SECOND MPOME REGIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Making Peace Operations More Effective

Edited by Claire Mc Evoy
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International Peace Support Training Centre
Nairobi, Kenya · 13–14 March 2018

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A publication of the Small Arms Survey’s Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, with support from the Governments of Canada and Germany
The Small Arms Survey’s Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project is a multi-year initiative to deepen understanding of and support efforts to counter the loss of weapons and ammunition from peace operations worldwide. It responds to an emerging consensus that the scale of the global loss of lethal materiel from United Nations (UN) and regionally led peacekeeping operations is considerably greater than previously understood—with much of the loss likely preventable. MPOME research has also demonstrated that oversight and proper management mechanisms are lacking for weapons and ammunition that peacekeepers recover outside of formal collection programmes.

The MPOME project addresses these concerns in four ways:

- by deepening understanding of the loss of materiel from peace operations through a series of regional conferences;
- by developing training modules and good practice guidelines to counter losses in cooperation with major troop- and police-contributing countries;
- by working directly with the UN and regional organizations to develop mechanisms to improve stockpile security and administrative oversight of materiel; and
- by highlighting findings and initiatives with policy-makers, programmers, and experts at relevant international forums (such as UN Programme of Action on Small Arms meetings and the UN General Assembly).

The MPOME project is supported by Global Affairs Canada, with additional assistance from the German Federal Foreign Office and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. It draws on research undertaken with the backing of Denmark, Norway, and the United States.

For more information, please visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/mpome or contact:

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About the editor

Claire Mc Evoy is a projects editor with the Small Arms Survey, authoring and content editing Survey publications on conflict and violence.
About the partners

International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

Evolution of the IPSTC
The Peace Support Training Centre was established in 2011. It achieved autonomy through formal partnership arrangements with Canada, Germany, Japan, Kenya, the UN Development Programme, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Fifteen partners currently support the IPSTC (the seven first partners were joined by the Eastern Africa Standby Force, Switzerland, Belgium, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, and UN Women).

Vision
To establish the IPSTC as the premier peace support training, research, and education centre in Africa.

Mission
To conduct training, education, and research informing military, police, and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace support operations in order to improve the effectiveness of the response to complex emergencies.

Core values
Excellence, professionalism, trust, integrity, accountability, and gender equality.

Goals
- To maintain a comprehensive programme of training and education addressing conflict in Eastern Africa (Programme Strategy);
- to establish the IPSTC as a leading research, training, and education centre in the African Peace and Security Architecture (Network Strategy);
to provide intellectual inputs into the African Peace and Security Architecture (Research Strategy); and

to implement an integrated internal management and support system (Internal Resource Management Strategy).

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Small Arms Survey
The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

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The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) and the Small Arms Survey are pleased to have been afforded the opportunity to work together to co-host the Second Regional Workshop of the Survey’s Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project. The contributions of the Governments of Canada and Germany to our respective institutions are numerous and long standing, and we appreciate the support they gave to this workshop, as well as to other efforts we undertake. We are keen to collaborate to build on the progress made to date and to respond to the conference participants—both policy-makers and practitioners—who have asked for help in improving the management and security of arms and ammunition in their peace operations.

This workshop complements and expands on numerous courses that the IPSTC undertakes that are not limited to peace operation settings, such as the Regional Senior Mission Leaders’ Course and train-the-trainer courses to develop and teach physical security and stockpile management. The IPSTC will explore with the Survey and project donors how MPOME-related concerns can be introduced or expanded to existing undertakings. The Survey stands ready to support such initiatives—as well as the possible development of new courses.

The management of contingent-owned equipment and recovered or captured material from negative forces operating in mission areas is both a force-protection and a mandate-implementation concern. The countries that the IPSTC serves comprise some of the most active peace mission troop- and police-contributing countries in the world. They provide uniformed personnel to peace operations undertaken by the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN), as well as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Southern African Development Community, among others.

As an interim step both to inform policy-makers and practitioners and to benefit from their expertise, the IPSTC plans to work with its donors to hold an Amani Lecture on
the subject of arms and ammunition management in peace operations in the coming year. This will be timely in light of the publication last December of the so-called Cruz Report, the UN Secretary-General’s reform efforts, the AU’s efforts to develop guidelines for recovered materiel in peace operations, and the establishment by the UN of a task force on weapons, ammunition, and explosives in peace operations. The Survey stands ready to contribute to the planning and execution of such an important event.

Brig. Patrick Muta Nderitu
Director, IPSTC
Karen, Kenya
July 2018

Eric G. Berman
Director, Small Arms Survey
Geneva, Switzerland
July 2018
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BNDF</td>
<td>Burundi National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoI</td>
<td>Board of inquiry</td>
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<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent-owned equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multi-National Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MPOME</td>
<td>Making Peace Operations More Effective</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-contributing country</td>
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<td>PODS</td>
<td>Peace Operations Data Set</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoE</td>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Rapid Support Forces</td>
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<td>RSMLC</td>
<td>Regional Senior Mission Leaders’ Course</td>
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<td>SCIC</td>
<td>Somalia Council of Islamic Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing country</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Forces</td>
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Final workshop agenda

Second MPOME Regional Workshop

Monday 12 March

18:00–20:00  ‘Icebreaker’ and dinner at Peace Banda, IPSTC

Tuesday 13 March

08:30–09:00  Registration

09:00–09:45  Welcome and overview
Brig. Patrick Muta Nderitu, Director, IPSTC
Eric G. Berman, Director, Small Arms Survey
Yannick Hingorani, First Secretary (Political), High Commission of Canada to Kenya
Michael Derus, Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of Germany

09:45–10:15  Group photo and coffee

10:15–11:15  Session 1: Understanding the challenges
Moderator: Emile LeBrun, Small Arms Survey
Presenter: Eric G. Berman
11:15–12:30  **Session 2: Experience and lessons from UNAMID**  
Moderator: Mihaela Racovita, Small Arms Survey  
Presenter: Ambassador Obiodun Bashua, Former Joint Special Representative of the AU Chairperson and UN Secretary-General, UN–AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur

12:30–13:30  **Lunch**

13:30–15:00  **Session 3: Reflections from the MNJTF and AMISOM**  
Moderator: Emile LeBrun, Small Arms Survey  
Presenters: Sanni Mama, Head, AU Mission Support Team to the Multi-National Joint Task Force  
Brig-Gen. Bouba Dobekreo, Sector I Commander, Multi-National Joint Task Force  
Maj-Gen. Fred Mugisha, Uganda People's Defence Forces

15:00–15:30  **Coffee break**

15:30–17:00  **Session 3 (continued)**

18:30  **Dinner at the IPSTC**

**Wednesday 14 March**

09:00–09:15  **Recap of Day 1**  
Presenter: Emile LeBrun

09:15–10:30  **Session 4: Documenting/estimating losses and policy update**  
Presenter and moderator: Mihaela Racovita

10:30–11:00  **Coffee break**

11:00–12:30  **Session 5: Gender and arms control in peace operations**  
Moderator: Emile LeBrun  
Presenters: Col. Joyce Sitienei, Plans and Programmes, IPSTC  
Maj. Nina Omany; Maj. Agnetta Apondi, IPSTC

12:30–13:30  **Lunch**
13:30–15:00  **Session 6: Recommendations for improving TCC/PCC training, oversight, and accountability**  
Moderator: Mihaela Racovita  
Presenter: Ambassador Abiodun Bashua

15:00–15:30  **Coffee break**

15:30–16:00  **Wrap-up and closing ceremony**  
Closing statements: Brig. Patrick Muta Nderitu  
Eric G. Berman
Opening statements
Brig. Patrick Muta Nderitu  
Director, IPSTC

Director of the Small Arms Survey, Mr Eric Berman, Director of the Eastern Africa Standby Force’s Secretariat, Dr Abdillahi Omar Bouh, Small Arms Survey facilitators, staff from the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) who are present, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I wish to start my remarks this morning by warmly welcoming you all to Kenya, and to the IPSTC in particular. I am delighted to preside over the official opening of two days’ work.

I wish to extend the centre’s appreciation to the Small Arms Survey for supporting several training events at the IPSTC through the years, and more specifically its facilitation of the Physical Security and Stockpile Management Course. Please be assured that we greatly value this contribution, and as we continue to grow and improve our training capabilities, we hope that this support will continue.

To our distinguished workshop participants, I wish to congratulate you for having been nominated by your governments and organizations to attend this important training workshop.

The workshop aims to:

- share the Small Arms Survey’s research and analysis on weapons and ammunition management in peace operations;
- benefit from the experiences and expertise of participants regarding the loss of contingent-owned equipment (COE) and the management of weapons recovered from negative forces;
- review international and regional obligations, policies, procedures, and good practices for preventing COE losses and managing recovered weapons; and
- identify recommendations for strengthening current practice through the development of training materials, as well as policy and operational guidance.

As you discuss these issues, I wish you to keep in mind that peace operations are becoming increasingly complex and challenging. UN and AU missions are being deployed in situations where the military, civilian police, UN civilian staff, UN agencies, and international agencies are increasingly facing open hostility.

The Cruz Report on Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeeping reiterates this by highlighting that two-thirds of UN peacekeepers are deployed in high-risk environments and more were killed by acts of violence between 2013 and 2017 than in any other five-year period in UN history. The report proposes practical, implementable,
and effective recommendations to reduce peacekeeping personnel fatalities and injuries from acts of violence.

Some of the recommendations, if implemented, should also help address the issue of the loss of COE and the management of weapons recovered from negative forces, especially those related to the use of force, the adoption of a defensive posture, intelligence, and pre-deployment training.

I urge you to keep an open mind as you interrogate the challenges of peace support operations in this area and to seek to support the Small Arms Survey in identifying possible areas for further research and capacity building.

I now wish to declare this MPOME Regional Workshop officially opened.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this important gathering. Enhancing global peace operations is a signature commitment of Canada. Especially since 2015, the focus has not only been on the quantity of peace support, but the quality of such operations, so that they can get better at protecting civilians and curb, if not eliminate, sexual and gender-based violence. While we are in a better place than we were 25 years ago, the context of peace support operations continues to change and has become more complex.

Most peace support operations are undertaken in contexts where there is no political settlement. The lack of a settlement is only aggravated by the easy availability of small arms and light weapons. With new challenges emerging and the increasing complexity of violence in new theatres of operation, we must strive to understand the political dynamics that drive conflict—whether economic, social, or cultural—and not just the military dynamics. And we must design peace support operations in such a way that they can contribute to the search for political solutions.

Providing a secure environment so that local authorities can eventually gain a monopoly over the instruments of violence is a key goal in this regard. As a result, small arms proliferation works directly against peace support operations. While confidence building and the creation of secure environments are key aspects of peace building, these are difficult to achieve in areas where small arms are in wide circulation.

