Searching for Stability

Perceptions of Security, Justice, and Firearms in Libya

Introduction

Three years after the 2011 armed conflict the same issues still dominate news reports on Libya: insecurity, armed groups, and firearms. The ongoing instability is a stark reminder that Libyans’ aspirations for freedom and prosperity will require more time and effort to realize. Despite the attention of the media, however, there is relatively little focus on the Libyan population’s own interpretation of events and actors on the ground. This Issue Brief attempts to rectify this information gap.

The Small Arms Survey partnered with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to research the Libyan population’s views and experiences of armed violence, security and justice providers, and firearms circulation. The research relies on a mix of qualitative and quantitative tools, including semi-directed interviews, focus groups, and a nationwide household survey. This Issue Brief focuses on the nationwide survey administered to 1,500 Libyan households between June and August 2013 (see Box 1). The survey’s findings are complemented by information gleaned from the interviews and focus groups.

This Issue Brief uses the survey’s four main thematic components to elucidate findings: (1) perceptions of security and justice; (2) perceptions of security and justice providers; (3) direct experiences of crime and violence; and (4) perceptions of firearms and arms control initiatives.

The primary findings include the following:

- Although Libyans consider the general lack of security to be their main concern, most also claim that their own neighbourhoods are relatively safe. Reported levels of victimization—i.e., respondents’ direct experiences of crime and violence—also appear to be relatively low. Regular clashes between armed groups and tribes in a number of locations contribute to the rampant perceptions of political instability and general insecurity.

- The population is confused about the security sector. More than half of survey respondents claimed that no institution, group, or individual provided security in their own neighbourhoods. While the police were the most frequently cited provider of security, Libyans assessed their performance negatively. Some actors, such as the former revolutionary fighters or thuwar, are viewed as both providers of security and sources of insecurity.

- A diverse set of both formal and informal actors are involved in the successful resolution of disputes, including police, traditional leaders, family members, local councils, and non-state armed groups.

- Self-reported household ownership of firearms is only moderately high in Libya when compared to the situation in several other countries and territories affected by conflict or marked insecurity. Most respondents who reported owning firearms identified them as automatic weapons, such as Kalashnikov-pattern rifles. While they expressed openness to weapons control initiatives, respondents also identified stronger government and security institutions as preconditions for their participation in such initiatives.

Box 1 Survey sampling and margins of error

To measure public perceptions of security and firearms in Libya, the Small Arms Survey and USIP contracted Gallup to carry out a nationwide household survey. The survey questioned 1,500 people aged 15 and older and was carried out between 22 June and 4 August 2013 using face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes. Diwan Market Research, a Libyan firm, was trained by Gallup and the Small Arms Survey, and conducted the survey. The sample was a probability-based clustered sample covering all areas of Libya; the sampling units were stratified by geographic region. The results presented in this Issue Brief were weighted for geographic region, gender, and age.

The survey’s results are valid within a statistical margin of error, also called a ‘95 per cent confidence interval’. This means that if the survey were conducted 100 times using the exact same procedures, the margin of error would include the ‘true value’ in 95 out of the 100 surveys. With a sample size of roughly 1,500, the margin of error for a percentage at 50 per cent is about ±2.5 percentage points. For results that are based on socio-demographic sub-samples (such as gender, age, and level of education), the margin of error varies between ±3.5 and ±6.5 percentage points. The results by geographic location (Libya’s three largest cities, other urban areas, and rural areas) are based on the smallest sub-samples and this increases the margin of error to about ±5 percentage points. As such, some caution should be exercised when interpreting the results of this survey in geographic terms.

To demonstrate visually the significant differences among groups, most bar charts are provided with confidence intervals. These lines, which hover above and below the reported percentage, represent the area within which the true percentage (i.e. the percentage that would apply to the actual population) would lie within the 95 per cent confidence margin. This means that if a confidence interval of one bar intersects that of another bar, these two bars are not statistically different from one another. Conversely, if the confidence intervals of one bar are exclusive of the confidence intervals of another bar (i.e. there is no overlap between the two), then a statistical difference can be inferred between the two bars.

