Introduction

More than a decade of civil war in Liberia came to a close on 18 August 2003 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana. The CPA called for, among other things, the establishment of a National Transitional Government in Liberia (NTGL) and the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) programme for the country’s estimated 38,000 ex-combatants. Established by Security Council resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was charged with the task of keeping the peace while the DDRR programme was planned and implemented. The programme began December 2003, and its DD component officially ended on 31 October 2004.

This chapter charts the progress of the DDRR programme in Liberia up to December 2004, one year after eager ex-combatants first surrendered their weapons. The assessment is divided into three sections: the first presents the operational process of DDRR and highlights main results to date; the second focuses on the principal difficulties experienced during this process; while the third discusses main challenges ahead.

Information and analysis used in this chapter draw extensively on the author’s experience as DDRR officer in Liberia from mid-2004 to early 2005. While in Monrovia, the author interviewed a wide range of international civil servants, peacekeeping officials, ex-combatants, and representatives of civil society. The author undertook an extensive review of UN documents and statistics, and secondary sources such as press articles, to further substantiate his analysis.
The chapter comes to the following conclusions:

- The disarmament process resulted in the surrender of more than 27,000 weapons, which represents roughly two-thirds of Liberian armed groups’ estimated stockpiles.
- A weak screening process enabled more than 100,000 people to go through the DDRR process – more than two-and-a-half times the original estimate.
- A rushed start and subsequent operational hiccups led to several riots and demonstrations.
- As of December 2004, funds for rehabilitation and reintegration (RR) were insufficient to reintegrate the large number of people who demobilized, raising fears that some 47,000 ex-combatants would be excluded from the programme.
- Despite demobilization, Liberian armed groups’ structures remain very much intact and incidents of violence still threaten the fragile peace process.

**Liberia’s DDRR process: a closer look**

*Getting it wrong: disarmament in December 2003*

Following a symbolic weapons destruction ceremony on 1 December 2003, UNMIL started the official DDRR process on 7 December despite widespread fears that the launch was premature (UNMIL, 2003a). When frustrated ex-combatants fired shots and took over the disarmament site, it became clear that preparations were woefully inadequate. Despite this highly publicized setback, disarmament continued until 27 December and was then suspended indefinitely due to the increasing threat of violence and general deterioration of security.

On 7 December at Camp Scheiffelin, near Monrovia, ex-Government of Liberia (ex-GoL) fighters began to disarm. From the moment the decision was announced, those on the ground knew there were going to be problems. As one UN official explained, ‘every technocrat knew the timing was premature... it went against all technical logic as there was not even a monitoring system in place.’ With fewer than 7,000 peacekeepers in the country, a distinct lack of security exacerbated an already precarious situation (UNMIL, 2003b). Many assumed that the decision to start disarmament was driven by donor pressure on UNMIL to demonstrate operational readiness.
**Table 4.1 Fourteen years of conflict in Liberia: A timeline of key events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1989</td>
<td>Charles Taylor leads his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in an invasion of Northern Liberia—the first step of a plan to topple President Samuel Doe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sends an intervention force to Liberia: the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Doe is executed by a breakaway faction of the NPFL, led by Prince Johnson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1991</td>
<td>Fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invade Sierra Leone from Liberia, led by Foday Sankoh, an associate of Charles Taylor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1991</td>
<td>Liberian refugees from Guinea and Sierra Leone, who had backed ex-President Doe, form the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)—a rival to Taylor’s NPFL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–95</td>
<td>Fighting continues between the NPFL, ECOMOG and ULIMO forces. In 1993 ULIMO splits along ethnic lines into two warring factions, ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1995</td>
<td>A peace agreement is signed in Abuja, calling for a cease-fire and disarmament of fighting forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Fighting erupts between ULIMO-J and the NPFL and spreads to Monrovia. ECOMOG troops regain control and another ceasefire is declared. ECOMOG launches a disarmament and demobilization programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1997</td>
<td>The RUF, backed by Taylor, topples President Kabbah in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s Kamajor fighters, who supported ex-president Kabbah, flee to Liberia where they unite with ULIMO rebels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Charles Taylor is elected president. His National Patriotic Party wins a majority of seats in the National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1997</td>
<td>UNOMIL withdraws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2000</td>
<td>Anti-Taylor groups, including the Kamajors and ULIMO, unite to form Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>LURD invades northern Liberia from Guinea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>Taylor counter-attacks LURD by sending RUF forces into Guinea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001</td>
<td>The UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo and sanctions on Liberia for its continued support of the RUF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>LURD advances to within 50 km of Monrovia. Taylor declares a state of emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) emerges as a new Liberian rebel group, closely linked to LURD but based in Côte d’Ivoire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>The Special Court in Sierra Leone issues an indictment for war crimes against Charles Taylor due to his alleged support for the RUF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>ECOWAS peacekeepers arrive in Liberia. A CPA is signed in Accra. Taylor accepts an offer of asylum in Nigeria and an interim government is established, headed by Gyude Bryant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>Liberia’s DRRR programme is launched.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outside the US embassy, civilians pile up the corpses of those killed in the latest mortar attack on central Monrovia.
UNMIL officials also claimed, however, that Chairman Gyude Bryant of the NTGL pushed for disarmament in response to violent threats from ex-GoL fighters eager to swap arms for cash.4

On the opening day of disarmament, UNMIL officials expected to process 250 ex-combatants, but well over 1,000 showed up. Needless to say, numbers were completely unmanageable, and both UN staff and NGO service providers were overwhelmed. A slow start meant that by nightfall, 500 people were still lining up outside the camp, weapons in hand.5 A lack of food and water, coupled with widespread confusion led to mounting frustration. Many fighters mistakenly assumed that when they turned in their arms they would instantly receive their cash payment of USD 150. This misinformation was clearly attributed to inadequate sensitization regarding the DDRR process. As dissatisfaction boiled over, the ex-combatants began brandishing their weapons and subsequently took over Camp Scheiffelin. Shots were fired and many disgruntled fighters returned to Monrovia, riding atop vehicles and waving their guns. Angry ex-combatants set up roadblocks and a general period of rioting ensued in the capital and surrounding areas for the following two days, resulting in the deaths of nine citizens (assumed to be ex-GoL fighters).6