For this reason, Canada puts a premium on working with multilateral partners, such as the AU and UN, as well as civil society organizations in order to improve peace support operations and more effectively counter small arms proliferation. Tracking and managing weapons within operations can be part of that effort. There are no easy answers to the challenges that these needs present, so we welcome the engagement and discussions ahead that will help us to find widely applicable solutions to take back to national capitals and apply directly.
Michael Derus  
Deputy Ambassador to Kenya, Embassy of Germany

I would like to highlight two aspects of the security of arms that are important to framing our discussion. The first is the importance of the issue on the African continent. Small arms and light weapons have greatly affected the region by their prevalence, and it is appropriate that we are holding this workshop in East Africa where it is truly relevant. In managing crises from Libya, Mali, the Lake Chad Basin, and beyond, it is important to work together—to give support to national and regional organizations and to work towards strategic cooperation, including building capacity within regional organizations.

In this regard, Africa provides a role model for other efforts, including the effective control of small arms and light weapons. The AU and the framework of the German-led Enlarged Action Plan for the implementation of the ‘Silence the Guns 2020’ initiative can guide other UN peace operations. Peacekeeper components are exposed, in many cases, to the loss of their own materiel and to the handling of found caches, yet after 60 years of UN procedures there is still no standard operating procedure for recovered arms—in part due to the speed with which operations are often fielded.

The second aspect I would like to highlight is the value of NGOs focusing on the importance of this issue, and on the proper handling of unsecured weapons. The influence of NGOs is evident in reports, such as the December 2017 small arms and light weapons report by the Secretary-General of the UN, and their expertise is important in uncovering the root causes of, and solutions to, these issues.

I would also like to assure all present that the new German government under re-elected Chancellor [Angela] Merkel will continue to support and value the primacy of this project and its efforts to address the insecurity of arms in peace operations.
Thank you, Brigadier Nderitu, for your kind remarks, and for your agreement to have the IPSTC host this workshop. The Small Arms Survey has had a long history of engaging the IPSTC, with excellent results. We appreciate your team’s professionalism and flexibility when it proved necessary to postpone this meeting. Indeed, let me take this opportunity to underscore my appreciation to the IPSTC for agreeing to address the need to improve weapons and ammunition management in peace operations when this was still a sensitive subject, and before its importance was widely understood. Specifically, the IPSTC agreed to introduce a module on the diversion of lethal materiel in peace operations in its Regional Senior Mission Leaders’ Course (RSMLC) back in 2013—and again throughout 2014. As we discussed yesterday, the constructive feedback that IPSTC officials and RSMLC participants provided to the Survey from those early interventions was instrumental in framing elements of an initial study and influenced how we moved forward.

I also wish to acknowledge the long-standing support the Survey has received from the Governments of Canada and Germany, generally speaking, and for the specific support they have provided for this workshop. We will discuss the role regional workshops play in the Survey’s Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project in the next session. Let me simply say here that this project would not be possible without the vision and generous support of Canada, which worked closely with the Survey to create the MPOME’s ambitious multi-year framework. As part of this framework, Germany has not only helped fund this workshop, but also the effort to establish guidelines for recovered small arms and ammunition that the AU has asked the Survey to help develop.

Let me use this occasion to express my gratitude to the participants of this workshop. You have given us your valuable time and travelled from across much of the continent to be here. We rely on you to share and draw on your expertise and experience to help make this workshop a success.

MPOME regional workshops are designed to bring together both practitioners in peace operations and officials from regional bodies authorizing or planning such operations. The workshop participants represent a tremendous resource, and today and tomorrow, here at the IPSTC, we have an excellent opportunity to address important issues and make important progress.

The discussion of weapons and ammunition management—including less-than-best practice—is not a ‘naming and shaming’ exercise. Only by talking about current challenges can we identify shortcomings, propose solutions, and then act on them.
To conclude, the Survey looks forward to building on its long engagement with the IPSTC and the Governments of Canada and Germany. The IPSTC can count on our continued support. We also hope to work with the experts here with us—as well as with your colleagues back home and those deployed in peace operations—for many years to come. Together we can improve on present practice, thereby helping to make peace operations more effective.
The sessions were conducted under Chatham House rules to encourage a frank exchange of views. Therefore the names of speakers from outside the Small Arms Survey have been removed from the discussion summaries.
Session 1: Understanding the challenges

Eric G. Berman opened the discussion by noting that the Small Arms Survey’s work in this area began with two main questions about the problem of the loss of arms and ammunition in peacekeeping operations:

- What is the scale and scope of this loss?
- What can be done about it?

He commended the IPSTC for hosting the conference, thereby confirming that this issue is of prime importance for peacekeepers. He said the fact that peacekeepers, and the international organizations and governments who lead them, are now taking part in this workshop shows that peace support leadership is concerned about the issue, and that it is taking steps to reduce the loss of arms in peace operations. This marks a change from several years ago, when reactions to the subject were somewhat dismissive.

Mr Berman went on to discuss the work that the Survey has done to research this topic. It began working on the issue in 2015 with the publication of Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14. This report identified that the loss of arms was a fairly common occurrence in peace operations. While it showed that there are varying circumstances behind this loss, the report also identified steps that could be taken to prevent it from happening again, including by applying existing guidelines on best practice.

He noted that the Survey’s initial findings were similar to those in the December 2017 Cruz Report (Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeeping: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business, by Lt. Gen. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz) in which the state of various peacekeeping missions’ training, preparedness, and equipment standards was examined. He added that the Cruz Report underscores the importance of the Survey’s work, because it reaffirms that while peacekeeping has become increasingly more complicated and deadly, the loss of materiel still continues to result from less-than-best practice. The report also reiterates what UN Secretary-General António Guterres has often called for: the need for high standards of accountability and performance so that peacekeepers can do their jobs effectively.

Mr Berman explained that the Survey’s next study from 2016, Checks and Balances: Securing Small Arms during Peace Operations, examined further facets of the issue. It addressed challenges that included the blue hatting of green helmets—the process by which AU or other peacekeepers are integrated into UN operations and retrained or otherwise repurposed to fight under different mandates and operating procedures. He noted that the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi Report—a publication from 2000 that recommended reforms to peace operations—had already recommended that this process should not be as simple as
re-uniforming formed units. Often troops under the leadership of other organizations are not deployed with the requisite equipment and force projection ability necessary for a UN operation, the necessary controls to implement the mandate, or the ability to reach full strength in anything but a base number of troops. Checks and Balances reiterates this finding, because peace operations still occasionally transition troops without retraining them.

Mr Berman went on to discuss recent progress made by the MPOME project on gaining access to more accurate and more wide-reaching data, in addition to developing the project’s methodology:

- **Geographical spread.** The Survey’s initial 2015 study, Under Attack and Above Scrutiny?, was limited to the East Africa region. In contrast, its 2017 report, Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations, was able to broaden its analysis to the global scale.

- **Accuracy.** While Making a Tough Job More Difficult is not a comprehensive summary of all arms and ammunition lost during peacekeeping operations, it is a step in the right direction in terms of putting together a more complete picture of the problem. It also shows that earlier Survey studies significantly underestimated the scale and scope of losses. This is partly due to events previously being classified as ‘possible’ incidents that were later confirmed by eyewitness reports and interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and partly due to overly conservative estimates intended not to over-sensationalize the issue.

- **Actors.** Making a Tough Job More Difficult expanded the scope of the Survey’s research both by documenting the number of actors involved—in a table of non-UN organizations that have mandated peace operations in the last 50 years—and by drawing a distinction between civilian and military staff of peace operations.

- **Methods.** Making a Tough Job More Difficult also includes a sample from the Survey’s Peace Operations Data Set (PODS), which allows readers to provide direct feedback based on their personal knowledge.

**Discussion**

Workshop participants discussed the research findings and their contexts, including the issue of conflict. One participant clarified that workshop participants were not discussing the issue of the loss of arms in Europe, the United States, or China, but specifically the difficulty of securing arms in conflict zones. This was deemed especially important throughout Africa, where conflict is pervasive.

In the Horn of Africa, small arms issues were discussed as being a failure of government control measures and of peace operations prior to 1995. The first armed group
in Somalia was created as a result of the failure of the first peacekeeping missions conducted there, for example. One official shared an anecdote that in 2007 peacekeepers from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had found weapons, ‘technicals’, trucks, and uniforms that were clearly sourced from the initial UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) in the 1990s.

Eric G. Berman reaffirmed that these instances illustrate that the bigger picture is much more problematic than single losses of arms affecting single nations. This is not to say that the most important problem facing peace operations is the loss of arms and ammunition, he said, only that the issue is more important than we previously understood it to be.

He added that losses originate from many actors: peacekeepers are likely not the worst offenders in terms of the illicit proliferation of arms. At the same time, no one actually knows the total extent of the proliferation of small arms from peace missions. UN spokespeople have claimed that less than 1 per cent of arms are lost in peace operations, but this takes away from the important fact that some such losses are preventable.

Mr Berman moved on to discuss the four key components of the MPOME project. He said that regional workshops are a major element of the project. Their aims are to:

- consult and learn from regional actors as part of developing solutions;
- engage regional organizations to develop guidelines for best practices;
- engage troop-contributing countries (TCCs) bilaterally; and
- share information with civil society organizations to facilitate all of the above.

Through these efforts, the issue of arms and ammunition losses in peace operations has grown more mainstream: it was discussed at the UN Programme of Action meetings recently and at negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty; the UN has recently begun to develop guidelines on small arms recovered in UN peace operations; and even the UN Secretary-General authored a report in 2017 on small arms management.

Mr Berman added that the workshop discussions aimed to focus on a manageable issue: whether it is possible to make progress on weapons management, while distinguishing between preventable losses and unpreventable ones.

One participant agreed that the issue was one needing resolution and discussion, and asked several pertinent questions as to the desired outcomes of the workshop:

- What added value will come from the workshop?
- What specific recommendations can we give to peace operations support leadership?
- What specific capacity-building programmes are recommended?
In response, Mr Berman noted that the aim of the MPOME workshops are, in part, to guide participants towards creating tangible guidelines and specific recommendations by drawing on the knowledge of insiders. Other aims of the MPOME project include developing reporting templates and reminding UN and regional organizations’ member states of their existing commitments. For example, the Lake Chad Basin Commission has no structures in place specifically requiring states to establish control mechanisms for arms in peace operations, yet all of its member states are members of the Economic Community of West African States or the Economic Community of Central African States, and these organizations impose legally binding requirements on their member states to keep proper records of what their militaries or police bring into, lose during, and take out of, peace operations. In terms of programmes, the Survey recommends that they include capacity building, not just sensitization to the issue of arms losses; that is, it recommends actionable programmes that can lead to practical solutions.
Session 2: Experience and lessons from UNAMID

In order to understand the operational challenges that peace operations face, as well as the bigger picture of the loss of arms and ammunition from them, the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) provides an important case study.