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sana
Perceptions of security

Libyans overwhelmingly identify lack of security as a significant concern. Almost half of respondents (49 per cent) identified security as their main concern, while 82 per cent said it was one of their top three concerns (Figure 1). Other issues listed in the top three by a large number of respondents included healthcare (a top-three concern for 70 per cent of respondents), education (49 per cent), and justice and the resolution of disputes (48 per cent).

Interviews and focus groups reveal that Libyans are anxious about security largely as a feature of their concerns about the country’s future as a whole. The political crises surrounding Libya’s post-conflict transformation nurture these fears: the stalled process of drafting a new constitution, the slow pace of integrating revolutionary armed groups into government structures, and regional tensions in Cyrenaica and Fezzan are the primary concerns. Similarly, discrete incidents of violence in places like Benghazi or the border regions spur fears about the country’s stability. Taken together, these various factors sustain the perception of a high level of insecurity in Libya.

Overall, at the local level Libyans feel that security in their neighbourhoods is decreasing. The perception is not held as strongly as the international media seem to assume, however. Although 41 per cent of respondents felt that security in their neighbourhoods had decreased compared with before the revolution, 38 per cent felt that the situation remained unchanged. A further 16 per cent claimed that security had improved. Compared to the neighbourhood security situation a year before, almost half of interviewees felt that the situation had remained stable (Figure 2). The remaining responses were equally distributed between those who felt that the security situation had improved and those who thought it had deteriorated (23 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively).

Despite concerns about the lack of security in the country, a majority of Libyans consider their neighbourhoods to be safe. The majority of surveyed respondents (64 per cent) ranked the areas where they lived as safe (58 per cent) or very safe (5 per cent). Only 35 per cent of respondents felt that they lived in unsafe (30 per cent) or very unsafe (5 per cent) areas (Figure 3).

The focus groups and interviews also offered several clues to help understand the divergence between the high concern about the security situation and the comparatively high proportion of respondents who considered their neighbourhoods to be safe. Firstly, perceptions of insecurity do not result from immediate threats or direct experiences of violence or crime, but from political instability and regular episodes of violent armed clashes. Secondly, social integration in villages and neighbourhoods is quite deep in Libya and people tend to know each other, even in large cities. People rely on their families, clans, and tribes for protection.

Despite the general feeling of safety there are some notable differences in perceptions of security across different geographical locations. In Misrata, while 81 per cent of respondents identified lack of security as their main concern, 92 per cent assessed their neighbourhoods or the areas they lived in as either safe or very safe. In Benghazi ‘only’ 45 per cent of respondents identified lack of security as a primary concern, but 68 per cent felt that their area was either unsafe (56 per cent) or very unsafe (11 per cent). Respondents...
in rural areas generally considered their neighbourhoods to be safer than their urban counterparts (74 per cent versus 61 per cent, respectively).

These significant discrepancies may be explained by the security arrangements that emerged between formal security forces and government-sanctioned but non-state forces, which vary among different cities and even different neighbourhoods. Interviews and focus groups show that, where state security forces and government-sponsored non-state groups dominate or closely cooperate, perceptions of security appear to be higher. In contrast, those areas where security forces are either absent or dramatically weaker than local non-state armed groups yield perceptions that neighbourhoods are less safe. Further, in certain areas higher perceptions of insecurity can also be explained by the presence of both supporters and opponents of the Qaddafi regime in the same neighbourhood. Finally, individuals or families in large cities may live in neighbourhoods where their affiliated tribe is only a small minority or not present at all, and may feel more insecure as a result.

At a very basic level the survey responses also helped to identify situations where Libyans feel particularly unsafe. These include walking around their neighbourhoods at night (58 per cent ‘somewhat unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’) and seeing the thuwar patrolling the streets (42 per cent ‘somewhat unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’). In contrast, respondents reported feeling safe when walking outside during the day (86 per cent ‘somewhat safe’ or ‘very safe’) and seeing the police patrolling the streets (83 per cent ‘somewhat safe’ or ‘very safe’).

