

Executive Summary

including recommendations

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Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment

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
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Kenya has experienced the effects of small arms availability and misuse for many years, and the unprecedented violence that erupted after the December 2007 general elections placed the issue of small arms reduction higher on the national agenda. Central to the Kenyan government's effort to address armed violence and illicit firearms is the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP), an inter-agency coordinating body within the Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security. Despite significant progress, law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms still face considerable challenges.

The extent of illicit firearms and their distribution over the Kenyan territory was the focus of a 2003 National Mapping for Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, carried out by the KNFP, which informed the development of the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management. While most of the independent research before and after that report focused on the northern parts of the country (i.e. North Rift, Upper Eastern, and North Eastern Province), a nationally representative survey has not been carried out since 2003.

This joint study by the Government of Kenya and the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey assesses small arms proliferation in Kenya (mapping their location, sources, and movements) and the capacity of various actors involved



in small arms control and peace-building efforts in the country. For this purpose, the study adopted a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods involving approximately 2,500 interviews with individual households (HHs), law enforcement agents (LEAs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and other key informants from 31 out of the 47 counties of Kenya.

The sample targeted counties perceived as highly volatile (those where small arms are endemic, those with significant pastoralist communities, emerging areas, and high-density urban areas with high crime levels), as well as areas considered to be of medium and low volatility.

Study objectives

The main objectives of the study are to:

- assess the number of illicit small arms in Kenya;
- identify the sources and prevalence of small arms and their movement in and out of Kenya;
- assess the capacity of various actors involved in small arms control and peace-building efforts in the country;
- assess the role and use of information on illicit small arms and linkages to early warning and response mechanisms in conflict transformation;
- assess the effect of insecurity as a result of the use of illicit small arms, especially among the pastoralist communities, on food insecurity, poverty, and livelihoods, among other related concerns; and
- highlight lessons learned in the past survey that can inform future efforts to address the problem of illicit small arms.

Background

The election-related violence of 2007/08, mass displacements, and wide-spread insecurity are believed to fuel a new demand for small arms in Kenya, especially in the central Rift Valley Province. Previous reports have suggested the possibility that communities seek to acquire more sophisticated firearms beyond the crude weapon varieties used during the

election violence. This development, in addition to concerns about the potential for proliferation of armed groups and the growth of existing organized gangs, highlights the urgency of adopting well-founded arms control measures alongside national peace-building efforts.

Several factors challenge law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms. They include: inadequate physical presence of law enforcement officers, poor infrastructure, corruption, scarcity of resources, and difficult terrain in the small arms and conflict hotspot areas. Some police security initiatives have equally posed blowback challenges. For instance, Bevan (2008, p. 17) observes that the Kenya Police supplies almost 50 per cent of the ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North in order to provide the Turkana with some defence against rival groups in South Sudan and Uganda.

Arms trafficking is of paramount concern in Kenya. Kenya's borders are susceptible to illicit small arms trafficking through the same channels used for legal arms shipments, with Mombasa being one of the main entry points used by smugglers (HRW, 2002, p. 9). Additionally, inland border towns serve as conduits for small arms trafficking into Kenya, including Mandera, Moyale, El Wak, and Lokichoggio. Northern Kenya, bordering conflict-affected neighbouring countries, is believed to have the highest prevalence of small arms in the country (Wairagu and Ndung'u, 2003, p. 3).

A 2010 study conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010) suggests significant under-reporting of crime and violence, and therefore, the police may not be fully aware of the extent of the crime and violence in Kenya.

Numerous attempts to formally disarm civilian populations in Kenya have been implemented, with varying degrees of success. In its current Strategic Plan 2010/11–2014/15, the KNFP is committed to its vision for the realization of a 'peaceful, secure and prosperous society free of illicit SALW [small arms and light weapons] for sustainable development' (KNFP, n.d.). The KNFP's focus areas include stockpile management, capacity



Source: Wepundi et al. (2012, p. 39)

building among LEAs and other actors in small arms, awareness raising on the dangers of illicit small arms, and institutional capacity strengthening for mitigating small arms challenges.

The KNFP's mandate is derived from the 15 March 2000 Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Declaration), which called on the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa states to strengthen or establish national mechanisms to deal with the problem of illicit small arms and implement the declaration. The Nairobi Protocol (2004) legally bound states to this requirement under Article 16 on transparency,

information exchange, and harmonization. Government–civil society cooperation is equally guaranteed by both the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol (Article 2c).

