There and Back

Trajectories of North African Foreign Fighters in Syria

Introduction

The conflict in Syria, pitting rebel groups from across the political and religious spectrum against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, has become a rallying point for people from around the world. Scholars estimate that over 20,000 ‘foreign fighters’ are fighting or have fought in Syria, including over 4,000 from western countries (Neumann, 2015). While these fighters can join various rebel groups in the country, most have been recruited by and travel to Syria to join jihadist groups, including Jubhat al-Nusra (JAN) and the non-state armed group known as Islamic State (IS). It is these two groups, especially IS, that attract most of the foreign volunteers to their ranks.

The current incarnation of IS originated in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. Since 2006, IS has seized the opportunities presented by weakened governments in Baghdad and Damascus to greatly increase the territory and resources under its control. In so doing, it has become, in many senses, a rival to al-Qaeda for allegiance of foreign fighters worldwide. It has also become a territorial power in its own right. Unlike al-Qaeda, IS plays down its role as an endogenous struggle, emphasizing instead its universal dynamic: from its inception, it has publicly declared the goal of establishing and enlarging the ‘caliphate’.

The nations of North Africa, including Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, provide a large share of the foreign fighters currently active in Syria. Indeed, Tunisia is believed to be the home country of more foreign fighters—over 3,000—than any other. Morocco and Libya are estimated to be the country of origin for some 3,000 fighters, many of them in leadership roles within IS. It is striking that, of the three nations, the two more politically stable provide more fighters to the Syrian conflict than revolutionary Libya.

This Issue Brief sheds light on the mobilization of foreign fighters to Syria between 2011 and 2015, focusing on the last two years. It seeks to answer the following questions: Who are the fighters? Why do they travel to Syria? How do they get there and what groups do they join when they arrive? Perhaps most importantly, the Issue Brief explores what the fighters intend to do in Syria or in their home country if they return. The key findings include:

- Recruitment of foreign fighters from North Africa is still largely done face to face. News broadcasts and online media (including social media) may influence recruits but most North African fighters are recruited directly, by people they (already) know.
- The most effective recruiting networks are the most established groups. Ansar al-Sharia, the Libyan militant group, was established during the Libyan revolution. It has played a key role in recruiting and training both Libyan and Tunisian fighters, even more so than its Tunisian offshoot (Ansar al-Sharia-Tunisia).
- North African fighters are more likely to travel to Syria from countries that have stable, even authoritarian, governments. Such governments provide fewer opportunities for local expression, forcing prospective volunteers to look to Syria to engage meaningfully with their jihadist beliefs.
- Most North African fighters go to Syria with the intention of staying there. Whether it is with the aim
of building the ‘new caliphate’ (declared by IS on 29 June 2014; Al Jazeera, 2014), to escape difficult economic or social situations in their own country, or for other reasons, most fighters intend either to stay in Syria after the conflict ends or to be martyred there.

- In Syria, reputation and experience count. Libyans and Moroccans are reputed to be effective fighters with tactical ability and experience. They often serve in senior IS positions.
- Tunisians, on the other hand, have less experience as fighters and are generally forced to prove themselves to their fellow foreign fighters, serving in more junior roles.
- When fighters return home, it is currently more likely to be because of disillusionment with reality on the ground in Syria (Moroccans and Tunisians) or the deterioration of the situation in their home country (mostly Libyans) than it is to take up arms against their own governments.

The Issue Brief draws on a combination of literature and media reviews on foreign fighters and the conflict in Syria, complemented by fieldwork in Turkey, including interviews with Syrian journalists, activists, and former residents and prisoners under IS control. It follows up on the research and findings of SANA Dispatch no. 4, published in March 2014.7

Quantifying foreign fighters in Syria

It is difficult to establish the number of foreign fighters in Syria with any accuracy. Although estimates vary, experts believe that there have certainly been more than 12,000 over the course of the conflict (Barrett, 2014) and perhaps over 20,000 (Neumann, 2015). Importantly, this means that more foreign fighters have now fought in the Syrian conflict than fought in Afghanistan with the Taliban (and in the violence following the fall of its government). Fighters of North African origin are well represented among the various groups fighting in Syria.

The Moroccan government estimates that up to 2,000 citizens of Morocco or persons of Moroccan origin resident in other countries have fought in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts. The Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Mohamed Hassad, stated that 1,122 Moroccan citizens had gone to fight in Syria and Iraq (Hassad, 2014). Of that number, the government believes that 200 died in the fighting and admitted to investigating 128 of them on their return to Morocco. Hicham Baali, National Security Representative, also noted, however, that the government believes that since only 18 per cent of the fighters under investigation have a criminal record, it is difficult to track all of their movements or whereabouts at a given time (Baali, 2014).

Making this issue perhaps more troubling for the Moroccan government is the reputation of Moroccan fighters in Syria. Many nationals are known to hold important roles in Syrian rebel groups, especially IS.
The government has acknowledged that its citizens are among the senior military ranks of IS (military ‘emirs’ or battle commanders) as well in senior logistical (Emir of the financial commission) and political ranks (Emir of the Turkmen Mountains, Emir of North of Aleppo, and Emir of Land Borders, for example) (Hassad, 2014; Ghioua, 2014). The reputation of Moroccan fighters among their fellows is fearsome; they are reputed to be more willing to commit suicide attacks than other nationals (Hassad, 2014).

The government believes that many of the Moroccans fighting in Syria are motivated not only to fight there but also to obtain military training in order to commit attacks in Morocco. The country’s Minister of the Interior has publicly stated the government’s concern that Moroccan fighters have received both training and practical experience in combat, in making and deploying explosives, and in the use of heavy arms. Already, some Moroccan fighters have sought to project their capabilities beyond Syria’s borders, making direct threats to Morocco’s interests in general (Hassad, 2014; Ghioua, 2014) and specific threats to Moroccan public figures. In August 2014, for example, the Moroccan Minister for Justice and Liberty, Mustapha Ramid, was labelled a kafir (unbeliever) and received death threats from a group affiliated with IS (Al-Soussi, 2014; Khbarna.net, 2014).

The situation is similar in Tunisia. There are an estimated 1,800 to 3,000 fighters of Tunisian origin participating (or having participated) in the Syrian conflict (Barrett, 2014; Neumann, 2015). Indeed, it is widely believed that Tunisians make up the largest group of foreign fighters among non-Syrian rebels.

It is almost impossible to establish a reliable number of Libyans who have fought in Syria. Libyan volunteers were certainly among the earliest foreign recruits of IS and its predecessors. The desire of Libyans to travel and fight in Syria was given fresh impetus by the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011. The revolutionary government established contact with Syrian rebels in the autumn of that year. Subsequently, Libya sent money and weapons to anti-Assad forces, even considering sending ‘military’ trainers. Contemporary sources describe ‘hundreds’ of Libyans going or intending to go to Syria, although there were never any reliable figures.

