



© REUTERS / Luc Gnago

Cherif Ousmane, a top Ivorian rebel commander, leads his troops over the Cavally River during a patrol, 17 May 2003.

PART II



CÔTE D'IVOIRE

OVERVIEW

After the death of founding President Félix Houphouët-Boigny on 7 December 1993, Côte d'Ivoire plunged into a power struggle and recurrent political instability. Controversies over restrictive nationality laws and their implications for eligibility to national elections, which resulted in the disqualification of prominent leaders such as Alassane Ouattara of the Rally of Republicans (Rassemblement des républicains, RDR), served to heighten tensions, which culminated in the overthrow of President Henri Konan Bédié by General Robert Gueï in December 1999. Deadly clashes followed the disputed results of the 2000 presidential elections.¹ The Ivorian Supreme Court eventually declared Laurent Gbagbo the winner over the main contender, General Gueï. The situation, however, remained dangerously volatile.

On 19 September 2002, a group of about 800 soldiers from the Ivorian National Armed Forces (Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire, FANCI) launched a coup attempt against

President Gbagbo, during which General Gueï was killed. After failing to capture Abidjan, the country's commercial capital, the mutineers retreated northward to the city of Bouaké, about 100 km north of the political capital Yamoussoukro, where they were joined by disgruntled soldiers and civilians. In late September, they formed the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire, MPCCI).² French troops prevented rebels from seizing either capital, but the MPCCI captured other cities in the northern and central regions. The group finally declared a ceasefire on 17 October 2002. On 28 November 2002, however, two other rebel groups emerged—the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest, MPIGO), and the Movement for Justice and Peace (Mouvement pour la justice et la paix, MJP) and seized cities in the western region. Eventually, on 13 January 2003 in Lomé, the MJP and the MPIGO concluded a ceasefire with the Ivorian government.

On 24 January 2003, in Linas-Marcoussis, France, the three rebel groups reached an accord with all major Ivorian political parties to

PART II

create a new 'government of national reconciliation' that incorporated representatives of the rebel movements, now unified under the umbrella name 'Forces nouvelles'. The government of reconciliation's programme included preparing transparent national elections, investigating human rights violations, organizing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-rebels, as well as restructuring the 20,000-strong³ FANCI.⁴ On 4 April 2004, the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) was established with a mandate to monitor the ceasefire and to assist the new government in the DDR process.⁵ The 1,300-strong Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) was quickly 'blue-hatted' to help establish ONUCI, whose mandated strength is 6,240.⁶ An estimated 4,000 French troops are stationed outside the UN mission, but may provide support to ONUCI as a rapid intervention force.⁷

The implementation of the Linas Marcoussis agreement was slow and difficult, however, and this caused the suspension of Forces nouvelles participation in the government of reconciliation in September 2003 and

again in March 2004.⁸ West African leaders, ECOWAS, and the United Nations mediated a series of meetings between the Marcoussis signatories in an effort to relaunch the peace process. This resulted in the signing of the so-called Accra III agreement on 30 July and in the government of reconciliation resuming its functions. Accra III called on President Gbagbo to undertake constitutional reforms expanding eligibility to the presidency by the end of September, with all parties committing themselves to starting DDR by 15 October 2004.⁹ Neither deadline was respected, however, and the Forces nouvelles ministers suspended their participation on 28 October 2004.¹⁰

ARMED GROUPS

Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI)

Origins/composition:

The rebel group formed shortly after the 19 September 2002 coup attempt for the express purposes of forcing the resignation of President Gbagbo; holding inclusive national elections; reviewing the constitution; and ending southern domination.¹¹

Movement members initially consisted of army mutineers involved in the September 2002 coup attempt.¹² A number of northerners enrolled after the MPCCI gained control of the northern half of the country. Members of western ethnic groups, such as the Yacouba¹³ and foreigners from Mali and Burkina Faso, also joined.¹⁴ The MPCCI also allegedly recruited Liberian combat veterans from refugee camps in Ghana.¹⁵ MPCCI members had increased from 800 combatants in 2002 to approximately 5,000 in early 2003¹⁶ after it folded with the MJP and the MPIGO into the Forces nouvelles umbrella coalition. By late 2003, the MPCCI had reportedly grown to 7,000–10,000 fighters and included more than 1,000 traditional 'dozo' hunters recruited from northern Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali.¹⁷

Leadership:

Guillaume Soro, an ex-leader of the Student and School Federation of Côte d'Ivoire (Fédération étudiante et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI) student association (see Young Patriots), is the MPCCI's political leader and general secretary. Louis Dacoury-Tabley is another important political leader—until 1999, Gbagbo's right-hand man and for-

merly an influential member of the Ivorian president's Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI).¹⁸ Several local military commanders hold prominent positions—among them, Chérif Ousmane, the 'strong man' of Bouaké. Most MPCCI commanders were originally members of the FANCI or were under the orders of Sergent Chef Ibrahim Coulibaly (also known as 'IB') in the presidential guard under the Gueï junta. Throughout 2001–02, many were exiled to Ouagadougou.¹⁹

Areas of control/activity:

Northern and central regions of the country, in particular the towns of Bouaké and Korhogo.

Sources of financing/support:

The MPCCI used resources from territory seized (cocoa, cotton) to finance its rebellion.²⁰ Financial support also reportedly came from former Liberian President Charles Taylor,²¹ wealthy businessmen close to Ouattara's RDR, political-financial networks close to the president of Burkina Faso, and French multinationals and cocoa traders.²² In 2002 and 2003, numerous reports pointed the finger at Burkina Faso as backing the MPCCI.²³ Dacoury-Tabley, in particular, visited Ouagadougou before the coup, and had developed close

PART II

relations with Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré during the years when the latter financed the FPI.²⁴ Some funds came from armed robberies—in particular, hold-ups at branches of the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO). On 27 August 2002, in Abidjan, the MPCCI seized more than CFA Franc 2 billion (USD 3.87 million).²⁵

Status:

Following the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement on 24 January 2003, the group joined the Forces nouvelles umbrella coalition, which it now largely dominates.

Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO)**Origins/composition:**

On 28 November 2002, the MPIGO emerged in the west of the country to avenge the death of General Gueï²⁶ and to defend the rights of the Yacouba ethnic group.²⁷ A number of Liberian President Charles Taylor’s most senior commanders organized the group, which also included Ivorians who had previously fought for General Gueï.²⁸ The MPIGO was mainly composed of English-speaking Yacouba,²⁹ many of them Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.³⁰ The group

claimed they were not bound by the October 2002 ceasefire signed between the MPCCI and the government. In 2003, the total combined strength of the MPIGO and the MJP was estimated at approximately 2,000.³¹

Leadership:

N’dri N’Guessan, also known as Felix Doh (MPIGO), signed the ceasefire agreement of 13 January 2003. Doh was killed in April 2003.³²

Areas of control/activity:

The MPIGO attacked towns and villages in the western part of the country,³³ and the group controlled the areas around Binhouye. In November 2002, the insurgents captured the city of Danane in the western part of Côte d’Ivoire (near the Liberian border). They then took control of Bangolo, which is located 40 km south of Man,³⁴ but failed to capture the port of San Pedro—vital for the export of cocoa and coffee.³⁵

Sources of financing/support:

Charles Taylor’s Liberia allegedly trained and armed the MPIGO.³⁶ While the MPIGO, the MJP, and the MPCCI often cooperated, analysts note that Taylor created and actively supported the MPIGO in order to create a strategic buffer against the MPCCI. The MPCCI had among its

ranks a number of armed Liberians who had previously opposed his presidency.³⁷ Along with his forces, the Sierra Leonean warlord Sam Bockarie, who had briefly broken away from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, also assisted the MPIGO until just after the death of Felix Doh in April 2003.³⁸

Status:

The MPIGO signed a ceasefire agreement with the French troops and the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement in January 2003,³⁹ after which it became part of the Forces nouvelles coalition.

Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)

Origins/composition:

On 28 November 2002, the MJP emerged simultaneously alongside the MPIGO; both had very similar objectives.⁴⁰ Like the MPIGO, the group claimed it was not bound by the October 2002 ceasefire signed between the MPCCI and the government. MJP leaders said they broke from the MPCCI after the latter engaged in peace talks with the government—although the MJP reportedly retained close contact with the MPCCI leadership⁴¹ and cooperated on a number

of occasions with Soro's movement.⁴²

The MJP was composed of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians,⁴³ as well as traditional 'dozo' hunters.⁴⁴ In 2003, the total combined strength of the MPIGO and the MJP was estimated to be approximately 2,000.⁴⁵

Leadership:

Commander Gaspard Déli (MJP) signed the ceasefire agreement of 13 January 2003.

Areas of control/activity:

The MJP was present around the town of Man.⁴⁶

Sources of financing/support:

Although Charles Taylor is believed to have created and backed both the MPIGO and the MJP,⁴⁷ the latter was believed to have very close ties with the MPCCI,⁴⁸ while the MPIGO was reported to be closer to Taylor.⁴⁹

Status:

In January 2003, the MJP signed a ceasefire agreement with French troops and the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement,⁵⁰ and then joined the Forces nouvelles rebel coalition.

Forces nouvelles

Origins/composition:

Shortly after the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accord, the MPCCI, the MPIGO, and the MJP joined forces

PART II

under the umbrella Forces nouvelles movement. In practice, however, the MPCCI largely dominates the group. This was because the MJP and the MPIGO were severely weakened following the August 2003 fall of Liberia's President Charles Taylor and because of power struggles within the Forces nouvelles itself—particularly between the MPCCI and the MPIGO.⁵¹ Between February and April 2003, the MPCCI's Chérif Ousmane led several operations to purge the Forces nouvelles of Taylor-backed Sierra Leonean and Liberian mercenaries (who were apparently committing too many abuses, were too undisciplined, and were selling territories to the enemy). This coincided with the controversial killing of MPIGO leader Felix Doh on 28 April.⁵² In late 2004, the Forces nouvelles were at an estimated strength of 20,000⁵³ to 26,000.⁵⁴

Leadership:

Guillaume Soro is the secretary-general of the Forces nouvelles. Soro (MPCCI), Gaspard Déli (MJP), and Ben Souck (MPIGO) signed the Accra III agreement on 30 July 2004.⁵⁵ Sergeant Chef Ibrahim (aka 'IB') Coulibaly, a top MPCCI military commander exiled in Burkina Faso and then France,⁵⁶ has been Soro's main oppo-

nent within the Forces nouvelles. Soro appears to have gained the upper hand following IB's arrest in Paris in August 2003 and deadly clashes between pro-Soro and pro-IB factions in Khorogo and Bouaké in June 2004. These resulted in at least 22 deaths, including that of key IB backers.⁵⁷ Following these incidents, reports circulated that IB had given up his initially hard-line stance, and was warming to Gbagbo.⁵⁸

Areas of control/activity:

The Forces nouvelles effectively control and provide basic administrative and social services in the northern half of the country, north of the ONUCI- and French-controlled 'zone of confidence'. Their main strongholds include Bouaké (effectively their military headquarters), Man, and Danane.

Sources of financing/support:

Forces nouvelles-administered road-blocks, with levy fees in the range USD 180–270 for trucks travelling from Bouaké to Korhogo, are an important source of funding.⁵⁹ Rebels also stole CFA Franc 20 billion (worth at the time USD 38.73 million) from a bank in Bouaké in September 2003,⁶⁰ which Soro has reportedly used to provide MPCCI members with a monthly allowance of CFA Franc 5,000 (USD 9.68).⁶¹

Status:

Active.