Despite the chaos, disarmament continued. UNMIL decided to appease ex-combatants intent on handing in weapons and ammunition with an on-the-spot payment of USD 75. A second instalment of USD 75 was to be paid out when disarmament resumed in April 2004. In the meantime, ex-combatants continued to hand over their weapons at Camp Scheiffelin until 27 December 2003, at which point the process was finally suspended amid further security concerns. More than 13,000 fighters reportedly disarmed, although JIU officials estimated that at least 3,000 of these succeeded in ‘disarming twice’ owing to the lack of monitoring and control.7

Resuming the process
Following the December fiasco, UNMIL returned to the drawing board and focused on raising public awareness while simultaneously continuing site preparations. On 21 January 2004, UNMIL launched a nationwide DDRR information campaign (UNMIL, 2004a). In April, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Liberia Jacques Klein announced that three
preconditions for resumption of DDRR had been met: adequate sensitization of combatants; adequate force deployment; the construction of cantonment sites and service provider readiness. Unfortunately, however, armed factions had failed to submit comprehensive lists of combatants to UNMIL (UNMIL, 2004b). This not only contributed to the delay of the DDRR process, but also made it impossible to predict the number of ex-combatants expected to take part.

Despite this critical absence of crucial information, on 15 April 2004, UNMIL re-launched DDRR and continued to disarm ex-combatants largely without incident until the DD component officially closed on 31 October 2004. All told, 102,193 ex-combatants disarmed and UNMIL collected a total of 27,804 weapons and 7,129,198 rounds of small arms ammunition (SAA) (NCDDRR, 2004b; UNMIL, 2004d, Annex E). A complete breakdown of DDRR results is presented in Table 4.3.

Under the guidance of a National Commission on DDRR (NCDDRR), a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) made up of UNMIL, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other partners was responsible for the overall planning and implementation of the DDRR programme. As outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, DDRR targeted the three main warring parties, namely, the former Government of Liberia (GoL) forces (and other paramilitary groups); Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD); and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

The disarmament and demobilization phase of the DDRR programme took place in 11 separate areas around the country. UNMIL personnel collected, separated, and then destroyed weapons and ammunition at specific sites. Daily, explosives teams destroyed ammunition at disposal sites around the country, while the weapons themselves were temporarily stored in containers until they could be transported to Monrovia. Prior to their destruction, personnel collected, re-counted, and catalogued by type and serial number all weapons. An American company, ORDSafe, dismantled the weapons using circular saws and a large shredding machine. Local organizations used some of the scrap for parts. The rest was disposed of.
## Table 4.2 DDRR and weapons collection and destruction programmes in Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event and timeframe</th>
<th>Implementing agency</th>
<th>Number of combatants disarmed</th>
<th>Number of weapons/ammunition collected</th>
<th>Number of weapons and ammunition destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament and demobilization programme (D&amp;D) (^a) 22/11/96—9/02/97</td>
<td>ECOMOG / UNOMIL (^b) / HACO</td>
<td>20,332 (^c)</td>
<td>7,797 weapons (serviceable) (^d) 1,782 weapons (unserviceable) 1,218,300 rounds of ammunition (^e)</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordon and search operations 9/02/97—13/08/97</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>132 (^f)</td>
<td>3,750 assorted weapons (^g) 152,500 rounds of ammunition</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial weapons burning 26/07/99</td>
<td>ECOMOG and UNOL (^h)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons destruction Completed 19/10/99 (^i)</td>
<td>ECOMOG and UNOL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18,420 small arms (^j) 626 heavy machine guns 150 anti-tank launchers 63 mortars 26 recoiless rifles 9 guns and howitzers 3 rocket launchers 3,000,000 rounds of SAA (^k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR 7/12/03—31/10/04 Note: the DDRR process was suspended from January to April 2004</td>
<td>JIU, UNMIL, UNDP, other UN agencies and partners</td>
<td>68,952 men 22,020 women 8,704 boys 2,517 girls - - - Total: 102,193 (^l)</td>
<td>27,804 weapons 7,129,198 rounds of SAA 32,530 other ammunition (^m)</td>
<td>All destroyed or slated for destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community arms collection programme (^n) (timeframe to be determined)</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:
- \(^a\) This D&D programme was called for under the 1995 Abuja Agreement.
- \(^b\) The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established by Security Council resolution 866 (1993).
- \(^c\) CAIL (1997, p. 19).
- \(^d\) These weapons included: pistols, revolvers, sub-machine guns, sub-machine carbines, rifles, general purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank, heavy-calibre, and other weapons (UNSC, 1997a, Annex II). Ammunition included grenades, SAA, higher-calibre ammunition, artillery shells, and mines (UNSC, 1997a, Annex II).
- \(^e\) UNSC (1997b, para. 17).
- \(^f\) UNSC (1997c, para. 16).
- \(^g\) The UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was established on 1 November 1997 following the withdrawal of UNOMIL (UN, 2000).
- \(^h\) Source for this section: PCASED (1999).
- \(^i\) The small arms were as follows: 25 per cent AK-47 (USSR and China), 25 per cent M16 (USA), 15 per cent Fames (France), 15 per cent Beretta (Italy), 10 per cent Uzi (Israel), 5 per cent Rifles (USA), 5 per cent other (various).
- \(^j\) The total weapons and ammunition destroyed were estimated to be worth more than USD 6 million. J NCDDR (2004b).
- \(^k\) A community arms collection programme, to be implemented following the completion of Liberia’s formal DDRR process, was called for in the Liberian DDRR Strategy and Implementation Framework (Draft Interim Secretariat, 2003, p. 16).
Table 4.3 Liberia’s DDRR statistics at a glance (as of 24 November 2004)\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total ex-combatants processed</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adult</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>68,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>22,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>8,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>102,193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total ex-combatants processed by faction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LURD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODEL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-GoL (incl. paramilitary)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total weapons collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rifles/sub-machine guns</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Machine guns</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pistols</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPG launchers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Misc.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total ammunition collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPG rockets</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>60/81 mm mortars</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>82 mm mortars</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hand grenades</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface-to-air missiles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Misc.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ammunition (excluding SAA)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} The CPA called for the Armed Forces of Liberia to be ‘confined to their barracks, their arms placed in armouries and their ammunition in storage bunkers’ (CPA article VI, para. 3.). However, this did not occur and AFL members were subsequently allowed to go through the DDRR process along with the other warring parties. b This category is largely assumed to be ex-GoL fighters. c Based on information from the JIU, it is believed that over 3,000 of these weapons are actually shotguns.