Currently, most estimates place the number of Libyans fighting in Syria at anywhere from a few hundred to a thousand. There is definite evidence of their continued presence: news of the deaths of Libyan ‘martyrs’ or the departure of fresh recruits continues to be reported (Libya Herald, 2014; Ali, 2014). These news reports and social media posts provide a rough recruitment map, showing that fighters going to Syria are largely drawn from the Islamist-dominated towns of Dernah, Tripoli, and Benghazi (Ze- lin, 2013b).

**Box 1 Female fighters**

It is difficult to establish how many women travel to Syria as fighters or activists. This may be partly cultural since North African societies tend to be reluctant to report the phenomenon. Although a Tunisian government minister estimated that over 1,000 Tunisian women had gone to Syria, there is little reliable data to support that or any other estimate (Al-Amin, 2014).

Despite the uncertain numbers, it is clear that there are two distinct groups of women travelling to Syria: young, single women going alone to fight or support the cause by marrying a fighter, and married women (often with their children) who join their husbands on the battlefield. There is ample evidence to confirm the existence of the former travelling to Syria for social reasons. Recent evidence suggests that women are also taking part in IS administration. A brigade made up exclusively of women (the ‘al-Khansaa Brigade’) is active in Raqqa. The brigade is apparently charged with keeping social order and enforcing sharia rules (as defined by IS leadership) in the town (Winter, 2015b, p. 7). It is difficult to determine whether the women of the ‘al-Khansaa Brigade’ are from Syria, Iraq, or other countries. While the presence of so many foreigners in IS leadership positions presents the possibility that some members of the brigade are foreign fighters, it is more likely to be made up of Syrian and Iraqi nationals.

Equally, there is evidence of women travelling with their husbands and families to join IS. Such women have their own ‘role models’ to encourage participation. Among the most influential female Salafist activists is the Moroccan Fatiha Hassan, also known as Oum Adam Al Mejlati or ‘The black widow of al-Qaeda’. Hassan was married to the well-known Moroccan fighter Karim Mejlati, who was killed in Saudi Arabia in 2004 during a clash between al-Qaeda and Saudi government forces. Mejlati lived with her husband in Afghanistan in 2009 under Osama bin Laden before moving first to Pakistan (probably in early 2002) and then to Saudi Arabia. Despite imprisonment, and (after her release) close monitoring by security forces, Hassan made her way to Iraq. There are rumours that Hassan is engaged to or has married Al Baghdadi’s deputy, the second in command in IS (Benhada, 2014).

Female fighters of the ‘al-Khansaa Brigade’, near Raqqa, Syria. Source: Ahmad al-Bahri/SyriaDeeply.org

**Foreign fighters: who they are**

It is unwise to make generalizations about the motivations of fighters of North African origin. Religion, economic opportunity, and even a government’s own actions or inactions may influence an individual’s choice to travel to Syria and become involved in that conflict. There are, however, features common to many fighters that may lend themselves to a better understanding of who the North African fighters are, how they got to Syria, and what groups they have joined.

**Motivating factors**

**Morocco**

I (feel) bad when I see and hear of the [suffering] of the Syrian people . . . [we learned] day and night . . . how people were killed and displaced in their own country . . . I decided to go to Syria to help (Saadouni, 2013).
Morocco is considered one of the most stable countries in the North African region. Despite this, Moroccan citizens have frequently participated in the conflicts that shaped modern 'jihadist' thought and doctrine: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Indonesia (Rogelio and Rey, 2007). Moroccan fighters ascribe their presence to noble aims: to fight against the oppressive Assad regime, to restore justice (specifically Sharia law), and to promote jihad in Syria (ONERDH, 2013a). Research suggests, however, that socio-political and economic reasons may be among the factors that ultimately drive Moroccan participation in the Syrian conflict.

Perhaps most important of the three broad factors behind Moroccan motivation is the religious element. Though Syria, as the seat of the Ummyad Caliphate, is an important location in the history of Arab nationalism, it is primarily understood now as the 'cause célèbre of jihadism' (Mohamedou, 2014). Like other contemporary Muslims, Moroccans recognize Syria’s important status in Islam as the location for the ‘final battle’ to take place in Dabiq at the ‘end of time’ between Muslims and non-believers, and the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate (Masbah, 2013a).

If such broad reasoning is the foundation of the religious element of Moroccan desires to fight in Syria, the specific impetus can be traced to the active encouragement of religious leaders and the government’s laissez-faire attitude. Pervasive media coverage of both the devastation wrought by the Syrian conflict on the civilian population and the many religious fatwas (directives) issued by religious leaders, encouraged potential fighters. At the same time, conservative government leaders were subject to strict government control, including imprisonment. After several high-profile and Salafist-inspired attacks against the government and the tourist infrastructure in the first decade of the 21st century, the Moroccan government cracked down heavily on Salafists, religious leaders, and sheiks. Prominent among those arrested was Mohamed Fizazi, sentenced to 30 years following the 2003 Casablanca attack. Fizazi is believed to have influenced many Moroccan foreign fighters (Barrada, 2014). Indeed, prisoners often became further radicalized while they were serving their sentence, declaring their ‘loyalty’ to IS (Benhada, 2014c; Chamal Post, 2014). Fizazi and 91 others were released in 2011 as part of a royal pardon.

After their release, an estimated 30 per cent of the Salafist former detainees went to Syria (Masbah, 2013a). It has been suggested that this was the result of the tacit encouragement of the Moroccan government. In 2012, the government hosted a ‘Friends of Syria’ meeting, an act that many (especially former prisoners) interpreted as official encouragement to go to fight in Syria (Benhada, 2014b). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Tunisian strain of ‘political Islam’ developed mainly outside the country and for a long time involved only a few militants. The first recognized militant Islamic leader was Seifallah ben Hassine, also known as Abu Ayadh. Hassine was a close companion of Osama Bin Laden, notably taking part in the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud in Afghanistan on 9 September 2001. Abu Ayadh was also the first emir of the Tunisian Fighting Group (TFG; the group was Tunisian in character but was founded and operated outside the country) and played a central role in establishing recruiting networks for Tunisian fighters to travel to both Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st century (Bergen et al., 2008). Though these militants had returned to Tunisia...
from their time abroad, it was not until April 2006 that militant Islam made its first domestic attack, as an armed jihadist group clashed with Tunisian Security Forces in the vicinity of Mount Chambi. Political Islam emerged in Tunisia with the fall of the Ben Ali government in January 2011. Islamist groups benefited from the interim government’s 20 January amnesty for political prisoners detained under the Ben Ali government’s 2003 anti-terror laws. The most potent force to emerge was Ennahda Movement, an Islamist political party that was finally legalized in March 2011. Ansar al-Sharia-Tunisia (AS-T), founded in April 2011, represented the Salafi-jihadist strain of political Islam. AS-T followers rapidly ‘took over’ more than 100 mosques in Tunisia. The mosques allowed AS-T openly to recruit volunteers for the burgeoning Syrian conflict.