***Group of Patriots for Peace
(GPP/ CPP/ FLN)***

Origins/composition:

The Group of Patriots for Peace (Groupe des patriotes pour la paix, GPP), also known as Convention des patriotes pour la paix (CPP) or Front de libération nationale (FLN), is an umbrella organization comprising half a dozen pro-government militias⁶² that emerged during the September 2002 crisis to support President Gbagbo. Although the group is believed to include some members of the Bété, President Gbagbo's ethnic group,⁶³ experts point out that the GPP is not as ethnically oriented as other militia groups, such as the FSCO or the FLGO (see below).⁶⁴ In late 2003, it was estimated that the GPP was made up of some 6,000 young Ivorian men organized into units of 500–700.⁶⁵

Leadership:

Moussa Touré Zeguen and Charles Groguhé (an ex-FESCI leader).⁶⁶

Areas of control/activity:

The GPP has been active throughout southern Côte d'Ivoire, and particularly in Abidjan's Adjame district. In

early 2005, however, buses reportedly transported GPP members from Abidjan to the western part of the country.⁶⁷ It is important to note that these movements coincided with the 28 February 2005 attack on Forces nouvelles positions in Lougoulé (north-west of Abidjan) by about 100 armed men belonging to the previously unheard of Ivorian Movement for the Liberation of Western Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire, MILOCI).⁶⁸

Sources of financing/support:

The Ivorian government and security forces allegedly support the GPP.⁶⁹ In late October 2004, former FANCI officers reportedly provided training, including the handling of military firearms, to some 1,600 GPP volunteers at a training camp situated in Abidjan's Adjame district.⁷⁰ Groguhé has claimed the GPP was heavily armed and supported by numerous military and political elites.⁷¹ Zeguen, on the other hand, claims the GPP is 'unarmed', although he admits that weapons are 'everywhere' and easy to find.⁷²

Status:

Active. The GPP was not part of the Linas-Marcoussis process,⁷³ but the Accra III agreement did extend DDR

PART II

coverage to all paramilitaries and militias.

Front for the Security of the Centre-West (FSCO)

Origins/composition:

The 14,000-strong Front for the Security of the Centre-West (Front pour la sécurité du Centre-Ouest, FSCO), is another pro-Gbagbo militia that emerged following the September 2002 crisis.⁷⁴ As previously stated, it includes many Bétés, President Gbagbo's ethnic group.⁷⁵ Although allegedly backed by circles close to the Ivorian presidency, it appeared disgruntled in mid-2004 when it threatened to bar Gbagbo's entourage from the centre-west town of Gagnoa.⁷⁶

Leadership:

Bertrand Gnatoa.⁷⁷

Areas of control/activity:

The FSCO is based in Gagnoa,⁷⁸ the closest town to Gbagbo's home village and the Ivorian president's electoral stronghold.⁷⁹

Sources of financing/support:

In March 2004, Gnatoa claimed that the FSCO received training from the FANCI.⁸⁰

Status:

Active.

Front for the Liberation of the Great West (FLGO)

Origins/composition:

The Front for the Liberation of the Great West (Front pour la Libération du Grand Ouest, FLGO) is the most important of several pro-Gbagbo militias active in the far western part of the country. It is made up of a mix of Ivorian and Liberian nationals,⁸¹ recruited primarily among the Ivorian Guéré or Wè in the west of the country and in Abidjan, and among their ethnic cousins, the Liberian Krahn (see MODEL, below).⁸² Local Guéré elected officials in Abidjan were reportedly involved in recruiting young men for the FLGO.⁸³ The FLGO is estimated to be 7,000-strong.⁸⁴

Leadership:

Mao Gloféi Denis.⁸⁵

Areas of control/activity:

The FLGO is active in the far west of the country, notably in the towns of Guiglo and Toulépleu.⁸⁶

Sources of financing/support:

The Ivorian government and security forces allegedly support the FLGO.⁸⁷ Mao Denis is reportedly in regular contact with the Gbagbo presidency; he is also third assistant to the mayor of Guiglo.⁸⁸ The FLGO allegedly fought alongside Liberian rebel

movement MODEL in 2003 in the final push against Charles Taylor.⁸⁹

Status:

Active.

**'Young Patriots'
(FESCI/UPLTCI/COJEP)**

Origins/composition:

'Young Patriots' is the umbrella term for the young Ivorian pro-government activists drawn from student networks such as FESCI,⁹⁰ as well as from political parties, including the ruling FPI.⁹¹ The Union for the Total Liberation of Côte d'Ivoire (Union pour la libération totale de la Côte d'Ivoire, UPLTCI) claims to have more than 70,000 members.⁹² Other large movements include the 25,000-strong Pan-African Congress of Young Patriots (Congrès panafricain des jeunes patriotes, COJEP). Although their leaders usually claim that their movements are unarmed, they are closely connected to armed militias such as the GPP, the FSCO, or smaller armed units such as the Bees, Gazelles, Ninjas, and Panthers,⁹³ and their members represent an important recruitment pool for these armed groups. FESCI students, for instance, were reportedly given weapons and money and transported from the uni-

versity in assigned public buses just days before the November 2004 crisis and the resulting stand-off between French troops and crowds of Young Patriots in Abidjan.⁹⁴ Patriot movements draw their membership from the large pool of unemployed young men in the southern half of the country, who are willing to participate in protests for small fees ranging from CFA F 1,000 to 5,000 (USD 2–10). Recent estimates suggest there may be as many as 150,000 Young Patriots.⁹⁵

Leadership:

Prominent Patriot leaders include Serge Kuyo (FESCI), Charles Blé Goudé (COJEP, former FESCI leader 1998–2001), and Eujène Djué (UPLTCI, former FESCI leader 1994–95).

