

## Too close for comfort: an analysis of the UN tracing negotiations

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Yet again, it went down to the wire. As the United Nations Open-ended Working Group on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (OEWG)<sup>1</sup> reached the end of its six-week mandate, it finalized the details of a new International Tracing Instrument, agreed it would be political, not legal, in character, and adopted the report to which it was annexed.<sup>2</sup> The Instrument is the first agreement to be negotiated within the framework of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (or PoA)<sup>3</sup> and constitutes a modest, but significant, step forward in efforts to tackle the small arms problem. Yet, despite broad agreement that tracing—initially seen as an uncontroversial, “technical” issue—was the obvious place to begin fleshing out the PoA, the negotiations nearly ended without agreement. This article will explore the reasons for this near failure and highlight several lessons that appear relevant to future small arms negotiations.

### *First steps in the UN tracing process*

The agreement on the International Tracing Instrument—which the UN General Assembly adopted in late 2005—marks the culmination of a process that began almost a decade earlier. The 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms focused on the marking aspect of the broader tracing question,<sup>4</sup> but by the end of the decade governments and civil society had put the connected issues of marking, record-keeping and tracing at the top of their small arms action agendas.

In 2000, the Governments of France and Switzerland launched an initiative to promote the development of new international measures for the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons.<sup>5</sup> That same year, the Brussels-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) released a comprehensive study of the tracing issue, which also argued for new measures.<sup>6</sup> Pro-gun groups, in particular the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), weighed in with their views too, especially on weapon marking.<sup>7</sup> These inputs all contributed to the preparatory process for the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference.

The July 2001 conference resulted in the adoption of the Programme of Action, which, like the UN Firearms Protocol adopted two months earlier,<sup>8</sup> contained a number of commitments in the areas

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of marking, record-keeping and tracing. Many of the small arms measures adopted at the regional level over the past decade have also addressed these issues.<sup>9</sup> Yet, none of these initiatives satisfied the need for a single, global instrument that sets out comprehensive, detailed and authoritative requirements in the areas of marking, record-keeping and tracing.

There had been considerable support at the 2001 conference for recommending, in the final PoA, that negotiations start on a *legally* binding international tracing instrument, but this was opposed by the Arab group, China and the United States. At the end of the day, states could only agree on a UN study that would examine the “feasibility” of developing an international tracing instrument. There was no indication that any such instrument should be legally binding.<sup>10</sup> In December 2001, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to undertake this feasibility study.<sup>11</sup> He established the Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (GGE). Under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India, the GGE met three times between July 2002 and June 2003 before issuing its report (*GGE Report*) in July 2003.<sup>12</sup>

The GGE unanimously concluded in its report that it was both desirable and feasible to develop an international tracing instrument, and recommended that the General Assembly take a decision at its Fifty-eighth Session to negotiate, under UN auspices, such an instrument. Yet, as some members of the Group would not support a recommendation for the negotiation of a legal text, the GGE left the crucial question of instrument character open—merely noting that this “will be determined in the course of negotiations”.<sup>13</sup>

Another contentious issue was whether to include ammunition and explosives within the scope of the study. In the end, the GGE used the definition of small arms and light weapons developed by the 1997 UN Panel of Experts.<sup>14</sup> It also listed those elements of the Panel definition that dealt with ammunition and explosives, indicating that the latter were “generally regarded as a part of the problem of small arms and light weapons”.<sup>15</sup> The GGE also “took note” of the 1999 UN expert study on the subject of ammunition and explosives.<sup>16</sup> It did not, however, refer to ammunition or explosives in its conclusions or recommendations. Nor did it mention ammunition or explosives in the sections of its report dealing with marking, record-keeping or cooperation in tracing—a crucial omission since, especially in the area of marking, ammunition raises technical issues different to those relating to weapons.

So in practical terms, the GGE excluded ammunition from its report. Yet, in formal terms, it kept ammunition (and explosives) on the table by referring to them in the definitions section and noting that they were “part of” the small arms problem. The GGE’s failure to provide any guidance on the technical aspects meant, however, that the place of ammunition in the tracing process had become exceedingly tenuous.