The fall of the Ben Ali regime also led to a period of economic uncertainty in Tunisia. That, combined with political instability, contributed to increasing the pool of potential recruits for the Syrian conflict. At the same time (like many tapped into Arabic-language media), Tunisians were relentlessly exposed to images and descriptions of the abuses and deprivations of ordinary Syrians. Online jihadist propaganda was another important recruiting tool. All of these factors played a role in the large number of Tunisians from various social and economic backgrounds who ended up fighting in Syria (Ghribi, 2014).

Beyond the social and economic factors, however, history and geography also played a role. The fall of the Ben Ali regime did nothing to heal the cultural and economic rift between the borderlands and more prosperous coast, which includes the capital Tunis. The former regions account for a significant share of Tunisia’s GDP and have historically struggled with higher unemployment and lower wages.

The unstable situation in Libya appears to have convinced Ansar al-Sharia and others that Libyan fighters were best used to further their religious aims—perceived to be under threat—in their own country. This trend was probably influenced by the ‘split’ in Libya’s government between more secular and more religious factions and by actions such as ‘Operation Dignity’ (al-Karamah), the effort by former Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar and units loyal to him to ‘cleanse Libya of terrorism and extremism’ (Tawil, 2014).

Summarizing affiliations to armed groups

**Morocco**

Moroccan fighters have joined three main groups over the course of the Syrian conflict:

- **Jubhat al-Nusra (JAN):** The first group that Moroccan fighters in Syria joined was Jubhat al-Nusra (also known as the ‘al-Nusra Front’). The group has boasted several well-known Moroccan foreign fighters, including Ibrahim Bencheckroun (an ex-Guantanamo prisoner). JAN is the ‘official affiliate’ of al-Qaeda in Syria, although its stated aims are local rather than global. While JAN is considered to be one of the most effective and experienced of the Syria-based jihadist groups, many of the Moroccans who originally joined the group ‘defected’ to other groups, including IS and Harakat Sham Al-Islam, which was founded by Bencheckroun (see overleaf).

Moroccans fighting for JAN were known for their suicide attacks on behalf of the group. Abu Mus’ab...
Ash-Shamali was the first to commit such a suicide bombing in August 2012, attacking a building of army officers in Neirab (between Aleppo and Idlib). A second prominent suicide attack was undertaken by Abu-Ayman, a Moroccan from Casablanca. He exploded a bomb at an army checkpoint in Qusayr in March 2013 (Caillet, 2014).

Islamic State (IS): IS was founded in 2013 by its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group was successful in attracting mostly foreign fighters, including many Moroccans. This ‘second wave’ of Moroccans included Abdelaziz Al Mahdali (also known as Abou Oussama al-Maghrebi, a former merchant from Fnideq). Originally, Al Mahdali joined JAN but later left for IS, where he became a commander in the group and a leader in operations against JAN in the Aleppo area. JAN members killed him in Aleppo, in March 2014 (Azaali and Yussuf, 2014). As with JAN, Moroccan fighters for IS are known for their willingness to commit suicide attacks. Among them was Abu Sohaib al-Maghrebi, who attacked a Syrian military checkpoint at Deir Al-Zour, killing 25 soldiers and injuring scores more (Hexpress, 2014a).

Harakat Sham Al-Islam (HSAI): Harakat Sham Al-Islam was founded in mid-August 2013 and was the first ‘Moroccan’ group to be created in Syria. It was founded in the Latakia countryside by former Guantanamo detainees: Ibrahim Benchekroun (also known as Ahmed al-Maghrebi or Abou Ahmed Al-Muhajir), and Muhammad al’Alami Slimani (also known as Abou-Hamza al-Maghrebi). Benchekroun had extensive experience of jihad. Originally from Casablanca, he shaped his jihadist views in Mauritania in 1990. Subsequently, he lived in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he was captured fighting for the Taliban and sent to the US prison at Guantanamo in Cuba. He was repatriated to Morocco, where he was imprisoned from 2005 to 2011. Released under the royal amnesty, Benchekroun immediately fled to Syria, where he joined JAN before founding HSAI. Like Benchekroun, ‘Alami Slimani first gained experience as a fighter with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001. He too was captured and sent to Guantanamo, repatriated, and imprisoned in Morocco before being released, probably as part of the royal amnesty. Slimani was the first leader of the group. Following his death, he was succeeded by Benchekroun, who changed the name from ‘Ahrar Al-Sham’ to ‘Sham Al-Islam.’

When Benchekroun was killed, Mohammed Mazouz (also known as Abou al Izz-Al Muhajir) took the lead of HSAI. Like the founders, Mazouz fought in Afghanistan and was imprisoned at Guantanamo and once back in Morocco was convicted of recruiting for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Mazouz fled Morocco for Syria after his release, where he eventually joined HSAI (Azaali and Yussuf, 2014; Thomson and Nasr, 2014; Mawassi, 2014).

The group has 500–700 Moroccan fighters, who comprise most of its armed strength (Masbah, 2014a). HSAI is not exclusively Moroccan, however: its spiritual leader (mufti) is the Saudi, Abu Hafs al-Jazrawi, and its military commander is Egyptian (Ahmed Muzin) (Azaali and Yussuf, 2014). Ideologically, HSAI espouses the ‘Takfiri’ ideology of al-Qaeda, including the application of Sharia law in all territory under its control. There are suggestions that HSAI is training fighters for their eventual return to Morocco and actions against the monarchy, although the group has not publicly stated this aim (Al Tamimi, 2013; Mawassi, 2013).

Tunisia

Although they may have joined other groups (including JAN) in the early days of the Syrian conflict, Tunisians now mainly join IS. In IS, Tunisian fighters have a reputation for zeal and brutality. A possible reason for this is that Tunisia does not have a strong gun culture and has had limited experience of political Islam. Consequently, Tunisian fighters lack the experience of Algerian Islamists or Libyan fighters (after the revolution in 2011) and many believe that they strive to prove their courage and commitment to the cause.

