoma, and FROLINA) on the basis of the number of combatants in each group and the number of arms inventoried. Ranks in the Burundian
army have been linked to ranks previously used in armed political movements (Info-Burundi.net, 2005).

The national police force
The new Burundian national police force (the PNB, set up by Law no.1/023 of 31 December 2004) operates under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security. The old gendarmerie has been abolished. The mechanism by which officers are integrated into this new national police force has been supported by the UNOB via its police component. The French, Belgian, and Dutch governments have promised substantial assistance in terms of training and equipment. The Netherlands has already supplied communications equipment and vehicles (UNOB, 2006d). The restructuring of the national police force is an enormous challenge, as its membership will increase from 3,000 to 18,000–20,000, and it will incorporate former members of the FAB (including gendarmes) and former members of armed political movements in addition to former police officers. Each police officer has an arm that he has to return at the end of his shift; officers have two arms (a pistol and a Kalashnikov) that they are authorized to take home after work. It seems that the police force currently lacks arms for all the new officers, and that equipment has been ordered.

Management and security of stocks
Stocks of arms are managed by the logistics division of the army rather than the police. The logistics division also recovers arms seized by soldiers and by the former gendarmerie. At the present time, it is said to have a stock of 5,000–6,000 small arms which are to be destroyed. Battalion commanders report their consumption of ammunition each month to the head of the general staff, who sends the information to the logistics division. No practical measures have been introduced in this division to label or trace equipment.

Members of the army or police who lose their (one) arm are punished severely, if they do not have an adequate explanation (such as an assault). According to the Decree-Law of 1971, they may be sentenced to up to five years’ imprisonment and/or a maximum fine of BIF 1,000 (USD 1) if the loss can be attributed to their ‘negligence or lack of precautions’.
III. B. Other actors

III.B.1. Civil society
The number of civil society associations and initiatives has increased considerably in recent years. Some are involved in autonomous disarmament initiatives: in the province of Gitega, for example, a small NGO of demobilized ex-combatants, the ARCP, has launched a campaign to increase public awareness which, on 18 March 2006, resulted in the collection of 6 grenades, 4 *mugobore*, 21 bullets, and 1 bomb (RPA (Radio Publique Africaine (African Public Radio)), 2006). Meanwhile, the CEDAC, an association of ex-combatants active throughout the country, organized a collection of arms in Bujumbura-Mairie on 22 December 2005. In March 2005, this association began a campaign with the Ligue Iteka to increase awareness in the interior of the country. This collaboration continues with operations to collect arms from ex-combatants in several regions. The arms collected are delivered to the division commander of the nearest province, with the idea of retrieving them when there are enough to organize a public destruction ceremony in the capital. On 11 March 2006, in Muramvya, ex-combatants collected 455 cartridges (mostly Kalashnikov but also FAL), 5 Kalashnikov magazines, 27 grenades, 1 bayonet, and 8 *mugobore*. The list of equipment handed to the organizers did not include any industrially manufactured firearms, as the people holding such arms say they are waiting for concrete action on the part of the government and hope to be paid for handing them in. This experience suggests that associations which undertake disarmament initiatives have the resources on the ground to carry out awareness-raising campaigns and to make contact with individuals in possession of arms, but that the latter are waiting for an initiative on the government’s part and will not give up their arms without anything in return.

III.B.2. Regional obligations
On 15 March 2006, Burundi ratified the ‘Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa’, which was adopted in April 2004. This ratification has enabled the protocol, which aims to combat the proliferation of
small arms in the region, to come into force. The Nairobi Protocol envisages a national initiative and/or a coordinated effort by states in the region to harmonize the following areas: legislation governing the possession of arms; the management of stocks held by the state; the destruction of surplus or obsolete arms; good practice in the import and export of arms; the regulation of national production; awareness programmes and programmes to disarm the population; and finally transparency and the exchange of information between participating countries. The Secretariat in Nairobi was replaced in June 2005 by the RECSA (Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa), whose aim is to implement the Protocol and coordinate efforts made by the national focal points in the countries involved in the fight against the proliferation of small arms. Eleven countries in the region, plus the Seychelles, are taking part. All the countries of the Great Lakes Conference are involved in the RECSA, which therefore seems to be the ideal forum for increased cooperation in security matters and the fight against the proliferation of small arms.

There is also a tripartite initiative between the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda relating to border security. This initiative was expanded to include Burundi (‘tripartite-plus’) in September 2005. Each of the countries concerned must prepare a ‘merger unit (cellule de fusion)’ (UNOB, 2005b). The Netherlands will finance Burundi’s participation in the tripartite-plus mechanism (UNOB, 2005e), while the United States will provide communication equipment, training, and information (UNOB, 2005b).