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The *GGE Report* did contain language that the Open-ended Working Group would later use in its negotiations. Especially useful were the provisions that articulated “common minimum standards” for marking, record-keeping and cooperation in tracing. Nevertheless, the GGE’s ambiguity on ammunition, along with its silence on the question of instrument character, would haunt the OEWG for the duration of its mandate. In its resolution 58/241 of 23 December 2003, the UN General Assembly, following the GGE’s recommendation, decided “to establish an open-ended working group ... to negotiate an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons”. The General Assembly did not specify whether ammunition or explosives were part of the negotiations. Nor did it take any decision on the question of instrument character. Using the GGE’s language, the General Assembly simply noted that this “will be determined in the course of negotiations”.

## *The negotiations*

In February 2004, the OEWG held an organizational session at United Nations Headquarters in New York. It elected Ambassador Anton Thalmann of Switzerland as its Chairman, along with a number of vice-chairpersons, and agreed on the dates for its three substantive sessions, all of them in New York. The OEWG also agreed to apply the rules of procedure of the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference to its own work.<sup>17</sup>

Prior to the OEWG's first substantive session (14–25 June 2004), the Chairman distributed a non-paper designed to provide delegations with a starting point for the discussions. The paper was based to a large extent on the *GGE Report* and highlighted areas of common practice and understanding, as well as gaps in various areas that were of importance to the negotiation of an international instrument. The first part of the OEWG's first session was taken up with general statements by delegations, an exchange of views on the character of the instrument and statements by intergovernmental organizations and representatives of civil society. The last part of the session was devoted to thematic discussions on marking, record-keeping and cooperation in tracing—the three pillars of the eventual instrument. For these discussions, the Chairman prepared and circulated questionnaires that served to ascertain national positions on the various issues and generate the raw material for the first draft of the instrument.

The issues that were to bedevil the OEWG throughout its mandate were all identified at the first session. These included, first and foremost, instrument character; while a large number of states expressed support for a legally binding instrument, a few others wanted a political instrument. Other controversial issues were the inclusion of ammunition, the definition of small arms and light weapons, marking at import, the length of time states would keep records and the question of whether non-state entities would have the right to make tracing requests.

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Between the OEWG's first and second sessions, the Chairman met with Interpol officials at their headquarters in Lyon, France in order to explore Interpol's potential role in supporting instrument implementation. Ambassador Thalmann also held informal consultations with UN Member States in New York to seek further clarity on a number of important issues, including instrument follow-up and the role of the UN and Interpol in implementation.

The Chairman's first draft text, based on the inputs received from delegations, was circulated to Member States in the UN's six official languages prior to the OEWG's second substantive session (24 January – 4 February 2005). With regard to the more contentious issues, the draft contained several provisions relating to ammunition but, given the lack of consensus, it left the question of instrument character open.

At the beginning of the second session, the OEWG agreed that the Chairman should produce further drafts based on new inputs from delegations. This working method, which dispensed with the use of rolling text and square brackets, was accepted by the Group as a whole—despite some expressions of discontent—given the short time remaining for the negotiations. Following its reading of the Chairman's first draft text, the Group considered the Chairman's second draft, which, at the request of some delegations, had been translated into the UN's six official languages despite pressures of time. (While not entirely without precedent, this represented a departure from the normal practice of United Nations working groups.) At the end of the second session, the Chairman undertook to produce a third draft of the instrument well in advance of the Group's third session.

The OEWG's third and final substantive session was held 6–17 June 2005, again at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Group first agreed to continue working without rolling text and square brackets. It then undertook a paragraph-by-paragraph reading of the Chairman's third draft, adopting specific paragraphs *ad referendum*<sup>18</sup> wherever possible. The Chairman asked interested states to work together to develop consensus language for those provisions that were not immediately agreed. In some cases, he issued his own proposals. As the session progressed, Ambassador Thalmann asked specific delegations to act as focal points for outstanding provisions. Halfway through the session, he appointed facilitators for the most contentious issues, namely instrument character (India), ammunition (South Africa), the definition of small arms and light weapons (Brazil) and marking at the time of import (Belgium).