Areas of control/activity:

Young Patriots are present in the southern half of the country, and especially in Abidjan. In early 2005, however, buses reportedly transported Young Patriots and GPP members from Abidjan to the western part of the country, which both Blé Goudé and Djué had visited recently, illustrating the volatility in that region.⁹⁶ These movements appeared to coincide with the 28 February 2005 attacks on Forces nouvelles positions in Lougoualé (northwest of Abidjan) by about 100 armed

PART II

men belonging to the newly formed MILOCI, and with the gathering of 500 youths around Bangolo on 1 March.⁹⁷

Sources of financing/support:

The Ivorian government and security forces allegedly provided training and weapons to Young Patriots.⁹⁸ In Abidjan, 15,000 militia members reportedly received training from elements of the FANCI as well as Angolan and Israeli mercenaries.⁹⁹

Status:

Active.

Liberian mercenaries (Limal/MODEL)

Origins/composition:

The Ivorian army¹⁰⁰ as well as pro-government militias such as the FLGO¹⁰¹ relied on Liberian mercenaries in their fight against the rebels. French officers refer to these as 'Lima' after the radio call sign 'L' for Liberia, a term subsequently used by the Ivorian government to give the impression of a gulf between it and these 'Liberians'. Liberian mercenaries based in Côte d'Ivoire formed the backbone of the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL, see Liberia) that emerged in mid-2003 to fight Charles Taylor alongside the

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).¹⁰² Many fighters were allegedly recruited from areas close to the Liberian border (where many Liberian nationals had lived for several years), including the Nicla refugee camp, where young refugees reportedly were offered CFA F 10,000 (about USD 17 at the time) to become fighters.¹⁰³ Most of them were ethnic Krahn (the Liberian cousins of the Ivorian Guéré or Wê—see FLGO) who had fled Liberia after the first civil war of 1989–97.¹⁰⁴ In early 2003, an estimated 1,500–3,000 such Liberian fighters were operating in Côte d'Ivoire, 1,000 of whom subsequently left for Liberia to fight with MODEL and LURD against Taylor.¹⁰⁵

Leadership:

Liberian mercenaries reportedly served under the command of pro-government militias¹⁰⁶ and the FANCI.¹⁰⁷

Areas of control/activity:

Liberian fighters operated in the west of the country, where they were involved in military operations against the MJP and the MPIGO.¹⁰⁸ MODEL occupied the towns of Toulépleu and Bloléquin in 2003.¹⁰⁹

Sources of financing/support:

The network of those close to President Gbagbo financed and sup-

ported Liberian mercenaries. Gbagbo is said to have armed Liberians and contributed to the formation of MODEL in early 2003.¹¹⁰

Status:

The demobilization of non-Ivorian fighters was not addressed in the Linas-Marcoussis agreement.¹¹¹ While most Liberian mercenaries are believed to have returned to Liberia in mid-2003 to fight in that country's civil war¹¹² and have since enrolled in that country's DDR programme, Ivorian groups such as the FLGO reportedly still included a number of Liberian fighters as of mid-2004.¹¹³ In 2004, a number of MODEL fighters were said to have turned to gold, rubber, and wood trafficking around Guiglo.¹¹⁴

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Stockpiles

Small arms:

MJP holdings include a wide array of small arms, including AK-47s, MAT-49s, PPSs, semi-automatic rifles such as the MAS49 or the FN M1949, and Colt-type revolvers.¹¹⁵ MPCCI and MPIGO stockpiles are believed to contain weapons similar to that of the MJP's.¹¹⁶

Liberian mercenaries were reportedly armed with AK-47s,¹¹⁷ while GPP members have been spotted carrying 12-gauge shotguns as well as AK-47 assault rifles.¹¹⁸ In the western part of the country, pro-government militias such as the FLGO reportedly use 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms.¹¹⁹

Light weapons:

The MPCCI appears to have anti-tank grenade launchers and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.¹²⁰ The MPCCI also obtained artillery for air defence in October 2002.¹²¹

Sources

Domestic:

Many rebel group weapons come from captured government armouries.¹²² The MPCCI claimed to have seized army weapons stocked in Bouaké, Korhogo, as well as arms hidden by deserting soldiers in 2000.¹²³ Pro-government militias have obtained weapons from Ivorian security services. The International Crisis Group reports that militia groups involved in the March 2004 violent repression of an opposition rally had received weapons from police commissariats. Ninety-five per cent of these weapons were subsequently returned to the presidential palace.¹²⁴

PART II

Although there is no information available on the local manufacture of small arms, there are reports that Ghanaian blacksmiths have been 'invited' to Côte d'Ivoire to demonstrate their gun-making skills.¹²⁵

Foreign:

Allegations point to Burkina Faso as one MPCCI weapons source. According to the International Crisis Group, 'Western intelligence services have proof that a portion of the arms used in the original attacks came from the Burkinabe Presidential Guard stocks'.¹²⁶ Most MPIGO and MJP arms came from Monrovia under Taylor's presidency.¹²⁷ Ex-MODEL fighters reportedly cross the militia-patrolled border between Liberia into Côte d'Ivoire to exchange their weapons for motorcycles.¹²⁸ The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire on 15 November 2004,¹²⁹ which was further strengthened on 1 February 2005.¹³⁰

Recovered**DDR:**

The government of national reconciliation's National Commission for DDR (Commission nationale de désarmement, de démobilisation, et de réinsertion, CNDDR) is in charge

but DDR had still not started as of December 2004. In October of that same year, the CNDDR estimated that about 30,000 armed combatants would take part, including 26,000 Forces nouvelles and 4,000 FANCI.¹³¹ In addition, the CNDDR estimated that 10,000 militia members would need to be included in the initiative.¹³² While the Accra III accord provides for the participation of paramilitaries and militias in DDR, one major challenge will be how to deal with Liberian combatants remaining in Côte d'Ivoire.