Among other government efforts to manage security challenges has been the establishment and deployment of members of the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR). In their role as volunteers, KPRs are called upon in times of need to support regular police units during problematic security situations. However, some members of these units have privatized the small arms given to them by the government and allegedly use them for criminal ends (Ndung'u, 2010, pp. 6–7). Public perceptions of KPRs are not altogether

favourable. Local populations complain that KPR deployments are politicized, uncoordinated, and controversial.

Findings

Eight years after the 2003 National Mapping for Illicit SALW exercise, this study provides the first comprehensive assessment of small arms prevalence and perceptions of security in Kenya. Based on the main findings, the study provides a number of recommendations. The six major findings of the study are as follows:

■ **Between 530,000 and 680,000 firearms may be in civilian possession nationally.**

Total numbers of firearms in civilian possession may be much higher than previously estimated. While the 2003 mapping survey found on average that 6 per cent of HH respondents owned arms, this 2012 survey found that only 2.7 per cent of HH respondents—a significantly smaller proportion—reported owning at least one illicit firearm, which translates into an estimated minimum of 210,000 illicit arms in civilian hands nationally. The reasons for this reduction can be multiple. Firstly, it may be a reflection of gains made in government and civil society arms reduction efforts.¹

Secondly, it is possible that respondents were more reluctant to admit gun ownership for fear of self-implication. Under-reporting is a possibility that should be taken into account. For this reason, responses to survey questions on the perceived prevalence of firearms provided by all groups including HHs, LEAs, and CSOs were used to generate ‘high’ estimates that indicated that the number of HHs owning firearms may be more than 1.1 million. As self-reports are likely to underestimate total numbers and perceptions of small arms are likely to overestimate these numbers, the reality may be somewhere in between. Findings suggest that if the most conservative estimates from the survey are applied to the entire territory of Kenya, the number of firearms may be between 530,000 and 680,000.²

Table 1 **Trafficking routes and means of transportation**

Region	Main source	Means*	Routes
Nairobi	Somalia, Uganda, Sudan	Road, rail, government vehicles, individuals	Garissa-Eastleigh Lodwar-Eldoret-Nakuru Mombasa-Nairobi Maralal-Nyahururu-Nairobi Ethiopia-Moyale-Isiolo-Nairobi
Central Kenya	Somalia, Uganda, Sudan	Road, individuals	Isiolo-Nyeri Nairobi-Thika Nairobi-Kiambu
Coast	Somalia, Tanzania	Road, ship, boats	Lunga Lunga-Mombasa Kiunga-Lamu-Malindi-Mombasa Ocean-various ports & homes-Mombasa
North Eastern	Somalia, Ethiopia	Road, people, animals	Somalia-Mandera Somalia-Garissa Mandera-Wajir Ethiopia-Mandera-Wajir
Upper Eastern	Somalia, Ethiopia	Road, animals, traders, government vehicles	Moyale-Marsabit-Isiolo Garissa-Isiolo-Marsabit
North Rift/ Western	Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda	Road, traders, community to community	Sudan-Lokichoggio-Lodwar-Kapenguria-Eldoret Ethiopia-Maralal-Nyahururu Kapenguria-Tot-Kapedo Uganda-Lodwar Uganda-Kapenguria-Kitale-Bungoma
Central Rift	Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda	Road, traders, community to community	Kitale-Eldoret-Nakuru Nairobi-Naivasha-Nakuru Nyahururu-Nakuru
South Nyanza	Tanzania	Road, traders, community	Tanzania-Isebania-Kisii

* Small arms are hidden in cargo, dead animals, charcoal, etc., or on the persons of individuals.

Source: Wepundi et al. (2012, p. 58)

■ **In some areas, including the Mt Elgon and Rift Valley regions, public perception of civilian gun possession is high, in spite of government activities to forcibly disarm civilians.**

Despite the drop in the perceived number of arms nationally, **some zones have recorded a significant increase in gun possession since 2003.** The prevalence rate in Western Province went up from 4 per cent to the current 10.4 per cent. Similarly, Rift Valley’s proportion of arms owned increased by a margin of 6.8 per cent. This finding underscores the need to re-examine the effectiveness of government approaches to disarmament. Inasmuch as the 2008 Operation Okoa Maisha in Mt Elgon recorded gains in dismantling the Sabaot Land Defense Force, reducing insecurity, and recovering arms, the persisting view that firearms are available in the area is a wake-up call. The same can be said of Operation Dumisha Amani, which has predominantly focused on Rift Valley.

