WOMEN IN STATE SECURITY PROVISION IN NEPAL

Meaningful Participation?

Mihaela Racovita
About the author

Mihaela Racovita is a researcher at the Small Arms Survey, where she works on illicit small arms proliferation and control, armed violence, and gender. She has led the multi-year Nepal Armed Violence Assessment Project and has expertise in methodology and research design. She holds a master’s and a PhD in international relations from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, as well as a second master’s in peace studies from the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. She has authored and co-authored various publications on violence and gender, illicit arms trafficking, and arms management in peace operations.

Acknowledgements

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Overview

The Government of Nepal has recently stepped up efforts to integrate women within the state security apparatus. This Briefing Paper examines recent legislative and institutional changes governing female participation in the security sector, the latest recruitment and advancement trends, and the persistent challenges facing female security providers.

It shows that while formal and institutional changes have enabled more women to become part of Nepal’s security sector, women remain under-represented therein, and face challenges including objections to positive discrimination, difficult trade-offs between professional careers and personal lives, and societal attitudes that see security provision as a male-only occupation.

Introduction

In October 2015, almost a decade after the end of the civil war and 15 years since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Nepal elected its first female president, Bidhya Devi Bhandari. A long-time women’s rights activist, and former minister of defence, Bhandari thus became Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (BBC News, 2015). Even though this event was celebrated by some as cementing recent moves in the country towards greater gender equality, women’s participation in security provision—and other spheres—is still a work in progress.

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government and Maoist forces in 2006, Nepal has taken concerted steps to reform its security sector and increase the participation of women in security provision. The tempo of reform increased after the adoption of the National Action Plan (NAP) for implementing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in February 2011, with the government intensifying the recruitment of women as police officers and soldiers, and introducing programmes to ensure their integration across state security forces.

These formal measures have done much to support the inclusion of women in the Nepali security sector. Yet despite these advances, female security providers continue to confront challenges ranging from continuing demands at home to discrimination, and even, in extreme cases, physical violence. Nepali women today fulfil a variety of security-related roles; they contribute to peace and security in their country, region, or locality, in many cases serving as examples of female empowerment. Efforts to change current practices and make security forces friendlier to women are being rolled out, albeit slowly; yet, more is needed to ensure that women’s participation in the security sector is meaningful, and that Nepali security institutions become and remain more gender-responsive.

This Briefing Paper assesses the progress of the Nepali government in including women in security provision. It explores whether the institutional framework that precluded their meaningful participation in security has fundamentally altered in recent years, or if the inclusion of women has followed a more superficial “add women and stir” approach. It looks at the evolution of female participation in the formal security sector—namely the NP, APF, and NA—reviews recent numbers and trends in recruitment and promotion, and explores the motivations of and challenges faced by Nepali women serving as

Key findings

- Since 2012, the number of women in state security forces has steadily increased, but remains relatively low, especially in higher-ranking positions. Women made up just over 8 per cent (5,467) of the Nepal Police (NP) and close to 4.5 per cent (4,094) of the Nepal Army (NA) in 2017, and around 5 per cent (1,837) of the Armed Police Force (APF) in 2014.
- Besides tackling crime and security as part of their formal mandate, female officers often act as role models, providing advice and guidance to women seeking to escape violence in their homes or communities.
- Legislative and policy changes introduced after 2013 have paved the way for more and more women to join the security forces, though barriers to meaningful participation remain.
- Working in the NP, APF, and NA brings women a range of not only opportunities but also daily challenges, ranging from continuing demands at home to discrimination from their families, society, and institutions.
security providers, particularly in combating violence against women and girls (VAWG). Although this Briefing Paper focuses primarily on the role of women within the three largest state security forces, it also recognizes the important role played by local women’s groups that provide security services. It draws on 30 interviews conducted in Kathmandu with women in the police, APF, and army in July and August 2015, as well as on extensive secondary data including official statistics, media, and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports.

This study is divided into four sections. The first explores the legal and historical background of the inclusion of women in state security forces in the country. The second examines the latest figures and patterns relating to the recruitment and advancement of women within state security forces. The third section looks beyond the numbers to analyse women’s motivations for joining, the roles they play, and the challenges they face, while the last section places security provision in the wider context of VAWG in the country.

Beyond ‘add women and stir’

Gender-sensitive security sector reform (SSR) includes both gender mainstreaming and gender balancing—the equal participation of men and women in security provision (OECD, 2005, p. 58). Too often, however, the implementation of such reforms has focused primarily on gender balancing, or the ‘adding of women’ to existing structures, without enough attention to the need to transform institutional cultures (Mobekk, 2010; Ní Aoláin, 2009). The successful integration of women into security structures involves not only a quantitative increase in the ratio of women to men but also qualitative changes that challenge and transform patriarchal social norms and practices (Kunz, 2014). In Nepal, as in many countries around the globe, social norms that legitimize the use of domestic violence or portray women as inferior to men are still widespread (Dziewanski, LeBrun, and Racovita, 2014), though women’s roles in society are slowly changing. Nepali women who work in the security sector can play a key role in challenging violent masculinities.

Women and security provision in Nepal

Security providers in Nepal include both statutory—NP, APF, NA—and non-statutory forces, as well as other types of actors—such as those fulfilling justice and rule-of-law functions or relating to management and oversight—and civil society organizations. Non-statutory groups present a particular challenge, as they fall outside the scope of state regulation; these include, among others, armed groups, youth party wings, and even some student organizations (Sapkota, 2009). Despite continuous reforms, state security institutions continue to enjoy a high level of trust among the population. An Interdisciplinary Analysts perceptions survey conducted in 2014 finds that the NA is the fourth most trusted institution in the country—behind radio broadcasting organizations, television, and the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority. It is followed by the Nepal APF and the NP, which enjoy a similar level of trust to civil society organizations and the judiciary, and well above that of Maoist combatants and political youth organizations (Interdisciplinary Analysts, 2015, p. 31).