On the evening of the penultimate day of the negotiations, the Chairman presented his *Package Proposal*, covering all unresolved issues with the exception of instrument character, which he continued to leave open. During the afternoon of 17 June—the last day of negotiation—the OEWG reached agreement on most of the elements of the Chairman's *Package*, including some previously intractable issues such as the definition of small arms and light weapons.

With respect to instrument content, the final stumbling blocks concerned ammunition, import marking and the role of peacekeeping operations. On the evening of 17 June, the Chairman presided over informal discussions that resulted in final agreement on these issues. Ammunition and peacekeeping operations were addressed principally through recommendations in the Group's *Report*; and it was agreed to incorporate a strong recommendation to mark weapons at the time of import in the instrument itself—abandoning earlier language (modelled on the UN Firearms Protocol) that had made this mandatory.

During these informal discussions, the Chairman also presented delegations with three options on instrument character: 1) a legally binding instrument, 2) a politically binding instrument, or 3) no agreement on instrument character (the Group would refer the issue back to the General Assembly).

With time running out, the Chairman reconvened the OEWG for formal approval of the informal deal that had been struck on the outstanding paragraphs. This was quickly achieved, but the question of instrument character remained unresolved. Ambassador Thalmann asked the Group to choose among the three options already presented. There was no consensus on the first option, with several states objecting to a legally binding instrument. Yet there were no objections to option two. In other words, the OEWG had agreed by consensus to adopt the instrument in politically binding form. Immediately afterwards, however, both the African and Latin American groups made statements to express their disappointment that the OEWG had been unable to agree on a legal instrument.

The Group faced one last hurdle—the adoption of its *Report*. With the cleaning staff hovering outside the conference room door, the OEWG adopted its *Report* by consensus, thus formally concluding the negotiations.

## *On a knife edge*

### FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

The success of the tracing negotiations was by no means assured. While a series of factors militated in favour of a positive outcome, others pushed the Group toward failure.

Among the positive factors, one can cite good timing. The OEWG's third and final session came one month after the failure of the 2005 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT)<sup>19</sup> to agree on any substantive outcome. This was just the latest in a series of setbacks in multilateral arms control that have left both the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the New York-based UN Disarmament Commission virtually paralysed.<sup>20</sup> The small arms issue had been one of the few bright spots in this otherwise dismal picture. Yet failure to reach agreement on the Tracing Instrument risked compromising other plans for PoA follow-up—in particular, on brokering.

A second element that increased the chances of success in the tracing negotiations was that, as described above, much of the necessary substantive groundwork had been prepared by the UN Group of Governmental Experts. The UN Firearms Protocol also provided useful precedents and language in areas that overlapped with the International Tracing Instrument: definitions, marking and record-keeping.

Last—and perhaps least—among the factors nudging the OEWG toward success was political will. Undoubtedly more of a question mark than a proven asset at the beginning of the negotiations, by the time the dust had settled Member States had clearly demonstrated that they did indeed want a positive outcome. All delegations showed flexibility on many of the issues under discussion. A critical mass of states also worked actively to promote compromise solutions to the most difficult issues. At the end of the day, UN Member States collectively showed the political will that was necessary for the success of the tracing negotiations, thereby allowing the global small arms process to advance, while preserving the consensus-based approach that had prevailed in UN small arms work to that point.

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#### FACTORS FOR FAILURE

Among those factors that pushed the tracing negotiations towards failure, the most important was the decision of the Group of Governmental Experts, confirmed by the General Assembly, to leave the question of instrument character to the OEWG. This created several problems for the negotiations.