■ **The majority of household respondents state that they feel the most insecure during election periods.**

More than 40 per cent of HH respondents feel there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year. The peaceful management of Kenya’s elections is therefore important for reducing the demand for small arms.

An examination of perceptions of individual and community safety reveals **that people feel most unsafe during electioneering periods**, with 48.4 per cent of HH respondents holding this view. The survey also found that a significant proportion (42.5 per cent) of **HH respondents feel unsafe when they are outside their homes at night** and more than one-third (37.2 per cent) even when they are at home in the night. However, it is apparent that there is a predominant feeling of safety among HH respondents, regardless of the time or place (see Table 2).

Table 2 Perceived HH safety levels (various times and places)

Context/time of day or night	Unsafe	Safe
Safety outside home during the day, during political campaigns	48.4%	50.0%
Safety outside home at night/in darkness	42.5%	57.2%
Safety in home at night/in darkness	37.2%	62.7%
Safety outside home during the day, during festivities	26.5%	72.6%
Safety outside home during the day, at harvest time	23.0%	75.5%
Safety outside home during the day, during the rain season	19.9%	79.0%
Safety outside home during the day, during the dry season	16.3%	82.6%
Safety walking alone from home to the market during the day/in daylight	13.9%	86.0%
Safety walking around the marketplace during the day	13.9%	85.7%
Safety outside home during the day, less than a 1-minute walk from home	10.9%	89.0%
Safety inside home, during the day/in daylight	8.8%	91.2%

Source: Wepundi et al. (2012, p. 61)

■ *Approximately 20 per cent of household respondents were victims of a crime or an act of violence over the year preceding the interviews, but twice as many felt that there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year.*

The most frequent type of crime experienced by HH respondents was robbery/theft, accounting for 61.2 per cent of cases; followed by cases of threat and/or intimidation (20.9 per cent); and assault, beating, shooting, or fighting (14.0 per cent). The most serious cases, those in which the victim was killed, accounted for 15.6 per cent, including intentional killing (7.1 per cent), revenge killing (5 per cent), and unintentional killing (3.5 per cent).

The vast majority of HH victims of crime or violence (85.5%) made the incident(s) known to the relevant authorities. Incidents were most frequently reported to the police (in 64 per cent of cases) and provincial administration (in 21.5 per cent of cases). In a few cases, the reports were made to family members (in 4.6 per cent of cases) or traditional leaders (in 4 per cent of cases).

Forty-two per cent of HH respondents felt there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year.

Incidents of **crime and the use of arms in North Eastern Province have reduced in number**, and local efforts have estab-

lished a mediated state—relative stability born from initiatives grounded in government–civic partnerships.³ Despite this stability in North Eastern, communities remain wary of the threat of spillover effects of the war in Somalia. The biggest concerns about the region are now the threat of al-Shabaab infiltration and the use of the region as an arms corridor to other parts of the country. Recent reports about suspected al-Shabaab grenade attacks on civilian targets in Garissa in response to the ongoing Kenyan pre-emptive incursion into Somalia confirm these fears.⁴

Other regions such as **Upper Eastern and North Rift are still grappling with small arms-fuelled insecurity**. Inter-community rivalries persist, some of which are with cross-border groups (from Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda).

Among the reasons for **inter-group rivalry** are the cattle rustling and boundary disputes that inform many inter-community conflicts, for example in Coast, the Wardei conflict with the Orma over community grazing blocks and boundaries. Communities in North Rift accuse each other of expansionism, such as the Samburu, who consider the Pokot as expansionist. The Maasai, Kisii, and Kuria are in conflict over boundaries in Nyanza, while the Sabaot have grievances over land issues in Western Province. The conflict between the Tharaka

and Igembe of Meru is also caused by boundaries. All these conflicts, including post-election violence, are resource based.⁵

■ *More than one-third of those who were victims of crimes were confronted with a firearm.*

In total, more than one-third of victims of crime or violent encounters were confronted with a firearm (Figure 1). Among firearms, automatic weapons were the most frequently used (16.8 per cent), followed by handguns (14.5 per cent). Bladed and traditional weapons were mentioned in approximately one-quarter of cases, while in 19 per cent of cases no weapon was used. Interviews and focus group discussions carried out during this study indicated that AK-47 assault rifles are the most commonly used firearm in perpetrating crime and violence in the country.


■ *Perceptions of government initiatives to control illicit firearms differ between respondents from law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations.*

Among LEA respondents, 75.5 per cent rate government arms control initiatives as successful, while 55.9 per cent of CSO respondents feel the same way. Figure 2 illustrates the differences in opinions between LEAs and CSOs.