Women can take part in security provision by joining statutory forces, partnering with them ‘to deliver integrated services’—such as providing shelter, medical, legal, or psychological assistance to victims of violence and crime—participating in disarmament or arms control, or even organizing local security committees (Bastick and Whitman, 2013, p. 8; SFCG, 2016, p. 30). For instance, the Nepali NGO Maiti collaborates with border-management police to identify victims of human trafficking (Bastick and Whitman, 2013, p. 11). Besides serving as state security providers, women have also been hired as security guards in the private sector. There are, however, no official sex-disaggregated statistics on how many women are hired as guards, the profile of their companies, or their range of tasks.

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triggering incremental change in patriarchal assumptions about security provision being the domain of men.

One of the most widely articulated reasons globally for including more women in state security forces is to adequately respond to the needs of women and children. Academics and gender specialists have warned, however, that too strict a division of the functions exercised by women can lead to pigeon-holing—where female security providers only have authority to deal with ‘women’s matters’—to the detriment of wider gender equality (Eriksson Baaz and Utas, 2012, pp. 14–15, 25–26). Kunz warns of reinforcing the stereotypical image of the “soft” security provider, which can be seen as an expression of a wider ‘add women and stir’ strategy that does not challenge the gendered nature of male and female roles in society (Gosewinkel and Kunz, 2014, p. 23).

Both domestic forces and the global gender-responsive agenda have driven the push for integrating gender considerations within broader SSR efforts in Nepal. UNSCRs 1325 (UNSC, 2000) and 1820 (UNSC, 2008) have played a key role in supporting the inclusion of women in the country’s security architecture by providing the impetus for this, as well as associated funding mechanisms. In 2011, after an extensive consultative process, Nepal became the first country in Asia to adopt an NAP for implementing UNSCR 1325. Experts have concluded that this process enjoyed much political support; however, they have also pointed out that knowledge of these instruments remains largely concentrated in upper social and urban strata (Yadav, 2017; Kolás, 2017).

Recent changes in the normative landscape in Nepal have helped advance this reform, particularly in relation to recruitment but also the meaningful participation of women in security provision. Though moves to expand the participation of women in political and social spheres are recorded as early as 2000, the CPA of 2006 codifies these efforts, including provisions for non-discrimination on the basis of gender and protection of the rights of women and children (Yadav, 2017). The CPA also outlined a quota system by which one-third of the membership of the Constituent Assembly is reserved for women (Government of Nepal, 2007). These commitments are reiterated and reinforced in the 2015 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, which also states in Article 38 on the Rights of Women:

(4) Women shall have the right to access participate [sic] in all state structures and bodies on the basis of the principle of proportional inclusion. (5) Women shall have the right to special opportunity in the spheres of education, health, employment and social security on the basis of positive discrimination (Government of Nepal, 2015a).

Despite many far-reaching measures, limitations remain; for example, women’s rights activists have criticized the failure of the new text to allow women to pass on their citizenship to their children on an equal basis with men (Kathmandu Post, 2015d).

The authorities have also adopted a number of legislative and policy acts to increase the participation and integration of women in security institution structures, as well as to take account of the different needs of men and women. The NP adopted a Gender Policy in 2012, as well as a Code of Conduct against gender-based violence, both aiming to regulate behaviour within this institution (Saathi, 2014, p. 6; Nepal Police, 2012) (see Table 1).

One possible challenge in gender-sensitive SSR is the perceived tension with local ownership. As Gordon, Welch, and Roos (2015) argue, gender mainstreaming can be seen as at odds with local culture, preventing the absorption and ownership of reforms. Other analysts note that positive discrimination of women in the workplace—whether within the security sector or the public sector more generally—can create resentment and negative reactions (Burke, 2014; Baines, 2004). A study of gender dynamics in the NA in 2011–12 finds that some male officers complain that women receive unfair advantages, including more favourable postings or qualifying much faster for well-paid posts in peacekeeping (Adhikari, 2013, p. 51). More research is needed to understand changes in attitude, if any, towards the integration of women in security forces following the recent reforms.

The drive to include women in the Nepali security sector has so far operated in parallel with calls to increase the ethnic diversity of the security forces by opening posts to a variety of ethnic groups. Gender, however, is not a homogenizing force and cannot gloss over differences in social backgrounds among women in similar roles. Women and men from marginalized ethnic backgrounds or modest social situations can experience integration in state security forces differently from those with higher social status. A 2012 study shows that, similarly to the distribution of men in security forces, the majority of women in the NA and APF are members of the Brahman and Chhetri ethnic groups (1,971 in the NA and 782 in the APF), followed by Adibasijanjati (939 and 310), Dalit (277 and 37), and Madhesi (270 and 10) (Awasthi and Adhikary, 2012, p. 32). This suggests that women from a Dalit background (previously known as

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**Table 1** New legislation and internal procedures enhancing the inclusion of women in state security institutions, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Legislation, policies, and guidelines enhancing the inclusion of women in state security institutions, 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Police Force</td>
<td>- <strong>Formed Police Units (FPU) Selection Guidelines</strong>, 2013, to include more women in peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>General Principles for Promotion and Recruitment in APF</strong>, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>- Policy establishing a gender unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal Army</td>
<td>- Amendments to the <strong>Recruitment Regulation</strong>, 2012, on recruitment, training, and maternity leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Women Recruitment Guideline</strong>, 2012, on the professional development, transfer, promotion, and group division of female officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Amendments to the <strong>Code of Conduct</strong>, 2010, on sexual misbehaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal Police</td>
<td>- <strong>Peace Service Work Process</strong>, 2013, on the participation of women recruits in peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Nepal Police Gender Policy</strong>, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Code of Conduct against gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Saathi (2014, pp. 13–15)
lower caste) continue to suffer from lower representation overall than those with higher social status (previously known as higher caste). More ethnicity- and sex-disaggregated data is needed, however, to fully capture the extent of diversity among female security providers.