Despite the large number of Tunisians in the IS ranks, few rise to leadership. Among the military ranks, leaders from North Africa are generally chosen from the more experienced Libyan or Algerian fighters, with Tunisians limited to local operational command of IS military elements. In the civil aspect of IS, Tunisians are more likely to be media handlers or judges, though in the latter capacity...
their advancement is limited to positions such as being a judge in a small village.39

When asked about the role of Tunisians in IS, interviewees commonly referred to their viciousness, notably in the treatment of prisoners.36 This characterization is a widely held belief, and was confirmed by Syrian activists and journalists who had been imprisoned by IS in Aleppo.37 Perhaps as a result, Tunisian fighters are favoured for sensitive, potentially unpopular missions such as the assassination of Sunni Muslims from organizations rivalling IS, or even from within its own ranks.38

Libya

As noted above, Libyans were among the first foreign fighters in Syria. Originally, they tended to join al-Qaeda-related groups, including JAN and IS.39 Abu Abdallah al-Libi, one of the main Libyan commanders in Syria, paid allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and was appointed as the IS emir in al-Dana (Idlib region) (Roggio, 2013). While the uncertain relationship between JAN and IS was being clarified, Libyans stayed ‘outside’ the fray, remaining in their own units and not integrating into other IS hierarchies or command structures.40 In Latakia for instance, Libyans kept their own separate battalion (The Daily Star, 2013). As the split between JAN and IS deepened, Libyans chose IS but remained apart, forming the Katibat al-Battar al-Libiya (KBL) (The Libyan al-Battar Brigade), under the auspices of IS.

Since its formation, the KBL has been active in eastern Syria, notably in Al Hasakah and Deir az-Zor. The battalion maintained links with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, an early and prominent supporter of IS. Ansar al-Sharia proved to be an excellent recruiting tool and played a role in the arrival of many Libyans in Syria prior to 2014. Most of these fighters were young men who were more religious than revolutionary. As the conflict in Libya intensified, Libyan recruits became more rare, younger, less educated and were ultimately less ‘successful’ in advancing within IS command structures.41 They were foot soldiers and ‘cannon fodder’ not battlefield commanders.

Methods of recruitment

Morocco

Two waves of Moroccan fighters have gone to Syria. The first wave lasted from December 2011 to April 2013.42 The second wave—younger, less experienced but often more radicalized—arrived after the formation of IS in April 2013. After the establishment of IS, Moroccans almost exclusively joined that group until the founding of HSAI in August 2013 (Masbah, 2014a).

The recruitment of fighters from Morocco has varied from ‘traditional’ to modern methods.43 The former are largely built on personal connections: families, friends, or personal acquaintances who have gone to Syria or know someone who has been, encouraging others to join them in ‘the struggle’. For example, Rachid Lemlihi, a young Moroccan, began his journey to Syria after contacting a friend who had gone before, using social media. The friend encouraged him and helped Lemlihi plan his trip to Syria, via Turkey. Following the friend’s advice, Lemlihi told Moroccan authorities his final destination was Turkey. Once there, however, he met his friend and together they went to the Syrian border (Saadouni, 2014). This journey is typical of traditionally recruited fighters, relying on personal connections to make their way to Syria. Many of these fighters remain active on social media networks after their arrival, maintaining contact with friends in Morocco and perpetuating recruiting ‘networks’ (Masbah, 2014a).

‘Modern’ recruitment involves creating a relationship with potential fighters based on their interest in the conflict, and then cultivating that interest. Social media—including Facebook, Skype, Twitter, and a vast number of blogs—are used to recruit future fighters and to raise money for their trips. A good example of a site dedicated to recruiting future fighters is the blog of ‘Ansar al-Tawhid’, which provides information on why fighters go to Syria and how they get there (Amaya, 2014). Given the inherent uncertainty of online connections, fighters recruited by modern methods may face heavier scrutiny than those traditionally recruited. For example, a new fighter may require the endorsement of either a trusted source or a current fighter vouching for the recruit’s adherence to the ideology of the overall movement, and in particular the group the recruit will join. Such an endorsement may be obtained by email or through social networks.

As recruitment has moved towards modern methods, the methods and manner of travel are also changing. New recruits are encouraged to avoid direct flights from Morocco, travelling instead through third countries. Recruits are also encouraged to establish a modern identity, dressing in western clothing, even having a passport issued with a photo showing them so dressed. Fighters are discouraged from discussing their intentions with family. They are even advised to save money in order to marry in Syria—provided they pass all loyalty tests and are accepted by their new comrades (Benhada, 2014a).

Tunisia

Tunisian fighters are still largely recruited traditionally via personal contacts. Recruitment often begins at mosques, many of which were ‘colonized’ by more radical strains of Islam after the fall of the Ben Ali government in 2011 (Gall, 2014). Once recruited, many Tunisian volunteers travel to Syria via Libya (see ‘Reaching the destination’). Most, but not all, fighters from Tunisia are young men from poorer backgrounds. The key to successful recruitment appears to be establishing a personal relationship and exploiting the potential recruit’s sympathy for the oppression of Syrians, as well as the potential religious ‘benefits’ of undertaking jihad in Syria (Al-Amin, 2014).

The Tunisian government has not had an effective programme to either monitor or prevent such recruitment. Some accused the government, under the religious Ennahda Movement (which took power after elections in 2011), of deliberately turning a blind eye to the radicalization of mosques.
and the recruitment of fighters. The current government has made attempts to curtail both trends but both are well established and not easily dislodged (Ghribi, 2014).

**Libya**

It is hard to find reliable data on recruitment of fighters in Libya. Certainly, there are celebrated examples of Libyans who fought in Syria. Beyond those popular examples, however, it is difficult to make an accurate description of the recruitment process. There is evidence that Ansar al-Sharia, the Islamist militia founded in Benghazi, has played an active and important role. The group is believed to have set up training camps for recruits on territory it controls in eastern Libya. The camps provide training not only for Libyan recruits, but also for other North Africans, notably Tunisians and Syrians (Carlino, 2014; Zelin, 2013b).

‘Graduates’ of these camps are believed to have travelled on to Syria, via traditional routes through Turkey. It is important to note that this information is widely circulated but essentially unverified (Zelin, 2013c). And even assuming the presence of the camps and the importance of Ansar al-Sharia in recruiting Libyan fighters, the apparent diversity of Libyans who have fought and died in Syria suggests that informal connections may play as important a role in recruiting them.

**Reaching the destination**

**Morocco**

The ‘traditional’ route for a fighter seeking to join IS or other jihadist groups in Syria was to fly to the Turkish border region and then drive to the crossing for a rendezvous with contacts already in Syria. This route is still widely used, albeit with variations in itinerary in order to conceal the prospective fighter’s true destination from the authorities. However they arrive at the border between Turkey and Syria, the majority of Moroccan fighters still cross this frontier and the same is likely to be true of Tunisian and Libyan fighters.