In this session the moderator, Dr Mihaela Racovita (Researcher, Small Arms Survey), invited reflections on:

- the causes and impacts of materiel losses from UNAMID;
- the measures taken to prevent or reduce them; and
- the contributing factors that are particular to UNAMID and other missions.

Ambassador Abiodun Bashua highlighted the Cruz Report as an example of the importance of addressing security challenges affecting peacekeepers, and the need to address high-threat environments. The report supports the Survey’s assertion that the loss of arms in peace operations is a global phenomenon that requires a global solution, and that fatalities can often accompany the loss of such arms. In UNAMID alone at least 71 fatalities have occurred during attacks to steal weapons from peacekeepers.

In order to achieve tangible outcomes and help policy-makers take appropriate measures, it is key to understand the context of losses and the relevant rules of engagement. In UNAMID’s case, the mission was a successor to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS did not have the necessary equipment or training to fulfil its mandate, and so was ill equipped to address the conflict in Darfur. The transition to a hybrid AU–UN operation was meant to address these imbalances, yet even after this the attacks against peacekeepers continued and arms continued to be lost, raising a key question: Given that standards of training improved, why did arms losses continue?

Discussion

The discussion focused initially on the lack of adherence to UNAMID’s rules of engagement and the negative impact of the loss of weapons, including on the overall credibility of the mission. Despite the authorization to use deadly force in self-defence (or defence of mission assets), many contingents have failed to do so.

Participants noted several factors that may have led to the loss of arms and ammunition from UNAMID, including:

- insufficient or inadequate pre-deployment or in-mission training;
- a lack of willingness or readiness to respond to attacks;
- a lack of accountability;
- the low quality and inadequate calibre of the peacekeepers’ weapons, which may be insufficient for the strategic operating environment and leave them unable to defend themselves and prevent materiel losses from occurring;

- the difficult operational environment. Helicopter use, which was intended to enhance the mission’s ability to defend itself and civilians by pursuing attackers, has been limited as the Government of Sudan (GoS) has often refused to authorize flights. Government-imposed blocking of information flows to the mission has also reduced available intelligence and the mission’s ability to accurately assess threats; and

- the lack of investigation or prosecutions, where necessary.

TCCs reticence to incur or disclose loss of life may also make them less likely to take a proactive approach, despite an operation’s mandate.

A number of ways to avoid arms losses emerged during the discussion:

- **Empower force commanders.** The empowerment of the force commander is crucial to effective operations, together with stronger command-and-control overall. Good communication and coordination inside the mission, as well as with host governments and other actors in the field, are vital in preventing and mitigating arms losses.

- **Gather intelligence for better threat assessments.** The gathering of intelligence is a method of preventing casualties and the loss of materiel. This may require stronger communications between a mission’s military and political contingents. How prepared are the various contingents in the same operation to coordinate their activities? How coordinated are the military and political contingents of missions when conducting threat assessments?

- **Focus on quality, not quantity.** As per the recommendations of the Cruz Report, quality is more important than quantity for effective peace operations: the strength of missions comes not from having the correct number of troops or covering the most territory, but from their training, equipment, and preparation.

- **Respond to changing threat environments.** Threats and operating environments change, and so should the mandates and capabilities of peace support missions in response to these changes.

- **Ensure accountability.** Poor performance affects entire missions, because each mission either succeeds or fails as a single entity. Furthermore, if contingents know they cannot get away with ‘failure’, they will improve; on the other hand, if they know there are no repercussions for failure, they will lack incentives to improve. The threat of the repatriation of TCC contingents—for failure to protect
civilians, for example—has the potential to be used as a tool for mitigating arms losses. A strict approach from the upper leadership of UNAMID on repatriating and replacing contingents whose members had failed to defend themselves set a strong example and proved effective in improving the operation, increasing both the quality of troops and the mission’s morale.

Other salient points made during the discussion were the following:

- Participants noted that many attacks by armed groups on peace operations are committed for the purpose of obtaining arms. In Darfur, this has extended to the militias sponsored by the GoS, some of whom have attacked peacekeepers because they (the attackers) had not have been paid.

- Most peacekeeping operations do not have effective public awareness or media programmes in place, making it hard for the public to know about their successes and failures. Strategic communications about successes are important in ‘winning hearts and minds,’ as is clarifying the circumstances of attacks and losses. UNAMID’s reticence to provide direct protection to civilian sites, and its alternative strategy of providing protection for displaced populations who seek refuge at its team sites—which have never been attacked—has been widely criticized; yet this has overshadowed the indispensable role the strategy has played in saving lives.

- One participant noted that if TCCs were willing to undertake initiatives to prevent and protect against arms losses, change might be possible. He added that some troops consider deployment to peace operations to be a form of retirement and do not take their missions seriously.
Session 3: Reflections from the MNJTF and AMISOM

This session examined other peace operation case studies in an effort to understand the broader issue of the loss of arms, as well as the specific management practices that may contribute to or mitigate losses. Experts from the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and AMISOM provided reflections, with Emile LeBrun (MPOME Coordinator, Small Arms Survey) moderating.

The session began with a presentation by Sanni Mama on the proliferation of small arms throughout the Lake Chad Basin. In Niger in particular there is frequent illicit trafficking of arms, both in the country and across its borders. National coordinated collection and control programmes help to curb this trade.

He recommended that efforts to collect such arms include the following:

- authorization to implement the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction;
- information for populations on surrendering arms with victim-focused action plans; and
- a centralized depot for seized weapons.

Brig-Gen. Bouba Dobekreo spoke about his experience as an MNJTF sector commander, touching on the origins of illicit arms proliferation among hostile forces. He said that the source of these arms is well known: they are taken from peace operations. In the Lake Chad Basin specifically, arms have been taken from the French Operation Barkhane, and also during attacks against neighbouring countries’ armies and depots.

He said that arms were often trafficked to Boko Haram from the Democratic Republic of the Congo through South Sudan, Chad, and Cameroon. Due to the high frequency of illicit activity by Boko Haram and other such organizations, large quantities of arms are trafficked throughout the region. He repeated the earlier recommendation on the need to have centralized arms depots and policies to manage arms among all the actors involved, ranging from the gendarmerie (including its police and military branches) to peacekeepers.

He added that few attacks are committed with small arms. Instead, rebel groups often use recycled and improvised craft bombs and weapons. Boko Haram had filled shell casings with explosive components to create suicide-borne improvised explosive devices, for example.
Maj-Gen. Fred Mugisha related his experiences from AMISOM. He reiterated that the loss of weapons in peace operations, especially in the African context, is complex and requires sophisticated solutions. This necessitates taking into account:

- the political and historical drivers of conflict, including why such insecurity exists in the region;
- which actors are involved; and
- why not how previous efforts to remedy the situation have succeeded or failed.

He reminded the group that controlling arms proliferation relies on addressing the root causes of conflicts. In the case of AMISOM, relevant factors include the earlier UNOSOM I and II missions, the slow speed at which AMISOM was deployed, the perception among some Somalis of AMISOM as an occupying force due to al-Shabaab propaganda, and the related danger of the local population turning hostile due to the extended period that AMISOM troops have been deployed in Somalia.

He then discussed issues that are specific to AMISOM, noting that due to decades of conflict in Somalia there was ‘no peace to keep’. Furthermore, peacekeepers deployed to the region were not properly equipped: they arrived and were immediately required to engage in counter-insurgency operations and urban warfare, which they had neither prepared nor planned for. Their ally, the Somali army, also lacked formal training and logistics, including equipment, making it ill suited to combat the threat. Although the army needed to be re-armed to form an effective defence against al-Shabaab insurgents, embargoes prevented the formal transfer of arms. He said this made peacekeepers Somalia’s only source from which to acquire weapons, with many of the arms from re-equipping programmes ending up in the hands of al-Shabaab. He added that the notorious Dayniile incident in 2011 (see p. 46) could have been prevented if peacekeepers had been prepared to fight a war rather than just attempt to keep the peace.

Discussion

The group posed a number of questions regarding practices within AMISOM, including the following:

- What happens to weaponry collected in Somalia outside of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes?
- When is an incident preventable/how can losses be mitigated?
- Who is listening to the concerns expressed and recommendations made during the workshop?
Weapons are repatriated after they are marked and/or recorded. This often happens at the sector level with the general—but not explicit—approval of the force commander. There is no standard directive for this procedure, which relies on the needs of local national forces.

Preventing losses should be part of normal training procedures: countering ambushes is not a UN-specific goal, but one shared by all militaries globally. There are different requirements for training for different missions and strategic environments. Not all members of contingents from TCCs are trained or equipped using the same standards. In order to counter this, the UN could initiate processes to identify contingents needing equipment and take active measures to address equipment (and related training) gaps.

Discussion followed on the challenges and limitations that peace operations face. One key point raised was the importance of force command in peace operations. Participants also agreed that it was important not to sensationalize or embarrass contingents for losing arms, but rather to use relevant data to understand the scope and effects of losses due to seizures and corruption.

**Emile LeBrun** responded that the Survey collaborates with organizations fielding peace support operations, such as the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and creates a space in which these sensitive issues can be discussed and addressed. For example, the Survey is currently working with the AU on developing a policy on recovered weapons in peace operations. Yet the Survey’s goal is not to stop with a declaration of policy; instead, it aims to also assist the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of efforts to address losses. In ECOWAS, the Survey is assisting TCCs to develop record-keeping procedures to help them achieve their commitments to Article 11 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms.

In concluding the session, participants discussed the shared responsibility of various actors to undertake research on what can be done to prevent losses. These actors include TCCs, the leadership of operations, supporting organizations, and, indeed, all entities involved in conducting or researching peace operations.
Session 4: Documenting/estimating losses and policy update

In this session Dr Mihaela Racovita described the reporting templates and methodology that the Survey uses to collect and analyse information on peace operations. The Peace Operations Data Set (PODS) draws on official reports, media accounts, and key informant interviews to compile information on incidents involving losses. It records the date and time of each loss, the actors involved, the circumstances, and the types of arms and ammunition lost. PODS goes one step further by producing an estimate of missing materiel for incidents where the information is not sufficiently specific.

She also emphasized the following points:

- Proper information collection is key for awareness raising and agenda setting at the strategic planning level. High-quality intelligence gathering also produces better threat assessments.
- Good data enhances transparency and understanding of losses and leads to actionable solutions. Understanding the circumstances in which losses occur is a first step in designing a strong prevention strategy.
- It is important to gauge the impact of losses, including on the security of missions, on the capacity of armed groups, and on troop morale. In order to do this, it is key to understand the magnitude, frequency, types, and circumstances of losses.
- Because attackers are likely to try again if they manage to seize weapons, preventing loss can actually prevent further attacks and loss of life.