A history of service

Nepali women have taken part in security and military activities since ancient times, but their role is seldom recognized in official histories (Lohani-Chase, 2008, p. 52). The first documented involvement of female fighters was during the Nalapani War (1814–16), when they fought in support of Nepali Gurkha troops against the British (Adhikari, 2015, p. 133). With the process of modernization of state institutions, women’s participation in the security sector also increased. Following a modification to the Army Act of 1953, women were enrolled in the technical service—initially as nurses, and later as parachute folders and medical doctors—in 1961, in general service areas after 2004, and in the Aviation Branch for the first time in 2011 (Nepal Army, 2016).

Prior to the Maoist insurgency, Nepali women were predominantly relegated to positions within the home or as caretakers and labourers, while security-related functions and the bearing of arms were largely considered male domains. The women’s movement, which emerged in opposition to the Rana regime and campaigned for wider social and political rights, gained ground in the 1940s and early 1950s. Although Nepali women have had the right to vote and stand for election since 1951, social changes regarding women were slow to occur, with the women’s movement being largely suppressed during the Panchayat regime. Another push to improve the status of women in Nepali society took place in the 1970s and 1980s, with help from foreign donors, but it largely served to reinscribe gender distinctions (UNDP, 2014, pp. 6–7). The democratic movement of 1990 saw women and marginalized groups increasing their calls for the protection of their rights and an end to discrimination, as stipulated in the 1990 Constitution. This ‘women’s movement’ would reach its apogee during the civil war (Tamang, 2009). The civil war, which erupted in 1996, challenged existing social dynamics in terms of both class and gender inequalities, triggering large-scale social and political upheaval and the admittance of women into various professional fields. The Maoist ideology explicitly called for an end to the patriarchal and class systems, as suggested in the 40-point manifesto submitted to the government prior to the beginning of the armed conflict (Hutt, 2004, p. 155; Lawoti and Pahari, 2009). The inclusion of women in the armed struggle was not only ideological but also strategic; seasonal migration patterns meant that rural communities were, at certain times, predominantly composed of women (Visweswaran, 2011, p. 369). As a result of the support for gender equality and property rights for women, as well as promises of empowerment, many women joined Maoist ranks during the war, although many also enrolled in the Royal NA9 (Lohani-Chase, 2008, pp. 172–73).

The reported level of women’s participation in the (Maoist) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has triggered much debate over the years. The PLA has stated that 40 per cent of its combatants during the conflict were women, amounting to over 12,300 female fighters (Lohani-Chase, 2008, p. 173). Yet of the over 20,000 PLA combatants registered by the UN mission in Nepal in October 2008, only 3,846 were women (IRIN News, 2008), casting doubts over the accuracy of these estimates. Further, while around 3,000 child soldiers were reportedly discharged following the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process, only about 1,000 of them were girls (IRIN News, 2010). The discrepancy between reported and measured rates of female participation in the PLA may be due to the politicization of such participation, with figures being inflated or deflated depending on the actor’s political agenda (Tamang, 2009; Manchanda, 2010), or the difficulties of producing one representative figure for a conflict that spanned ten years and a large geographical area (Kunz and Paudel, 2015).

In any case, the figures regarding female participation in the Maoist conflict fail to provide a qualitative picture of their involvement. The extent and significance of women’s participation in the top echelons of the Maoist revolutionary structure is a subject of debate (Manchanda, 2010, p. 6; Panta and Resurrección, 2014). A high-ranking female Maoist Commander has openly criticized the party for allegedly having reinforced a patriarchal view of marriage and a gendered view of child-rearing within the organization (Manchanda, 2010), while others have taken it to task for the comparatively low number of women in leadership positions, their lack of involvement in peace negotiations, and the difficulties ex-combatants face in rejoining society (Kunz and Paudel, 2015; Tamang, 2009). This would help explain why the Maoist agenda has had limited success in transforming gender relations in Nepali society. Yet by allowing women to serve as guerrilla fighters, carry guns (see Box 1), and engage in combat alongside men, many argue that the Maoists did indeed challenge—and even change—the status quo. According to activist Hsila Yami, writing in 2006:

Today, the image of tired malnourished women carrying children at one end and rearing cattle at the other end has been transformed into the image of dignified fighting women with guns (in Manchanda, 2010, p. 4).

Women have served in the state security forces since 1951; the NP recruited the first female constable, Chaitamaya Dangol, on 15 June 1951. Her tasks, however, were gender-specific: she carried out search-and-arrest activities involving women (CID, 2016). She served for 31 years and retired as assistant inspector (Kathmandu

Box 1 Women and guns

The role of arms in supporting the emancipation of women has received a great deal of scrutiny over time. The Maoist leadership promoted images of Maoist female combatants carrying rifles as symbols of not only vulnerability but also emancipation: a challenge to patriarchal views of the role of women in Nepali society. Some researchers argue that such images do indeed serve—to some degree—as a means of emancipation (Lohani-Chase, 2008, pp. 81, 278–79); others, however, argue that carrying weapons creates only ‘momentary emancipation’, and warn against viewing this as an end in itself (Kunz and Paudel, 2015, pp. 7–8).

Women in state security forces carry weapons, though the exact number of armed women officers remains unknown. Police officers generally carry a handgun, while constables often carry loathi (a type of baton) or a rifle. Members of the AFP may be more heavily armed, depending on their missions (Karp, 2013, p. 6). Although women in the AFP must carry weapons as part of their daily duties, this has not helped to increase social acceptance of the practice. One interviewee from the AFP said there is still a misconception that carrying a gun is not for women, a belief she said she was ‘proud’ to disprove every day.9 Another female police officer remarked that discrimination continues to affect women within both the police and the villages (see section on ‘Challenges’, below).
In 1968, more than 15 years after the first recruitment of a woman as a constable, female police were recruited for traffic management (Kathmandu Post, 2013b). In 1986, a separate Woman Police Company was established, followed in 1995 by the creation of a specialized Traffic Woman Company for the Kathmandu Valley (CID, 2016). In 2017, there were dedicated Women and Children Service Centers (WCSCs) in 75 districts, and a number of capacity-enhancement programmes had been instituted in accordance with the NAP to implement UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on WPS (CID, 2016).