Conclusions


Accomplishments in **arms control and security management initiatives benefit from the centrality of bottom-up dialogical approaches of a multi-stakeholder nature**. The north-eastern region, whose history of insecurity was fuelled by a Somali secessionist attempts in early post-independence Kenya, is often cited as a success story in armed violence reduction programmes. Such efforts involved the use of local elders, women representatives, local administrators, and law enforcers in joint non-coercive

Figure 1 Weapons used in incidents of crime or violence



Source: Wepundi et al. (2012, p. 64)

Figure 2 Percentage of respondents believing that Kenya has succeeded in controlling small arms in the past five years, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: Wepundi et al. (2012, p. 67)

efforts to establish peace and manage small arms and light weapons.⁶

An often-celebrated achievement is the work of the Wajir Women for Peace Group that kick-started local initiatives to end local firearms-fuelled violence in Wajir. This process catalysed the formation of a more inclusive multi-clan Wajir Peace Group, which brokered a local peace pact—the Al Fatah Declaration. The process later gave birth to the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC)—a local peace structure that became integrated as a sub-committee of the government’s District and Development Committee in 1995. This heralded the creation of local peace committees for violence reduction and security management, initially in northern Kenya, but later countrywide. The committees were useful in utilizing traditional conflict resolution methods, such as passing binding peace agreements based on community norms that have contributed to the current stability.

It is observable that **the facilitating conditions for small arms demand still**

exist. Specifically, the recurrent cycles of politically motivated clashes escalated by the 2007/08 post-election violence have created a new demand for small arms, especially in central Rift Valley. A reduction of cattle rustling in West Pokot around this period was linked to the lucrative arms trafficking trade due to heightened demand in central Rift Valley (UNDP/UNOCHA, 2008, p. 1). In this region, arms demand is said to be a function of two broad factors. Firstly, the government is viewed as having failed to provide adequate security. Secondly, communities feel increasingly vulnerable to attacks from neighbours, emergent criminal gangs, and armed youths.

In order for the government to accurately diagnose the small arms problem, it should recognize that **small arms acquisition by groups is as much a response to threats as it is an attempt to gain offensive capability.**

Although the gains made in bottom-up approaches, such as the use of local peace structures, have been replicated

countrywide (through the formation of peace committees and District Task Forces), **the ingraining of lessons learned in successful armed violence and gun reduction practices has been slow.** For instance, although the government showed progress by infusing varied confidence-building measures in Operation Dumisha Amani, local and regional security complexes, among other internal challenges, undermined security forces’ efforts. Thus, while the disarmament programme targeted several districts simultaneously, rival communities felt unfairly targeted, in part due to the suspicion that neighbours were not disarmed as extensively. In effect, disarmed groups developed even greater demand for arms, as local conflicts escalated in some areas. This fact is particularly observable in Isiolo. It is apparent that the quick-fix solution has often been forceful disarmament. It has been trickier to integrate peace-building approaches into disarmament initiatives, regardless of existing local peace and arms reduction structures.

The present study has shown that **multiple arms sources and movements, and widespread prevalence call for robust regionalized mechanisms** that include border control, joint inter-state initiatives, and proper and efficient internal surveillance and enforcement machinery.

These demand and supply anti-arms instruments should in part be dependent on **strengthened early warning and response mechanisms that integrate the monitoring and reporting of arms-related dynamics.** The KNFP’s sister unit, the National Steering Committee (NSC), runs an early warning platform that should be tapped for pre-emptive measures against emergent arms problems. This is as much an inter-unit and inter-agency coordination concern as it is a warning against the temptation to duplicate efforts rather than to harmonize them.

To some extent, this survey demonstrates the negative impact of small

arms-fuelled insecurity on human security. In nearly one-third of cases, respondents generally felt that there had been increased armed violence, more deaths and injuries, more frequent cattle raids, and greater food insecurity, among other impacts. It cannot be gainsaid that **small arms have indirect impacts on health, access to education, and under-development, among other human development indicators.**

Importantly, this study is the first comprehensive arms mapping in the region since the formulation of the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) Best Practice Guidelines. In these guidelines, a baseline study of the arms situation should precede any arms collection exercise. The example of Kenya, through this study and the 2003 KNFP mapping, should serve to guide the fine-tuning of appropriate small arms research approaches and methodologies. This will require scaling up the research capacities of RECSA member states' small arms and light weapons focal points. ■



A Kenyan police reservist shows G3 ammunition provided by the government, 2011.
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Recommendations

Based on the survey findings, a number of recommendations can be formulated. They originate from the perceptions of LEAs and respondents from HHs, CSOs, and focus group discussions, and have been grouped according to emerging main issues.