The traditional route is well known, both to those seeking to join IS (and other groups) in Syria and to the governments of Tunisia and Morocco. It is easy for citizens of those two countries to travel to Turkey since no visas or other entry permits are required (Lefebure, 2014). The traditional route is widely discussed online, where activists supporting IS give detailed advice on logistics and proposed itineraries. As a result, it was easy for Moroccan or Turkish authorities to intercept prospective fighters and prevent them from completing their journey.

To counter this, the traditional route has been varied and prospective fighters are taught to conceal their intentions. This ‘modern’ route uses social media and online resources, including blogs, to disseminate up-to-date information and advice. A good example of the type was the aforementioned Ansar al-Tawhid blog, written and run by Mustafa Maya Amaya (Amaya, 2014). This blog, like others of its kind, describes the trips as ‘tourist trips to Turkey’, although it offers advice on how to avoid undue scrutiny by security services. For example, potential fighters are encouraged to book return tickets for flights to major cities away from the border area; it is acceptable to book a ticket to Istanbul, Ankara, or Eskisehir but not to Gaziantep, near the border. There they are told to buy a local mobile phone or SIM card and act like tourists, travelling from place to place by taxi, domestic airline, or other public transport, and spending a day or two at each stop. Prospective fighters are advised to follow this pattern towards the border, saving enough cash to purchase a weapon once they have crossed.

When they arrive in the border area, they are to coordinate with their contacts in Syria, using their prospective comrades’ routes and logistics to effect the crossing.

Returning from Syria to Morocco appears to be more difficult and there is less of a set route. Online sources suggest flying to Libya and travelling overland through Algeria to its mountainous northern border with Morocco. Once there, returning fighters are advised to sneak across the border, along the same paths used by sub-Saharan migrants trying to get to Europe (Rubin, 2013).

The trip to Syria is estimated to cost almost USD 1,000 (about 8,000 dirhams) (Crétos and Boudarham, 2014). Online sources encourage those who do not plan to travel to Syria themselves to make contributions to allow prospective fighters to make the journey (Amaya, 2014). Local groups also provide funding. For example, a criminal network in Fes was broken up after it was found to be dealing in contraband goods. Members of the network included ex-prisoners and prospective fighters, using the profits from their illicit trade to finance the journey to Syria (Hibazoom, 2014).

**Tunisia**

There are strong indications that, despite the large number of Tunisian fighters in Syria, few travelled directly to join IS. Rather, Tunisians travel via Libya, often being trained there before going on to Syria, usually via Turkey. Transport to Turkey may be by sea,

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**Box 2 Sourcing weapons**

While there are ample small arms in circulation in North Africa, prospective fighters are advised to leave them at home (Kartas, 2013). Fighters travelling to Syria are informed that weapons are plentiful, and that a few hundred US dollars will be sufficient to purchase a simple Kalashnikov-pattern rifle in areas outside government control. In places where the government retains control—in Damascus, for example—prices are twice as much or more.57

The source of the weapons circulating in Syria is a matter of debate. The UN continues to document instances of weapons coming into Syria from Libyan stocks (UNSC, 2014 and UNSC, 2015 provide examples). Libyan weapons arrived by boat or by plane in Jordan or Turkey before overland transport to Syrian conflict zones. Both routes are likely to require the cooperation of government officials in Jordan and Turkey (Donati, Shennib, and Bosalum, 2013; Chivers, Schmitt, and Mazzetti, 2014), as well as help from third parties, for example, the Qatari government (UNSC, 2015). The renewed conflict in Libya may have stemmed this tide of weapons and even reversed the flow (Good Morning Libya, 2014). If so, it is a worrying development, given the sophistication of some of the heavy weapons in circulation in Syria, such as MANPADS.52

Interestingly, despite the rudimentary training given to most foreign recruits, there are indications that they are less than skilled in handling their weapons (Al Arabiya, 2015).
for example from the port at Brega (Hamedi, 2013). Transit through Libya also pre-empts the need for younger prospective fighters to obtain parental ‘permission’, a requirement put in place by the Tunisian government in an effort to stem the flow of volunteers to Syria. Such permission is not required for travel to Libya.

**Political objectives**

**On the ground**

**Morocco**

Most Moroccan fighters in Syria have no intention of returning home. They prefer to stay in Syria and either die a martyr’s death or achieve victory and thereby establish a new caliphate. A minority, however, dismayed by the internecine squabbling between JAN and IS, are willing to return home (Masbah, 2014; Larbi, 2014; Saadouni, 2013).

**Tunisia**

Like Moroccan fighters, Tunisians in Syria have a reputation for intending to stay in the country, settling in what they hope will become the re-established caliphate. Tunisians do not view Syria as a stop in their careers as foreign fighters, nor do they see it as a training ground for later action in their home country. That is to say, these fighters do not view IS as merely an armed group fighting for a cause but as the cause itself.

The reputation of Tunisian fighters in this regard appears to be widespread. They are perceived (positively, according to the Syrian interviewees) to be willing to marry and settle in Syria, or to bring their families over from Tunisia, raising their children in the land of the caliphate. Tunisian fighters are not uniform in their desire to stay in Syria, however: according to the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior, at least 400 fighters had already returned from Syria by August 2014 (Gall, 2014; Ghribi, 2014). The evolving context in Iraq and in North Africa, change in the shape or success of the battles in Syria, and especially the place of IS in the country, may quickly change the intentions of larger numbers of Tunisian fighters.

**Libya**

Libyan fighters’ long presence in Syria is undoubtedly linked to Libya’s history of providing fighters for foreign ‘jihad’ and to the feeling of political kinship that many Libyans feel with the people of Syria under the Assad regime. Indeed, the Libyan Transitional National Council was among the first ‘governments’ to formally recognize the Syrian opposition as the ‘legitimate (governmental) authority’ in Syria (Chulov and Weaver, 2011). As a result, the first wave of foreign fighters included many Libyans, joining groups across the religious and political spectrum (Karadsheh, 2012). In that sense, the presence and motivations of these early Libyan fighters can be distinguished from other fighters of North African origin in that theirs was largely inspired by revolutionary interests rather than being tied to domestic socio-economic hardship or in response to the graphic displays of the suffering of Sunni Muslims that gained such currency across the region (Al-Amin, 2014).

If the first wave of Libyan volunteers was motivated largely by revolutionary fervour, subsequent volunteers were more focused on ameliorating the suffering of their fellow Sunni Muslims or establishing a new caliphate. As noted above, many Libyan volunteers arrived in Syria after being recruited, ‘trained’, and transported by Libyan Islamist militias, notably Ansar al-Sharia. Indeed, KBL, the largest Libyan-affiliated Syrian opposition group, both is affiliated with IS and maintains close ties to Ansar al-Sharia. Thus, despite the departure of many Libyans, those volunteering for IS in Syria are fighting for many of the same reasons as other fighters from the North African region.