**III.B.3. Assistance from the UNDP**

Jointly with the Burundian authorities, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has devised activities described as the preparatory assistance phase. The aim is to create a preliminary framework for the government’s preparation of a coherent strategy to disarm the civilian population, and to meet its international obligations.

The preparatory assistance phase will include the following:

- The appointment of a technical adviser to take charge of small arms whose job will be to support all the various actors (government, international organizations, and civil society).
• A study of the problem of small arms, which will supply the data for the preparation of the national strategy and action plan.
• The organization of a national campaign to increase public awareness of the danger of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons at all levels of society.
• Activities intended to enhance the capacity of the various actors (army, police, customs, justice system, and civil society) in order to equip them with specific expertise in the fight against the proliferation of small arms.
• The coordination of activities to combat the proliferation of small arms.

The UNDP has continued to support the government’s involvement in sub-regional initiatives (participation at meetings of members of parliament and national experts, technical support). It has also supported members of parliament working to harmonize laws relating to arms as part of Burundi’s cooperation with the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda).

III. C. Disarmament initiatives

III.C.1. The demobilization of ex-combatants

The DRR programme
The demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants programme, financed by the World Bank, began officially in September 2004. The details of the programme were as follows:

The demobilized combatants will receive financial support for reinsertion equivalent to 18 months’ salary; the amount of the support corresponds to the wages paid by the FAB in each category. This will be paid in four instalments: one instalment for nine months when the individual concerned leaves the demobilization centre and three instalments of three months each, which will be paid quarterly.

The demobilized combatant will also receive help with social and economic reintegration. This help will be provided in the form of a benefit in kind, to help the individual concerned to pursue a project of his choice. […] (CNDRR, 2004)
A specific programme was set up by the World Bank MDRP (Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme) for child soldiers, who were recruited by all the groups, including the ex-FAB and the Peace Guardians (see Table 3). A total of 3,015 of them benefited from the DRR programme between January 2004 and June 2006, when it came to an end (CNDRR, 2006). Each group had a ‘focal point’ which identified the child soldiers who each received the equivalent of USD 20 per month for 18 months, in non-food goods, and food aid from the WFP (World Food Programme). Children who so wished were also given training, in areas such as dressmaking, carpentry, or mechanics. Those who chose this option received a ‘starter kit’ containing tools.\(^\text{136}\)
Table 3
Number of child soldiers demobilized per armed group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed group</th>
<th>Number of child soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD–FDD</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties and armed political movements</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Guardians</td>
<td>1,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,028</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arms collected

As the name of the commission charged with its implementation suggests (‘National Commission charged with the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of ex-combatants’), the DRR programme was primarily concerned with demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration. It was not concerned with disarmament, and as a consequence, the new Burundian army (FDN) and the UNOB have assumed responsibility for that problem.

By 31 May 2006, a total of 5,729 arms had been collected. Disarmament was achieved in two ways: firstly by direct integration (into the army), which was the preferred option, in which combatants handed their arms directly to the FDN; secondly by a process of formal integration which was administered by the UNOB, in which demobilized combatants went through demobilization centres (in Randa, Gitega, and Muramvya) (CNDRR, 2004). The majority of combatants chose the first option as the arms handed over were counted in order to estimate how many ‘places’ in the new army would be reserved for their group (UNOB, 2005a).

According to UNOB, 5,403 arms were collected by this method (UNOB, 2005a); they went straight into the stocks of the FDN. The arms collected included pistols, AK-47 assault rifles, FAL, R-4, and M16, light machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and SPG-9s. Another source gives a total of 5,404 arms, distributed as in Table 4 among the various armed political movements involved in the integration process (Info-Burundi.net, 2005).
Weapons collected by the UNOB.
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Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former armed group</th>
<th>Number of combatants*</th>
<th>Number of arms surrendered*</th>
<th>Proportion arms/combatants**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNDD–FDD</td>
<td>18,924</td>
<td>4,901</td>
<td>1 arm for 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaze-FDD</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1 arm for 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL-Icanzol</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1 arm for 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palipe-Agakiza</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1 arm for 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1 arm for 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1 arm for 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,364</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,404</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Info-Burundi.net, 2005
**Calculation based on the number of combatants and the number of arms surrendered.

But even when ex-combatants were integrated directly, when handing over a large number of arms gave the group concerned the hope that they would be allocated more places in the new army, the evidence suggests that the number of arms collected was less than the number of arms effectively held by armed political movements. The foregoing figures suggest a ratio of one arm for four people for the CNDD–FDD. The accounts of ex-combatants show that a ratio of one arm for two combatants was the minimum.\textsuperscript{141} The average ratio for the CNDD was closer to one arm for three combatants (against one arm for 13, as shown in the table). With respect to child soldiers, it was not possible to establish clearly if they had been asked to give up their arms when they were demobilized. Some of them, however, played combatant roles in their respective groups, and carried arms.\textsuperscript{142}

It also seems that a certain number of ex-combatants, disappointed by the financial compensation offered (which was based on their rank in the group) and by the follow-up, which was thought to be inadequate (particularly regarding the projects that they were supposed to undertake), preferred to keep their arms, and that some of them used them to commit crimes.\textsuperscript{143} However, it cannot be concluded from the study by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue Iteka that a majority of the ex-combatants were involved in the security
incidents recorded in the six provinces studied, nor that the rest of the population regards them with particular suspicion.