One obvious difficulty was that uncertainty over whether the Instrument would be legal or political made content development more difficult. While the OEWG Chairman ensured, as far as possible, that his drafts took account of both possibilities, not all aspects of the drafts could be made to look in two directions at once. Some of the language depended on whether the Instrument was legally or politically binding. This was true of the Instrument's "Follow-up" section. Moreover, provisions governing the Instrument's entry into force, future amendment and similar matters were needed for a legal text, but not for a political one.

Most important, however, was the effect that uncertainty over instrument character had on the positions states took on the content of the Instrument. During the OEWG's final session, the Chairman learned that several delegations had developed relatively conservative or cautious negotiating positions because they assumed that the final text would be legally binding. As a result, they pushed for a significant weakening of the Chairman's third draft. This raises the possibility that the content of the final Instrument might have been stronger had the decision that it would be political been taken earlier during the negotiations, or by the General Assembly before the negotiations.

The second hurdle the OEWG had to overcome was the issue of ammunition, which the GGE had dealt with inconclusively. The question of whether or not to include ammunition had major implications for the Instrument's content. At issue was an entire class or type of armament that differed in several fundamental respects from the small arms and light weapons that were the main focus of the negotiations. Moreover, as with instrument character, until the very end of the negotiations there was no middle ground where states could work out a compromise. Several states argued forcefully that

ammunition was not part of the OEWG's mandate and therefore refused to discuss the issue, while others insisted on including ammunition, in some form, in the final Instrument.

In his organization of the various negotiating sessions, the Chairman sought to strike a balance between those states who wanted no mention of ammunition in the Instrument and those who wanted specific provisions. At the end of the day, the OEWG devoted precious time to ammunition for relatively little gain. The central element of the final deal was a recommendation in the OEWG's *Report* to address the issue of ammunition in a comprehensive manner as part of a separate UN process. While agenda-setting is a critical element of any multilateral process, it appeared, once again, that the OEWG had been called upon to resolve a broad, essentially political question that would more commonly—and perhaps more appropriately—fall within the domain of the General Assembly.

The third problem was lack of time. The OEWG had three sessions of two weeks each for its negotiations (six weeks in total). Although the Group could draw upon the previous work of the GGE, as well as the UN Firearms Protocol, its schedule was dangerously tight. Instrument character and

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ammunition were not the only issues casting long shadows over the proceedings. Several others—such as the roles the UN, Interpol and peacekeeping operations would play—inspired their share of enthusiasm, hostility and confusion among delegates. With three days left in the negotiations, only around 40% of the final Instrument's operative provisions had been agreed. As a result, the Chairman waited until the evening of the second-to-last day of negotiation, when just over 60% of the content had been agreed, to issue his *Package Proposal*.

During the last day of negotiation, OEWG participants conducted the final round of trade-offs that is a hallmark of negotiations of this kind. In an elaborate face-saving ritual, states give up some of their demands in exchange for concessions from those on the other side of an issue. Perhaps most important, as the negotiations drift to the brink of failure, sufficient pressure is generated to allow participants, including capitals, to reach the hard compromises necessary for a result. In the case of the OEWG, however, this kind of brinkmanship was more risky than usual because of the range of issues (many of them technically complex) remaining on the table. As late as the last afternoon of negotiation, it appeared that the OEWG might simply run out of time. Equally important, frustration over the unwillingness of a few states to join consensus on issues that they had “red-lined” raised the prospect of a backlash by other states that would upend the negotiations.

A fourth factor that greatly complicated the tracing negotiations and could hamper future small arms negotiations was that many delegations, both large and small, did not understand—or understand very well—issues of central importance to the Tracing Instrument. Some delegations that appeared to want an effective instrument in fact pushed to weaken it or at least made the negotiations more complicated—inflicting, in essence, the diplomatic equivalent of “friendly fire”.