**Returned fighters**

**Morocco**

As noted above, the primary political objective for most Moroccan fighters travelling to Syria remains rooted in the conflict there and in the establishment of a new caliphate. Recently, however, some Moroccan fighters or their sympathizers are alleged to have explicitly announced their intention to wage ‘jihad’ in Morocco, against the monarchy. In this potential jihad, HSAI, the Moroccan-dominated militant group in Syria, is said to be acting as a training regime (Sakthivel, 2013). This development could have serious ramifications for the security of Morocco and its government.

**Tunisia**

When the Ben Ali regime collapsed and the freedom of speech was established, Islamists re-emerged as political players. As noted above, the collapse of the Ben Ali regime brought a re-emergence of Islamists who used their new found freedoms to ‘take over’ many mosques. The post-revolutionary government’s general amnesty for jihadists held under Ben Ali’s 2003 anti-terror law also swelled their ranks. This ascendancy was checked by the country’s reaction to the assassination of prominent anti-Islamist politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi (on 6 February and 25 July 2013, respectively) and the initial anti-government attacks near the Algerian border (see below). The new Tunisian government has taken a harder line on political Islam (Zelin, 2013).

While there are few overt signs of fighters returning from Syria and taking up arms against the Tunisian government, the country is nevertheless uneasy. Given the large number of Tunisians with experience of fighting in Syria, there is (and will likely continue to be) a significant proportion that returns. Ansar al-Sharia-Tunisia (AS-T) famously pledged to confine its activities to outside Tunisia’s borders and not seek to destabilize its internal security. In an interview, its leader, Abu Ayadh, declared: ‘Tunisia is for now a land for peaceful preaching, where we should be rooted. Tunisia is not a land of jihad.’ He also stated that: ‘(AS-T) supports Jihadists against dictators still in power within the Muslim world’, implying that Tunisia was not such a place (Merone and Béchir Ayari, 2014). Ayadh’s pledge has done little to mitigate the government’s fears, however: AS-T continues to recruit fighters and there are persistent indications that the group ultimately intends to develop an Islamist-focused parallel state (Gartenstein-Ross, 2013).

At the same time, the new Tunisian
government struggles to provide basic security, especially on the Libyan border. The smuggling cartels of Ben Guerdane, traditionally sympathetic to Islamist or jihadist causes and a source of many recruits for the Syrian conflict, continue to trouble the government (Kartas, 2013). New actors in the illicit trade markets, as well as jihadists operating on the lawless border regions, are also making it difficult for the government to re-establish its authority in the region. On the Algerian border, the Okba Ibn Nafia Brigade (OINB) is increasingly besetting the Djebel Chambi region (Kasserine government). Indeed, the region has become virtually a fiefdom of the group and the past two years have seen a steady stream of attacks.57

**Libya**

Since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has spiralled into instability. In the absence of functioning and neutral institutions, multiple groups are battling for political leverage, territory, and resources. By late 2014, these groups had broadly coalesced into two rival camps, each with its own claims to legitimacy and its own foreign allies or sponsors. At its simplest, the two sides can be described as ‘Islamist’ and ‘anti-Islamist’: the Islamists include the Tripoli faction and Misratan militias, and hold sway in the capital. The anti-Islamists include the Tobruk faction and Misratan militias, and are the ‘secular’ coalition.

Despite the symmetry of this political division, the actual situation is probably better described as two ‘loose coalition(s) of disparate interests’ (Cristani, 2015). Libyan communities have a long-standing reputation for strong local identities. For reasons both cultural and geographical (given the distances between many communities, different local environments, and relative isolation), local loyalties continue to play a large role in Libyan politics and their related conflicts. When faced with a common threat—the Ottomans, the Italians, or, more recently, the Qaddafi regime—communities may join together in resistance. In the absence of any external threat, however, they tend to retreat into their narrow and localized worldview. Thus, two communities that may have fought together to oust the Qaddafi regime may now be in violent conflict as each seeks to promote its local interests at the expense of the other (Cristani, 2015).

Libya is not neatly divided between the two camps. Indeed, among the most radical supporters of the Tripoli faction are militias based in the eastern city of Derna, close to Tobruk. Derna is and has long been a jihadist stronghold. It has been controlled by Islamist militias for several years and has contributed numerous fighters to the conflict in Syria (see above). Indeed, the current militia purporting to control Derna is called the Islamic State (IS-L). The group, formerly known as the Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (the Islamic Youth Shura Council; MSSI), took the name in April 2014, after pledging allegiance to IS in Syria (Zelin, 2014b). Since declaring itself the legitimate governing authority in October 2014, IS-L has attempted to implement its version of Islamic law, copying the methods used by IS in Syria in areas under its control (Zelin, 2014b; Wehrey

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**Box 3 Home-country government responses**

The government of Morocco has refined its response to returning fighters over the course of the Syrian conflict, changing from harsh to repressive. As noted above, the Moroccan government gave tacit approval to fighters travelling to Syria, but discouraged those fighters from returning home. The combination of Moroccans coming back from Syria and threats made against the government, particularly by IS itself, prompted an explicit crackdown. In September 2014, the government amended its 2003 anti-terror law, originally passed during a wave of internal terrorist attacks, to address more specifically the issue of returning fighters. The revised law essentially makes participation in the conflict in Syria a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment for five to 15 years and fines of between 50,000 and 500,000 dirhams (about USD 59,000) (Alarosni, 2014; Hakiki, 2015). At the same time, the government implemented a new security regime, dubbed Hadar (Cautious), which, for the first time, saw the Moroccan army deployed on city streets. The government has followed through on its threats; by August 2014, 128 Moroccans were awaiting trial on return from fighting in Syria (Benotmane, 2014). Some of the detainees have expressed their regret for going to Syria and their allegiance to the monarchy, urging a softer government reaction than the harsh response envisaged in the revised law (Benhada, 2014b).

The Moroccan crackdown is not limited to detention of returning fighters. The authorities have also announced the arrest of members of cells recruiting men to fight in Syria. Between 2011 and 2014, the government publicized arrests related to at least 20 such cells (Alhurra.com, 2014; Hespresse, 2014c). Even speech has become criminalized under the crackdown. In October 2014, a 20-year-old student was arrested for ‘pledging’ allegiance to IS by painting a statement to that effect on the wall of a house (Al-Khazari, 2014). This followed on from the September 2013 arrest of several people for linking to or promoting a video allegedly produced by al-Qaeda entitled ‘Moroco: The Kingdom of Corruption and Tyranny’. Among those arrested was Ali Anouza, a well-known leftist (and secular) journalist (Sakthivel, 2013).