Sources: NCDDRR (2004b); UNMIL (2004d, Annex E)
In order to be eligible for the DDRR programme, participants had to:

- present a serviceable weapon or ammunition which met the required entry criteria (see Table 4.4); or
- be a child (under 18) associated with the fighting forces (CAFF); or
- be a woman associated with the fighting forces (WAFF).13

Following disarmament, ex-combatants were housed and fed at a demobilization cantonment site for a total of five days. A maximum of 250 ex-combatants were expected to be admitted every day, and upon arrival, cantonment site staff put them through a medical screening process, issued ID cards, identified their reintegration preference, and provided them with a
package of non-food items. Following registration, women and men were housed in separate quarters while child protection agencies transported children to interim care centres until they could be reunited with their families.

During their stay the ex-combatants participated in a series of pre-discharge orientation sessions dealing with topics such as career counselling, health awareness, civic education, peace-building, and reconciliation. Women also received reproductive health and sexually based gender violence (SBGV) counselling.

Prior to discharge, ex-combatants received a one-month food ration and USD 150, the first instalment of their Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA). Child combatants also received a TSA, though this was paid only once they were reunited with their parents. The second instalment of the TSA, another USD 150, was subsequently paid to the ex-combatants after a period of three months.

**DD in review**

While the RR of Liberia’s ex-combatants is ongoing and the success of the final outcome not yet clear, DD officially ended 31 October 2004, and is thus ripe for analysis.

**Shortcomings in the screening process**

Firstly, the incredibly large number of people who went through the DDRR process (102,193, more than two-and-a-half times the original estimate of 38,000) can undoubtedly be attributed to two factors: underestimation coupled with a flawed screening process. When originally planning DDRR, UNMIL came up with a best estimate of 38,000 given that armed factions failed to provide a comprehensive list of their fighting forces. Following the first phase of disarmament in December 2003, UNMIL and the NTGL raised the number to 53,000 ex-combatants – although this figure also proved sadly inaccurate (NTGL, 2004, p. 11).

UNMIL soon discovered that the high number of participants was not simply the result of low estimates, but could also be blamed on a flawed screening process. Initially, military observers (MILOBS) were tasked with both disarming fighters and subsequently screening them at the demobilization camp using a series of questions designed to ascertain that participants were,
Government soldiers loyal to Liberian president Charles Taylor get psyched before heading to the Waterside front to battle LURD insurgents. Many take drugs before engaging in combat.
indeed, ex-combatants or women or children associated with the fighting forces (WAFF or CAFF). However, the MILOS left this post-disarmament screening process to local NGO staff, who lacked the training and authority required to effectively identify and reject illegitimate participants. This meant that, by the time the ex-combatants had been processed at the disarmament sites, they were virtually guaranteed admission into the cantonment sites, making any screening process largely irrelevant.  

At the initial pick-up points, MILOS did attempt to screen the ex-combatants before allowing them to board the trucks that then transported them to disarmament sites. They questioned them about their roles and responsibilities during the war, and tested their knowledge, often asking them to dismantle their guns, identify parts, and explain what ammunition they used. There was no standardized screening procedure or set questions, however, and this process was often undermined by language barriers and cultural misunderstandings despite the assistance of local translators. In essence, the extent to which ex-combatants were screened depended entirely on the persistence and ability of the MILOS to ask the right questions and to obtain accurate information. While they had the final say in who boarded the trucks and who did not, MILOS were often obliged to rely on information that commanders provided or on local NGO and NCDDR staff, all of whom have been accused on occasion of trying to deceive MILOS into granting entry to non-combatants.

As a result of the weak screening process, many non-fighters managed to gain entry into the programme. It was even easier for women and children because they were not required to hand over a weapon or any ammunition—although many did. Of the 33,241 women and children processed, 13,891 brought weapons or ammunition with them. The remaining 19,350 were admitted as WAFF or CAFF. MILOS managed to screen these, but found it tremendously difficult to separate legitimate WAFF and CAFF from regular citizens trying to sneak into the DDRR programme. As one of the MILOS explained, ‘fighting has been ongoing in the country for the last 14 years … sometimes it seems as though everyone has been associated with the fighting forces in some way or another at some point in time.’ It is not clear how many potential WAFF or CAFF MILOS were turned away but according to one observer, ‘not very many’.
In general there is no way to determine how many illegitimate participants took part in the DDRR programme, although one UNMIL official estimated that of the 102,193 people processed no more than 60,000 were legitimate fighters, WAFF or CAFF.25

Weak entry criteria—specifically, the 150 rounds of ammunition—have also been blamed for contributing to the large number of ex-combatants who entered the DDRR programme. Some UN officials felt that SAA should not have been accepted in lieu of a weapon or that the minimum amount should at least have been set higher than 150 rounds.26

One consequence of incomplete lists and weak entry criteria was that some faction leaders hand-picked and provided weapons to soldiers whom they then sent through the programme. Leaders profited by collecting the TSA payment. This was reported, for example, at the Harper disarmament site where commanders disarmed fighters in advance and then redistributed weapons and ammunition to those from whom they could easily recover money. Annoyed and frustrated, a number of legitimate fighters excluded from the DDRR programme openly clashed with commanders and demanded that their weapons be returned—to no avail.27

These kinds of scams meant that the DDRR programme effectively resulted in the enrichment of many commanders who were able to turn in a weapon or ammunition with a market value ranging from USD 30 to USD 50 and come out the other end with up to USD 300.28 While ex-combatants still controlled by their commanders were forced to give up their cash payment, they still stood to benefit from the reintegration phase. In a similar twist, there were also reports of both commanders and other legitimate combatants selling weapons and ammunition to non-combatants, who then succeeded in breezing past the DDRR screening process (UNSC, 2004b, para. 11).