Dr Racovita then prompted discussion by examining a number of challenges related to data collection, including the following:

- the unavailability of complete information on the circumstances of weaponry or ammunition losses;
- the difficulty of independently verifying accounts of losses;
- contradictory reports (media versus official reports) on the number of losses or the circumstances of attacks;
- the fact that sensitive issues are often omitted from or obscured in official reports, and that it is difficult to gather data after the fact; and
- the difficulty of gathering data on the loss of non-lethal but strategically important equipment, such as radios, vehicles, uniforms, and fuel.
Discussion

One participant stated that data on losses is deemed sensitive not only for control purposes, but also as part of maintaining effective operations. In contexts such as Somalia that are more used to war than peacekeeping, psychological operations are key, and disclosing the quantities and types of arms that peacekeeping forces lose is counterproductive.

Dr Racovita asked the group whether not disclosing such information was productive in light of the propaganda armed groups posted on arms seizures and successful attacks. Due to the publicity given to these reports and their resonance with populations both at home and abroad, would more transparency from missions be beneficial to counteract this propaganda?

One participant explained that some African TCCs are not in favour of releasing information on losses, because citizens at home believe that the money spent on war materiel should be spent on development. Furthermore, if foreign donors provide funds, partner countries might stop giving assistance to prevent their support being squandered by losses.

Others reiterated that ‘naming and shaming’ can lead to political challenges at home. Criticizing a country’s loss of life and materiel in a mission will decrease its willingness to provide troops. Indeed, sometimes the loss of materiel is impossible to avoid, especially in circumstances where operational information is leaked and peacekeepers are overwhelmed. Other participants counter-argued that reporting on losses is not naming and shaming by default. They stated that it is important to understand the driving mechanisms behind deployment and that record keeping is a key part of this.

The group made a number of recommendations:

- engage with TCCs directly to address shortages of information;
- map non-lethal materiel that can become targets of attacks;
- seek to capture the specific circumstances of each loss, including the location of the armoury in the base;
- systematically overhaul the management of recovered weapons; and
- streamline reporting mechanisms of COE to better estimate losses.

Eric G. Berman asked the group what effects are felt from the loss of arms and non-lethal equipment such as uniforms. The following salient points were made in the ensuing discussion:

- All kinds of stolen equipment, including uniforms, radios, or arms, can be used to support subsequent attacks. In asymmetric environments without clear front
lines, any such materiel that can influence security is used to do so. Uniforms and vehicles are used to infiltrate camps, for example.

- UNAMID peacekeepers had to stop using radios and transmitters in their cars because they were being targeted by militants who later profited—both strategically and financially—from seizing these items.

- There are no specific procedures to deal with such losses.

Participants ended the session by noting that Uganda had made public a number of court martials related to fuel stolen from AMISOM, leading to improved accountability, efficiency, and morale. They added that there were several existing gaps in policy, including on dealing with recovered weaponry. One presenter stated that while recovered arms were registered, recipients’ handling of them was sometimes problematic due to a lack of training. Some had sold recovered ammunition in informal markets.
Session 5: Gender and arms control in peace operations

Col. Joyce Sitienei discussed peacekeeping, armed violence, and related policy creation from a gender perspective. She then discussed the role of gender dynamics in arms management itself.

She highlighted the experiences of peacekeepers in terms of peace operations and armed violence:

- Men constitute the majority of weapons owners and perpetrators of armed violence.
- Women (and children) constitute by far the majority of victims of armed violence, including as civilian casualties of conflict and due to displacement, indirect conflict deaths and sexual violence.
- Women view arms as a threat, whereas men see them as a tool to gain power and security.
- Increased proliferation increases the threat of the intimidation of or use of violence against women.
- Women are still under-represented in small arms and light weapons control policy-making.
- Women in communities receive demobilized ex-combatants after DDR programmes.

Understanding the different contextual roles of women and men in society, as well as their behavioural patterns, helps relevant actors to create more effective policy and practice. Col. Sitienei highlighted a number of prescient examples:

- In the area of arms and ammunition control, women can play a vital role in information and intelligence gathering.
- UN peacekeepers have noted that when villagers move closer to UN camps, it may indicate an impending attack. The people who are relocating tend to be primarily women and children, while men move closer to conflict zones to defend their people.
- Women may be engaged as an effective tool for community outreach through their roles in traditional communication methods. In some cultures, poetry or music is used to prepare communities and rally members for war, for example. The same methods can also be used to convince villagers to disarm.

Col. Sitienei underscored that in some communities men are forbidden to communicate with local women. This means that male peacekeepers are unable to speak to half the population they are supposed to protect. In other cultures, men refuse to speak to women; in still others, men prefer to speak to women, and give female peacekeepers
far more information than they would to male counterparts. By employing a balance of men and women in intelligence-gathering operations, peacekeepers are better able to gather information, and are therefore better equipped to conduct accurate threat assessments. When peacekeepers understand their operating environments, they can adequately control and manage both arms issues and broader peace and security concerns.

She advised participants that gender advisers and gender focal points need to be more informed on small arms-related issues to contribute more effectively to the management of broader safety and security initiatives. She said that women and gender focal points should be included more broadly in preventive efforts and institutional structures, including by contributing to national small arms legislation reforms.

Discussion

Dr Mihaela Racovita posed a number of questions for the group to engage with on arms control and gender:

- How can female peacekeepers contribute to improving the control of arms and ammunition in peace operations? What barriers exist to participation?
- Do women hold specific roles or positions in arms management?
- How do the roles of men and women differ in the political economy of mission areas and in monitoring the political economy?
- How are men and women impacted differently by small arms proliferation?
- How can a gendered perspective help us address the challenges of arms proliferation? How can it help us address control programmes, information gathering, and community education?
- How can intelligence better use local women’s groups to prevent the diversion of illicit materiel?

A former gender focal point in UNAMID responded by discussing the need for the full integration of gendered structures into missions, noting that the integration of strategies, policies, and directives needs to be implemented top-down. At the mission level, she said that efforts to address women’s inclusion in peace operations are most effective when there are knowledgeable liaison officers at each team site who consider the concrete effects of policies across every level of the mission, from headquarters down to the local village level.

She discussed the difficulty of intelligence gathering and ‘hearts and minds’ operations running into ‘roadblocks’ imposed by society: either men refusing to speak to female peacekeepers or communities refusing to acknowledge gender dynamics
entirely. Such roadblocks can prevent peacekeepers from effectively gathering much-needed intelligence.

Other salient points made during the discussion included the following:

- **Gender and support for armed groups.** In Boko Haram-affected areas women are some of the most active participants supporting the group. There are several possible reasons for this, including the duration of Boko Haram’s presence in these areas and its relative strength on the ground, allowing it to offer monetary gain to supporters, and to target women for brainwashing.

- **Gender and control of arms.** Because militants tend to be organized in their home villages, as opposed to camps with armouries, women who maintain households often also maintain the arms stockpiles that militants use.

- **Gender and conflict.** Women can become involved in conflict both directly and indirectly. They can escalate conflict and arms proliferation in conflict zones *directly* by encouraging their husbands and sons to obtain arms for security and financial betterment. If peacekeepers could involve women in their work to counter proliferation, better results might be achieved. They can also be used *indirectly* as part of attacks against peace operations: in one incident in Kidal (Mali), women and children were used as a diversion to distract peacekeepers before militants attacked them (the peacekeepers).

- **Gender and operations.** Operations should include consideration of the safety of all parties involved, both male and female. One participant cited an example of women in Pakistan answering questions from investigators and then becoming targets of violence because of their cooperation. In small arms collection programmes similar considerations should be taken into account when gathering information so that it does not endanger participants.
Session 6: Recommendations for improving TCC/PCC training, oversight, and accountability

Dr Mihaela Racovita framed the session by reiterating key points raised in earlier workshop discussions, including the following:

- Peacekeeping is most effective when proper channels and procedures are in place for accountability and the prevention of arms and equipment losses.
- It is important to adhere to rules of engagement and be prepared for combat.
- The root causes of a conflict need to be adequately addressed in order to address the conflict itself.

She also reminded the group of the current momentum for change in UN policies, specifically with regard to addressing small arms control.

Ambassador Abiodun Bashua began the session by asking participants where accountability resided in their missions when incidents of loss occurred. Participants provided two examples:

- **AMISOM.** Anyone given a position of command in the mission is accountable to report losses, from the unit commander up. The only problematic issue is when information is considered to be ‘sensitive’. Commanders must then engage stakeholders on why information should be released and who benefits through that transparency.

- **MNJTF.** Incident reports are disseminated through the contingents to mission headquarters and then distributed to TCC heads of state. Headquarters also produces two situation reports daily, ensuring that each force commander is aware of the situation at all times. Nigeria has taken the lead on financing and operationalization that lends stability to the mission. This centralization of responsibility and control allows for the effective management of arms.

Participants also made the following recommendations:

- **Training.** Each nation trains its soldiers differently, and so each looks at operational activity through a different lens. In some missions this can lead to differing perceptions of the purpose and unity of the mission, which can lead to ineffective practice due to a lack of coordination. Capacity-building initiatives at all levels are recommended to build cohesion at the group, unit, and contingent levels.

- **Reporting of incidents.** When contingents in a mission are not coordinated, it can lead to a spirit of competition that may result in some contingents not reporting incidents of losses to avoid dishonouring their TCCs. Proper training can prevent this.
• **Centralized marking and storage.** Participants discussed the need for centralized marking and storage practices in missions. There was broad agreement that there are no general centralized structures to coordinate information on weapons and ammunition, but that individual TCCs do have such structures.

Eric G. Berman raised the issue that marking machines—and accompanying training on using them—are not widely distributed, creating inconsistency in their use in peace operations. One participant stated that, despite these limitations, ensuring that weapons are consistently marked is an achievable goal.
Subject matter expert background papers
Challenges in addressing the loss of weapons in peacekeeping operations: lessons from Darfur

Ambassador Abiodun Bashua (Nigeria)
(Former Joint Special Representative of the AU Chairperson and UN Secretary-General, AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur)

1. Considerable attention has been paid to the exploration of the loss of weapons by peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations. Particular attention has been paid to Africa, given the negative impact of weapons loss on the effectiveness, capacity, credibility, and relevance of peacekeeping forces in the many conflict situations on the continent. Efforts in this important area are currently being led by the Small Arms Survey, which defines such losses as ‘diversion’. The purpose of this paper is to enhance knowledge in this area by addressing some of the challenges I experienced first hand on this subject, based on my field experience in Darfur.

2. The loss of weapons in peace operations is classified by the Small Arms Survey as ‘diversion’, defining it as the ‘unauthorized change in possession or use of military materiel (arms, ammunition, parts, and explosives) from holdings or transfers, occurring domestically and internationally’. This definition appears to be very loaded and may be subject to different interpretations. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I will stick to the term ‘loss’ of weapons.-

3. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1769 (2007) established the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) after extensive consultations and negotiations between the AU Commission, the UN, and the Government of Sudan (GoS). The mission took over the functions and operations of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which operated in Darfur from late 2003 until the end of 2007, when it transitioned to UNAMID.