As the UNOB was responsible for demobilizing fewer ex-combatants than the FDN, it collected fewer arms than the Burundian authorities. By 31 May 2006, the UNOB had in its possession 326 small arms and 45,433 munitions, accessories, and some knives. Out of these 326 arms, 64 were out of use, which is nearly a fifth of the total. The number of arms collected was relatively high at the beginning of the demobilization process, and fell gradually later. At the beginning, in order to benefit from the demobilization programme, each member of an armed political movement had to hand over one arm and show that he knew how to operate it. But with the passage of time, the criteria became more flexible, and even individuals who were not members of armed political movements were able to qualify for the programme – it was enough for their name to be on the list that had been drawn up at the time of the ceasefire by the heads of the various movements. The August 2005 figures give a total of 227 arms collected for 237 ex-combatants (which represents 96 per cent) (UNOB, 2005a), but, at the beginning, UNOB collected on average one arm for five ex-combatants, once child soldiers are excluded from the total.

Arms collected by the authorities were transferred into the arsenals of the FDN. In this case also, the entry conditions for the DDR programme became more flexible over time. At the beginning of the programme, each ex-combatant had to surrender one arm, but, in an attempt to achieve reconciliation, a certain number of them were accepted even if they did not meet this criterion. Less than a third of the combatants demobilized definitely gave up one arm, as the army recovered one arm for two to five individuals on average, and very few munitions (mostly grenades). The arms collected were often in poor condition, and it is thought that one arm in three was completely unusable. This may explain the Burundian government’s decision to destroy around 6,000 obsolete arms in its stocks with the assistance of the UNOB (UNOB, 2005d). According to another source, up to 80% of arms surrendered were unusable at the first integration phase, which took place in Bururi. This can be explained by the fact that those involved did not really trust the process, which was only just beginning. Furthermore, precisely
because this was only the start, the authorities applied the rule that those wishing to benefit from the programme had to surrender one arm for each ex-combatant. However, they failed to specify that the arm be in good condition. In consequence, while each individual gave up one arm, they were not all in good condition.\textsuperscript{152} The army now needs help with the destruction of surplus or obsolete arms, as it does not have sufficient resources. It can only burn them, which means that some people may recover the barrels and use them to make \textit{mugobore}.\textsuperscript{153} It needs access to more efficient destruction techniques, such as crushing or cutting them into pieces.\textsuperscript{154}

Nothing in the Arusha accord indicates what should happen to the arms collected during the DDR process. The UNOB has proposed to the Burundian government destroying them rather than transferring them to the army. A total of 5,949 munitions (Umuco News Agency, 2005), mostly out of use, were destroyed on 27 December 2005 in Kabezi, south of Bujumbura. What was originally supposed to be a relatively confidential event was, in the end, given wide media coverage.\textsuperscript{155} A certain amount of confusion in the press followed about what had been destroyed that day. Most of the articles covering the events reported the destruction of 6,000 arms rather than munitions.\textsuperscript{156} Between March and December 2005, the UNOB destroyed more than 55,000 cartridges, grenades, mines, explosives, and parts of munitions.\textsuperscript{157}

In July 2006, the UNOB, UNDP, and FDN jointly organized a training exercise in the management and destruction of stocks of arms and munitions. This exercise was followed by a second phase consisting of the destruction of all the unusable arms and munitions (particularly 40,000 12.7 mm cartridges) collected by the UNOB, and the destruction of unusable arms and munitions from the stocks of the Burundian army.

\textit{III.C.2. The disarmament of civilians}

In March 2004 an interministerial commission compiled a report on strategies for disarming the civilian population. This report established the need to restore public confidence in Burundi, identified gaps in existing firearms legislation, and concluded that public security must be improved. It recommended that the government should set up a Commission responsible for civilian disarmament, which it did in May 2005.
The Decree of 4 May 2005 on civilian disarmament

On 4 May 2005, President Ndayizeye signed a decree (no. 100/061) marking the start of a civilian disarmament campaign. This decree applied to ‘young members of the Peace Guardians and […] any other person holding firearms for the purposes of civil self-defence; armed civilians in possession of a firearms licence; persons who are illegally armed’ (Republic of Burundi, 2005, article 2), and based penalties against offenders on the 1971 Law (Republic of Burundi, 1971; Republic of Burundi, 2005, article 10). The authorities expected people to surrender arms in their possession quite willingly, and to inform on others who were holding them (Sunday Times, 2005). This decree also set up a National Disarmament Commission ‘responsible for the development and implementation of strategies for disarmament’ chaired by the Minister of Public Security (Republic of Burundi, 2005, articles 3 and 4).