The government is also taking actions to make it harder for fighters to return, including a series of reforms aimed at controlling ports, airports, and land borders. A 70-kilometre fence, complete with sensors, was constructed along the border with Algeria. It was designed, according to Mohammed Assad, the Minister of the Interior, to ‘protect against terrorist threats’ (Arbaoui, 2014).

It is difficult to assess the success or failure of the government’s actions at this stage. Certainly, no major terrorist attacks have taken place inside the country, and there are indications that Moroccan fighters who intend to return home are waiting on the Turkish border for government clearance (Bouturawat, 2014). Internationally, the government is cooperating with other countries and coordinating its response to potential threats posed by returning fighters (Belga News Agency, 2014). On the other hand, and as noted above, there are calls for the government to ‘moderate’ its hardline stance and re-integrate returning fighters rather than merely punish them. The radicalization of the last round of Islamists imprisoned by the government (see ‘Motivations’ above), in the first decade of the 21st century, suggests that moderation may be a course worth exploring.

In contrast to Morocco’s more proactive efforts to control returning fighters, the Tunisian government’s attempts are more reactive. Indeed, Tunisia’s first post-revolutionary government, led by the Islamic-oriented Ennahda party, was widely believed to turn a blind eye to the recruitment of fighters for Syria. While there is little direct evidence to suggest that the government actively facilitated such recruitment, the party is considered to be supportive of Salafists generally, including that group’s active encouragement of jihad and support for violent jihadist thought (Al-Amin, 2014). With the fall of the Ennahda government (partially tied to a series of Islamist attacks on Tunisian security forces and secular politicians) the Tunisian government’s stance on Syria changed (Stevenson, 2014). New measures—including strict border controls and often heavy-handed monitoring of known Islamists—point to a government attempting to make inroads against the successful recruitment networks operating in Tunisia (Gall, 2014; Stevenson, 2014; Al-Amin, 2014).
and Alrababa’h, 2015).

Today, IS-L and its affiliates have about 2,000 fighters in the country. In many senses, the emergence of IS-L has changed the conflict in Libya from a two-sided to a tripartite affair. In Iraq, former members of the deposed regime lead some of the IS-L affiliates (mainly in the centre of the country). Thus, these groups may be considered affiliates of both sides of the conflict, with neither having a natural opposition to them. IS-L’s emergence has also exposed the facile nature of the Islamist versus anti-Islamist dichotomy, revealing that conflict between those once associated in any way with the Qaddafi regime are opposed by those who, ostensibly, were not (Wehrey, 2014).

Largely as a result of these conflicts, the number of Libyan fighters in Syria has diminished. As there are only a few ‘local’ power centres and no functioning ‘central government’ to destabilize, these returning fighters have immediately engaged in the low-level ‘civil war’ taking place in Libya. This civil war is the reason that, beginning in the second half of 2014 and continuing to the present, many (if not most) fighters returned to Libya. The returned fighters pick a side, a choice that seems uniformly to be in favour of the Tripoli faction or sympathetic groups. Indeed, most fighters coming back from Syria appear to be motivated to fight against former Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar. Haftar’s ‘Operation Dignity’ forces are fighting Islamist militias (including Ansar al-Sharia) for control of the Benghazi region (Wehrey, 2014).

If the Libyan returnees are fighting on one side of a civil war, there are also fighters from other nations in Libya. Reports suggest that IS fighters from Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen joined their Libyan comrades when the latter returned, offering training and logistical support in the Libyan conflict (Taha, 2014; Wehrey and Alrababa’h, 2015). This development may eventually lead to increased instability for Libya’s neighbours.

**Conclusion**

Foreign fighters in Syria may at some point become a problem on the scale of that posed by veterans of the anti-Soviet-Afghan campaign, but that day has not yet arrived. At present, most of the foreign fighters who have travelled to Syria have remained there to live, fight, or die. Of those who have returned to their home country, most seem content to try to reintegrate into society if given the chance, disillusioned by the internecine violence they saw in Syria.

Despite its rhetoric, IS is not a homogenous and unified structure. It is better understood as an umbrella organization, largely dominated by local concerns in Iraq and Syria. While pledges of allegiance from Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Dernah, Libya, or other similar regional jihadist groups may increase its profile, there is little other connection. Under current conditions, even if it wanted to do so, IS could not exercise direct control over its newly declared affiliates, let alone provide them with additional money, manpower, or weaponry to expand territories under their control.

At present, Morocco and Tunisia can still be considered success stories in having weathered the upheavals of the Arab Spring and avoided major internal conflicts. The recent attacks in Tunisia highlight the need for the government to remain alert to the continuing threat posed by instability in Libya. Recent criticism of the Moroccan government’s harsh treatment of returning fighters has highlighted fears that this could lead to a re-emergence of militant Islamist groups in the country. Both governments will need to remain vigilant and work to reintegrate any fighters returning from Syria in order to ensure continued stability.

The future may bring changes to the status quo. Foreign fighters may abandon Syria and return home, especially if IS continues to lose territory and resources or (as is the case in Libya) the political situation in their home country significantly deteriorates. Indeed, as noted above, some foreign fighters in Syria have already said they will go home and wage jihad against their own governments. That is to say that, despite their professed intention to stay and build the caliphate, ‘home’ still has a powerful draw. Libyan fighters, even those whose commitment to the conflict in Syria was more religious than revolutionary, have largely already abandoned the conflict for this very reason. They could soon be followed by fighters from the North Caucasus, Yemen or even Tunisia. Should a significant number of combatants leave Syria, the balance of the conflict in that country could change significantly. Furthermore, the influx of dedicated and experienced foreign fighters to jihadist groups ‘back home’ would have serious consequences for regional security in North Africa and beyond. Such dispersal would surely be seen not just as the rekindling of the Islamist attacks that plagued Morocco in the first decade of the 21st century and the intensification of Tunisia’s current conflicts.

**Notes**

1 This Issue Brief uses the broad term ‘foreign fighters’ in its discussion of non-Syrians fighting in the ongoing conflict in Syria. We have adopted the following definition of foreign fighter: non-nationals who are involved in armed violence outside their habitual country of residence . . .’ (Geneva Academy, 2014, p. 3). For a detailed discussion of foreign fighters under International Humanitarian Law, see Geneva Academy, 2014.