Other:

In late October 2004, the Forces nouvelles announced the seizure of a large consignment of weapons and ammunition in Bouaké, including some 80 AK-47 assault rifles, nine RPG-7s, and 20 hand grenades, which they accused President Gbagbo of sending to supporters of Ibrahim 'IB' Coulibaly.¹³³ In March 2003, French forces confiscated 72 AK-47 assault rifles from Lima fighters in Bangolo. These weapon types were found to match those used by the Ivorian National Security Forces.¹³⁴

HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES

CAFF

Extent of recruitment:

Reports indicate the MPCI, the MPIGO, and the MJP all recruited and used children associated with fighting forces (CAFF). Human rights organizations reported a strong presence of Liberian child combatants, particularly among those groups fighting in the west of the country.¹³⁵ In January 2003, the United Nations expressed fears that Ivorian rebels could recruit Burkinabe children.¹³⁶ Government armed forces also allegedly recruited children from Liberian groups MODEL and LURD, as well as from refugee camps and transit centres in Abidjan and Nicla.¹³⁷ Discussions undertaken by UNICEF and Save the Children in 2003 suggested that the MPCI, the MPIGO, and the MJP agreed in principle to demobilize CAFF.¹³⁸ In October 2004 UNICEF had identified some 3,000 CAFF affiliated with the Forces nouvelles for participation in the DDR programme.¹³⁹

Functions:

CAFF reportedly played 'supporting roles' in the fighting.¹⁴⁰

Displacement

IDPs:

As of October 2003, there were an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Côte d'Ivoire;¹⁴¹ by October 2004, the Global IDP Project estimated that the lower end of 500,000 IDPs was likely more accurate, with 350,000 now identified.¹⁴²

Refugees abroad:

During the fighting in 2002–03, some 20,000 Ivorian nationals fled to Liberia; 2,000 to Guinea; 1,000 to Mali; and nearly 2,000 as asylum seekers to industrialized countries. An estimated 80,000 immigrants who lived in Côte d'Ivoire also fled the country.¹⁴³ As of October 2004, Côte d'Ivoire had some 65,000 refugees living abroad.¹⁴⁴

Refugees hosted:

About 50,000 refugees from other countries, mostly Liberia, remained in Côte d'Ivoire in 2003.¹⁴⁵

Other violations or abuses

Killings, rape, and torture:

There exist numerous reports of rebel groups, government armed forces, and pro-government militias killing civilians¹⁴⁶ during the conflict¹⁴⁷ and following the Linas-Marcoussis talks.¹⁴⁸

PART II

A number of NGOs and news reports have documented the discovery of mass graves containing up to 120 bodies.¹⁴⁹ Amnesty International has accused the MPCI of killing dozens of paramilitaries and children in October 2002.¹⁵⁰ Liberians and Sierra Leoneans fighting for the MPIGO and the MJP reportedly perpetrated acts of indiscriminate violence, killings, and pillaging throughout the west of the country.¹⁵¹ Pro-government militias are accused of killings,¹⁵² especially of immigrants,¹⁵³ and were allegedly involved in the bloody repression of an opposition rally in March 2004¹⁵⁴ during which 200 were killed and 400 wounded.¹⁵⁵ Pro-government militias have been accused of torture,¹⁵⁶ especially of immigrants.¹⁵⁷ Sexual violence and exploitation are reportedly widespread, particularly owing to the fact that conflict has forced many families to separate—thus leaving women and children on their own and without protection.¹⁵⁸ In 2003, Young Patriot militias reportedly harassed and assaulted peasant farmers of foreign origin (Burkinabe and other West African migrants) in the west and south-west of the country,¹⁵⁹ as well as residents of several of Abidjan's *quartiers populaires* such as

Abobo, Adjame, Koumassi, Marcoury, and Yopougon.¹⁶⁰ According to Human Rights Watch, in the western region Liberian forces and government and rebel fighters have all set upon civilians and perpetrated executions, rape, forced labour, looting, and other crimes.¹⁶¹ Pro-government militia human rights abuses continued into late 2004, with incidents in Abidjan, Yamassoukro, Bloléquin, Guiglo, Tai, and other locations.¹⁶²

Other:

A UN commission described the bloody government crackdown of the March 2004 opposition rally as 'the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and the committing of massive human rights violations' and as 'a carefully planned and executed operation by the security forces, i.e. the police, the gendarmerie, the army, as well as special units and the so-called parallel forces, under the direction and responsibility of the highest authorities of the State'.¹⁶³ In January 2005, the United Nations confirmed that it had drawn up a list of people accused of human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire. Although the official list had not been released as of mid-February 2005, Radio France Internationale (RFI) reported that it contained 95 names, including

President Gbagbo's wife (Simone Gbagbo) and defence and security advisor Bertin Kadet, COJEP leader Charles Blé Goude, and Forces nouvelles leader Guillaume Soro.¹⁶⁴

OUTLOOK

The peace process experienced a serious setback on 4 November 2004, when President Gbagbo launched an offensive against the rebel-held north and the city of Bouaké in particular. The presence of French soldiers added another dimension to the conflict. Politicians exploited their advantage by inflaming anti-French passions, which were further fuelled when French soldiers killed at least 20 people by firing into an angry crowd in Abidjan.¹⁶⁵ Following an Ivorian offensive that left nine French soldiers dead, the French contingent destroyed the entire Ivorian air force on the ground.¹⁶⁶