**Disarmament: what’s in a number?**
The large number of participants in the DDRR programme would be little cause for alarm, were it not for the apparent lack of corresponding weapons: only 27,804 for 102,193 ex-combatants. As alluded to above, the lopsided person-to-weapon ratio can be partly explained by the fact that almost 20,000 women and children entered the programme without weapons or ammuni-
All weapons collected during the disarmament programme were systematically destroyed.
tion, and that many men may have brought in ammunition and left their guns behind. It should also be noted that at least 75 per cent of the 4,008 ‘miscellaneous’ weapons collected were actually shotguns. This represents more than 10 per cent of the total arms turned in. Some UNMIL officials felt that these weapons should not have been accepted for entry into the DDRR programme owing to their extremely poor quality and the fact that it is questionable whether ex-combatants actually used them. Many larger weapons, such as those used during the August 2003 siege of Monrovia, were never turned in despite promises from faction leaders (NCDDRR, 2004a).

Following the start of DDRR, UN officials soon noticed a significant disparity between the number and type of weapons that the JIU (DDRR headquarters) reported collecting, and the actual physical count that took place prior to their destruction. This apparently stemmed from confusion between the MILOBS who recorded the collected weapons, and database personnel who then processed the disarmament forms and tallied figures at the JIU. For example: when an ex-combatant handed in a 120 mm mortar, MILOBS would record a ‘1’ on the disarmament form, which was its identification code. Likewise, a ‘7’ would be recorded for an AK-47 assault rifle. Those processing the forms easily misread numbers that appeared so similar when handwritten, resulting in an inordinately high number of 120 mm mortars being reported instead of AK-47s.

Another problem arose with the mortar weapons, which consist of three parts: a base plate, a tripod, and a firing tube. These three components would often be handed in separately, yet each one would subsequently be recorded and tallied as a complete weapon. Compounding problems even more was the fact that some MILOBS apparently lacked sufficient training to accurately identify the weapons collected, thus further skewing the numbers.

These reporting errors means that NCDDRR and JIU weapons and ammunition breakdowns listed in their fortnightly DDRR Consolidated Reports were inaccurate and unreliable. To resolve this, DDRR officials were required to rely on the actual physical count of the weapons and ammunition collected and recorded by MILOBS (the figures reported in Table 4.3). Data that the JIU collected from the disarmament forms was largely ignored.

There is no clear indication how many weapons were present in Liberia prior to DDRR, though the illegal shipments reported by the UN Panel of Experts
on Liberia in 2002 and 2003 alone suggest that the number is significant (UNSC, 2002, paras. 64–5; 2003, paras. 95–7; 2004a, paras. 55–6). Since August 2003, there have been no recorded weapons shipments by air although, as the Panel of Experts points out, ‘international smuggling networks remain in place and could be reactivated at any time’ (UNSC, 2004a, para. 4).

With no accurate figure for weapons stockpiles, it is difficult to assess to what extent the disarmament process has been successful. However, one rough calculation undertaken by UNMIL is based on the examination of serial numbers and type of weapons collected and then comparing this to six known arms shipments transported from the former Yugoslavia in 2002.

Included were a total of 5,000 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39 mm), highlighted in the red boxes in Table 4.7. As disarmament progressed, it quickly became evident that many of the automatic rifles collected probably came from these shipments because serial numbers were similar and spanned a range of exactly 5,000—from 795,163 to 800,163. With less than a month remaining in the disarmament process, by 3 October 2004, ex-combatants had turned in a total of 3,175, or 64 per cent, of the original 5,000 rifles. UNMIL undertook a similar count of 200 missile launchers (RB M57), highlighted in the black boxes. Of these, it appeared from the serial numbers that ex-combatants had turned in 184, or 92 per cent. Further analysis also showed that, of an estimated 791 RPG-7 rockets (not listed in Table 4.7), a total of 459, or 58 per cent, were collected.  

Combined, these figures show that 64 per cent of the weapons from these three groups were collected (see Table 4.5). When these calculations were made in early October 2004, a total of 25,167 weapons had been turned in during the Liberian disarmament process. If one were to extrapolate and assume that 25,167 weapons collected represented 64 per cent of the total, this would suggest that, in early October 2004, approximately 14,000 weapons remained unaccounted for (see Table 4.6). (Since that time, ex-combatants turned in an additional 3,000 prior to the official end of disarmament.) Such calculations are, of course, exceptionally crude owing to the fact that there is little to suggest that the 64 per cent collection rate can accurately be extended to Liberia’s total small arms holdings.

Noteworthy is the fact that many ex-combatants, particularly faction leaders, were perhaps well aware that the weapons from the Yugoslavian ship-
ments are well-tracked by the UN and therefore would likely have been inclined to turn these in first. Nonetheless, as rough as the figures may be, one member of the Panel of Experts on Liberia estimates that approximately 60 per cent of the country’s weapons have been collected.

While there is no doubt that many weapons still remain unaccounted for, there is little to indicate where they may be. In October 2003, UNMIL discovered large weapons caches in the executive mansion, in ex-President Moses Blah’s residence, and in two areas in the bush (one in Voinjama, northern Liberia, and the other near the western border with Sierra Leone). UNMIL assumes that other caches exist but have yet to be found. Occasional reports circulating in the media suggest this is the case. It is also possible that traffickers may have shipped missing weapons to Côte d’Ivoire. Fortunately, since the serial number batches of the collected weapons are being recorded, it will be possible to discover whether any of the weapons turned in during Côte d’Ivoire’s eventual DDR programme originated in Liberia, thus providing information on cross-border trafficking.