Perceptions and experiences of crime and violence

Respondents were asked to assess how frequently they thought certain types of incidents occurred in their neighbourhoods. Celebratory shootings, car accidents, and car theft (including ‘car jacking’) were the incidents most often described as occurring ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ (78, 57, and 30 per cent, respectively). Fighting between armed groups happened ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ in the view of 13 per cent of respondents, with another 21 per cent identifying such fighting as occurring ‘occasionally’. More-violent incidents were reported with less frequency, although murders, armed robberies, kidnappings, and burglaries were still described as frequent or very frequent occurrences in some neighbourhoods (respectively, 10, 9, 6, and 5 per cent).

Respondents were also asked about their direct experience of three specific types of crimes: assaults and threats, thefts, and sexual offences. Few respondents (9 per cent) reported that members of their households were victims of one or more of these three crimes in the 21–22 months that followed the end of the revolution. Assaults and threats were the most common reported incidents (by 8 per cent of respondents), followed by thefts (3 per cent), and sexual offences (1 per cent).

Among the respondents who described assaults and threats against one of their household members, 86 per cent said that the incidents occurred in the evening and 78 per cent said that the incidents involved the use of a weapon. Male respondents said that members of their households experienced assault and threats more frequently than women (12 per cent versus 3 per cent, respectively). Claims of assaults were also more likely among young respondents (10 per cent among 15–34-year-olds, compared with 6 per cent among those over 34).

Over half (52 per cent) of respondents whose households suffered an assault or threat said that they reported it to some authority or organization (Figure 4). Of the reports made, one-third were formal reports filed with the police, while other respondents reported the assault or threat to the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) (11 per cent), friends (11 per cent), the thuwar (11 per cent), local councils (8 per cent), the nearest family member (8 per cent), traditional leaders (6 per cent), central or national government authorities (4 per cent), youth groups (4 per cent), neighbours (1 per cent), and unspecified others (3 per cent). Those who reported assaults and threats were slightly more frequently dissatisfied than satisfied with the response they received (35 per cent versus 25 per cent, respectively; 40 per cent had no opinion or declined to answer). Respondents relating these incidents believed that ‘offenders’ were ‘punished’ in only 12 per cent of cases.

Participants in interviews and focus groups indicated that they believed that victims only made formal reports of crimes to the police ‘to create a file’. They also noted that government-sanctioned armed groups, e.g. the SSC, tended to send complainants to the police to make such formal reports. On the other hand, those interviewed did not think that the police were actually able to arrest the alleged perpetrators. Indeed, interviewees described a system where prosecutors and judges faced formidable challenges to retain suspects in custody, let alone indict or convict them. They felt that evidence was not ‘properly’ collected because state security forces (e.g. the police) did not make most arrests. Further, they thought that many prosecutors and judges were regularly subjected to intimidation, including threats of kidnappings or harm to their family members. According to interviewees, citizens’ impetus to create a file with police therefore illustrated their desire to have the state address their complaints, even if only in the future.
Security and justice providers

The survey examined respondents’ perceptions of security and justice providers. The survey’s questions were designed to elicit answers illustrating the variety of state and non-state actors that perform security-related roles in Libya, and Libyans’ perceptions of these actors’ performance.

Strikingly, half of all respondents felt that no one provided security in their neighbourhoods (Figure 5). Among the 42 per cent of respondents who did identify an institution, group, or individual that contributed to securing their neighbourhood, the police were cited as the primary provider (67 per cent). Other identified security providers included the army, the thuwar, and the SSC (mentioned respectively by 43, 38, and 33 per cent of respondents where the respondent could identify one or several security providers) (Figure 6).

In interviews and focus groups the perception (identified in the survey data) that the police lacked the capacities and equipment to properly do their jobs was reinforced. Interviewees described several cases where the police referred plaintiffs to non-state forces for assistance. Generally, those interviewed believed that police forces and prosecutors tended to collaborate with the thuwar to make arrests and transfer accused people or prisoners. They also noted that some non-state security providers had police officers accompanying them when they formally arrested or interrogated suspects. However, the interviewees’ descriptions of this cooperation indicated that it varied in degree from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Non-state security providers were perceived to have unclear mandates and explicit tribal, political, or religious affiliations, while many interviewees were confused by the multiplicity of actors in the security sector and had experienced difficulties in identifying ‘proper’ security providers. Indeed, interviewees indicated that, rather than searching for the proper security provider, they tended to go first to any armed group (whether the police, state-sponsored group, or thuwar) where they had relatives or friends.