Recent efforts to recruit more women into the state’s security apparatus are the result of a confluence of factors, from broad international donor support for greater gender equality in the country to civil society involvement. At the political level, the Nepali government has begun the gradual implementation of a number of international commitments to gender balance and mainstreaming, such as UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (UNSC, 2000, 2008; UNGA, 1979). In 2007–08, the government also introduced gender-responsive budgeting and a quota system for the recruitment of marginalized groups in the public sector, including the police, APF, and army. Of these posts, 45 per cent were reserved, of which 20 per cent were earmarked for women. The other 80 per cent of reserved positions was divided as follows: 32 per cent for Janajati, 28 per cent for Madhesi, 15 per cent for Dalit, and 5 per cent for individuals from remote regions (Himalayan Times, 2007; UN Women, 2015a). Some state security institutions have also developed internal regulations on the integration of women, meant to encourage both recruitment and retention.

Although the number of women in state security forces remains relatively low, greater awareness and engagement have led to significant increases. For example, the number of women within the NP increased from 4,162 in 2014 to 5,467 in 2017—around 8.1 per cent of the total force size (Nepal Police, 2014, p. 66; 2017, p. 59). The number of new female recruits has also increased, although not steadily, dropping from 413 in 2013 to just 47 in 2014 before rising to 435 in 2015 and 856 in 2016 (Nepal Police, 2016, p. 65). To some extent, the accelerated employment of women tracks overall recruitment increases for the NP, the numbers of which grew from around 60,000 in 2011 to close to 70,000 in 2016 (see Figure 1). In 2013, an electoral year for the Constituent Assembly, there was a spike in the overall number of police personnel, yet the percentage of women was lower than previous years. The introduction of the new Gender Policy that same year, however, resulted in a renewed commitment to increase female participation in the force. Yet despite the steady progression in numbers since 2014, the current rate of growth—around half a percentage per year—remains insufficient to meet the self-imposed target of female police as 10 per cent of the total force by 2018 (Kathmandu Post, 2013b).

These figures are still low compared to the mobilization achieved during the Maoist struggle, when thousands of women took part in the conflict as active combatants. Beyond the cultural barriers to women assuming a role customarily assigned to men, this disparity is also rooted in the post-conflict DDR process. Only 1,450 former combatants, both men and women, were integrated into the NA
by 2012—far fewer than the agreed figure of 6,500 (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The fact that the process took a long time to complete, coupled with difficulties many women faced in the cantonments, led large numbers to return to their communities and take up other economic activities (Kunz and Paudel, 2015).

The NP has also encountered difficulties in hiring women for temporary policing jobs. Called Myadis, these officers are hired for short periods to supervise local elections and ensure the security of voters before and after the polls (Kathmandu Post, 2017b). In anticipation of the local elections on 14 May 2017, the NP opened a call for 75,000 temporary positions—close to double the number deployed during the 2013 elections—half of which the Electoral Commission hoped would be staffed by women. Two days before the deadline, however, only 14 per cent (24,605) of total applicants were women (Gautam, 2017; Kathmandu Post, 2017a). Experts attributed this low number to the social stigma applied to women in the security sector and the lack of career prospects associated with a temporary position (Kathmandu Post, 2017a).

Women fulfil a variety of functions within the NP, including criminal investigation and intelligence; staffing the WCSCs; traffic management; medical and technical fields; information and communication technology; and conducting police trainings (CID, 2016). As of 2017, however, data on the number of female officers in these posts is not publicly available.

Though information on the male–female ratio within the APF is difficult to obtain, the APF has also made steps towards implementing the aforementioned 20 per cent women quota system, with an increase in female recruitment. In May 2012, there were 996 (3.2 per cent of force size) women serving in the APF; this figure increased to 1,837 (6 per cent of force size) by mid-2014 (Saathi, 2012, p. 14; 2014, p. 20).

The NA has also moved to implement the quota system and ensure the wider inclusion of women in the service. It amended the Army Act in 2006 to ensure greater inclusiveness of women as well as marginalized ethnic groups (Nepal Army, 2017a). In 2010, a women’s division was created, as part of the Military Secretary branch, to address the needs of women officers (Nepal Army, 2016). In November 2015, 3.5 per cent of the force was comprised of women—a higher figure than neighbouring India (2.4 per cent), though still much lower than other armed forces, such as the United States (16.3 per cent) (Dhakal, 2015; Adhikari, 2015). In March 2017, there were 4,094 women serving in the army, or 4.5 per cent of the force (Chauhan, 2017).

Women occupy a wide range of posts in the NA. Before 2004, women served exclusively in the medical, engineering, and legal services and in the parachute regiment as folders; since then, however, their roles and attributes have diversified. Today, women function as part of the military police, as office staff, as technicians, and in combat and combat support (Kathmandu Post, 2014). In August 2016, of the 3,668 women serving in the army, 73 per cent (2,691) were in general service (infantry); 26 per cent (214) served as nurses; 5 per cent (187) as clerical staff; 5 per cent as non-combatant enrolled (175); 4 per cent (145) in technical service, and the rest in other fields (see Figure 2) (Nepal Army, 2016).