This programme of—forced—civilian disarmament was launched at Gishubi (Gitega) on 9 May 2005, alongside a campaign designed to explain to the population how it would work (Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 2005a). But the programme has proved to be a failure: not a single weapon has been recovered as a result. It probably failed because it was held on a date too close to the elections.158 Presumably the transitional
nature of the government could not generate a sufficiently strong climate of confidence to begin the process of civilian disarmament at that time.

A new civilian disarmament strategy was therefore developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Security, which was set up following the 2005 elections. This time the new strategy, initially due to start in January 2006, had to rely on voluntary rather than forced disarmament. So on 14 April 2006, the government announced that the civilian population had until 5 May to register their arms, after which people still in possession of an arm would be liable for prosecution (IRIN, 2006). This amnesty was to be accompanied by a dialogue between the authorities and civilians, the latter being invited, if they felt it necessary, to explain in writing why they did not wish to part with their arms. Discussions on the security issue were also planned, particularly for individuals who stated their wish to keep their arm for their own protection (IRIN, 2006). This initiative seems, however, to have had disappointing results; according to journalistic sources in Burundi, the government announcement was poorly understood by the population, who did not come forward to register their arms (Ntahondi, 2006).

The disarmament of the Peace Guardians and the Militant Combatants
The Decree of 4 May 2005 was aimed first and foremost at militia groups, chiefly the Peace Guardians, who were armed by the government during the civil war, and the Militant Combatants, the armed wing of the CNDD–FDD. The Ministry of Defence, responsible for the distribution of arms to the Peace Guardians during the war, was put in charge of the implementation of this disarmament programme. Following this decree, some members of the Peace Guardians stated that they would not surrender their arms without financial compensation, threatening to rejoin the ranks of the Palipehutu–FNL, who were still active (IRIN, 2005a). In mid-June 2005, they staged demonstrations and set up roadblocks (IRIN, 2005b).

The effective demobilization of the Peace Guardians and Militant Combatants finally began on 6 July 2005 (IRIN, 2005b), after they had been promised a single sum of BIF 100,000 (USD 100) each for their reintegration into civilian life (IRIN, 2005b). The process of dismantling the militias nevertheless had to be interrupted two days later because the lists of militiamen published by the
Ministry of Defence were contested by the main interested parties. The process resumed on 12 September 2005, in blocks of two provinces at a time, and district by district (UNOB, 2005b); but it was interrupted again in October 2005, when about 100 members of the Peace Guardians, and another group of civilians who had worked as porters for the army and the police during the war, demonstrated and erected barricades in the capital to protest against the absence of 172 of them from the list of beneficiaries (IRIN, 2005d; 2005c). These lists quite obviously contained irregularities: it would seem for example that a list of 500 names was published at Kirundo, although this region had never had any civil defence militiamen (UNOB, 2005c). In mid-October, in response to demonstrations, the government appointed new administrators to head the CNDRR and announced that a new list of civil defence militiamen eligible for compensation would be published (IRIN, 2005d). The process resumed in November 2005, and was almost complete by July 2006 (CNDRR, 2006).

The Peace Guardians had received arms from the army, actually distributed to them by the gendarmerie.\textsuperscript{162} In theory, all the people who received an arm were identified, and the Ministry knows the total number of arms distributed.\textsuperscript{163} In reality, it is unlikely that the Ministry has all the names, as the confusion surrounding the composition of the lists and their successive revisions seems to confirm.\textsuperscript{164} An awareness of the methods used to recruit the Peace Guardians makes it easier to understand how this confusion arose. During the war, the army advised local administrators, who were often targeted by rebels, to recruit 20 or 30 young people to protect them. At the outset, these young people had no arms, being trained and supervised by two armed soldiers. Gradually, however, they equipped themselves with arms, drawing on army stocks without any proper supervision or follow-up to ensure that accurate records were kept.\textsuperscript{165} Another category of Peace Guardians was made up of young people who provided logistical support to the army (transport, food, etc.). The soldiers armed these young people for their own protection, then withdrew, leaving them with their arms.\textsuperscript{166}

Financed by the MDRP, the dismantling of the militias aimed to reach a total of 19,861 Peace Guardians and 9,964 Militant Combatants (CNDRR, 2006). These operations were carried out region by region; no Peace Guardians
or Militant Combatants were registered at Karuzi or Kirundo (CNDRR, 2006). Problems with the lists of militiamen continued throughout the process; on 7 February 2006, they seriously hampered DDR activities in the district of Matongo (Kayanza province) (ONUB, 2006b).