Just over a quarter of respondents (26 per cent) answered that a group, institution, or individual contributed to insecurity in their neighbourhoods (Figure 7). Of the groups identified by respondents, 83 per cent cited criminal groups, 52 per cent mentioned youth groups, and 29 per cent cited the thuwar as sources of insecurity (Figure 8). In interviews and focus groups this view was reinforced: many interviewees said that they felt that the release of prisoners during the 2011 armed conflict contributed to the increase in criminality and insecurity. It is noteworthy that the thuwar are seen as sources of both security and insecurity, although on balance applied to the whole survey sample twice as many respondents identified them as security providers rather than sources of insecurity (16 per cent versus 8 per cent, respectively).

As noted above, there was a disconnect in respondents’ perceptions of...
the police. The survey results indicated that the police were perceived as the main security provider, but more than half the respondents expressed negative views about their ability to provide security (‘fairly poor’ or ‘very poor’) (Figure 9). These negative perceptions extended to how the police interacted with Libyans making formal reports of crimes: more than half the respondents (52 per cent) thought the police poorly received citizens making such formal reports (20 per cent ‘very bad’ and 32 per cent ‘quite bad’). About half (48 per cent) of those surveyed reported that police performance had not changed in the past 12 months and 20 per cent even said that it had deteriorated. A quarter of respondents were more optimistic and reported that they had seen improvements in the police’s performance.

Respondents were asked to rate various security institutions and actors’ performance and work based on a series of criteria: familiarity, trust, accessibility, effectiveness, responsiveness, rapidity, fairness, and transparency. The military received the highest scores (an average score of 2.9/4). Other institutions with comparatively high ratings were the police and traditional leaders (both at 2.7), followed by religious leaders and judges (both 2.5). Prison authorities received the lowest score (1.8). The thuwar received a score of 2.2: they scored low in the trust, transparency, and fairness measures (2.1, 2.1, and 2.0, respectively) and slightly higher for responsiveness (2.4). Looking at geographic differences in the results, the thuwar received somewhat higher ratings in Misrata than in the rest of the country.

The survey results indicated that access to justice and conflict resolution actors was more readily available than access to security providers. A large majority of respondents (68 per cent) would seek help (whether from individuals or institutions/groups) to resolve disputes (Figure 10). Among this majority, over half identified the police (53 per cent), followed by traditional leaders (mentioned by 49 per cent), the local council (31 per cent), a family member (24 per cent), or the SSC (22 per cent) (Figure 11). Fewer respondents cited the thuwar and the army (12 and 15 per cent, respectively). Interestingly, when results were looked at in terms of gender, men appeared to be more likely to go to traditional leaders, while women relied more on police or family members.

It is interesting to note that there is an inherent dichotomy in the two most frequent choices for the resolution of disputes (the police and traditional leaders). On the one hand, utilizing traditional leaders—who have no official status in the formal justice system—appears to be thought of as an efficient means to seek the resolution of disputes. On the other hand, in so doing, the formal authority of the state—as the justice provider upholding the rule of law, equality, and fairness—is challenged. That said, these
two methods of dispute resolution are not mutually exclusive. Interviewees indicated that both systems are used in parallel: Libyans will seek a temporary solution through traditional leaders, while filing an ‘official complaint’ in parallel: Libyans will seek a temporary solution through traditional leaders, while filing an ‘official complaint’ in traditional leaders, while filing an ‘official complaint’ in

**Perceptions of firearms**

Survey results confirm the common assumption that firearms are widely owned and easily accessible in Libya. Although more than one-third of respondents (32 per cent of male and 44 per cent of female respondents) did not answer this question, 30 per cent indicated ‘a majority’ of households owned a firearm, while a further 14 per cent indicated ‘quite a few’ did. Eleven per cent of survey respondents thought that ‘almost all households’ in their towns or local areas owned a firearm. Only 8 per cent thought ‘only a few’ households possessed a firearm (Figure 12). Widespread ownership corresponds with the perceived lack of difficulty of obtaining a firearm. Only 12 per cent of respondents thought that acquiring a firearm was difficult.