To facilitate the recruitment and retention of a growing number of women, the NA adopted two gender directives in 2014—Directive on Gender Conduct 2070 BS and Women Military Directive 2070 BS—which aim to create a gender-sensitive work environment. They feature a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy towards gender-based violence (GBV), and enhanced career opportunities for female officers (Kathmandu Post, 2014). Moreover, the Chief of Army Staff, General Rajendra Chhetri, announced on 1 October 2017 the creation of the first female-only unit of the NA as a means to secure the professional advancement of women in its ranks (New Spotlight, 2017). While this development is positive, other armies have gone further, with the creation of all-female Special Forces units in countries such as China and Norway (Women Voice, 2017; Angerer, 2017). Some gender scholars have warned, however, that gender-mixed units—where men and women serve alongside one another—provide better and more balanced interactions with local populations (Egnell, 2016).

In response to the growing demand for female security providers in international peace operations, the Nepali government has also introduced policies to encourage women to apply to the police and army. In 2014 for instance, following a call from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to increase the number of female peacekeepers (Himalayan Times, 2014), the NA issued guidelines facilitating the recruitment of women to serve in UN peace operations (Saathi, 2014). In 2015, 402 (5.7 per

![Figure 2 Number of women in the NA by service category, 2016](image)

**Figure 2: Number of women in the NA by service category, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combatant enrolled</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>2,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nepal Army (2016)

In the army, or 4.5 per cent of the force (Chauhan, 2017).

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![Figure 3 Evolution of the number of women in low-ranking versus high-ranking positions in the NP, 2011–16](image)

**Figure 3: Evolution of the number of women in low-ranking versus high-ranking positions in the NP, 2011–16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of high-ranking female officers</th>
<th>Number of low-ranking female officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data for 2015 is not available.

Sources: CID (2016); Nepal Police (2016)
cent) of the Nepali uniformed personnel deployed to UN missions were women: 301 as part of FPU and 101 as UN Police (UNPOL) (Nepal Police, 2015). As of November 2017, the NA was contributing 4,665 troops to 13 UN missions, of whom 116 soldiers were women (Nepal Army, 2017b).

Despite overall progress in increasing the percentage of women in state security forces, a noticeable gender gap in terms of rank distribution remains. Thus, within the NP, the number of high-ranking female officers is close to its 2011 level (see Figure 3), despite a progressive growth in the total number of women in the force. This could be due to the time lag associated with job progression for newer recruits, but also to missed opportunities in promoting female officers. The highest function held by a woman in 2016 was deputy inspector general of police (two posts), followed by senior superintendent of police (one post, down from four in 2014), superintendent of police (7 posts), deputy superintendent (12 posts), and inspector of police (63 posts) (Nepal Police, 2016, p. 65). Furthermore, the Ministry for Home Affairs recommended 25 superintendents for promotion in 2017, none of whom were women (Himalayan Times, 2017).

The NA has a lower overall percentage of women in its ranks than the NP, but a higher percentage of female officers. In 2014, 17.2 per cent (306) of women in the NA were officers compared to only 0.5 per cent in the NP; of the latter, only 21 female officers held the rank of deputy superintendent of police or above (Nepal Army 2016; CID, 2016). In 2016, Nepal promoted 44 women to the rank of Major in the army infantry for the first time (Pariyar, 2016). The growth of female personnel in the NA has occurred at both the officer level and other ranks (see Figure 4). From 2014 to early 2017, the total number of female personnel in the NA more than doubled, from 1,776 to 4,094 (Kathmandu Post, 2014; Chauhan, 2017). In terms of ranks, in early 2014 there were 134 female officers in general service and another 172 in technical service (Nepal Army, 2016). This increase in general service posts suggests that women are increasingly working in areas that may see them engaging in combat alongside their male peers.

Although the recruitment of female security providers is rising, no data is available on retention trends and patterns—information that would tell us something about the success or failure of efforts being undertaken to retain women once recruited.

### Beyond the numbers: women as security providers

The number of women security providers recruited and promoted provides just part of the picture of their integration within state security institutions. As critics of the ‘add women and stir’ approach emphasize, equally important are the factors that shape women’s experiences in these roles and facilitate—or militate against—such integration. This section examines some of these broader factors, focusing on the reasons why women decide to enter the security service, the challenges they face in their work, and the contributions they make to addressing VAWG specifically and to security promotion more broadly.

### Motivations for joining

While legal measures can remove structural barriers to the recruitment of women in the security forces, they are not sufficient to bolster the number of female officers. Considerations of supply (motivations for joining) as well as demand (supported by the quota system) are needed for an accurate picture of the forces that shape gender balance. Women join the Nepali security forces for a number of reasons, ranging from economic stability to social and symbolic status, a desire to contribute to their society, and family influence.

Jobs in the police and army provide good economic and financial stability for many Nepali women. The country’s female labour force is one of the most active in the region, with more than 80 per cent involvement in 2008, compared to 27 per cent in India in 2012 and almost 33 per cent in Sri Lanka in 2012 (ILO, 2014, pp. 1, 4). Yet women in Nepal are predominantly involved in the agricultural sector—close to 74 per cent of all women employed—and as craft, trade, and service workers (Acharya, 2015, p. 26). One female soldier in the NA, recruited shortly before being interviewed in July 2015, stated that one of ‘the main attraction[s] for women to join the Army is economic security’ and another is perceived job stability. In a job market plagued by perennial youth unemployment (which reached 13 per cent for urban youth in 2008) and high poverty rates, the prospect of joining state security forces, and thus obtaining a ‘permanent position’, has become more attractive (ILO, 2014, p. 1).

The Nepali labour market is segmented by gender, with certain occupations seen as the purview of men or women. A 2015 study finds that a majority of children, irrespective of gender, listed posts in the security forces, sports, business, and sciences as better suited for men, and teaching, social work, nursing, and tailoring as more suitable for women (Acharya, 2015, pp. 67–68). The study also finds a correlation between the career choice of girls and their social environment—particularly gender beliefs and security sector affiliations within the family—as well as education (Acharya, 2015).