As of late 2004, the country remained effectively divided into two zones, and the disarmament of combatants appeared improbable in the absence of an unexpected political breakthrough. South African President Thabo Mbeki secured promises from all sides to restore the

peace process, but, as of December 2004, mistrust still permeated negotiations.¹⁶⁷ As the International Crisis Group noted, 'the political impasse is exceptionally lucrative for almost everyone except ordinary citizens'. This complicated efforts to restore peace and to bring widespread prosperity to the country.¹⁶⁸ In light of the renewed fighting throughout the country, ONUCI's force commander asked for a new mandate providing for broader powers.¹⁶⁹ UN Special Representative to Côte d'Ivoire, Albert Tevoedjre, resigned, citing lack of progress towards peace.¹⁷⁰

Increased international pressure following the November 2004 violence resulted in President Gbagbo's late December 2004 decision to ban street marches and demonstrations in Abidjan until June 2005. It also resulted in the Ivorian National Assembly's decision to adopt key provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, including a contentious amendment to article 35 of the Constitution relating to the eligibility of candidates to the presidency.¹⁷¹ President Gbagbo has stated his intention to submit the proposed constitutional amendment to a national referendum¹⁷² but it is unclear whether these signs of progress will

PART II

be pursued should international attention evaporate.¹⁷³ Furthermore, the presence of an estimated 150,000 Young Patriots in the southern part of the country represents a significant threat to the country, as they vastly outnumber the 45,000 troops of the FANCI and Forces nouvelles combined.¹⁷⁴

As of mid-April 2005, Mbeki-led mediation resulted in hopeful signs of progress, however, including a commitment from all parties to start disarming in mid-May, and President Gbagbo's decision to allow Alassane Ouattara to participate in the October 2005 presidential elections.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCEAO	Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CAFF	Children associated with fighting forces
CNDDR	Commission nationale de désarmement, de démobilisation, et de réinsertion
COJEP	Congrès panafricain des jeunes patriotes
CPP	Convention des patriotes pour la paix
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FANCI	Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire
FESCI	Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire
FLGO	Front pour la Libération du Grand Ouest
FLN	Front de libération nationale
FPI	Front Populaire Ivoirien
FSCO	Front pour la sécurité du Centre-Ouest

		ENDNOTES
GPP	Groupe des patriotes pour la paix	
IDP	Internally displaced person	1 UNSC (2003a, paras. 2–4). 2 UNSC (2003a, paras. 8–9).
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy	3 ICG (2004, p. 25) 4 <i>Accord de Linas-Marcoussis</i> (2003). 5 UNSC (2004a).
MILOCI	Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire	6 As of 30 November 2004, ONUCI had 6,208 total uniformed personnel, including 5,842 troops, 153 military observers, 213 civilian police supported by 231 international civilian personnel, and 155 local staff. See UNDPKO (2004).
MJP	Mouvement pour la justice et la paix	
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia	7 IRIN (2004b). 8 IRIN (2004a).
MPCI	Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire	9 UNSC (2004c, para. 15). 10 UNSC (2004d, para. 12).
MPIGO	Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest	11 UNSC (2003a, para. 10). 12 Szajkowski (2004, p. 84).
ONUCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	13 ICG (2003b, p. 15). 14 UNSC (2003a, para. 46). 15 ICG (2003b, p. 19).
RDR	Rassemblement des républicains	16 UNSC (2003a, para. 46). 17 ICG (2003b, p. 14).
RFI	Radio France Internationale	18 ICG (2003b, p. 10). 19 ICG (2003b, p. 10).
RUF	Revolutionary United Front	20 ICG (2003b, pp. 15–16). 21 ICG (2003b, p. 15).
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund	22 ICG (2003a, p. 15; 2003b, p. 12). 23 See ICG (2003a, p. 17, fn. 123; 2003b, pp. 12–14); HRW (2003a).
UPLTCI	Union pour la libération totale de la Côte d'Ivoire	24 ICG (2003b, p. 10). 25 ICG (2003b, p. 10). 26 Global Security (2004); ICG (2003; 2004).

PART II

- 27 AFP (2003).
- 28 ICG (2003b, p. 18).
- 29 Global Security (2004).
- 30 ICG (2003b, p. 18).
- 31 UNSC (2003b, para. 49).
- 32 Zajtman (2003).
- 33 ICG (2003).
- 34 Global Security (2004).
- 35 ICG (2003).
- 36 ICG (2003a, p. 17; 2003b, p. 18); Global Witness (2003, p. 31).
- 37 ICG (2003a, p. 17; 2003b, pp. 18–19).
- 38 Bockarie was killed in May 2003, less than two weeks after Doh (ICG, 2003).
- 39 *La Documentation française* (2004).
- 40 AFP (2003).
- 41 AFP (2003).
- 42 ICG (2003b, pp. 20, 51).
- 43 ICG (2003).
- 44 AFP (2003).
- 45 UNSC (2003b, para. 49).
- 46 UNSC (2003a, para. 47).
- 47 ICG (2003a, p. 17; 2003b, p. 18); Global Witness (2003).
- 48 ICG (2003a, p. 17; 2003b, pp. 20, 51).
- 49 ICG (2003a, p. 17; 2003b, pp. 18–19).
- 50 *La Documentation française* (2004).
- 51 ICG (2003b, pp. 24–25).
- 52 ICG (2003b, pp. 24–25).
- 53 ICG (2004, p. 25).
- 54 Ivorian National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration estimate, quoted in AUPSC (2005, para. 14).
- 55 *Accord dit d'Accra III* (2004).
- 56 Confidential written correspondence with Côte d'Ivoire expert, March 2005.
- 57 ICG (2004, p. 22).
- 58 Confidential written correspondence with Côte d'Ivoire expert, February 2005. See also IRIN (2004e).
- 59 ICG (2004, p. 23; 2005, p. 6).
- 60 *Le jour* (2003).
- 61 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 62 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 63 ICG (2003b, p. 45).
- 64 Confidential written correspondence with Côte d'Ivoire expert, March 2005.
- 65 ICG (2003b, p. 43).
- 66 ICG (2004, pp. 6, 25).
- 67 ICG (2005, pp. 17–18).
- 68 UNSC (2005b, para. 5); ICG (2005, p. 18).
- 69 OHCHR (2004, para. 72); ICG (2005, p. 5).
- 70 IRIN (2004f).
- 71 ICG (2003b, p. 44).
- 72 IRIN (2004f).
- 73 UNOCHA (2004, p.7).
- 74 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 75 Confidential written correspondence with Côte d'Ivoire expert, March 2005.
- 76 ICG (2004, p. 19).
- 77 ICG (2004, pp. 6, 25).
- 78 ICG (2004, p. 19).
- 79 Confidential written correspondence with Côte d'Ivoire expert, March 2005.
- 80 ICG (2004, p. 19).