In contrast, 39 per cent of respondents said it was very easy, while a further 24 per cent thought it was ‘complicated but possible’. More than a fifth of respondents (21 per cent) reported owning one or more firearms (either themselves or members of their households). This result is moderately high when compared with results of similar surveys undertaken in other contexts affected by conflict or marked insecurity.

The type of firearms reported was heavily weighted towards military types of weapons: 59 per cent of respondents who reported firearms in their homes described them as automatic rifles. Thirty per cent of respondents did not know what type of firearm was in their household, while handguns (29 per cent) and single-shot long guns (18 per cent) were the next most-cited firearms. Most of these respondents indicated that the firearms were purchased (37 per cent), given to them during the revolution (25 per cent), or seized from the enemy (17 per cent) (Figure 13). The reasons cited for owning a firearm ranged from personal protection against gangs and criminals (61 per cent) to fear of conflict (30 per cent) and protection of property (29 per cent).

Younger respondents were more likely than older ones to report that their households possessed firearms (24 per cent among 15–34-year-olds versus 19 per cent among those over 34), and so were males than females (29 per cent versus 13 per cent, respectively). Firearm ownership was also more common in rural areas (28 per cent of self-reported ownership in rural areas, compared with 21 per cent in urban areas). Among Libya’s cities, the survey found that ownership of firearms was highest in Benghazi (43 per cent; this compares to 20 per cent reported ownership in Misrata and 17 per cent in other urban areas). Looking outside respondents’ households, the perception was that the institutions or groups holding the most firearms were the Thuwar (74 per cent), followed by the army (57 per cent), criminal groups (41 per cent), the SSC (35 per cent), the police (31 per cent), and youth groups (26 per cent).

Despite high firearm ownership levels, the survey indicated that there was a general perception that firearms are a threat to safety, which was a view 87 per cent of respondents shared. In contrast, only 6 per cent of respondents believed that firearms were a necessity, while 3 per cent said they contributed to security. Respondents who reported that their households

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**Figure 11 If there is an individual, group, or institution you would go to for a solution if you witnessed or experienced a dispute, whom would you go to first?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders (tribe elders)</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local council</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearest family member</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuwar/brigade</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government agencies</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutor or judge in the city/town court</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society/community organization</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/national government agencies</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth groups</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutor or judge in Tripoli</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/Ref</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Multiple responses allowed; DK = ‘do not know’; Ref = ‘refuse to answer’; n = 1,299.

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**Figure 12 How widespread would you say firearm ownership is in the town or area where you live? How many households have guns?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How widespread</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very few</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a few</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The majority</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most/ almost all</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages; DK = ‘do not know’; Ref = ‘refuse to answer’; n = 1,506.
did not own any firearms ascribed their choice to the fact that ‘they did not like guns’ (35 per cent) or that ‘it would be dangerous’ for their family and neighbours (30 per cent).

Negative feelings towards firearms were also confirmed by the stated willingness of a large percentage of respondents to participate in possible firearm control efforts. Eighty-four per cent felt that a disarmament process would help improve security, while only 6 per cent thought it would increase insecurity. Respondents in urban areas were more likely than their rural counterparts to believe that disarmament would ‘very much’ improve security in their neighbourhood (62 per cent versus 37 per cent, respectively). Respondents in Benghazi were less likely than those in Tripoli or Misrata to share this view. When asked about what kind of incentives would persuade them to surrender their weapons, one-third cited stronger government and security institutions, while 8 per cent cited economic compensation (Figure 14). Yet few respondents reported weapons collection efforts had taken place in their neighbourhoods. One in six (17 per cent) respondents thought that since the end of the revolution there had been initiatives in their neighbourhoods to collect firearms, while only 1 in 20 (5 per cent) believed that there had been initiatives to register firearms.