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**Figure 4 Number of women in the NA by rank, 2014–17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officers in general service</th>
<th>Officers in technical service</th>
<th>Other ranks in general service</th>
<th>Other ranks in technical service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Kathmandu Post (2014); Nepal Army (2016); Chauhan (2017)
Family ties also influence whether a woman applies to join the army or police. One study of female army personnel in the Kathmandu Valley finds that over 66 per cent of female officers and 53 per cent of non-officers have some family military connection (Adhikari, 2013, p. 34). Survey interviews with women serving in the police and army also confirmed that having a family member in these institutions influences their decision to join. Others, such as a police sub-inspector for Crime Investigation Bureau, confessed to having applied for posts secretly and against the wishes of their families. While social attitudes are slowly changing, Nepali women still reportedly experience pressure from their families or communities to conform to certain roles, and often take up employment centred on domestic or agricultural activities (Saferworld, 2014).

In terms of personal motivations, empowerment is also a key factor in opting for a position in the state security forces. One female interviewee working for the NP said: ‘there is no one who is not exploited in society’, but credited her work with making her more conscious of such problems and helping her ‘make a contribution’. Another officer working for the Bureau of Drug Control described the authority and power that female security providers gained through their profession: ‘our own separate identity. Some female soldiers in the NA stated that they were primarily motivated by a sense of responsibility for the defence of the country (Adhikari, 2013, p. 36), while others viewed it as their duty to help other women suffering from ‘violence and injustice’. One female police inspector cast the net wider, arguing that since both men and women were victims of GBV, her role was to address this irrespective of the gender of the victim.

The uniform, seen as a symbol of prestige and social status, increased the attractiveness of the position for many women. A constable in the APF noted that ‘not only [highly] educated women but ordinary literate women of the village have become powerful through the wearing of the uniform’. Uniforms were also seen as tending to neutralize gender differences, promoting gender equality. In 2014, the now-retired deputy inspector of police, Thapa Magar, stated: ‘We can’t afford to wear saris in uniform [. . .] because that would immediately change the perception of our ability as officers’ (in Pun, 2014). Officers in the APF likewise identified the practice of carrying guns as a source of responsibility and of respect, underscoring the link between militarization and power.

We are familiar with the law. We know that we should not endure violence and injustice and we should make others understand it. We can bring in people who violate the law. We help people in distress.

Working in state security forces also helped some women gain ‘courage and confidence which may not be available through other professions’, while also providing a measure of financial independence in the home. As one female APF officer stated, this can also serve as an identity marker:

If we had not entered the service of a security agency, we would have been the wife or daughter-in-law of someone in the village. We would not have been able to establish our own separate identity.

Though most female officers interviewed mentioned personal empowerment playing a role in their decision to join the security forces, others were careful to distinguish between the mere participation of women in security activities and empowerment in such roles, noting the need for equal treatment within the force. Another key driver leading women to take up a security role is the desire to contribute to their country and society. Some female soldiers in the NA stated that they were primarily motivated by a sense of responsibility for the defence of the country (Adhikari, 2013, p. 36), while others viewed it as their duty to help other women suffering from ‘violence and injustice’. One female police inspector cast the net wider, arguing that since both men and women were victims of GBV, her role was to address this irrespective of the gender of the victim.

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Women joining Nepal’s security forces: motivations and deterrents

Challenges

Working in the police, APF, or army can open a range of opportunities for women in the security forces. In the course of their work, however, female security providers also face complex challenges from within the institutions they work for, and sometimes also from within their homes or communities. These range from a lack of support to dealing with entrenched discrimination.

In a society where patriarchal norms remain powerful in defining the role of women, female security providers often find it particularly difficult to manage both work and family obligations. One interviewee denounced the pressures from within her core and extended family to conform to certain predefined roles as a wife and daughter-in-law. Being a security provider did not usually change views of the male–female division of labour within the home. Some women whose spouses also worked as security providers had an easier time achieving a work–life balance, due to their partners’ better understanding of the demands of the job. Other women reported facing pressure to stop working in favour of their partner, particularly when the latter outranked them.
In terms of equality in the workplace, a number of the women interviewed said they had the same level of responsibility and largely the same opportunities as male peers with the same qualifications. Though appreciative of the opportunities it provided them, some women indicated that the current policy of positive discrimination should be limited in time, so as to allow women to develop their capacity to compete with men on equal terms.40 Others asserted that for positive discrimination to work, it was important to maintain high recruitment standards, so as not to damage the image of female police.41

Working in the security field does not, however, mean that women are exempt from experiencing gender-based discrimination—and even, in rare cases, physical violence. Kathmandu Post states that, according to a 2012 internal police survey, more than 40 per cent of female security personnel reported ‘some type of sexual harassment, including attempted rape’ (Kathmandu Post, 2013a). The Nepali media widely reported the case of a female police constable gang raped by her colleagues on the premises of the District Police Office in Achham, as well as the subsequent sentencing (Kathmandu Post, 2013b). Some female officers have reported feeling insecure about walking home at night with their male colleagues.42

Some of the female security personnel interviewed also objected to not being given the same responsibilities as their male colleagues despite having the same qualifications, while others reported feeling resented as a result of the quota system that was instrumental in their recruitment.43 Many of the interviewees said they wanted to be entrusted with more challenging tasks and roles and presented with clear advancement opportunities.44

The institutional culture of many security agencies can also constitute a barrier to the integration of female personnel. One female officer in the NA described the role of women in the institution as secondary and subordinate to that of their male colleagues.45 Certain extraordinary circumstances such as the 2015 earthquake have acted as equalizers, ordinary circumstances such as the 2015 earthquake have acted as equalizers,46 and the two months with pay that are standard practice in the NP—as well as provisions for maternity leave provisions and inflexible hours hamper their performance. One female officer from the NP noted that short maternity leave provisions and inflexible hours made many young mothers quit the force.47 As noted earlier, as of 2017, the rates of retention of female recruits are not known. The APF, however, appears to offer more enlightened policies, allowing an additional three months of leave without pay as maternity leave—in addition to the two months with pay that are standard practice in the NP—as well as provisions for paternity leave.48 The lack of appropriate infrastructure, such as barracks for women, is still a challenge for women in the NA, despite recent improvements in this area.49