4. On 31 July 2007, after many months of negotiations among the AU, UN, and GoS, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1769 (2007), which authorized the deployment of a 26,000-strong AU and UN ‘hybrid’ peace operation (UNAMID) with the objective of resolving the Darfur conflict.

5. The resolution provided that ‘UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to’, among other things, ‘protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers’. It also provided for the protection of civilians, ‘without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan’.

6. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1769 provided that ‘UNAMID shall incorporate the AMIS personnel and that the hybrid operation should have a predominantly
African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries’. These provisions set the limits of troop generation for the mission and, in some ways, were partly responsible for the initial failure of UNAMID to be robust and effective in protecting its personnel and equipment, and averting the massive loss of weapons that occurred during this early period.

Loss of weapons by peacekeepers in Darfur

7. The loss of weapons by peacekeepers has been rampant in Darfur since the days of the AMIS operation (2004–07). During this operation significant numbers of weapons were frequently lost to rebel groups and government-allied militias, with the most significant losses occurring in Tine (2005), Abdel Shakur (2006), and Haskanita (2007). In addition to the significant loss of weapons, materiel, and ammunition, ten AU peacekeepers were also killed during the attacks.

8. While the attacks and loss of weapons were initially partially blamed on the lack of adequate capacity of AMIS forces, UNAMID troops did not fare better, despite their superior equipment and capacity. In fact, in the first few years of its operations between January 2008 and June 2014, attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers and the loss of weapons were equally frequent, to the extent that they became the butt of jokes and ridicule by national and international stakeholders, including the GoS. At some point the GoS requested the UN to withdraw some UNAMID contingents based on the unsubstantiated allegation that some of them were not robustly defending themselves because they were ‘deliberately handing over weapons to rebel groups’.

9. Between 2008 and 2014, in addition to suffering many fatalities, UNAMID peacekeepers were attacked or ambushed 38 times and lost 73 weapons, 8,507 rounds of ammunition, 74 other pieces of equipment, and 34 vehicles. Perhaps a more significant and damaging consequence of the frequent attacks and losses of weapons was the diminishing confidence among the civilian population in the peacekeepers’ ability to protect them, as the UNSC mandate required.

Rules of engagement for UNAMID forces

10. On the basis of the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1769 (2007), a comprehensive and detailed set of rules of engagement (RoE) were issued as guidance for UNAMID forces operating in Darfur. These RoE were jointly issued in September 2007, and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations still use them.

11. The RoE provide the authority for the use of force—up to and including deadly force—and also set out the policy, principles, responsibilities, and definitions
relating to the use of force. Furthermore, they delineate the parameters within which UNAMID military personnel deployed in Darfur may use force.

12. The RoE provide, among other things, for the use of force in self-defence and authorize military commanders ‘to take all necessary, reasonable and appropriate action for self-defense, including pre-emptive self-defense against an anticipated attack from potentially hostile forces’. In situations other than self-defence, they provide for the use of force in the protection of UNAMID personnel, equipment, installations, and assets. Furthermore, they authorize the use of force to assist in the protection of civilians under threat ‘without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of Sudan’. In short, the RoE require a very robust and proactive posture and response by peacekeepers, at least in the instances cited.

Causes of loss of weapons by peacekeepers

(a) Non-adherence to the rules of engagement

13. The reasons for the frequency of attacks targeting peacekeepers are many and varied. Perhaps the most significant and obvious one relates to the failure of peacekeepers to act in accordance with their RoE. As noted above, the RoE state that peacekeepers must act in all situations where there are attacks or imminent threats against civilians, as well as act in self-defence, if and whenever they are attacked, by using ‘all available means, including the use of force’. While they are clearly authorized to use force, however, at least in the circumstances cited (among others), most of them failed to do so during the period under review.

14. It is very difficult to understand or explain this major failure of contingents from some TCCs to comply with the RoE. Explanations offered have included arguments that some of the peacekeepers were not made sufficiently aware in their pre-deployment training that they were to respond with force when under attack; or that they lack the professional competence and capacity to act. Some failed to act because they are from countries whose governments have close cordial relations with the GoS, and perhaps felt that shooting at Sudanese citizens, under any circumstance, might strain such relations.

(b) Inadequate combat readiness

15. The fact that some contingents are not ‘combat ready’ also contributes to attacks on their convoys and patrols. Because of their previous inadequate responses to attacks, some contingents were targeted because they were considered to be weak and, therefore, became easy targets to prey on. It also appears that some contingents do not seem to understand the risks involved in providing security for patrols and and do not know what to do in case of attacks by hostile forces or groups.
16. It is not very clear, given the gradual generation of forces for AMIS, how much pre-deployment training for a hostile environment was provided for its personnel. Similarly, there was no evidence that the request from the UNSC for the forces incorporated from AMIS into UNAMID to be provided with post-deployment awareness training was ever fulfilled. Consequently, although operating under a new and strengthened mandate, there is no indication that the combat readiness and mindset for robust engagement among AMIS troops in UNAMID changed significantly in the first few years of the mission.

(c) Quality and calibre of weapons/equipment

17. It should be recalled that one of the major reasons cited for the inadequate effectiveness of AMIS was the obsolete and poor quality of the weapons that its troops and contingents had been allocated. Old and non-serviceable equipment such as armoured personnel carriers provided by some contingents impeded their capacity to respond robustly when ambushed or otherwise attacked.

18. While many of the initial new contingents deployed in UNAMID had better weapons and equipment than AMIS, the situation did not change dramatically for the better. This was because the calibre of most of the weapons that the various contingents brought to Darfur required authorization and permission from the GoS, which were frequently not forthcoming. It is even more disheartening to note that the calibre of weapons that most of the contingents are allowed, such as 7.62 mm machine guns, are inferior to those used by some militia groups, most of which have 12.7 mm machine guns (as is evident from various reports of attacks on and ambushes of peacekeepers).

(d) Operating environment

19. Darfur represents a particularly challenging operating environment. Despite being a Chapter VII-mandated mission, for example, UNAMID has to notify the Sudanese authorities in advance and request approval for its operations—particularly patrols—before they can be undertaken. Such sharing of pre-determined patrol routes and the direction of movements creates security challenges, because this information may end up in the hands of unauthorized third parties, including militia groups or rebels.

20. Most of the ambushes of peacekeepers that occurred were carried out not only by rebel groups looking for weapons to stock their armouries for attacks on GoS forces, but also by government-allied militias for banditry and criminality purposes. In almost all cases, while it was fairly easy to determine the perpetrators of attacks by particular rebel groups, investigations into those carried out by government-allied militias were limited due to the denial of access by government forces to locations where investigations were required.
21. Another major constraint was the use of tactical helicopters. Although UNAMID was authorized to have 18 tactical helicopters in its fleet, it took more than three years to get any country to agree to deploy them to the mission. The helicopters were intended to facilitate and enhance the mission’s ability to pursue attackers whenever necessary and for other urgent assignments, given the very poor state of road infrastructure in Darfur. However, when a neighbouring country finally deployed the Tactical Helicopter Unit, the GoS imposed a 48-hour notice of intention to use the unit’s helicopters on the mission. Subsequently, the unit—which stayed in Darfur for more than a year—was never really useful and the donor country ultimately withdrew it.

22. Even in cases when peacekeepers appropriately defended themselves and killed some of their attackers—and ID cards found on them were handed over to host authorities—the GoS restricted further investigations. The outcomes of government investigations, if any, were never disclosed or communicated to the mission. Medical evacuations of critically wounded and deceased peacekeepers also required approval by the host authorities and sometimes took days to be granted. Government-imposed constraints on the capacity of UNAMID to effectively implement its mandate, including by not providing the necessary approvals for patrols and weapons, arguably constitute the single most important reason for the spate of attacks and losses of weapons.

Disciplinary actions taken against erring peacekeepers

23. Under UN peacekeeping rules and regulations, the head of mission establishes a board of inquiry (BoI) composed of uniformed officers and civilian staff to investigate and determine responsibility after any and every attack on peacekeepers. The BoI reports back and the head of mission subsequently sends recommendations to UN headquarters (HQ) for further necessary action, because under extant rules, erring peacekeepers can only be sanctioned or punished by their home countries. Such reports are then forwarded to the relevant TCC concerned for follow-up and disciplinary action.

24. Actions against erring peacekeepers have usually ranged from recommendations for repatriation to appeals to authorizing bodies (such as the UNSC or AU Peace and Security Council) to put pressure on the GoS to facilitate the effective implementation of the mission’s mandate through the lifting of restrictions, the removal of denials of access, and the reduction of long delays in Sudanese customs procedures to clear contingents’ equipment. Experience showed that such appeals fell on deaf ears.

25. Unfortunately, in the early years of UNAMID most of the BoIs’ recommendations were never implemented, particularly those relating to the repatriation of erring
peacekeepers. There are two main reasons for this state of affairs: the challenge of force generation and the politics in the countries of erring contingents. The capacity of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to generate troops for peacekeeping operations remains limited, even today.

26. It was not possible to take effective disciplinary actions at the time under review because most of the erring contingents came from either regionally powerful countries or major troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. There was at least one instance when the head of state of an erring contingent threatened to withdraw all his country’s troops from UN peacekeeping operations globally if the erring troops were sent home. A similar situation was repeated in South Sudan in 2016, when a major troop contributor withdrew all its troops because one of its nationals who held a command position in the mission was found to be negligent in providing sufficient command and control directives to protect civilians, including UN staff, from rape and other attacks by government forces. Failure to discipline erring contingents for such reasons affected the general morale of the troops on the ground, and partly accounted for the frequency of attacks and massive losses of weapons by peacekeepers during the period.

27. The situation in UNAMID has, however, changed since late 2014. This is because the then-acting head of mission and force commander mutually agreed that strong recommendations would be made to UN HQ for the immediate repatriation of troops who failed to act robustly in accordance with the RoE either in self-defence or to protect civilians seeking protection from attacks by militias or other hostile forces.

28. Between November 2014 and October 2015 at least five erring contingents were repatriated and replaced by troops from the same countries. This action had an immediate positive impact, because contingents whose members had earlier failed to defend themselves became more robust and not only defended themselves, but also inflicted fatalities on their attackers. Morale was also raised.

**Current state of attacks on peacekeepers in Darfur**

29. Since December 2015 there has been a considerable decline in the frequency and nature of attacks on peacekeepers in Darfur. Indeed, while there were a few minor attacks in 2016—which were successfully repulsed—there was no attack at all in 2017. The reasons for this change of fortune are many and varied.