**Demobilization**

Although relatively comprehensive, demobilization was hindered by its limited duration. Some officials viewed the five-day period in which the

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**Table 4.5 Total weapons collected for three groups as of 3 October 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon type</th>
<th>Number collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifles</td>
<td>3,175 / 5,000 = 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile launchers</td>
<td>184 / 200 = 92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG rockets</td>
<td>459 / 791 = 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,818 / 5,991 = 64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.6 Projected estimate of uncollected weapons as of 3 October 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projected estimate</th>
<th>Percentage and number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collected weapons</td>
<td>64% = 25,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total weapons</td>
<td>100% = 39,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncollected weapons</td>
<td>36% = 14,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of flight landing in Liberia</td>
<td>Contents of flights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 June 2002                     | 1,000 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39 mm)  
498,560 cartridges (7.62 x 39 mm, M67)  
2,000 hand grenades (M75) | 21 |
| 7 June 2002                     | 1,000 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39 mm)  
1,260,000 cartridges (7.62 x 39 mm, M67)  
2,496 hand grenades (M75) | 40 |
| 29 June 2002                    | 1,500 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39 mm)  
1,165,500 cartridges (7.62 x 39 mm, M67) | 40 |
| 5 July 2002                     | 120,000 rounds of ammunition (7.62 mm for M84)  
11,250 rounds of ammunition (9 mm NATO)  
75,000 rounds of ammunition (7.65 mm)  
100 missile launchers (RB M57)  
4500 mines for RB M57  
60 automatic pistols (M84, 7.65 mm)  
20 pistols (CZ99, 9 mm)  
10 Black Arrow long-range rifles (M93, 12.7 mm)  
5 machine guns (M84, 7.62 mm) | 33 |
| 23 August 2002                  | 100 missile launchers (RB M57)  
1,000 mines for RB M57  
50 machine guns (M84, 7.62 mm)  
1,500 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39 mm)  
17 pistols (CZ99, 9 mm)  
92,400 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 54 mm)  
526,680 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 39 mm)  
9,000 rounds of ammunition (9 mm)  
6,000 rounds of ammunition (7.65 mm)  
9 hunting rifles | 38 |
| 25 August 2002                  | 152 missile launchers  
1,000 mines for RB M57  
10 automatic pistols (M84, 7.65 mm)  
5,200 rounds of ammunition for the Black Arrow long-range rifle (M93, 12.7 mm)  
183,600 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 54 mm)  
999,180 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 39 mm)  
2 sets of rubber pipelines  
3 propellers  
1 rotor head  
17 pistol holders | 38.5 |

Source: UNSC (2002, paras. 64–65)
combatants were housed at the cantonment sites as too brief to enable substantial and sustained behaviour and attitude change—and certainly too short to effectively break up existing command and control structures among armed factions. This shortcoming was made clear following widespread reports of ex-fighters, usually children, relinquishing their TSA to ‘former’ commanders upon leaving cantonment sites. The power that faction leaders continue to exercise over their followers is significant: during a post-disarmament uprising of disgruntled ex-combatants in Tubmanburg, UNMIL troops had to bring in a former LURD commander to quell the rioting.

While the ‘demobilization’ goal of the cantonment period was only a minor success, ex-combatants did benefit from services provided, and this should not be discounted. Of particular value were the medical screening process and the SBGV counselling for women. Many of the ex-combatants also reported finding pre-discharge orientation sessions to be of considerable help. It was also critical that child protection agencies separate those under 18 from their commanders—even if for only a limited time—by handing the children over to interim care centres. This allowed the children an opportunity, however brief, to escape the control structure and influence of the armed faction they had been tied to, and receive some post-conflict support in a caring environment.

**Bigger picture, bigger problems**

Overall, despite problems such as those described above, and a very imperfect set-up, the DD phase came to a close minus any major mishaps—the December 2003 fiasco aside. This was no small feat given unexpected numbers of ex-combatants and the complex dynamics that existed between warring factions. Had the initial launch of DDRR in December 2003 not been rushed, and the appropriate preparations been made instead, UNMIL might even be in a position to describe the DD as an overall success—despite the small number of weapons collected.

In addition to the DD’s technical shortcomings, however, it is clear that greater problems undermined the effectiveness of the overall DDRR programme from its very inception. One senior UNMIL official commented that the programme was largely drawn up from scratch and it was unclear from the
beginning what policies should guide it. To be truly effective, he maintained, the DDRR process should have been based on a skeleton document formed in consultation with appropriate parties, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). This would have established specific criteria (with regard to women, children, and entry, for example) prior to the roll-out of DDRR, and thus avoided much of the debate, policy wrangling, confusion, and delay that took place during the design stage. This DDRR template could then have been adapted to both national and regional considerations, and elaborated with funders at the table.

The lack of coordination and communication between UN officials in neighbouring countries was apparent when, in March 2004, Côte d’Ivoire announced the details of its own forthcoming DDR programme – taking many UNMIL officials by surprise. Confounding Liberia’s DDRR, is the fact that in Côte d’Ivoire, ex-combatants will be receiving considerably more money than Liberians when (and if) the disarmament process finally takes place (BBC, 2004). This has prompted speculation that many Liberian fighters may be holding back weapons in order to cash them in next door. Côte d’Ivoire’s DDR process, which had been scheduled for 15 October 2004 but was delayed indefinitely, originally called for a payment of USD 900 (IRIN, 2004a). Despite reports that this sum has since been reduced to USD 830, it remains a significant amount of money compared with the USD 300 paid in Liberia. This disparity may not only have significantly undermined Liberia’s DDRR process by providing fighters an extra incentive to hold on to their weapons but also may be contributing to the ongoing instability in Côte d’Ivoire by encouraging armed Liberian fighters to cross the border. One UNMIL official speculates that fighters may have brought weapons into Côte d’Ivoire during March 2004 when DDR programme details were first announced. Although only Ivorian fighters will be eligible, Liberian fighters may be all too happy to offer a weapon to an Ivorian counterpart for a share of the spoils.