As with the ex-combatants, it was not necessary to hand over a weapon to obtain BIF 100,000 (USD 100) in compensation, mainly because it was common knowledge that not all militiamen had received arms. By 22 September 2005, a total of 154 arms (including 34 grenades) had been collected for 1,326 demobilized Peace Guardians and 1,203 Militant Combatants (UNOB, 2005b), which represents a ratio of 1 arm to 16 combatants. A third calculation for the month of February 2006 alone gives a similar ratio (1 weapon for 17 combatants), with a total of 342 arms collected for 5,792 registered Peace Guardians and Militant Combatants (UNOB, 2006b). Almost three-quarters of the weapons returned by this date were AK-47 assault rifles (73% of the total), followed by Simonov rifles (13%), grenades (8%), and FAL assault rifles (1.5%) (UNOB, 2006b).

It should be noted, however, that the numbers of arms cited here come from observations made by UNOB, which was not directly involved in the dismantling or disarmament of the militias. According to government figures, 1,323 rifles had been collected by 25 July 2006, of which 68 were handmade, 245 were grenades, and 2 mines, suggesting an approximate ratio of 1 weapon for 18 combatants.

Even with these provisos, it remains very difficult to estimate what percentage of the total number of arms held by the militias it has been possible to collect. According to sources, the ratio of arms to combatants within the Peace Guardians varied from one to two grenades per person and 1 arm for every 10 people (with one weapon per person in some areas such as Bururi or Kayanza) to 1 arm for every 15 combatants. The figures for the Militant Combatants are equally vague. Some merely acted as porters and informants, and were not armed; others undoubtedly had arms. It is therefore very difficult to assess whether, across the country as a whole, a ratio of 1 arm recovered for every 16, 17, or 18 combatants represents success or relative failure.

It is worth noting, moreover, that the 1,076 allied civil defence militiamen
and 930 Militant Combatants demobilized in November 2005 did not return a single weapon (UNOB, 2005d).

It would seem that here too the demobilization process became more flexible as successive lists of names appeared, some more reliable, some less so, and tensions mounted between the government and the militiamen. In truth this had far more to do with the dismantling of the militias than with a disarmament programme in the strict sense of the term. Given the number of arms returned to date, it seems reasonable to conclude that the majority of arms distributed to the Peace Guardians by the government during the civil war have not been recovered, although whether these arms have been kept by combatants or resold is impossible to judge.

The disarmament of the Civil Self-Defence Groups
In addition to the Peace Guardians and the Militant Combatants, there is a third group of civilians who received arms during the war. The Civil Self-Defence Groups (also sometimes called ‘Civil self-defence in solidarity’) are state employees to whom the government gave arms so that they could defend their neighbourhoods. The arms, taken from army stocks, were distributed by the gendarmerie. Some state employees already owned a weapon which they had bought abroad, usually in the DRC. The Burundian Armed Forces provided military training for some of these state employees, organizing shooting practice and delivering certificates. These groups, of whom there were many in small towns and provincial capitals, seem to have been relatively unstructured. The person in charge of army supplies was supposed to have a list of individuals who received arms. According to a police source, however, it seems that the very existence of these lists is uncertain—no one knows if there are any or not, and the number of arms distributed is completely unknown. The army might have kept these lists, but on this point also there is no certainty. The number of state employees who were armed is estimated at about 5,000, and it is more than likely that most of them still have their weapon today. Some have already returned their weapon as part of the disarmament of the Peace Guardians and Militant Combatants, but they received no payment, in contrast with these first two groups. These ‘forgotten’ state employees and their arms
would be the first to be affected if civilian disarmament were to take place.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{III.C.3. The people’s expectation of civil disarmament}

\textbf{Possible involvement in a disarmament programme}

The household survey shows a very clear link between firearms and insecurity, as more than nine out of ten people interviewed think that the level of security in their neighbourhood/colline will increase if firearms are collected. The least optimistic provinces are Bujumbura-Mairie and Bujumbura Rural, but even their rates are very high (89\% and 87.7\%). This general optimism continues with respect to people’s expectations of a disarmament programme: in all the provinces combined, 88\% of respondents think that if a disarmament programme were launched in their neighbourhood/colline, it could be a great success. Only 2\% think that it would be a total failure. Once again it was in Bujumbura-Mairie and Bujumbura Rural that people had most reservations, but these remained limited: 89.4\% of respondents in Bujumbura-Mairie and 89.7\% of those interviewed in Bujumbura Rural think that if a disarmament programme were set up, it could be a ‘great’ or ‘moderate’ success.