30. A decision taken in late 2014, and continued by the mission leadership, to repatriate peacekeepers who failed to adequately defend themselves was a critical factor. Non-performing contingents were repatriated, including those from an important regional power. Robust and aggressive self-defence by peacekeepers
as a consequence of the new policy, such as was witnessed in attacks in Kass in the first half of 2015, was a game changer and signalled to the attackers that their days of random attacks and seizures of weapons were over.

31. At the peak of the attacks on peacekeepers, some of the militias were restless and resentful of the GoS for not sustaining the (political, financial, and logistical) support that was initially provided or promised to them in view of the role they played in fighting proxy wars for the government. Realizing that the Sudanese army was finding it difficult to contain military incursions by the armed movements operating under the auspices of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the GoS took advantage of the situation to address both challenges. It created the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was mostly made up of so-called Arab militias. Those comprising Northern and Southern Rizeigat and Border Guards (who had been the main perpetrators of the attacks on peacekeepers) were recruited and absorbed into the RSF to reinforce the GoS’s military efforts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and, later, Darfur. This policy mopped up most of the potential attackers targeting peacekeepers, thus reducing the incidence of attacks against UNAMID.

32. With the significant degrading of military activities by the armed movements and the militias’ active involvement in counter-insurgency through the RSF, the possibility of major attacks against peacekeepers was considerably reduced, with the exception of criminal attacks (such as abductions, kidnappings, and carjackings), which are also on the decline.

Suggestions for addressing the challenge of attacks on peacekeepers and related losses of weapons

33. As noted above, based on extant UN rules, all incidents are investigated through the establishment of a BoI made up of military and civilian staff for each and every attack or ambush. Both the mission and DPKO HQ take these reports and recommendations seriously. On the basis of these reports and first-hand experience in the Darfur conflict, the following are some suggestions for preventing the loss of weapons by and mitigating attacks on peacekeepers, not just in Darfur, but in all peacekeeping missions.

34. Better orientation of peacekeepers in terms of combat readiness, particularly patrolling and convoy security, both during pre-deployment in their home countries and continuously in-mission. Such training must be mission specific, because what works in Sudan might not be appropriate elsewhere. It is also essential that deployment and orientation training should be carried out continuously in-mission, as appropriate.
35. Immediate repatriation of erring contingents after investigation to deter others and enhance robust patrolling and response to attacks. Due to the negative impact of the failure to punish erring contingents, many others did not consider it imperative to fully comply with the RoE, either to protect civilians under imminent threat or in self-defence, until the UNAMID leadership began in late 2014 to consistently repatriate contingents that failed to act robustly. The impact of this has been positive: there has been a noticeable drop in the frequency and nature of attacks on peacekeepers. Peacekeepers are now fully robust and ready to act as required of them whenever they are attacked. It is a policy that should be routinely instituted, despite the occasional challenge of political consideration because of the country of origin of particular erring contingents.

36. Enhanced cooperation between DPKO and TCCs/police-contributing countries (PCCs) on the RoE and quality of contingent-owned equipment (COE) to ensure their conformity with existing UN standards. This remains a major challenge, particularly the quality of the COE for which the UN reimburses TCCs and PCCs. The UN should not compromise on this important element of peacekeeping operations, despite the difficulties of force generation.

37. Contingents’ greater engagement with host communities through ‘hearts and minds’ projects to enhance early warning. This practice, which some contingents have adopted, has been found to be useful, particularly in obtaining early warning information on impending or likely attacks and ambushes. Contingents should be encouraged to utilize this useful practice and be assisted to do so (for example, through quick-impact projects for such purposes).

38. While naming and shaming might not be a feasible option at the current time (given the difficulties of force generation), innovative options should be considered to recognize performing contingents in order to encourage others. Perhaps the UN should review its force-generation policy in favour of quality rather than quantity.

39. A major challenge has also been the issue of command and control, whereby contingent commanders follow instructions from their countries’ capitals rather than those given by the mission’s force commander. TCCs need to be made aware of the implications of this for the performance, safety, and effectiveness, not only of their own troops, but also of the entire mission.

40. Many missions continue to receive bad publicity due to attacks on their troops and the resulting loss of weapons. Very little is known or heard when missions repel such attacks robustly in self-defence or when protecting civilians under imminent danger, however. It is therefore necessary for missions to have a proactive public information strategy to enable them to ‘tell their own stories’. UNAMID has consistently received bad press, for example, both locally and inter-
nation-wide, to the extent that at one point it was perceived as the worst-managed peacekeeping operation globally, perhaps because of its hybrid nature. This was at a time when reports of worse atrocities and failures by other missions were swept under the carpet and deliberately under-reported.

41. For instance, while UNAMID only established area security close to its team sites and locations, and protection of civilians sites was never established in Darfur for civilians fleeing from imminent threat of attack, it is to the mission's (and the GoS's) credit that there was never an attack on civilians under its direct watch, as happened in other missions. Yet the local and international media never gave this achievement adequate publicity. Current and new missions need to take a cue from this and aggressively tell their own stories, both within and outside their areas of operation, in order to be objectively judged and assessed.

42. To conclude, attacks on peacekeepers and substantial losses of weapons and equipment are real and pervasive occurrences across peacekeeping operations. They should be taken very seriously: efforts should continue to develop, and policies that urgently and adequately address related challenges should be implemented. The time to start is now.
Challenges in addressing the loss of weapons in peacekeeping operations: lessons from Somalia

Maj. Gen. Fred Mugisha (Uganda)
(AMISOM Force Commander, August 2011–May 2012)

Considerable effort has been invested in exploring the loss of weapons by peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa, given the negative impact on these operations’ effectiveness and capacity in the many conflict situations on the continent. The Small Arms Survey is currently leading the focus on this important area. The Survey defines such losses as any diversion of weapons from nation states’ control.

The purpose of this paper is to share knowledge in this area by addressing some of the challenges based on first-hand field experience gained in Somalia. It is important to mention from the outset that procedures on arms and ammunition handling (that is, arms control) form part and parcel of the basic training of soldiers in any military worth talking about.

Nevertheless, I am also aware that the development or evolution of some of the militaries that take part in peacekeeping operations falls short of these standards due to a lack of time and resources in a number of TCCs. Such scenarios make it possible for peacekeepers’ weapons to fall into the wrong hands during operations.


In order to discuss this topic, the nature of contemporary armed conflicts in Africa and, indeed, peace support operations must be analysed using different lenses to arrive at the correct recommendations, with a view to finding lasting solutions. Armament, resource allocation, and the building of local security forces, among other issues, must all be taken into consideration in order to determine the pre-mission training needs of troops.

In this paper I intend to use my experience together with the voices of others who have served before me and those who serve after me in similar circumstances. I do so in the hope that an idea might be borrowed from the paper that will enable and improve similar future missions, especially those on the African continent. I take cognizance of the fact that a number of people have already shared their views on this topic and will continue to do so. However, I assert that carrying out successful peace operations on the African continent—and, indeed, preventing one’s own weaponry from falling into the wrong hands—should be part of a set of related systems that currently the UN’s modus operandi does not adequately provide for.
In this presentation I borrow from David Richards’ and Greg Mills’ book entitled *Victory among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States*, in which they point out three core things that mission strategies must address:

- intelligence;
- resources; and
- people.

These three aspects form what is known as the ‘iron triangle’.

Although the subject matter of this paper is ‘challenges in addressing the loss of weapons in peacekeeping operations’, the aim of discussing my experience in Somalia is also to demonstrate how the largest source of weapons losses, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, can be local government forces. Yet some of the mandates that the UN and continental organizations such as the AU provide are categorical on the need to work alongside these security forces.

**Background: Somalia’s independence and the evolution of conflict**

The reason for mentioning this is to allow the reader to see the roots of the current chaos that Somalia finds itself in. This has led to weaponry landing in the hands of Somali criminals and other inhabitants of the Eastern Africa region.

The Federal Republic of Somalia became a nation state at independence in 1960. This was after the unification of the northern British territory of Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The second president of the Independent Federal Republic of Somalia, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, was assassinated in 1969 and a military coup followed thereafter, elevating Major General Mohamed Siad Barre to the presidency.

The haphazard killings of civilians, torture, and the burning of villages marred Siad Barre’s 22-year rule (1969–91). It has been argued that the main causes underpinning the implosion of Siad Barre’s government were twofold: Somalia’s 1977 invasion of Ethiopia and the ensuing civil wars, especially the one in Somaliland; and his alliances with and oscillation between the Eastern and Western blocs during the cold war.

Various scholars have rightly argued that had it not been for these two factors, Siad Barre’s exit and the chaos that subsequently ensued would not have occurred as early as 1991. It is also worth keeping in mind that the calamity that ensued not only engulfed Somalia, but the entire region.

It is estimated that Somalia’s chronic instability remains the single biggest contributing factor underpinning the unauthorized loss of arms and ammunition from
AMISOM. The neighbouring countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda have also all had their share of instability due to unrest and civil wars.

This brief recent history of modern Somalia was intended to show when exactly the country started to slide into conflict and how this has negatively impacted security in the Horn and East Africa regions. It further highlights that bad governance is an important factor in causing armed conflicts. The following section will provide a detailed account of how the Somali conflict evolved, resulting in illegal arms and ammunition falling into the wrong hands.

**The African Union Mission in Somalia**

As has been widely documented, the cold war period made it possible for African regimes, such as that of Siad Barre, to acquire as much weaponry as they wanted. Secrecy complicated matters during this period, since there was no international system to track such weaponry. Lack of international coordination during this period enabled rogue regimes in Somalia and other sub-Saharan African states unlimited access to weaponry that in turn entrenched civil wars and caused millions of deaths, starvation, population displacement, large-scale rape of women, and other forms of human suffering.

AMISOM was deployed to Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, in March 2007, following several attempts by the international community to end the suffering of Somalis since the implosion of the state in 1991. UNOSOM I (April–December 1992), UNOSOM II (March 1993–March 1995), and Operation Restore Hope (December 1992–March 1993) all preceded the mission.

AMISOM is the most costly, deadly, and longest-running operation in Somalia. It began primarily as an AU initiative, but received ex-post-facto endorsement from the UN Security Council in UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007). It is also important to note that six out of 54 AU member states have so far contributed troops to the mission. These are: Uganda (2007), Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013), and Ethiopia (2014). There are many reasons why only six states have chosen to join AMISOM. However, the most common justification was that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the majority of these TCCs, as well as the commitment to African solidarity.

UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) mandated AMISOM forces to monitor progress in the dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) institutions and the Somalia Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), while ensuring the safe passage of those involved. They were also mandated to maintain security in Baidoa, protect the TFG’s members and infrastructure, and train the TFG’s security forces, thereby helping to re-establish the national security forces of Somalia.
The force was not explicitly mandated to engage in offensive actions against the Union of Islamic Courts. Furthermore, although it was part of AMISOM’s mandate to train and re-establish the Somali security forces, no robust arrangements to achieve this were put in place. It is therefore no surprise that 11 years down the road AMISOM has not been able to control weaponry in the hands of the Somali military, let alone put a credible Somali force in place for when it finally withdraws.