While minimal harm was done in the tracing negotiations, this problem could be a factor in future small arms negotiations. Like tracing, the issues that states have prioritized for future action—such as brokering and ammunition—are partly technical in nature. The tracing negotiations were preceded by the *GGE Report* and a series of studies by civil society groups. Much information was also made available during the course of the negotiations as industry groups, pro-control NGOs and states gave briefings and issued papers on topics of special concern. The Chairman also liaised closely with Interpol on the development of his draft texts and, with the agreement of the OEWG, arranged for Interpol's Special Representative to the UN to brief the Group on the contributions Interpol could make to instrument implementation. Yet, despite these efforts—and despite the considerable time and resources invested in the UN expert study—the necessary information did not reach, or was not assimilated by, all those who needed it and who might have been receptive to it.

This knowledge deficit represents a crucial hurdle for future UN small arms processes. Getting policy-relevant information into the hands of those responsible for shaping national positions—across the entire UN membership—is obviously crucial. Situating future negotiations in Geneva, where the diplomatic community is arguably more comfortable with, and knowledgeable on, small arms issues, might help. In any case, it is ultimately the responsibility of national delegations themselves to ensure they have the necessary knowledge and expertise. In too many cases, OEWG delegations fell short in this respect.

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The final factor pushing the tracing negotiations toward collapse (but that ultimately brought them success) was political will. As noted earlier, this was the great unknown. To some extent, states' real intentions and objectives only become clear at the end of such negotiations, in light of the final result. But the outcome of the tracing negotiations appeared especially uncertain as signs of commitment to the collective end alternated, right to the end, with an insistence on narrower, national priorities. Throughout the process, it appeared that the OEWG was pushing up against the limits of consensus as one or another state held out on issues it considered vital. At the Group's third and final session, it even seemed possible that it would break with UN small arms tradition and move to vote on procedural and even substantive matters, as its rules of procedure allowed.

In the end, the crucial compromises were found. All states compromised on some issues, though a small minority insisted to the end on their "red lines". The OEWG succeeded in reaching agreement on an International Tracing Instrument, but only just. It is an open question whether future small arms processes will survive similar strains.

### *Half empty, half full*

The new International Tracing Instrument has been strongly criticized by pro-control NGOs who have noted that it does not reflect their key recommendations, in particular for a legal text that includes ammunition.<sup>21</sup> There can be little doubt that the glass is half empty. But it is also half full.

The International Tracing Instrument constitutes a significant advance in global efforts to combat small arms proliferation for several reasons. First, while legal instruments have a great many advantages over their political counterparts, scope and speed of application are not among them. Now that the International Tracing Instrument has been adopted by the General Assembly, it applies to all UN Member States. The Instrument's contribution on definitions is especially important. In contrast to the PoA, which has no definition of any kind, the Tracing Instrument includes a detailed definition of small arms and light weapons that incorporates language from both the law enforcement and the disarmament and arms control communities (UN Firearms Protocol and 1997 UN *Panel Report*, respectively).

The Tracing Instrument also consolidates, even advances, essential standards in the areas of marking and record-keeping. Import marking is the sole exception here since, in contrast to the UN Firearms Protocol, it is the subject of a strong recommendation, not a firm commitment. Yet, unlike the Protocol, which binds only its states parties, that recommendation applies to all UN Member States.

Equally important, the Tracing Instrument sets out detailed modalities for tracing cooperation—moving well beyond the single, open-ended provision contained in the UN Firearms Protocol. It also provides for cooperation with both the UN and Interpol, including the exchange of key information concerning markings used to indicate the country of manufacture and country of import—essential starting points for many weapon traces.

Last but not least, the International Tracing Instrument looks to the future, committing states to regular reports and meetings on Instrument implementation. States have also agreed to review the future development of the Instrument during PoA Review Conferences. Among other things, this opens the door to the potential transformation of the Tracing Instrument from political to legal form. It also allows for further development of Instrument content.

### *An uncertain future*

The new International Tracing Instrument represents a modest, but significant, step forward in the international community's efforts to tackle the small arms problem. Follow-up and concrete implementation, as ever, will be the real determinants of the success of these efforts, but for now the global small arms process remains firmly on the rails.