2 This Issue Brief uses the term ‘jihadist’ to denote ‘Islamist’ or Muslim ‘fundamentalist’ affiliated or inspired non-state armed groups and the beliefs associated with their members or supporters. We note that this term is controversial but widely understood and used in discussions of security issues. We adopt this term for two reasons. First, many if not most foreign fighters involved in the Syrian conflict identify themselves as ‘jihadists’, regardless of their religious motivation (or lack thereof). Some scholars and analysts argue that the term ‘jihad’ encompasses more than religious conquest to include the processes of building and maintaining the state (or caliphate) (Zelin 2015; Merone and Béchir Ayari, 2013). This idea is often traced to the well-known work ‘Stances on the Fruit of Jihad’ (Waqafat ma’ Thannat al-Jihad) by the influential Salafist preacher, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Vinatier, 2014). Second, the term ‘jihadist’ emphasizes the transnational dynamics inherent in groups comprising foreign fighters active in the Syrian conflict. For a fuller discussion of the term jihadist as it applies to foreign fighters in Syria, see Mohamedou, 2014 and Vinatier, 2014.

3 Formerly the Islamic State of Al-Sham, or ISIS. See Vinatier, 2014.

4 Caliphate is an important political and religious concept in the Arab world and is derived from the Arabic Khilafa which
The notion of ‘jihadist thought’ is contro-
versial, subject to much academic and
theological debate. For a good overview,
see Cook, 2005.

For example, one well-known Egyptian
religious leader, Mohamed Hassan, called
for jihad in a statement in 2013, made
from Cairo, as a necessity for ‘victory
in Syria … jihad with mind, money and
weapons, all forms of jihad’ (Middle East
Online, 2013).

19 The high-profile attacks included two in
Casablanca (2003 and 2007) and one in
Marrakech, in 2011 (Zelin, 2014).

20 Mohamed Darif, a political scientist and
expert on the ‘Islamist Movement’, stated
that when Salafists were released they did
not believe in their future, and that rather
than being re-integrated they remained
under state surveillance, which lends
credence to these arguments. Many have
been pushed to the fringes of society and
a large number of them went to Syria
(Crétois and Boudarham, 2014).

21 One Moroccan fighter in Syria claimed
that, on a flight from Morocco to Syria,
there were 30 jihadists on board. Another
source stated that, during passport con-
trol at the Moroccan airport, jihadists
were told that they could go to Syria but
could not return (Benotmane, 2014).

22 According to the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights, IS pays a monthly salary
of USD 400 to its fighters. Married fighters
receive an additional USD 100 for a spouse
and USD 50 for every child. Fighters also
benefit from housing and fuel allowances
(IS controls oil fields in Syria). Foreign
fighters receive USD 400 per month on
top of their ‘regular’ salary, paid as a
‘migration’ stipend.

23 Phone interview with Romain Caillet,
Beirut-based researcher and consultant
on jihadist issues, September 2014.

24 Phone interview with the journalist Mary
Fitzgerald and Claudia Gazzini, a Libya-
based researcher, in December 2014.

25 This second group was contemporary
with the first, non-religious, group.
Subsequently, those with religious motiva-
tions became the overwhelming majority
of Libyan fighters in Syria.

26 Abu Abdullah al-Libi was killed in Syria
in September 2013, fighting ‘under’ the
banner of al-Qaeda.

27 Phone interview with Claudia Gazzini,
December 2014.

28 Phone interview with Mary Fitzgerald,
December 2014.

29 Phone interview with Mary Fitzgerald,
December 2014.

30 See Mohamed, 2014.

31 Al Mahdali was known to be an aide to
Omar Al-Shishani, an IS leader. Al Mahdali
believed to have strong ‘tactical’ skills and
was known for personally carrying
out the death penalties handed down by
IS against its enemies and its own fighters.

32 ‘Alami Slimani travelled to Syria with his
family (Thomson and Nasr, 2014). He was
killed in August 2014 (Mawass, 2014).

33 Phone interview with a Syrian activist in
Gaziantep, September 2014.

34 Phone interview with Romain Caillet,
Beirut-based researcher and consultant
on jihadist issues, September 2014.

35 Saudi nationals hold most of the top judi-
cial positions, according to interviews
with Syrian activists and journalists
from Raqqah and Deir Ezzor, Gaziantep,
September 2014.

36 This reputation could be considered, in
some senses, a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Because Tunisian fighters often lack the
experience or training of their North
African counterparts, they are frequently
assigned roles that require less experience
or professionalism, e.g. forming the lead
elements of an attack (‘cannon fodder’)
or working as prison guards. As such,
Tunisian fighters may seek to increase
their ‘value’ to commanders, whether by
displays of reckless ‘bravery’ or through particular (and often brutal) devotion to
their duties. It is this devotion that appears
to be the basis of their spreading reputation.

37 Interviews with Syrian activists and
journalists from Aleppo, Gaziantep,
September 2014.

38 Interview with a Syrian activist, Gaziantep,
September 2014.

39 As noted above, the ‘first wave’ of Libyan
volunteers joined a variety of opposition
groups across the political spectrum.
The majority of fighters probably joined
al-Qaeda-related groups.

40 Interview with an international expert,
Geneva, October 2013 and Syrian journal-
ist, Antakya, September 2013.

41 Phone interview Mary Fitzgerald,
December 2014.

42 Most evidence suggests that fighters
did not start arriving until 2012, when
Moroccan fighters who may have been
part of al-Qaeda in Iraq were among the
first wave that joined JAN—after arriving

43 Prior to the establishment of IS, most
Moroccan fighters joined JAN.

44 One study suggests that 40 per cent of
fighters were ‘traditionally’ recruited
while the remaining 60 per cent were
recruited via social networks (Northern
Observatory for Human Rights, 2014).

45 As noted above, Mehdi al-Harati, Triopol’s
former mayor, took a large group of Libyan
fighters to Syria in 2012, returning after
deciding disillusioned with the in-fighting
of the Syrian rebel or opposition groups.

46 According to Romain Caillet, very few
foreign fighters travel to Syria via Jordan
or Lebanon as both countries have highly
militarized borders and stricter entry
requirements for Moroccan citizens than
does Turkey (Lefébure, 2014).

47 Amaya, a Belgian citizen resident in
the Spanish enclave of Melilla, was arrested
in 2014 after a joint Moroccan and Spanish
police operation. The blog remains online
For example, the Ennahda government has fighters from Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. See, for example, Schroeder, A. (2014). ‘Morocco Grants political asylum to Abu Qitadah.’ The Soufan Group, June. <https://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf>

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About the Security Assessment in North Africa

The Security Assessment in North Africa is a multi-year project of the Small Arms Survey that supports actors engaged in building a more secure environment in North Africa and the Sahel–Sahara region. It produces timely, evidence-based research and analysis on the availability and circulation of small arms, the dynamics of emerging armed groups, and related insecurity. The project places special emphasis on the local and transnational effects of the region’s recent uprisings and armed conflicts on community safety.

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