These results are reflected in respondents’ willingness to take part in a possible disarmament programme. People wishing to take part ‘totally’ account for more than 70\% of people interviewed in Mwaro and Ruyigi, and between 60\% and 70\% of people interviewed in Bujumbura-Mairie, Cibitoke, and Bururi. Bujumbura Rural had the lowest score, with 59.2\% of the population willing to participate ‘totally’ in such a programme—but the ‘totally’ and the ‘probably’ replies combined come to 94.3\% of the population, which is remarkable for a province that is still in a state of war.

The optimism that may be generated by the results of the survey must, however, be tempered by the fact that when surveys of this type have been carried out in other countries, disarmament is generally perceived positively by the population, but that perception is not always followed by a high level of involvement in the ensuing programmes. It should also be noted that the survey was carried out when financial compensation was being offered to militiamen who disarmed, which could have increased expectations among the civilian population.
**Table 5**

Provisional result of the DDR civilian disarmament programme\(^{181}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ex-FAB</th>
<th>Former armed political movements (PMPA)*</th>
<th>Ex-Peace Guardians</th>
<th>Ex-militant combatants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>23,364</td>
<td>19,861</td>
<td>9,964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration expected in the FDN (provisional total: 30,000, to be decreased to 25,000): 20,760 (5,760 Hutus and 15,000 Tutsis)

Integration expected in the PNB (total expected: 18,000–20,000)\(^{182}\): 3,000 at 3 August 2005, 6,921 at 3 August 2005

Expected number of demobilized individuals: 20,240

Demobilized: 9,605

Arms collected during the process of direct integration (Burundi transitional government/National Defence Force (GoTB/FDN)): None

Arms collected during the formal integration process (UNOB): None

Arms collected by other means: N/A

Location of the arms of persons demobilized: FDN stocks

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**Note:** Comprising the following groups: CNDD–FDD, Kaze-FDD, Palipe-Agakiza, FNL-Icanzo, CNDD-Nyangoma, and FROLINA

**---**
The surrender of arms is possible under certain conditions

Even if these results suggest real enthusiasm for disarmament on the part of the population, the conditions of any such programme should be examined in more detail. Indeed, a much smaller percentage of respondents say they would be prepared to take part in such a programme whatever the conditions (37.9% of respondents in the six provinces). The highest rates are to be found in Mwaro and Ruyigi, where more than one person in two would be prepared to take part in a disarmament programme unconditionally.

Various conditions and expected results were presented in the questionnaire as possible reasons for taking part in the disarmament programme: the purchase of the arm; its being exchanged for something else; everybody’s participation in the programme; less crime and more security; and finally, less unemployment. This latter option had little support in all provinces. The prospect of being paid for the arm appears, on the other hand, to be the decisive reason in five provinces out of six, Bujumbura Rural being the exception. In this latter province, the reduction in crime and improvement in security are more motivating than money, which says a great deal about the security situation in that region. Exchanging arms for ‘something’ arouses more suspicion, with only 13.5% of respondents in Cibitoke being convinced by such a programme—the province where this rate is highest. On the other hand, only 3.7% of respondents in Mwaro say they would be interested in a programme in which their arm was exchanged for something other than money. The general participation of the community only seems to be an important factor in Bujumbura-Mairie (13.9% of respondents). This is possibly one consequence of the very frequent insecurity problems in Bujumbura, and of the resulting ‘security dilemma’, which is that people who armed themselves for reasons of self-defence are only prepared to give up their arms if they can be sure that the criminals will also lose theirs. The continuing conflict with the Palipe-hutu–FNL around the capital does not reassure the population nor encourage them to hand over their arms while this insecurity problem remains.

How can the civilian population be disarmed?

It is essential to know to whom the population would be most prepared to give up their arms, if they were to be disarmed. Political parties, a union, and
‘someone in my community’ score close to zero. As a general rule, the categories ‘state officials’ and, above all, ‘representatives of the new government’ have very high scores in all the provinces surveyed (see Graph 18). These results hint at a real confidence in the new institutions of the country. Maybe this should also be seen as a consequence of disarming the militias (Peace Guardians and Militant Combatants)—during this process the government offered financial compensation to former militiamen. The population may be expecting the government to pursue the same policy with respect to arms held by the civilian population (financial motivation being, as we have seen, the strongest in five of the six provinces surveyed), and the recent example of disarmament for BIF 100,000 (USD 100) has excited hope. An example of this expectation is the remark made by the official with responsibility for the district of Gihanga, in the province of Bubanza, who says that people expect more than a mere return to security in exchange for surrendering their arms (CPD, 2006).