The unfinished small arms agenda is vast. If the international community is serious about addressing the issue, it has several decades' worth of work ahead of it. The list of items now identified for prompt attention—including brokering, transfer controls and ammunition—is growing and needs to grow further still. At the PoA's first Review Conference, to be held in New York in June–July 2006, states are expected to renew their commitment to effective action at the national, regional and global levels. The OEWG experience serves both as useful precedent and timely warning for future small arms work.

In reaching agreement on the International Tracing Instrument, UN Member States overcame their often considerable differences to finalize, within a relatively short period of time, useful new provisions on marking, record-keeping and tracing. Yet the “easy issue” proved more difficult than most had expected. The minimalist nature of the final result has also disappointed many. During the critical months preceding the 2006 Review Conference, the international community faces a clear choice—to either strengthen its commitment to small arms work or instead allow it to slide into the morass that has claimed so many other arms control and disarmament issues in recent years.

### Notes

1. Full name: Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. Mandated by General Assembly resolution 58/241 of 23 December 2003, UN document A/RES/58/241.
2. International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. Reproduced in UN document A/60/88, 27 June 2005. See <[disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-oewg.html](http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-oewg.html)>.
3. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Adopted 20 July 2001. Reproduced in the *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9–20 July 2001, UN document A/CONF.192/15, pp. 7–17. See also <[disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html](http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html)>.
4. See *Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms*, in UN document A/52/298, 27 August 1997, paragraph 80(l)(i).
5. See France and Switzerland, *Food-for-Thought Paper: Contribution to the Realization of an International Plan of Action in the Context of the 2001 Conference: Marking, Identification and Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Reproduced in UN document A/CONF.192/PC/7, 17 March 2000. Subsequent developments in the Franco-Swiss initiative are reflected in UN documents A/CONF.192/PC/25, 10 January 2001 and A/CONF.192/PC/38, 23 March 2001.
6. Ilhan Berkol, 2000, *Marquage et traçage des armes légères: vers l'amélioration de la transparence et du contrôle*. Brussels, GRIP, at <[www.grip.org/pub/rapports/rg00-2\\_track.pdf](http://www.grip.org/pub/rapports/rg00-2_track.pdf)>.

7. See World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), *Firearms Marking: Model Standards and Common Serial Number Codes*. Workshop held in Baia Sardinia (Olbia), Sardinia, Italy, 22–24 June 2000, at <[www.wfsa.net/Leg\\_Docs/WFSA%20Sardinia%20Marking%20report%20V2.pdf](http://www.wfsa.net/Leg_Docs/WFSA%20Sardinia%20Marking%20report%20V2.pdf)>.
8. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. UN General Assembly resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001, at <[www.undcp.org/pdf/crime/a\\_res\\_55/255e.pdf](http://www.undcp.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf)>.
9. See the article by Elli Kytömäki in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
10. PoA, section IV, paragraph 1(c).
11. UN General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, UN document A/RES/56/24, 10 January 2002.
12. *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects"*. UN document A/58/138, 11 July 2003.
13. *GGE Report*, paragraph 98.
14. *GGE Report*, paragraph 32.
15. *GGE Report*, paragraph 33.
16. See *Report of the Group of Experts on the Problem of Ammunition and Explosives*. Reproduced in UN document A/54/155, 29 June 1999.
17. *Provisional rules of procedure of the Conference*. UN document A/CONF.192/L.1, 14 June 2001.
18. In other words, subject to the final approval of the delegate's government.
19. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Entered into force on 5 March 1970. See <[disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html](http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html)>.
20. See Kofi A. Annan, "Break the Nuclear Deadlock," *International Herald Tribune*, 30 May 2005, at <[www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/29/news/edannan.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/29/news/edannan.php)>.
21. Control Arms campaign (Oxfam International, Amnesty International and International Action Network on Small Arms), *UN "Deal" on Arms Controls Means Business as Usual for the World's Worst Arms Dealers*, 14 July 2005, at <[www.controlarms.org/latest\\_news/un-deal.htm](http://www.controlarms.org/latest_news/un-deal.htm)>.