- 81 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 82 ICG (2003b, pp. 2, 17).
- 83 ICG (2003b, pp. 2, 17).
- 84 UNSC (2005b, para. 12).
- 85 IRIN (2004f).
- 86 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 87 ICG (2005, p. 5).
- 88 ICG (2004, p. 18).
- 89 ICG (2003b, p. ii).
- 90 ICG (2004, p. 7).
- 91 HRW (2003b).
- 92 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 93 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004. See also ICG (2003b, p. 17).
- 94 ICG (2005, p. 10).
- 95 ICG (2004, p. 25).
- 96 ICG (2005, p. 18).
- 97 UNSC (2005b, para. 5); ICG (2005, p. 18)
- 98 ICG (2004, p. 6. fn.19); UNOCHA (2004, p. 7).
- 99 ICG (2004, p. 25).
- 100 UNSC (2003b, paras. 56–57).
- 101 ICG (2004, pp. 6, 15).
- 102 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 103 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 104 ICG (2003b, pp. 1–2).
- 105 ICG (2003b, p. 23) ; UNSC (2003b, paras. 56–57).
- 106 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 107 UNSC (2003b, paras. 56–57).
- 108 UNSC (2003b, paras. 56–57).
- 109 ICG (2003b, p. 24).
- 110 ICG (2003b, pp. 1–2).
- 111 UNOCHA (2004, p. 7).
- 112 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 113 ICG (2004, p. 6).
- 114 ICG (2004, p. 21).
- 115 Confidential written correspondence with diplomat with military experience based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 116 Confidential written correspondence with diplomat with military experience based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 117 UNSC (2003b, para. 56).
- 118 ICG (2003b, p. 44).
- 119 ICG (2004, p. 19)
- 120 ICG (2003b, pp. 11–12)
- 121 ICG (2003b, pp. 11–12)
- 122 Confidential written correspondence with senior diplomat with military experience based in West Africa, May 2004.
- 123 ICG (2003b, p. 11).
- 124 ICG (2004, p. 6, fn.19).
- 125 See Chapter 3 on craft production in Ghana.
- 126 ICG (2003b, p. 11).
- 127 ICG (2003b, p. 12).
- 128 ICG (2004, p. 15).
- 129 UNSC (2004b, p. 2).
- 130 UNSC (2005a).
- 131 AUPSC (2005, para. 14).

PART II

- 132 UNSC (2005b, para. 12).
- 133 IRIN (2004e).
- 134 UNSC (2003b, para. 57).
- 135 CSC (2004).
- 136 IRIN (2003a).
- 137 CSC (2004); Amnesty International (2003).
- 138 CSC (2004).
- 139 AUPSC (2005, para. 14).
- 140 UNSC (2003a, para. 46).
- 141 Global IDP Project (2003).
- 142 Global IDP Project (2004).
- 143 USCR (2003).
- 144 UNOCHA (2005, p. 9).
- 145 USCR (2003).
- 146 IRIN (2003b).
- 147 IRIN (2002a).
- 148 UNSC (2003a, para. 60); UNSC (2004d, paras. 41–47).
- 149 IRIN (2002b); Global Witness (2003, p. 40); Global IDP Project (2004).
- 150 Global Witness (2003, p. 40).
- 151 ICG (2003a, p. 18; 2003b, pp. 25–26).
- 152 IRIN (2004c).
- 153 Global Witness (2003, p. 39).
- 154 IRIN (2004d).
- 155 Ivorian Human Rights Movement estimate. The official death toll is 37, while the opposition claims that between 350 and 500 people died in the protest. See IRIN (2004b).
- 156 IRIN (2004c).
- 157 Global Witness (2003, p. 39).
- 158 Global IDP Project (2004).
- 159 HRW (2003b, p. 1).
- 160 Confidential written correspondence with Côte d'Ivoire expert, February 2005.
- 161 Global IDP Project (2004).
- 162 UNSC (2004d, para. 43).
- 163 OHCHR (2004, para. 72).
- 164 IRIN (2005).
- 165 Soudan (2004).
- 166 IRIN (2004g).
- 167 IRIN (2004h).
- 168 ICG (2004).
- 169 IRIN (2004g).
- 170 IRIN (2004h).
- 171 UNSC (2005b, paras. 6, 8).
- 172 UNSC (2005b, para. 8).
- 173 See ICG (2005).
- 174 ICG (2004, p. 25).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Accord de Linas-Marcoussis*. 2003. Accessed March 2004.
<<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=31727>>
- Accord dit d'Accra III*. 2004. Accessed January 2005. <<http://www.afrique-express.com/archive/OUEST/cotedivoire/cotedivoire/loisetdivers/accordaccra3.html>>
- AFP (Agence France Presse). 2003. 'Details of Three Ivory Coast Rebel Groups and French Forces'. 12 January.
- Amnesty International. 2003. 'No Escape; Liberian Refugees in Côte d'Ivoire'. AI Index: AFR 31/012/2003. 24 June.