Overall, while the situation of women within Nepali security agencies is far from perfect, their jobs and careers have helped to empower many others. A member of the APF credited her agency with giving her the confidence to deal with social challenges, be they insecurity or discrimination.50

Violence against women and girls

In a society in which patriarchal notions of women’s exclusively domestic role still dominate, female security providers challenge these norms, acting as examples of empowerment while helping to safeguard the rule of law. Women working in the police, APF, and army contribute not only to the overall security of the Nepali community alongside their male colleagues but also to combating GBV in general, and VAWG more specifically.51

Although men account for the majority of victims of lethal violence worldwide and in Nepal (McEvoy and Hideg, 2017; Racovita, Murray, and Sharma, 2013), women are often affected by different types of violence rooted in gender stereotypes and discriminatory social norms (Nepal MOHP, 2012, p. 233; CREHPA, 2012). Data for Nepal from the 2017 Human Rights Yearbook confirms the worldwide trend of women and girls being disproportionately affected by certain types of GBV, such as rape (804 victims were registered in 2016, all female); sexual abuse (185 female and 11 male victims); child marriage (16 victims, all female), and some forms of homicide (5 women and 1 man died after being set on fire, and 12 women were killed after being raped) (INSEC, 2017, pp. 430–31). NP data shows that, of the 11,663 cases that it separately classifies as GBV from 2015 to 2016, more than 80 per cent were incidents of domestic violence, followed by rape (9.3 per cent); polygamy (4 per cent); attempted rape (3.9 per cent); trafficking (1.8 per cent), and a small number of child marriages and witchcraft allegations (0.4 per cent combined) (see Figure 5).

The number of reported cases of domestic violence affecting both women and children has risen exponentially over the past few years (Shrestha, 2014), from 6,835 cases in 2014, to 8,268 in 2015, to 9,398 cases in 2016 (CID, 2016; Nepal Police, 2016, p. 47). These figures do not include

Figure 5 Distribution of GBV cases by type of incident, 2016

- Domestic violence (9,938)
- Rape (5,090)
- Rape attempt (452)
- Polygamy (463)
- Trafficking (212)
- Other (48)

Source: Nepal Army (2016)
such crimes has improved as a result of—among other factors—the NP’s efforts and indeed expanded, some observers claim that attention to projects tied to the WPS and girls (UN Women, 2017). While gender-sensitive humanitarian efforts have continued, 2017). At the same time, UN Women identified an elevated risk of GBV for Nepali women during humanitarian emergencies, when existing vulnerabilities are heightened. Studies of gender impacts in disaster settings have confirmed that women and men, and boys and girls, are affected by emergencies in different ways, and that women can face greater risks compared to the pre-emergency situation (Northa, 2015). Though Nepal is regularly affected by floods and landslides, the latest of which (in August 2017) resulted in population displacement and damaged infrastructure, the country has difficulties dealing with large-scale emergencies.

On 25 April 2015, an earthquake of 7.9 degrees in magnitude—the biggest since 1934—struck the country, killing nearly 9,000 people, injuring close to 22,000, and destroying more than 600,000 homes (Oxfam, 2015; UNDP, 2015). Initial statistics showed that men and women were almost proportionally affected, with women accounting for around 55 per cent of deaths and 53 per cent of the displaced (Gender Working Group, 2015; Kathmandu Post, 2015a). According to UNFPA, 28,000 women in the worst-affected district faced an increased risk of sexual violence (UNFPA, 2015). NGOs report a higher-than-usual number of women feeling insecure, while the number of reports of domestic and sexual violence received after the quake also increased (UN Women, 2015b; Himalayan Times, 2015c). The Nepali NGO Women’s Rehabilitation Centre (WOREC) documents more than 731 cases of VAWG from mid-June to mid-July 2015—a sharp jump compared to the May–June 2015 period, when they recorded 114 incidents (Himalayan Times, 2015c). The Metropolitan Police also reveal an increase in the number of rapes reported in Bhaktapur compared to pre-quake levels. A few cases, such as the rape of a five-year-old girl living in an encampment with her family, received wide media attention (Kathmandu Post, 2015b, 2015c). Another story of five female victims of human trafficking—three teenage girls and two adults—who police rescued underscored the vulnerability of displaced or orphaned women and girls in post-disaster Nepal (Himalayan Times, 2015a).

Security providers mobilized after the earthquake to provide immediate support for the search and rescue operations, as well as long-term support to prevent and address VAWG. Of the 131,567 security providers mobilized, 41,776 came from the NP, 247,775 from the APF, and 65,016 from the NA (Nepal MOHA, 2015). In addition to their enhanced presence, the NP adopted a number of targeted measures to stem VAWG, which capitalized on its female personnel. These included the establishment of female-run security desks in 42 IDP camps (Nepal Police, 2016). In an innovative programme, female police officers also taught self-defence classes, including introductory karate and judo, to women living in makeshift camps to help them better protect themselves against sexual assault (Rauniyar and Burke, 2015). To prevent and address human trafficking, the border police also opened 14 additional posts on the country’s border with India and conducted awareness-raising campaigns on the dangers of human trafficking (Nepal Police, 2016). From 25 April to 11 June 2015, the NP reports rescuing over 92 women and children victims of human trafficking and charging 13 individuals in these cases (Parijar, 2015). The police also worked more closely with local NGOs, such as Maiti and Pradash Nepal, to identify trafficked women and children, with female officers increasing checks on buses and other means of transportation (Himalayan Times, 2015a, 2015b).