The situation was further complicated when Resolution 1725 was overtaken by events in Somalia. Most importantly, the resolution did not envisage the Ethiopian-led occupation of Mogadishu and its consequences. When the AU Peace and Security Council authorized AMISOM in January 2007 it was in a completely different political context. The process of dialogue was effectively stopped by Ethiopia’s campaign to forcibly insert the TFG into Mogadishu. Many Somalis also saw Ethiopian soldiers as an occupying force.

Additional geopolitical factors, including mixed perceptions of AMISOM among large sections of the Somali population, religious extremism within the SCIC, rivalry among neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa, and links between the SCIC leadership and al-Qaeda, quickly produced a two-sided conflict in Somalia that has lasted from 2006 to the present time. On one side there was an AMISOM force not ready for war—in terms of both its mandate and armament—while on the other there were an estimated 55,000 armed al-Shabaab fighters operating on their own turf, fuelled by nationalist and religious sentiments. The al-Shabaab propaganda machinery has played a significant role against AMISOM troops from then to the present time.

In summary, although AMISOM was supposed to be a peacekeeping mission in both nature and mandate, the situation on the ground quickly transformed it into a counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency/urban warfare force. It is my considered view that for this kind of situation there was a glaring disharmony not only in the mandate and combat order of the military, but also in the general preparations for this mission from the very start. The fundamental ingredients necessary for a successful counter-insurgency operation (such as a strategy, intelligence, resources, and people) were not included in the mission’s planning stage.

**Somali military**

As discussed above, part of AMISOM’s mandate was to support the Somali military. However, there were a number of associated challenges: members of the Somali military did not stay put in their barracks, and the force did not have any clear source of logistical supplies, or facilities for the safe storage of firearms and ammunition. Most of its rank and file had not received any formal military training, or training on the codified procedures of an armed force. Planning an operation with such a group also proved difficult due to information leakages to al-Shabaab insurgents.
Despite the dangerous character of the Somali military, AMISOM continued not only to supply it with arms and ammunition, but also to carry out joint combat missions. Inevitably, this ended up creating a vicious cycle whereby arms and ammunitions found their way into the hands of al-Shabaab.

Was there anything AMISOM troops could have done to change the situation? The answer would have been found in a massive reorganization of the Somali military. The international community did not have a unified strategy on this issue, however, and AMISOM had no capacity to do it alone. As expected, continuing to operate alongside such a force (the Somali military) led not only to the increased vulnerability of AMISOM troops to insurgents’ attacks, but also to the inadvertent supply of weaponry to the enemy.

**AMISOM: experiences of the Burundian and Ugandan contingents**

Due to the sensitivity surrounding the issue of troops sent from TCCs to AMISOM, I will discuss this matter in general terms based on codified military standards worldwide. It is hoped that this will enable the reader to fully appreciate the gaps created by the lack of standards, which made a difficult mission even more difficult. In an attempt to paint the correct picture, I will briefly discuss the Burundian and Ugandan contingents in AMISOM separately. Note that they formed the AMISOM mission for the first five years of its life.

**Burundian military**

The Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF) was itself a product of military integration carried out as part of the peace process after Burundi’s civil war (1993–2006). It is therefore likely that Burundi’s deployment to Somalia was to a large extent part of a desire to consolidate, strengthen, and create cohesion and professionalism within the newly integrated national army. One would not have expected particularly high standards with regard to military professionalism and the accumulation of military equipment in this force. Indeed, the high-intensity situation in Somalia led to the Dayniile debacle of 2011.

On 20 October 2011 three battalions of AMISOM BNDF troops supported by a detachment of Ugandan T-55 battle tanks and two brigades of the Somali National Army (SNA) were tasked with seizing and occupying an area north of Mogadishu’s suburbs and south of Dayniile. This was an important military objective because several hundred al-Shabaab insurgents held the area. Furthermore, from Dayniile town there was a crucial route via a cigarette factory into central Mogadishu that was used as a conduit for al-Shabaab to smuggle components for improvised explosive devices into the city.
Hours after the operation started the Burundian commander split his forces to approach the target area in two columns. As they were entering a small built-up area of Digmale, soldiers from one of the battalions in the western column saw what they believed were friendly Somali troops approaching from their left flank. The approaching troops were moving rapidly towards them, but since they seemed to be wearing SNA uniforms, the BND troops held their fire. In reality, the advancing column consisted of al-Shabaab troops launching a counter-attack from the Afgoye corridor. These al-Shabaab insurgents were able to open fire on the AMISOM troops at close range with heavy machine guns, not only causing the deaths of dozens of troops, but also capturing a large number of firearms and large quantities of ammunition. This was the single biggest loss of AMISOM personnel and equipment.

Could the attack have been avoided? I think not under the circumstances in which AMISOM troops operated, including:

- the nature of the mission (that is, trying to keep peace where there was none to keep);
- AMISOM’s diminished capacity in terms of combat order;
- the mix of both counter-insurgency and urban operations; and
- the poorly equipped AMISOM troops.

It is my strong belief that the Dayniile operation would have yielded different results if, for example, the AMISOM force had been in possession of unmanned aerial vehicles, combat helicopters, or some kind of air surveillance capacity to view the battlefield and be able to detect such a counter-attack by al-Shabaab insurgents.

The debacle led to the loss of military equipment (both small arms and ammunition) to al-Shabaab that facilitated its operations for months—if not years—which in turn perpetuated human suffering in the country.

**Ugandan military**

Uganda’s official explanation for the decision to lead AMISOM was based on pan-African solidarity and the desire to jointly fight terrorism in the region. This deployment operated under the theme of ‘African solutions to African problems’.

Uganda’s military, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), had relatively better standards and equipment, standard operating procedures, and battle-experienced troops by the time it deployed to Somalia. Compared to Burundi, which had experienced a long period of civil war, the Ugandan military had over 20 years of operational experience as one force, as well as intervals of peace that were used for training, consolidation, and to build up cohesion. With this background, therefore, it is
only fair to conclude that the Ugandan military was at an advantage compared to the Burundian forces in the joint AMISOM venture.

Despite this, many other aspects of the operational environment affected the two militaries equally. These included the absence of:

- a reasonably capable and disciplined local military force to work with;
- a supportive local population;
- the availability of force enablers or quick-impact projects to alleviate the suffering of Somalis and in turn work as an incentive for the population to support peace; and
- a cohesive effort by international actors to rebuild the Somali military.

These, among other factors, were responsible for the losses that the UPDF suffered, such as in September 2011, when al-Shabaab insurgents disguised in Somali military uniforms accessed a UPDF defence post near Mogadishu stadium, as well as the Janaale incident of September 2015, when a UPDF detachment was attacked, resulting in significant losses, both human and materiel.

There were a number of other challenges during my tenure of command. These included the issue of the protection of civilians during asymmetric warfare in built-up areas and the—most controversial—issue of causing inadvertent harm to civilians during combat operations inside Mogadishu city. Other issues included al-Shabaab propaganda against AMISOM, international organizations’ exaggerations of civilian casualties as a result of peacekeepers’ use of firepower during combat operations, and allegations of sexual exploitation by AMISOM troops. The issue of civilian casualties (collateral damage) was a thorn in AMISOM’s side because it negatively influenced local perceptions of AMISOM operations, thereby undermining its operational effectiveness. Bureaucratic tendencies in the UN Support Office for AMISOM also presented a stumbling block during this period.

**AMISOM arms and ammunition inventory control policies**

During my tenure of duty as a force commander I observed that although AMISOM was under the continental AU flag, to all intents and purposes it operated and behaved as a ‘coalition of the willing’. I saw that this in turn led to difficulties related to command and control in a number of areas, including achieving proper accountability for arms and ammunition. Force commanders’ requests for accountability were not always adhered to, for example. It was also easier for contingent commanders to send arms and ammunition stock records to their respective capitals than to AMISOM
force headquarters. I think this situation must have become worse when more TCCs sent troops to the mission area.

The short life span of the AU means that relevant procedures have not been fully developed, and where they have been, there is a wide gap between theory and practice. This places the responsibility for accountability on individual TCCs. The lack of pre-mission standardized training on accountability for arms and ammunition made an already bad situation worse, because each TCC relied on procedures applied in its home country. The effect of this was a heightened risk of loss for TCCs, particularly those without robust arms and ammunition control policies at home.

The discussion above is intended to highlight the operational environment in which AMISOM military force commanders worked. I will now proceed to briefly discuss the arms and ammunition control policy of the Ugandan military, to which I belong. Again, for the reasons discussed above, one inevitably fell back on these procedures.

The Ugandan military has a robust inventory control policy for weapons and ammunition that covers:

- the detection and deterrence of theft from storage facilities;
- the tracking of weapons to individual soldiers;
- the prevention of excessive accumulation of arms supplies; and
- the avoidance of excess items such as expired ammunition.

Continuous implementation of the policy focuses on a range of practical steps, including the maintenance of accurate and up-to-date registers or records of arms and ammunition; regular inspections of weapons; regular maintenance of ammunition and arms depots; and periodic audits of records, policies, and practices. Such measures make it difficult for arms and ammunition to leave stores without detection.

**Conclusion**

Whereas AMISOM has made great progress in its war against terror, at the same time it faces challenges that originate from the absence of a strategy on certain issues. This includes the absence of agreement on a unified way forward in relation to reconstructing the Somali security forces. As a result, 11 years after AMISOM first deployed, the international community finds itself unable to develop a realistic withdrawal plan for AMISOM troops, because this would enable al-Shabaab to recapture the country. At the same time, AMISOM’s continued presence in Somalia has its own risks: these include troops over-staying their welcome and generating hostility from Somalis.

Alongside the different levels of training among soldiers from TCCs, pre-mission training about weaponry controls was never given the priority it deserved. In line with this, an inventory of all weapons being used by troops involved in peacekeeping
operations should be forwarded and kept at continental headquarters; this would help future tracking of peacekeepers’ weaponry both during and after missions.

Ironically, although the international community expected AMISOM’s military component to support the Somali military in creating security stability, at the same time the UN imposed an arms embargo on the country. Coupled with the absence of a continentally developed policy on how to process captured or recovered weapons and ammunition, this resulted in individual AMISOM unit commanders using recovered weapons to arm the Somali military in pursuance of military operations against al-Shabaab.

Winning the hearts and minds of the local population by delivering quick-impact projects in liberated areas not only saves the lives of the starving population, but also works as an incentive for the population to pursue peace, as opposed to war. The international community has not fully understood that successful peace support operations, especially in Africa, will require commensurate reforms at UN headquarters with regard to mission mandates and armament, as well as policies to win the hearts and minds of local populations. If this is not addressed, the world body will continue to see different outcomes from those that deployments seek to achieve.