In an attempt to promote cooperation between UN missions in the region, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), located in Dakar, hosted an initial meeting in May 2004, followed by a second in August, which focused on the harmonization of DDR programmes in West Africa (UNOWA, 2004a;
While these meetings most certainly led to a valuable exchange of information between UN missions and to the tabling of numerous programme and policy recommendations, it is questionable whether this has translated into concrete action on the ground. The meetings were also likely of negligible value to the planning and implementation of DDRR in Liberia owing to the fact that the disarmament process was already well under way.

One UNMIL official commented that, preparatory shortcomings aside, Liberia’s DDRR programme was destined to have problems for two major reasons: first, all DDRR programmes are unique and each will inevitably encounter serious and unavoidable challenges; and second, a DDRR programme should not be launched in the start-up phase of a UN mission, particularly when there are insufficient peacekeepers to maintain a secure environment.

A final issue which has hamstrung DDRR operations is that, at the policy level, the JIU has failed to function in a cohesive manner. Relations between some UN officials have been particularly strained, with several policy-makers openly critical of one another. The concept of joint effort and responsibility quickly degraded into unilateralism and finger pointing when things went wrong. The NCDDRR has been critical of the JIU structure, claiming it has been sidelined throughout much of the process and set up to fail by being given a huge mandate but no means with which to fulfil it.

In general, UNMIL has been criticized for having a ‘you are either with us or against us’ attitude. This arrogance has caused friction with partner UN agencies and NGOs that were established in Liberia long before UNMIL’s arrival and will remain long after it departs. Operationally, DDRR continues to run relatively smoothly, but there remains significant potential for further conflict between experts as they clash over programme and policy decisions. When asked to comment on the overall situation, one UNMIL official simply concluded, ‘I know two things: disarmament in Liberia is incomplete… and there is no such thing as a DDRR expert.’

During the creation of Liberia’s programme it has become unclear to what extent lessons learned from other DDRR experiences, particularly those in neighbouring Sierra Leone, have been applied. The programme has also been criticized for being designed and implemented largely in a void, with insufficient thought given to Liberia’s neighbours. In a region as volatile as West
Disappointingly few of the larger weapons were handed in during the disarmament programme, despite the promises of faction leaders to do so.
Africa, and particularly the Mano River Union, this has potentially grave implications. Long, porous borders between Liberia and its neighbours means that what happens in one country will invariably affect the others. This is especially the case with transient fighters and their weapons. When Liberia launched its DDRR process and started paying for weapons and ammunition, a market was instantly created.

Reports indicate that arms and ammunition are being brought into the country from abroad. In Guinea, at least two individuals are known to have been selling ammunition for transport into Liberia. Similarly, in Sierra Leone soldiers were caught trying to steal grenades from an armoury with the intention of selling them to Liberians looking for a ticket into the DDRR programme. Following an assessment visit to Voinjama (northern Liberia) in September 2004, NCDDR officials also reported stories of arms and ammunition being smuggled from Guinea into Lofa County in order to allow individuals to enter the DDRR programme at the Voinjama site.

Despite initiatives such as Operation Blue Vigilance—a United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) attempt to patrol the Sierra Leone-Liberia border—stemming the flow of people and their weapons remains an impossible task (UNAMSIL, 2003). One estimate is that between Boh-Waterside and the Porkpa district, a relatively short section of Liberia’s overall border with Sierra Leone, there are 43 border crossings alone of which only 15 are monitored. The situation is dramatically worse with Côte d’Ivoire, because UNMIL has only minimal control over the border despite recent deployments to the area.

UN officials have no estimate of how many weapons or fighters may have already passed back and forth between Liberia and its neighbours, but the flow is unlikely to stop anytime soon. This was made abundantly evident following the outbreak of renewed violence in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2004, when reports emerged that the Ivorian government was recruiting Liberian mercenaries to support President Laurent Gbagbo (National Chronicle, 2004). Similarly, in September 2004 it was reported that a rebel group, led by a former associate of Charles Taylor, was paying Liberian fighters USD 150–USD 200 to join him in his bid to overthrow the Guinean government (IRIN, 2004b).
Challenges ahead

Money matters: funding Liberia’s RR

Key to the success of Liberia’s DDRR programme and the achievement of sustainable peace is the effective reintegration of ex-combatants who have been disarmed and demobilized. The RR aspect of the DDRR programme is designed to provide vocational training and formal education opportunities, which are of critical importance to the reintegration of ex-combatants into society as normal citizens. Indeed, without a comprehensive RR component, DD may largely be a wasted effort owing to the fact that impoverished, unskilled, and disgruntled former fighters are often prone to take up arms in the absence of better alternatives.

Much of the success of reintegration hinges on available funding which, in turn, is dependent upon the generosity of donor nations. The DDRR trust fund, administered by UNDP, is paying for all civilian-related demobilization and reintegration activities, as well as the establishment and operation of the JIU. As of 1 November 2004, a total of USD 30.4 million had been pledged to the trust fund, while the actual amount received was USD 24.3 million—approximately 80 per cent of the total (UNDP, 2004).

With the case-load of ex-combatants disarmed far exceeding the original estimate of 38,000, the projected budget for DDRR was shattered. Consequently, even if the remaining 20 per cent of pledges are fulfilled, there will be insufficient funding to cover the expected cost of reintegration activities. As of 1 December 2004, UNDP calculated that 47,000 ex-combatants would be excluded from the reintegration programme, owing to a shortfall of USD 44.2 million (UNDP, 2004). While donors are being solicited to assist in covering these costs, it is still unknown, when, or indeed, whether, this funding will ever come through.

Meanwhile, ex-combatants continue to grow impatient as they wait for their reintegration package – with increasingly dangerous implications. Many have already moved into the capital from outlying regions, and violent crime and demonstrations have consequently increased while the general security situation has deteriorated. Official disarmament may be complete but, until Liberia’s ex-combatants are effectively reintegrated, the country’s woes will be far from over.
The fragility of Liberia’s hard-earned peace became frighteningly apparent when on 28 October 2004, just days before the official end of disarmament, violence erupted on the streets of Monrovia and subsequently spread to other parts of the countryside. Three days later, after 19 people were killed, over 200 injured, and numerous mosques, churches, schools, and shops burned, UNMIL peacekeepers finally succeeded in restoring order. Liberians and foreign-aid workers alike were left reeling from the unexpected violence, which served as a grim reminder that the peace process is still very much in its infancy.