Monitoring and understanding the nature of the problem

In line with Kenyan civil society commitments to creating a community of practice on armed violence and development, this study has highlighted the importance of regularly measuring and monitoring (with gender disaggregated data) the incidence and impact of armed violence locally and nationally, and developing a set of specific and measurable indicators to assess progress in efforts to reduce armed violence and arms prevalence.

Monitoring should include:

- generating, computerizing, integrating, and creating a data- and information-sharing platform on small arms and light weapons management;
- establishing a broad-based reporting and cooperation framework for early warning and early response that should maximize public participation and multi-stakeholder engagement. Further, there is need to engage community leaders in curbing illicit arms trafficking through the identification of gunrunners, trafficking routes, and gun markets;
- expediting the process of marking government and civilian licensed firearms;
- upgrading the Kenyan forensic laboratory and acquiring new technological equipment;⁷
- test firing all state- and civilian-owned firearms and collecting their ballistic information. This information should be

kept in a national firearms database to aid in any investigations of gun-related incidents and reduce the misuse of government and licensed firearms;⁸ and

- requiring any future procurement of firearms to be supplied with their ballistic information.

Institutional environment

Improving policing capacities should involve:

- increasing LEAs' presence and visibility in affected areas. In many of the pastoralist areas, communities' interaction with formal government institutions and law enforcement agencies is minimal, and this reinforces the need for self-help security arrangements. Specifically, the dispatch of law enforcers to different areas should be tied to the strategic needs of these places. In frontier areas, the foremost concerns are managing border

security, cattle rustling, and arms trafficking. In urban areas, the challenges of robbery and carjacking, among other crimes, are the priority security issues;

- adequately equipping LEAs, including the provision of transport and communication equipment, with priority given to borderland regions (northern Kenya);

- strengthening law enforcement agency–public information sharing in security management using initiatives such as community-based policing, district task forces, district peace committees, and any other relevant structures. This will also improve public confidence in LEAs;

- strengthening the investigative and prosecutorial roles of the law enforcement agencies and the Directorate of Public Prosecution, including magistrates, especially in relation to combating small arms and light weapons-related crime;

- improving the country’s intelligence capacity, specifically in relation to curbing small arms and light weapons proliferation;

- establishing a specialized police unit to deal with small arms;

- streamlining the management of KPRs with a view to ensuring greater KPR discipline and accountability in their use of firearms;

- overhauling the KPR approach to security provision through increasing the deployment of police officers; and

- acknowledging Western Province and South Rift as emerging small arms demand zones, based on a rise in the prevalence of small arms. There is a need to strengthen small arms surveillance in these areas and resolve conflicts, manage emerging security threats, and curb all contributing causes to arms demand.

Targeting arms-trafficking and border control issues should involve:

- enhancing border control mechanisms through regular border patrols, strengthening border check points, establishing more border posts, and strengthening border surveillance systems;

- deploying rapid response forces in border areas to curtail the influx of illicit small arms and curb cattle-rustling raids/attacks;

- strengthening the role of traffic police and the Criminal Investigation Department in detecting gun trafficking and curbing this, and investing in gun detection equipment for these officers;

- strengthening the accountability of LEAs involved in the surveillance of entry points and trafficking routes through clamping down on corruption in these areas and through stricter supervision and vetting of these officers; and

- improving the terms of service for LEAs to curb corruption and improve their motivation.

Improving policy frameworks should involve:

- lobbying for the adoption and implementation of small arms and peace policies. These policies need to be audited for their relevance in comprehensively addressing the different social, economic, political and security dimensions of the small arms, disarmament, and community safety problems;

- reviewing the Firearms Act with a view to introducing stringent measures against illicit small arms possession and ownership; and

- incorporating best practices on small arms management into the discourse and efforts taking place in the security sector reform process in Kenya, e.g. the RECSA Best Practice Guidelines.

Measures to reduce access to firearms

These measures should involve:

- implementing cultural awareness programmes that dissuade communities from gun cultures and negative cultural practices, particularly among pastoralists. An example is a Catholic Justice and Peace Commission’s integrated peace and livelihoods initiative in greater Samburu that has infused conflict sensitivity into its activities to encourage cooperation

and dialogue among rival Samburu, Pokot, and Turkana (Wepundi, 2011).