The UN also needs to address the structural causes of conflict(s) on the African continent, especially issues related to (the absence of) democratic governance, since it is bad governance that leads to these conflicts. In situations where conflicts have already erupted, the international community should try to prevent them from becoming protracted—like the ongoing conflicts in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—in order to save both human lives and resources.

Although the prolonged conflict put the security of both the Horn of Africa and East Africa regions at risk, there was never an attuned strategy on how to solve long-term political challenges, such as the issue of whether to establish a strong federalist system or to empower the various Somali regions and then use them as building blocks for a future strong federal Somalia. It is my considered opinion that this unresolved issue feeds into al-Shabaab’s propaganda.

To conclude, my experience as AMISOM force commander taught me four key lessons that I would like to share:

1. The largest number of AMISOM weapons found their way into the wrong hands not as a result of the deliberate actions of peacekeepers (for example, for financial gain), but rather from the national forces that the peacekeepers were tasked to support and work alongside.

2. Peace operations require better planning, especially in matters related to standardized training on dealing with captured and recovered arms and ammunition.
3. Policy-makers at many levels (within the AU and UN) grossly misunderstand peacekeeping missions in Somalia and, indeed, on the African continent more generally, which tends to make conflicts more protracted and difficult to resolve.

4. The proliferation of weapons and ammunition from peace operations in a number of African countries is a symptom of much larger problems whose cure lies in proactively seeking to address the causes of conflicts and preventing their further escalation when they have already erupted.
Gender and arms and ammunition management and control in mission areas

Col. Joyce Sitienei (Kenya)

The connection between gender and arms and ammunition management and control is seldom made or appreciated, although studies have shown that men, women, boys, and girls are differently affected by and involved with small arms. In short, the use, misuse, and effects of small arms are heavily gendered and have different impacts on women and men.

There is no doubt that men make up an overwhelming majority of firearm owners, since they dominate:

- professions with easy access to firearms (such as the police, military, and private security companies); and
- firearm-related activities, such as hunting.

Men also constitute a majority of both perpetrators and victims of firearm-related incidents (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; Pavesi and Widmer, 2016).

Women, in contrast, are more often victims than perpetrators and are more likely to see the presence of a firearm as a threat to their own and their families’ security. The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms increases the threat of intimidation and abuse of women and increases the lethality of violence against them. During armed conflict women may also choose or be forced to perform certain roles for combatants or to act as so-called ‘wives’ (often forced), porters, cooks, spies, or messengers. In this context women are often also subjected to sexual violence. Of course, sexual and gender-based violence is also often committed against men and boys, but this issue has been severely under-reported and under-researched to date.

Women can also play roles that are conducive to small arms proliferation. They may play a role in weapons smuggling, they may arm themselves, and they may serve as combatants in civil conflict. In some situations women are instrumental in encouraging men in their communities to arm themselves; they may also play a key role in encouraging small arms violence, including by supporting and promoting cycles of revenge.

Despite the fact that the poor management of arms and ammunition affects and impacts women, they remain under-represented in small arms control policy-making and interventions. This hinders the articulation of diverse perspectives and affects policy outcomes. Therefore, a gender perspective in arms and ammunition management is crucial. In recognition of this, UNSC Resolution 65/69 (2010) acknowledged
the contributions of women to disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, and encouraged women’s participation in all related decision-making processes.

Although the engagement of women as agents of change in disarmament and arms control processes has been advanced by involving women directly affected by armed violence, as well as initiating women-led policy initiatives, integrating the gender perspective into small arms management needs to become more consistent. Furthermore, peacekeeping missions need to collect and use sex-disaggregated data to recognize and respond to the gender-specific risks that both men and women face with respect to small arms.

UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian responses, and post-conflict reconstruction. It stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security. It urges actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all UN peacekeeping and security efforts. It further calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict.

This resolution is also relevant to the process of engendering small arms management in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers have a responsibility to assist in building the capacity of host governments to implement commitments to address the illicit trafficking of small arms through weapons collection and DDR programmes, and by enhancing stockpile-management practices.

A study carried out in 2010 in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) estimated that civilians held at least 300,00 firearms (both licit and illicit) in the areas of Kivu, Ituri, Maniema, and Tanganyika (GRIP/BICC, 2010), all of which have experienced an unprecedented scale of human rights violations and rapes of civilians. It is worth noting that since its inception the UN mission in the DRC has worked with the government to enhance stockpile security, accountability, and the management of arms and ammunition, as well as to implement a national weapons-marking programme. This is significant, because it goes hand in hand with addressing sexual violence and violations committed by government forces and armed groups, the use of children in armed conflict, and the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources.
Women and peace support operations

Women can contribute to improving the control of arms and ammunition in peace operations in several different ways:

- **Interactions with host populations.** The deployment of female peacekeepers to help develop a relationship with host populations, including to make contact with families—through routine patrols, clearing operations, and security checks—and to engage key leaders can provide an entry point into communities. Female peacekeepers may have easier access to women in local communities than their male counterparts, for example, especially in cultures where the two sexes are not allowed to mix.

- **Awareness raising.** Through their interactions with local women, female peacekeepers can raise awareness on issues related to small arms, safety, and peace processes. They are also well placed to educate local women on the role they can play in small arms management and control measures. Given that local women have a direct stake in interventions that reduce the prevalence of firearms, they can be encouraged to play this important role in their communities.

- **Intelligence gathering.** Trust and credibility are priceless in information-gathering activities. When women are included in tactical security and policing operations there is a greater opportunity to mitigate violence and build trust with affected populations. Women’s groups can be a great source of information for the intelligence- and information-gathering branches of peacekeeping operations, including in terms of preventing the diversion of materiel and attacks on peacekeepers and understanding how to safely engage in information collection. Generally speaking, intelligence gathering is more successful where there is consistent access to populations; female teams have been successful in gaining such contact in camps for internally displaced persons in Darfur and South Sudan. They interact daily with women and children and quickly create bonds that allow the close observation of unfolding events.

- **Reintegration of ex-combatants.** Female peacekeepers play a crucial role in providing support to disarmament programmes, including the disarmament of female ex-combatants as part of DDR programmes. Similarly, women in host populations—whom female peacekeepers can assist—play essential roles in determining the success or failure of reintegration programmes, because they are more often than not the recipients of (male and female) returnees and can be helped to facilitate training, education (including on small arms), and family support for them.

If deployed strategically, female peacekeepers can, therefore, be an extremely useful resource in peace operations generally, and more specifically in programmes related to small arms and ammunition management.
References


Concluding remarks
Col. Joyce Sitienei delivered the following remarks on behalf of Brig. Patrick Muta Nderitu and the IPSTC:

Distinguished guests, participants, ladies, and gentlemen, it is my sincere pleasure to join you for the closing of the Second MPOME Regional Workshop. Firstly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Governments of Canada and Germany, together with the Small Arms Survey, for supporting and organizing this important MPOME workshop in the Eastern Africa region.

This workshop has provided us with an important platform to share information and exchange ideas, experiences, and lessons learned in our line of duty concerning the prevention of weapons/arms losses and the control and management of recovered weapons, both in the field and at the institutional level.

From the presentations that the various speakers made we can confirm that peacekeepers’ loss of small arms while executing their duties and the presence of illegal arms in conflict zones are a reality. They constitute a fact that the UN, AU, TCCs/PCCs, and generally all other stakeholders should not shy away from. The circumstances that lead to the loss of weapons by troops of TCCs also varied, as discussed in the workshop.

For the past two days participants have generated a wealth of information and experiences concerning the subject at hand. The Small Arms Survey team gave us an overview of the challenge posed by the loss of arms and the presence of illegal small arms in the context of peace operations. Some significant data on estimates of arms lost in different peace support missions and by contingents from different TCCs/PCCs was given. Equally, data collection procedures and some of the challenges faced by missions as they carry out their work were discussed.

We also appreciated the first-hand information and field experiences from various speakers who invited us to reflect on the causes of the loss of COE and the lessons learned that might help in arms control and management.

The insightful presentations on the loss of arms from AMISOM, the proliferation of illegal small arms, and the collection and management of arms retrieved from illegal forces—both in the field and by national governments—were also also valued. The inclusion of a gender lens on the prevention of materiel losses and the management of arms is further lauded.

From the workshop, participants have appreciated the challenges confronting peacekeepers and practitioners in the field in terms of the loss and management of illegal weapons. They have made recommendations, among them the importance of training and accountability and having policies and guidelines in place that are realistic in different operational environments.
At the IPSTC our main duty is training and capacity building in the Eastern African region in the area of peace and security, so we intend to incorporate the lessons learned from this workshop in our pre-deployment training for police and troops earmarked for peacekeeping duties in the region and beyond.

I also wish to state that through this workshop we have been able to establish a relationship and network that are important for our future concerted efforts in the control and management of small arms in the region through research and training, as we seek to make peace operations in the region more effective.

Once again, I wish to thank the Governments of Canada and Germany for providing critical support that made this workshop possible, and the Small Arms Survey team led by Mr Berman for organizing the workshop and ensuring that it took place and has been successful, and also for making the IPSTC your venue of choice for the Second MPOME Regional Workshop.

It has indeed been a great honour. Again I thank all the guest speakers and workshop participants who made the workshop a success by agreeing to come here.

I wish all of you a safe journey back home.

Thank you all very much.

Small Arms Survey Director Eric G. Berman echoed the sentiments in Brig. Nderitu’s thoughtful and expansive remarks. He underscored the Survey’s commitment to supporting the IPSTC in promoting peace and security in the region through the provision of enhanced training, as well as research and analysis for policy-makers and practitioners participating in the centre’s courses. Mr Berman looked forward to the Survey and its partners building on the progress and commitments made during the workshop.
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List of participants (in alphabetical order)

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Official workshop photo
Second MPOME Regional Workshop

Seated row (from left to right):
Col. Sarah M. Mpabwa (Uganda Embassy), Maj. Gen. Fred Mungisha (Uganda), Brig. P. M. Nderitu (Dir. IPSTC), Dep. Amb. Michael Derus (Embassy of Germany), Mr Yannick Hingorani (High Commission of Canada), Amb Abiodun Bashua (Consultant to AU/UN), Dr Abdillahi o Bouh (Dir EASF), Mr Eric Berman (Small Arms Survey), Brig. Bouba Dobekreo (Cameroon)

1st row standing:
Col. E. Oguga (HoR IPSTC), Nikhil Acharya (BICC/RECSA), Col. J. Sitienei (Plans & Progs IPSTC), Mama Sanni (Head AU MST), Brig. Albert Kendagor (EASF), Dr Mihaela Racovita (Small Arms Survey), Emile LeBrun (Small Arms Survey), Mr K. Abdelrahman (IGAD), Maj. N. H. Omanyo (Kenya), Lt. Col. T. Mallinson (CoS IPSTC)

2nd row standing:
About the Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policymakers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org.

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