Source: Nindagiye, 2006
The army also has excellent scores: in all the provinces, between a quarter and a third of respondents say they are ready to surrender their arms to the army. This result may seem to contradict other replies which indicated that soldiers were perceived as a source of insecurity. However, it may be explained by the fact that the FDN is associated, in the eyes of the population, with the new government. Furthermore, it was soldiers who dismantled militias on the ground and were responsible for handing out financial compensation.

The great surprise comes from the mediocre score achieved by the UN and local NGOs. One might have expected these institutions, particularly the UN, to represent a welcome form of neutrality in the still sensitive context of disarmament. On average, however, less than one respondent in ten would agree to surrender their arms to the UN. This ratio is a little higher in Bujumbura-Mairie only, where it is 11.3%. This may be explained by the fact that Burundians outside the capital do not know the UN very well, but even if
that is the case, the 11.3% score in Bujumbura-Mairie is still very low. The local NGOs do not inspire any more confidence, with only 3% of respondents in the six provinces who would agree to surrender arms to them. Yet again, these results must be interpreted with caution, as the disarmament of ex-combatants took place during the period when the survey was being carried out, which may have influenced the replies by increasing civilian expectations vis-à-vis the government, for example (particularly of those who would like to exchange their arms for financial compensation), to the detriment of other institutions.
Conclusion

The 100,000 or so arms circulating illegally in Burundi, and the numerous others that may cross its borders, threaten a transition to peace to which the country is committed. The return to apparent calm should not mask important sources of insecurity which are still present and which, aggravated by the availability of arms, could rekindle armed violence.

The conclusions of this study illustrate the need to control small arms in Burundi. The arms now in the territory contribute to the level of insecurity, which is high for a post-conflict situation, especially in the capital.

There is a real expectation on the part of the people regarding disarmament; they are looking to the government to take action. An effort to achieve civilian disarmament will, however, come to nothing if it is not accompanied by parallel measures which take account of Burundi’s specific circumstances. Given the considerable stocks of arms in the DRC, there is a fear that the disarmament of Burundian civilians might create a market which will be immediately invaded by Congolese arms sellers. A policy of disarming civilians must therefore be accompanied by serious border controls and better regional cooperation. It must also offer compensation which is sufficiently generous to satisfy the population, but sufficiently modest to prevent cross-border traffickers from spotting an opportunity to get rich.

The situation in Burundi must also receive the attention of decision-makers. The population does not yet have total confidence in the police and the FDN, which are supposed to protect them. This lack of confidence, made worse by continuing criminality after the war, might encourage those holding arms to keep them as a means of self-defence. It is therefore becoming urgent to speed up reform of the security sector in order to prevent abuses, improve coordination between departments, and update and modernize the system for registering legally held arms.

While waiting for an effective prevention policy, the victims of armed violence must be given the treatment they need. The government’s new aware-
ness of how difficult it is for the majority of the population to access medical care is an encouraging step forward. This should open the way to the necessary reform which will enable victims of armed violence, of whom there are still far too many in a post-conflict society, to be treated. However, if the number of small arms in circulation is not rapidly reduced, the situation could get worse in the future.
### Appendix: Some arms held by the parties and armed political movements, and their origin

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pistols</th>
<th>Automatic rifles</th>
<th>Sub-machine guns</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CNDD</strong></td>
<td><strong>CNDD-FDD</strong></td>
<td><strong>CNDD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Browning 1903</td>
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<td>Chinese Type 56</td>
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<td>Dragunov SVD</td>
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<td>FN FAL</td>
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<td>Uzi</td>
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<td>US M3</td>
<td>Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken to the FAB</td>
<td>Uzi</td>
<td>Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>FN MAG</td>
<td>Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN Minimi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goryunov SG43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 mm RPD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>Offensive, defensive, stick grenades, etc.</td>
<td>Tanzania, DRC, Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>60 mm, 120 mm</td>
<td>Tanzania, Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hand-held) Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>RPG-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>AP Mines</td>
<td>Tanzania, Taken to the FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AC Mines</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Interviews with ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1–2 February 2006

**Note:** This table gives an idea of some of the arms held by the various parties and armed political movements and does not claim to be exhaustive.
Map 2 **Percentage of respondents whose household includes at least one victim of an act of violence during the last six months, per district**

Source: Nindagiye, 2006
Map 3 **Percentage of respondents who say that firearms are ‘never’ used in acts of violence, per district**

Source: Nindagiye, 2006
Map 4 **Percentage of respondents who say that they feel ‘not at all’ secure, per district**

Source: Nindagiyeye, 2006
Map 5 Percentage of respondents who think that the possession of a firearm ‘helps to protect’, per district

Source: Nindagiye, 2006
Map 6: Percentage of respondents who would 'totally' accept taking part in a disarmament programme, per district

[ mapa detalhado de Burundi com cores para indicar porcentagens de aceitação]
Notes