Particularly disconcerting was the fact that some firearms were brandished and used during the violence, confirming widespread fears that even the capital Monrovia was not ‘weapon-free’, as suggested by UNMIL. The precise cause of the outbreak was unclear, though some attributed it to a land dispute between LURD members—who are predominantly Muslim—and other Christian locals. There was also speculation that those opposed to the peace process and/or the closure of the disarmament programme were responsible for engineering the violence (UNMIL HCS, 2004).

Liberia’s fighters: neither gone nor forgotten
In a post-disarmament ceremony held on 3 November 2004, representatives from LURD, MODEL, and the ex-GoL militias signed a formal declaration dissolving and disbanding their respective armed factions, which officially ceased to exist as military groups (UNMIL, 2004c). While this is a reassuring step on the path towards peace in Liberia, concerns remain whether this commitment is consistent with the intentions of ex-combatants in the countryside.

Liberia was relatively calm in late 2004 but remains widely unstable and insecure, especially in rural areas. Although UNMIL has close to its full capacity of 15,000 peacekeepers, former armed factions retain a significant hold over large parts of the country. LURD still largely controls most of the north-western region of Liberia (Lofa County) from the Guinean border to as far south as Tubmanburg. The extent of this control is such that, in October, LURD commanders presented visitors to Gola Konneh, an area towards the Sierra Leone border, with a typed ‘laissez-passer’ for their journey.56

To date, MODEL remains relatively quiescent but is very much intact and well organized. It is in charge of large parts of the country, particularly in the
south-east in the areas bordering Côte d’Ivoire (Grand Gedeh, River Gee, Maryland, and Grand Kru). The extent of its continued control is not overly surprising given that UNMIL peacekeepers did not arrive in the south-east until June 2004 (UNSC, 2004b, para. 2). MODEL’s level of organization is such that it completely controls two main vehicle border crossings. For example, at the main crossing near the town of Harper, in the Pleebo-Sodeken district, MODEL reportedly issues visas for LRD 100 (approximately USD 2) and even has an official stamp for passports.

While Liberia’s formal disarmament process may be complete, the country remains potentially volatile, in large part because armed factions still operate and because low numbers of weapons handed in suggests that many remain in the hands of former fighters. Some speculate that armed factions are gauging the political situation and biding their time until after elections, which are scheduled for October 2005. In the meantime, LURD and MODEL fighters, particularly those in outlying rural areas, are frustrated with the slow pace of reintegration and likely feel that their former commanders have abandoned them. Many of these are thought to be living well in Monrovia.

Also potentially problematic are an unknown number of ex-combatants who, for a variety of reasons, are without weapons and have thus been excluded from DDRR. These include those who surrendered their weapons to ECOMIL (the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission that was in place prior to UNMIL). Others claim their faction leaders confiscated their weapons prior to DDRR, and some argue they shared a single weapon among several fighters. UNMIL made a significant effort to verify these claims and accommodate the former fighters accordingly. They established a mobile disarmament team that operated for several weeks following the official closure of the DD.

During this time, over 5,000 ex-combatants were granted admission into the DDRR programme. According to one NCDDRR official, however, there is no question that many legitimate ex-combatants were left behind, many still with arms. This sentiment appears to be shared by many Liberians, and prior to the closure of disarmament, both LURD and MODEL representatives made public appeals for DD to be extended. Their concerns were reinforced late in November 2004 when reports emerged that some ex-combatants in
Zwedru were erecting roadblocks and harassing UN personnel to protest the DD closure. They claimed to still have weapons and wanted to disarm.44

Conclusion

DDRR is a concept that appears to be still very much in its infancy. This belies the fact that since 1990, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes have been integral to more than 15 peacekeeping operations. Indeed, there is no shortage of experience from which to draw when designing and implementing such programmes. Yet identification, let alone application, of lessons learned from previous initiatives appears to be perpetually and painfully difficult.

Much of the problem perhaps lies in the fact that DDRR remains a dauntingly complex process which, even when well conceived, can be easily undermined by time constraints, financial limitations, uncooperative ex-combatants, and the personal agendas of politicians and policy-makers who lack the will or ability to focus on practicalities on the ground.

Both the complexity of DDRR and the sluggish pace of learning from one initiative to the next have been made evident in Liberia, where one of the UN’s largest peacekeeping missions in history, and partners at the JIU, have struggled to push forward a programme whose credibility and effectiveness have been seriously questioned since its inception.

Shortcomings aside, the DDRR process has enabled Liberia to take significant steps on the path towards peace and stability. This is no small feat—particularly in view of the fact that the disarmament programme was perpetually at risk of derailment by any number of factors that can surface during dealings with armed factions in a post-conflict environment.

Nonetheless, even the most optimistically positive DDRR officials, UN or other, are not so blissfully ignorant as to believe that disarmament is anywhere near 100 per cent complete or that the threat posed by armed Liberian rebels is a nightmare of the past. Liberia’s history has devastatingly shown that unless the underlying causes of conflict are addressed—such as rampant corruption, widespread unemployment, and the subsequent disenchantment amongst the Liberian people—then the cycle of violence will be perpetuated. Indeed, in a sub-region notorious for its porous borders, ubiquitous weaponry,
and ruthless mercenaries, conditions remain ripe for continued instability. Clearly, enormous challenges to sustainable peace remain and it will require more than a DDRR programme—regardless of its effectiveness—to ensure they are overcome.