**Conclusion**

The end of the armed conflict in Libya did not end the violence that plagues the country. Instead, it seems to be caught in a reinforcing cycle: in the absence of strong and respected security institutions, a multiplicity of informal security providers and non-state armed groups have emerged. The presence of so many different armed groups—in many cases, better armed than the police—hammers the establishment of state authority. The lack of a strong state gives rise to the further proliferation of armed groups, and so the cycle continues.

The results of this research show that Libyans are, in some senses, caught between conflicting views. The interviewees expressed concern about the weakness of the formal security forces and these forces’ ability to provide security and justice, although they still preferred the police to provide those services over other groups. At the same time, the reliance of many Libyans on tribal and other informal mechanisms of reconciliation or retribution risks undermining the authority of the state’s justice and security institutions, thus perpetuating the weaknesses that caused the interviewees’ concerns.

But blanket characterizations of the levels of security in Libya are not supported by the survey’s data. Indeed, perceptions of security and levels of community safety vary considerably throughout Libya. The slow and timid efforts to rebuild the armed and security forces and to swiftly integrate the thuwar into formal institutions are reflected in the different security arrangements emerging in each region and neighbourhood. Similarly, even relatively strong security arrangements are perceived to provide security selectively in terms of tribal or clan affiliations.

Although the survey and qualitative research seem to paint a grim picture of Libya, some positive signs can also be discerned. Most respondents still consider their neighbourhoods to be safe or very safe, despite the weakness of the security forces. And although the population’s reliance on tribal and clan affiliations may tend to weaken state security institutions, the focus groups and interviews confirm the importance of traditional leaders in resolving disputes and de-escalating clashes between families and tribes. A majority of Libyans still make formal reports to the police, thereby expressing their desire for stronger state institutions and hope for the future formal resolution of disputes. As such, the survey responses also underline the preference for solid security institutions over informal security providers.
Acknowledgements
The Small Arms Survey and USIP partnered to conduct the research underlying this analysis. The Small Arms Survey oversaw the jointly funded nationwide household survey, while also participating in training Libyan focus group facilitators and survey enumerators. USIP undertook semi-directed interviews and oversaw the team of Libyan focus group facilitators. Peer review of this publication was provided by both organizations.

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Notes
1 The qualitative research, undertaken by USIP during 2012 and 2013, involved extensive semi-directed interviews and focus groups with a variety of actors in and users of the justice and security systems in Jadaf, Misrata, Sebha, Tripoli, Zawiya, and Zuwarah (see Mangan and Murtaugh with Bagga, 2014. Appendix II).
2 Please note that the totals cited have been rounded to whole figures from the actual numbers of 67.6 per cent (56.4 per cent unsafe and 11.2 per cent very unsafe).
3 Examples of government-sanctioned non-state security forces include the Supreme Security Committee, the Libya Shield Forces, and the Anti-Crime Unit, as well as local non-state armed groups.
4 Where respondents reported that weapons were used, three main types of weapons were identified: military rifles (40 per cent), handguns (28 per cent), and bladed weapons (25 per cent).
5 There were similar gender-based differences when respondents were asked if members of their households had been held at gunpoint in the previous 12 months, with 11 per cent of male respondents responding ‘yes’ compared with just 4 per cent of women.
6 Although reporting a crime is not mandatory, interviewees mentioned that they wanted to record their complaints for the evidence in case security and justice institutions become operational again.
7 For instance, Guatemala in 2008 (9 per cent), Liberia in 2010 (7 per cent), Kenya in 2012 (1 per cent), and Nepal in 2011 (1.5 per cent) exhibited lower rates of household firearm ownership than Libya in 2013. On the other hand, Somaliland in 2008–09 (74 per cent) and Eastern Equatoria (Sudan) in 2009 (38 per cent) experienced higher rates (Small Arms Survey, 2014).

About the Security Assessment in North Africa
The Security Assessment in North Africa is a multi-year project of the Small Arms Survey that supports actors engaged in building a more secure environment in North Africa and the Sahel–Sahara region. It produces timely, evidence-based research and analysis on the availability and circulation of small arms, the dynamics of emerging armed groups, and related insecurity. The project places special emphasis on the local and transnational effects of the region’s recent uprisings and armed conflicts on community safety.

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