While it has made some gains, these can be sustained only if similar efforts are more broadly implemented. Such efforts should also have components of cultural exchange programmes to strengthen value coexistence and support cultural institutions, e.g. elders, in order to have local community capacities for maintaining social order;

- undertaking comprehensive disarmament measures targeting all groups guided by the RECSA Best Practice Guidelines and the government’s disarmament and development approach. These should also be tied to other relevant peace and development initiatives;

- engaging communities in peaceful conflict resolution with a view to reducing the demand for small arms; and

- undertaking regional approaches to disarmament such as the joint disarmament exercises particularly within the Karamoja and Somali cluster areas.

Measures dealing with victims

These measures should involve:

- addressing the plight of violence- and arms-induced displacements. The government has often focused on internally displace persons (IDPs) in hotspots of electoral violence, such as central Rift Valley. While there has not been a complete solution to this group of IDPs, resettlement and compensation efforts for displaced persons should also target this cluster in pastoralist areas. Displacements resulting from cattle rustling and pastoral community conflicts are the most ignored humanitarian problem in the country; and

- the government improving the facilities in hospitals and boosting their capacity to handle patients with gun-inflicted wounds, many of which are complex.

Systemic development-oriented measures

These measures should involve:

- promoting alternative livelihoods in northern Kenya, such as exploiting the

huge potential in minerals extraction and processing, tourist attraction centres, the livestock industry, and agriculture. Similarly, community empowerment programmes should be designed that engage the youth in income-generating activities to reduce the allure of banditry and gun-related violence;

- improving infrastructure in northern Kenya to unlock the entire region's immense potential. Most of northern Kenya lacks paved roads, while communication infrastructure is underdeveloped. This has security implications—for instance, in Parkati village in Samburu North, a recent raid left several dead. But the community could not relay information on the attack early enough because of a lack of mobile phone network coverage. But even if such a report were given in good time, it is a five-hour drive from Baragoi (the main town) to Parkati. Infrastructure development would also curb highway banditry (Wepundi, 2011, p. 20);

- undertaking further research, particularly among pastoralist communities and in urban areas, to identify the relationships between incidents of crime, the use of small arms, and socio-economic factors;

- incorporating armed violence prevention and reduction strategies in development programming, in line with Kenyan civil society commitments to creating a community of practice on armed violence and development;

- assessing the movement of small arms in and out of the country. Although the present study looked at trends, cross-border volumes should be studied to authoritatively determine key players, sources, and destinations of arms, both licit and illicit. This was one of the limitations of this study; and

- assessing gendered responses in terms of themes and specific perspectives. Data used in this study and future research can be used to disaggregate gendered views on various concerns regarding small arms.

Through the coordinated effort of government agencies and law enforcement actors, it is possible to significantly reduce the possession and use of illicit small arms and light weapons in Kenya and avoid the recurrence of violent regional conflict. 📌

Notes

- 1 Whereas the government has implemented various disarmament operations, such as the 2005 and 2010 Operation Dumisha Amani, and the 2008 Operation Chunga Mpaka and Operation Okoa Maisha, among others, there have been initiatives involving civil society such as the UNDP-funded Armed Violence Reduction project in Garissa.
- 2 Pastoralist counties where respondents have self-reported possession of firearms include Baringo, Isiolo, Laikipia, Samburu, Tana River, and Turkana. Respondents in counties including Nairobi, Mandera, and Garissa denied firearms possession, despite evidence from other studies contradicting those claims (Sabala, 2002; Stavrou, 2002; Mkutu, 2008).
- 3 In his analysis on the Wajir success story, Menkhaus (2008, pp. 25–29) observes that the WPDC has helped stabilize relations between the Ajuraan and Degodia clans since 1994 and introduced a hybrid form of state building in weak states that is different from the European model.
- 4 For example, in a recent incident, six people died from grenade attacks (Hussein, 2011).
- 5 For example, the NSC (2011, pp. 126–33) tabulated the structural and proximate causes of conflicts in different parts of the country.
- 6 For example, Chopra (2008, pp. 15–16) demonstrates how the use of local peace structures eventually informed the evolution of local binding peace pacts, such as the Modogashe-Garissa Declaration.
- 7 Based on key informant interview.
- 8 Based on key informant interview.

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Credits

This Executive Summary is based on the Special Report, *Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*, by Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate. The full report is available in English and Swahili online, together with the Swahili version of this Executive Summary: www.smallarmssurvey.org/?special-reports

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