While security responses to the 2015 earthquake showed increased gender awareness, more is needed to ensure the needs of women and girls are being continuously and consistently addressed. The August 2017 floods, which affected several countries in South Asia, highlighted the persistent vulnerabilities of women and girls during natural disasters. With over 140 persons confirmed dead, more than 46,000 displaced, and over 65,000 homes destroyed in Nepal alone, the 2017 floods also exposed the continuing need for gender-aware interventions to ensure equitable access to relief aid and related services (UN Women, 2017; SBS News, 2017). The displacement the floods provoked has, according to UNFPA, put thousands of pregnant women and young mothers at risk (UNFPA, 2017). At the same time, UN Women identified an elevated risk of GBV for Nepali women and girls (UN Women, 2017). While gender-sensitive humanitarian efforts have continued, and indeed expanded, some observers claim that attention to projects tied to the WPS agenda has recently diminished (Yadav, 2017).

**Box 2 Women and security following natural disasters: the 2015 earthquake and 2017 floods**

Violence and insecurity affecting women and girls in Nepal can become exacerbated during humanitarian emergencies, when existing vulnerabilities are heightened. Studies of gender impacts in disaster settings have confirmed that women and men, and boys and girls, are affected by emergencies in different ways, and that women can face greater risks compared to the pre-emergency situation (Northa, 2015). Though Nepal is regularly affected by floods and landslides, the latest of which (in August 2017) resulted in population displacement and damaged infrastructure, the country has difficulties dealing with large-scale emergencies.

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Conclusion

The situation of women security providers in Nepal is slowly changing, in terms of both recruitment patterns and the roles and responsibilities they are entrusted with. The legal and policy framework has come a long way since 2007, with the establishment of a quota system, measures to ensure a gender-sensitive environment for women in the security forces, assistance such as maternity leave, and opportunities for professional development. These measures have begun to show results: the number of women security providers has steadily increased since the introduction of a quota system, which assigns them 20 per cent of the reserved posts in the police, APF, and army. The sustained commitment of governmental authorities will be key to ensuring these quotas are met in the medium term. Yet, beyond the wider inclusion of women in their ranks, state security agencies will also need to keep avenues for advancement open. The full and equal participation of women means promoting them to high-ranking positions, increasing the range of responsibilities they are entrusted with, and changing deeply engrained male-centred institutional cultures.

Women in the state security services still face a wide range of challenges, from balancing their personal and professional duties to facing discrimination from the institutions they work for and from a broader society still dominated by patriarchal norms. Yet despite these difficulties, female security providers are already serving as examples of empowerment and helping to improve security, including but not limited to addressing VAWG.

List of abbreviations

APF Armed Police Force
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
FPU Formed police units
GBV Gender-based violence
NA Nepal Army
NGO Non-governmental organization
NAP National Action Plan
NP Nepal Police
PLA People’s Liberation Army
SSR Security sector reform
UN United Nations
UNPOL United Nations Police
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
VAWG Violence against women and girls
WCSC Women and Children Service Center
WOREC Women’s Rehabilitation Centre
WPS Women, Peace and Security

Notes

1 Charlotte Bunch coined the phrase ‘add women and stir’ in 1979 (Bunch, 1979), and Bari Watkins described the term more broadly in 1980 (in Boxer, 1982, p. 682). This Briefing Paper recognizes that gender is a broader construct that cannot be reduced to a focus on women. While recognizing this, it chooses to focus particularly on the experiences of women in Nepal state security forces, placing this within the wider gender and security sector reform (SSR) agenda.
2 The 2009 DCAF Almanac lists, besides the big three institutions for security provision in Nepal, the border security and management, the National Intelligence Department, and private security companies (Sapkota, 2009). For an overview of actors that make up the security sector, please see Valasek (2008, p. 2).
3 Survey interviews, Kathmandu, Nepal, 5 August 2015. Nos. 28, 29.
4 SSR means transforming the security sector or system, ‘which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance’ (OECD, 2005, p. 58).
5 Gender mainstreaming is defined as ‘the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated’ (UNGA, 1997).
6 For a more comprehensive discussion of patriarchal social norms in Nepal, see Ghimire and Samuels (2014).
7 The ‘gender-responsive agenda’, which refers to the inclusion of gender considerations in SSR and the humanitarian field, predates the WPS agenda, and is also sometimes referred to simply as the ‘gender agenda’. It emerged in the 1970s with the growth of feminist scholarship (Cornwall, 2007).
8 Women in Nepal do not constitute a homogeneous group; their ethnic and religious backgrounds determine their relations within communities. Historically, some women, generally high-caste, were almost exclusively expected to operate within the private sphere, while those of Thakali origin were known for their business skills, and women from Limbu benefited from a freedom to divorce and remarry, which were not permitted to those from other social groups (Tamang, 2009, p. 65).
9 The award-winning documentary The Sari Soldiers (2008) documents the story of six women involved in both sides of the civil conflict in Nepal.
10 Some commentators argue that 40 per cent participation was achieved at the height of the conflict, but that this number then decreased; others question the definition of ‘combatant’—particularly whether supporting, non-combat roles should be subsumed under the label of female participation (Kunz and Paudel, 2015).
11 Survey interview with a member of the APF, Kathmandu, Nepal, 3 August 2015. No. 23.
13 Donor agencies and local NGOs have been working to promote gender equality through the use of a Gender Equality and Social Inclusion approach in their programming, a commitment the Government of Nepal has also made (Bennett, 2017).
14 Nepali civil society is actively involved in SSR, providing trainings to military personnel and advocating for stronger women’s participation in security provision (DCAF, 2009).
16 General army services refer to the air force and ground force, while technical service refers to engineers, ordnance, transporta-
17 BS refers to Bikram Sambat and marks the Nepali calendar year, which is 56 years ahead of the Gregorian calendar year.
18 See endnote 16 for an overview of general and technical services.
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