**List of abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFF</td>
<td>Children associated with fighting forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACO</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOBS</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDDRR</td>
<td>National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCASED</td>
<td>Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBGV</td>
<td>Sexually based gender violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transitional Safety Net Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOL United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa
UNSECOORD Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator
WAFF Woman associated with fighting forces

Endnotes
1 UNMIL is authorized to eventually include 15,000 military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers. As of 31 October 2004, UNMIL strength stood at 14,337 peacekeepers, 198 military observers, 1,097 civilian police, and 475 international civilian personnel. See UNDPKO.
2 Interview with UNDP DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.
3 An International Conference for the Reconstruction of Liberia was subsequently held in New York, 5–6 February 2004.
4 Interview with UNMIL officials in Monrovia, 22 September and 24 November 2004.
5 Unlike subsequent DD operations, in December the disarmament area was set up adjacent to the actual cantonment site, with the collected weapons being stored 30 meters away from the ex-combatants in line.
6 Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 28 September 2004.
7 This figure of 3,000 was based on the number of unclaimed forms (one copy was given to the fighter, another was kept by UNMIL) that remained after the ex-combatants continued the DDRR process in April 2004. Those who disarmed twice in December would have been given two forms—one for each weapon—but could use only one to continue the DDRR process.
8 A mobile disarmament team continued to disarm several residual case-loads around the country until 20 November 2004. These additional numbers are included in the totals presented in Table 4.3.
9 The NCDDR is comprised of representatives from the three armed factions, the UN, ECOWAS, the National Transitional Government of Liberia, the European Commission, and the United States.
10 Subsequent statistics, with slight variations, were reported in the UN Secretary-General’s report of December 2004. See UNSC (2004d, para. 23).
The 11 sites were: Buchanan, Ganta, Gbarnga, Harper, Kakata, Scheifelin Barracks, Tappita, Tubmanburg, VOA, Voinjama, and Zwedru.

Interview with ORDSafe staff in Monrovia, 29 September 2004.

WAFF and CAFF were generally considered to be those who were wives and girlfriends, cooks, and general support staff for the armed factions. It was left to UN Military Observers (MILOBS) to determine, through a series of questions, whether women and children seeking to enter the DDRR programme were legitimate WAFF and CAFF.

The non-food item kit included a mat to sleep on, a bucket for washing and some basic clothing and toiletry items.

Children stayed at interim care centres for an average of three months.

The TSA was designed to provide ex-combatants with a means of surviving during the period prior to the reintegration phase, and to decrease their need to depend on former commanders for support.

Interview with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

Interview with UNDP DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

As discussed below, commanders were in a position to hand-pick those who they wanted to enter either by providing weapons to non-combatants or by misleading the MILOBS about certain candidates. Some local NGO and NCDDR staff were also accused of trying to persuade MILOBS to admit friends and relatives, particularly women and children, who were non-combatants. Interview with UNMIL MILOBS in Monrovia, 17 November 2004.

Interview with UNDP DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

One UN official reported that women were going to night schools to learn how to handle and dismantle weapons so that they would succeed in convincing the MILOBS they were ex-combatants when they handed over the weapon. Interview with UNDP DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

These figures were obtained directly from the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit database, at the Joint Implementation Unit, DDRR Headquarters, Monrovia, 25 November 2004.

Child protection agencies working alongside the MILOBS managed to help screen out some of those children posing as CAFF, but it is thought that many more were allowed in.

Interview with UNMIL MILOBS in Monrovia, 17 November 2004.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 24 November 2004.

Interviews with UNMIL officials in Monrovia, 21 September, 28 September and 7 October 2004.

The allowance of SAA ammunition presented another problem when it was discovered that some ex-combatants were filling spent shells with sand and dirt and then resealing them in such a way that it was often difficult to distinguish them from unused ammunition.
Interview with UNDP officials in Monrovia, 23 November 2004.

Some Liberians have reportedly claimed that an AK-47 can be bought for USD 40–50, and 100 shotgun cartridges for USD 20. Interviews with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004, and phone interview with UNMIL JMAC official, 20 November 2004.

Interview with UNMIL MILOBS in Monrovia, 28 September and 17 November 2004.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 28 September 2004.

DDRR Consolidated Reports continue to circulate and misleading weapons and ammunition figures are being spread as a result. In the DDRR Consolidated Report of 24 November 2004, the weapons and ammunition analysis sections were not included at all.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 7 October 2004.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 7 October 2004.

Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004. These findings and conclusions regarding total weapons collected were echoed in the December 2004 Liberia Panel of Experts report to the UN Security Council. See UNSC (2004c, para. 67).

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 7 October 2004.

One local newspaper reported, for example, that ex-LURD fighters and Kamajor fighters from Sierra Leone were concealing heavy weapons in Gbarpolu County. See The Analyst (2004b).

Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.

One UNDP official explained that the minimum time for cantonment should have been three weeks, but that this was not feasible due to budget constraints. Interview with UNDP DDRR official in Monrovia, 23 November 2004.

As related by participants at the DDRR Weekly Forum meeting held at the JIU in Monrovia, 29 September 2004.

Interview with UNDP DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

Interviews with ex-combatants in April and May 2004 at VOA and Gbarnga sites.

Interview with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

Interview with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 28 September 2004.

Interview with UNMIL regional coordinator in Liberia, 11 October 2004.

Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 24 November 2004.

Interview with NCDDRR official in Monrovia, 20 November 2004.

Interview with UNMIL official in Monrovia, 24 November 2004.

Interview with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.
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51 Interview with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 21 September 2004.
52 Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.
53 Interview with NCDDR official in Monrovia, 15 November 2004.
54 Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.
55 While these figures were acquired directly from UNDP Liberia, they differ slightly from those in the UN Secretary-General’s report of December 2004 where the number of ex-combatants still needing to be provided for was put at 43,000, and the funding shortfall said to be USD 60 million. See UNSC (2004d, para. 25).
56 Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.
57 Interview with UNSECOORD official in Monrovia, 20 September 2004.
58 Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.
59 Interview with UN Security (UNSECOORD) official in Monrovia, 20 September 2004.
60 Interview with member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in Monrovia, 12 October 2004.
61 Interview with UNMIL DDRR official in Monrovia, 22 November 2004.
63 See, for example, The Analyst (2004a).
64 As related by MILOBS at the DDRR Weekly Forum held at the JIU in Monrovia, 1 December 2004.
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