- AUPSC (African Union Peace and Security Council). 2005. *Rapport du Président de la Commission sur la Situation en Côte d'Ivoire*. PSC/AHG/2(XXIII). 10–11 January.
- BBC News. 2003. 'Ivorian Leader Defends Peace Deal'. 7 February. Accessed May 2004. <www.bbc.co.uk>
- CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. *Child Soldiers Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict*. London: CSC. January. Accessed March 2004. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/child_soldiers0104/childsoldiers.pdf.>
- Global IDP Project. 2003. *Côte d'Ivoire: Country Profile*. Updated November. Accessed March 2004. <http://www.idpproject.org>
- . 2004. *Côte d'Ivoire: Country profile*. Updated October. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.idpproject.org>
- Global Security. 2004. *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest Profile*. Accessed February 2004. <http://www.globalsecurity.org>
- Global Witness. 2003. *The Usual Suspects: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Why it is still possible, how it works and how to break the trend*. London: Global Witness. March. Accessed May 2004. <http://www.globalwitness.org>
- HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003a. *Côte d'Ivoire: Trapped Between Two Wars; Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte D'Ivoire*. New York: HRW. Vol. 15, No. 14 (A). August. Accessed May 2004. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/cotedivoire0803/cotedivoire0803.pdf>
- . 2003b. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Militias Commit Abuses With Impunity.' *Human Rights News*. 27 November. Accessed May 2004. <http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/11/cote112703.htm>
- ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003a. *Tackling Liberia: The eye of the regional storm*. Africa Report No. 62. 30 April.
- . 2003b. *Côte d'Ivoire: The War is Not Yet Over*. Africa Report No. 72. 28 November.
- . 2004. *Côte d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight*. Africa Report No. 82. 12 July.
- . 2005. *Côte d'Ivoire: Le pire est peut-être à venir*. Africa Report No. 90. 24 mars.
- IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2002a. 'Côte d'Ivoire: US Condemns Rights Abuses'. 15 November. Accessed April 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- . 2002b. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Reports of Abuses Worry UN Human Rights Expert'. 13 December. Accessed April 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- . 2003a. 'Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire: UN Envoy Fears Children Could Get Involved

PART II

- in Conflict'. 29 January. Accessed April 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2003b. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Amnesty Exposes Rebel Atrocities, Calls for End of Impunity'. 28 February. Accessed April 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004a. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Opposition Parties Suspend Role in Government'. 25 March. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004b. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Government Confirms Paramilitary Role in Abidjan Unrest'. 2 April. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004c. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Militias Commit Abuses with Impunity'. 26 April. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004d. 'Côte d'Ivoire: No Sign of Break to Political Impasse'. 26 April. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004e. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Rebels Declare State of Emergency, Warn of Return to War.' 28 October. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004f. 'Côte d'Ivoire: Pro-Gbagbo Militias Undergo Military Training in the Heart of Abidjan.' 29 October. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004g. 'Côte d'Ivoire: ONUCI Mandate Needs to be Updated, Force Commander Says.' 2 December. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2004h. 'Côte d'Ivoire: All Sides Pledge Commitment to Peace Process Again, But Will Anything Change?' 7 December. Accessed December 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- 2005. 'Côte d'Ivoire: UN Confirms Existence of Blacklist of Human Rights Abusers'. 31 January. Accessed February 2005. <http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=Cote_d_Ivoire>
- La Documentation française*. 2004. *La crise en Côte d'Ivoire: les forces en présence*. Dossiers d'actualité. Accessed April 2004.

- <http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr/dossier_actualite/crise_cote_divoire/forces_presence.shtml>
- Le jour* (Abidjan). 2003. 'Attaque de la BCEAO de Bouaké; Les rebelles se partagent 20 milliards.' 3 November. Accessed May 2004. <www.abidjan.net>
- OHCHR (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2004. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Events Connected with the March Planned for 25 March 2004 in Abidjan*. UN Document No. 5/4/2004 of 29 April.
- Soudan, François. 2004. 'Le Piège et la Faute.' *Jeune Afrique l'Intelligent*, No. 2291. 5 December. Accessed December 2004. <<http://www.ivoireforum.info/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=10&highlight=>>
- Szajkowski, Bogdan, ed. 2004. *Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World*, 4th ed. London: John Harper Publishing.
- UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). 2004. 'Côte d'Ivoire – UNOCI – Facts and Figures'. Accessed December 2004. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unoci/facts.html>>
- UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. *Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): West Africa 2004*. New York and Geneva: UNOCHA.
- . 2005. *West Africa 2005 Consolidated Appeals Process*. New York and Geneva: UNOCHA.
- UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003a. *Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2003/374 of 26 March.
- . 2003b. *Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia*. S/2003/498 of 24 April.
- . 2004a. Resolution S/RES/1528 of 27 February.
- . 2004b. Resolution 1572, adopted on 15 November. S/RES/1572 (2004).
- . 2004c. *Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2004/697 of 27 August.
- . 2004d. *Third Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2004/962 of 9 December.
- . 2005a. Resolution 1584, adopted on 1 February. S/RES/1584 (2005).
- . 2005b. *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2005/186 of 18 March.
- USCR (United States Committee for Refugees). 2003. *World Refugee Survey 2003. Country Report: Côte d'Ivoire*. Accessed March 2004. <<http://www.refugees.org>>.
- Zajtman, Arnaud. 2003. 'Murky Death of Ivory Coast Rebel'. BBC News. 29 April. Accessed May 2004. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2985359.stm>>