1. This estimate takes into account all small arms and light weapons, and also grenades, which are usually classified with explosives or munitions.
3. Interview between the UNDP Technical Adviser on Small Arms and Armed Violence Reduction (TA SA-AVR) and national actors, January 2006.
4. Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and international actors, December 2005.
10. Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006; and information received from an international source, April 2006.
11. The questions were asked by pollsters recruited by the Ligue Iteka, who had been given prior training in Bujumbura by Mr Janvier Nkurunziza, independent consultant of the Economic Commission for Africa (Commission économique pour l’Afrique (CEA)).
12. In Burundi provinces are divided into districts (communes) which are themselves divided into smaller units known as collines and sous-collines.
15. The figures relating to the number of households per province come from ISTEEBU, 2004.
16. Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006; correspondence with an international source, March 2006.
17. Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. For information: this arms ratio has been aligned with that of the CNDD–FDD.
27 Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
28 Ibid.
29 Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
30 Ibid.
31 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
32 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interview with an ex-combatant of the CNDD–FDD, Bujumbura, 31 January 2006.
33 Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
38 Information received at the workshop validating this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006.
39 Interview with the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.
40 Average of six estimates from six different sources.
41 Average of 11 estimates from 11 different sources.
42 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
43 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
44 Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
45 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
46 Interviews with former Burundian fighters, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
47 Ibid.
48 Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
49 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
50 Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
51 Ibid.
52 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
53 Ibid.
54 Information received from a Burundian source, April 2006.
55 Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.
60 Ibid.
61 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.
62 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.
64 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.
65 Ibid.
66 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.
Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Information gathered from Burundian officials at the workshop organized to validate this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006.
Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.
Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.
Ibid.
Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interviews with former Burundian fighters, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.
Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, December 2005.
Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
Ibid.
Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
See for example ICG, 2003.
The particular case of Bururi can possibly be explained by the fact that the police presence is itself a new phenomenon: previously there were only two police posts in the province, one in Bururi and the other in Rumonge, and their activity was very limited. Most crimes were therefore dealt with by authorities other than the police. The new PNB has been introduced throughout the territory of the province and deals with all crimes directly (information gathered at the workshop organized to validate this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006).
Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006; HRW, 2006.
Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
Interview with the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, December 2005.
Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Interview with a Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.
Out of 1,675 cases recorded by the Ligue Iteka, 1,372 were collected from MSF-Belgium (Ligue Iteka, 2005, p. 50).
Edward B. Rackley writes that, ‘while rape itself is not really considered as a taboo act, it is taboo to talk about it openly. […] When it becomes known, women who have survived
rape are harshly criticized, banished or abandoned by their husbands and families’ (Rackley, 2005, p. 20).

98 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006. In 43% of cases studied by the Ligue Iteka, rape victims were minors (Ligue Iteka, 2005, p. 50).

99 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

106 Ibid.

107 Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.

108 Ibid. There is not, however, any monitoring or inspection of holders of firearms licences. It is therefore likely that many of these people are now dead (information received at the workshop organized to validate this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006).

109 Ibid.

110 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006; interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

111 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

112 Information received at the workshop organized to validate this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006.

113 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

114 Ibid; correspondence with an international source, March 2006.

115 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

116 Ibid.

117 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

118 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.

119 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

120 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.

121 Correspondence with an international source, March 2006.

122 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.

123 Ibid.

124 Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

125 Information received at the workshop organized to validate this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006.

126 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

127 Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

128 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

129 Information received from an international source, April 2006.

130 Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.
Source for this paragraph: correspondence with the UNDP TA SA-AVR, August 2006.

The difference between 3,028 and 3,015 is due to children who have disappeared or died.

UNOB, 2005a and confidential document. Sum of the arms collected from the ex-members of armed political movements during the process of direct integration (GoTB/FDN) and during the process of formal integration (UNOB) (see Table 5).

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

UNOB, 2005a; interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.

Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

Interviews with Burundian ex-combatants, Bujumbura, 1 February 2006.

This total does not include 775 magazines for assault rifles. It is not known if they were full, partially full, or empty.

Confidential document.

Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006; interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

Interview with an international source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

Ibid.

Confidential document.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interviews between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005 and January 2006.

Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, January 2006.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, January 2006.

Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Correspondence with an international source, March 2006.

Correspondence with a Burundian source, March 2006.

Correspondence with an international source, March 2006.
Correspondence with a Burundian source, March 2006.

Correspondence with an international source, March 2006.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

Interview between the UNDP TA SA-AVR and national actors, September 2005.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.


Information received during the workshop organized to validate this study, Bujumbura, 29 May 2006.

Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.


Interview with an official Burundian source, Bujumbura, February 2006.

Sources: CNDRR, 2006; confidential documents; UNOB, 2005a and 2006c.

5,305 former gendarmes have also been integrated into the PNB (UNOB, 2005a).

UNOB, 2005a.

Sixty-four are out of use.
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