MPOME FIRST REGIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Making Peace Operations More Effective

Edited by Emile LeBrun

A publication of the Small Arms Survey’s Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, with support from the Government of Canada
About the editor

Emile LeBrun is MPOME project coordinator at the Small Arms Survey. He has also served as series editor of the Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan project since 2006.
Acknowledgements

The Small Arms Survey is grateful to John Pokoo and Margaret Adomako of KAIPTC for their contributions to the session summaries.
ECOWAS

Established on 28 May 1975 by the treaty of Lagos, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a 15-member regional group with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries. ECOWAS member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo.

Considered one of the pillars of the African Economic Community, ECOWAS was set up to foster the ideal of collective self-sufficiency for its Member States. As a trading union, it is also meant to create a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation.

The vision of ECOWAS is the creation of a borderless region where the population has access to its abundant resources and is able to exploit the same through the creation of opportunities in a sustainable environment. ECOWAS has created an integrated region where the population enjoys free movement, has access to efficient education and health systems, and engages in economic and commercial activities while living in dignity in an atmosphere of peace and security. ECOWAS is meant to be a region governed in accordance with the principles of democracy, rule of law, and good governance.

To realise this vision, the ECOWAS administrative machinery based in Abuja, Nigeria, transformed its Secretariat into a Commission in January 2007. The Commission is headed by an empowered President with a Vice President and Fifteen Commissioners. ECOWAS is now preoccupied with the implementation of critical and strategic programmes that will deepen cohesion and progressively eliminate identified barriers to full integration.

KAIPTC

The Ghana Ministry of Defence established the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in 1998 and commissioned it in 2004. The purpose was to...
build upon and share Ghana’s five decades of internationally acclaimed experience and competence in peace operations with other states in the ECOWAS region and the rest of Africa. This was in recognition of the need for training military, police, and civilian men and women to meet the changing demands of multidimensional peace operations. The Centre is one of the three Peacekeeping Training Centres of Excellence mandated by ECOWAS to offer training in peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Africa.

The Centre delivers training courses in three thematic areas, Peace Support Operations, Conflict Management, and Peace and Security Studies, and also runs Masters and PhD programmes in the same subjects. The KAIPTC has a world-class research department that undertakes research in the thematic areas in Peace and Security. Located in Accra, the KAIPTC is an internationally-recognized institution and has to date trained and tutored over 15,000 participants and students since its inception.
It was appropriate to convene the first regional workshop of the Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project in West Africa at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been the most active sub-regional organization to undertake multi-dimensional peace operations. Since 1990 it has fielded eight such missions. And its members are some of the most active troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) in terms of both numbers of uniformed personnel that have been deployed and the number of missions in which they have served. These include many missions outside the African continent, including Cambodia, Haiti, and Lebanon. Currently, six of its 15 members are among the Top 25-largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations; three of them are in the Top 10. Many thousands more peacekeepers from the sub-region are deployed in non-UN peace operations.

The workshop, which benefited from the expertise and insights of practitioners with decades of experience in peace operations, showed that the issue of arms and ammunition management—and losses and diversion of such materiel (whether contingent-owned or recovered during operations)—was something deserving of greater attention. Among the participants were six current or former force commanders and deputy force commanders in UN and regional peace operations. They and their colleagues spoke openly and energetically. They took stock of under-performance and kept an eye on how to improve on current practice. It was clear to all that to be effective this workshop would need to be a first step in a longer process.

Moving forward, the Survey will work with KAIPTC and the two other regional Training Centres of Excellence (TCEs) in Mali and Nigeria: the École Maintien de la Paix in Bamako; and the National Defence College in Abuja, respectively. We will contribute to, and participate in, regional training courses when invited, and explore the development of training modules and materials when requested. The Survey will also work with ECOWAS to better understand its members’ implementation of the ECOWAS Small Arms
Convention as concerns peace operations. We will endeavor to help ensure that ECOWAS member states both understand and implement Articles 11 and 17 of the Convention.

We will also support and seek to engage the numerous peace operations in the region to understand the challenges they and their TCCs and PCCs face concerning weapons and ammunition management issues. We would welcome the chance to work with the UN and ECOWAS, and other regional actors such as G5 Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, to strengthen current peace operations, and review those that have recently ended (such as the UN missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia) to learn from recent practices . . . and improve upon them.

The Survey appreciates the assistance the governments of Canada and Switzerland provided to hold this initial meeting, and to create a framework that allows us to build on the progress made and commitments expressed to move this agenda forward.

—Eric G. Berman, Director
Geneva, August 2017
Contents

Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) .......................................................... 11

Final agenda ....................................................................................................................... 12

Opening statements .......................................................................................................... 15
    Air Vice Marshall Griffith S. Evans, Commandant, KAIPTC ........................................ 16
    Eric G. Berman, Director, Small Arms Survey .............................................................. 18
    Piex Joseph Aipri Ahoba, Head of Small Arms Division, ECOWAS Commission ........ 20
    H.E. Heather Cameron, High Commissioner of Canada to Ghana .............................. 22

Session summaries ........................................................................................................... 25
    Session 1: Understanding the challenge ................................................................. 26
    Session 2: ECOWAS and management of COE ....................................................... 30
    Session 3: UN peace operations and management of COE ........................................... 34
    Session 4: Typologies of loss events . . . and assumptions ........................................ 37
    Session 5: Response measures and charting the way forward ................................... 39

Subject matter expert background papers ...................................................................... 43
    Ghana’s experiences in peace operations and contingent weapons management, Brig-Gen. Benjamin Kusi (Ghana) .......................................................... 44
    The management of arms and ammunition for more effective peacekeeping operations, Lt-Gen. Babacar Gaye (Senegal) .......................................................... 51
    COE challenges in MISMA/AFISMA and Nigeria’s small arms control measures, Maj-Gen. Shehu Usman Abdulkadir (Nigeria) .................................................. 59
The Small Arms Survey’s Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project is a multi-year initiative to deepen understandings of, and to support efforts to counter, the loss of weapons and ammunition from peace operations worldwide. It responds to an emerging consensus that the scale of the global loss of lethal materiel from United Nations (UN) and regional-led peacekeeping operations is considerably greater than previously understood—with much of the loss likely preventable. MPOME research has also demonstrated that oversight and proper management mechanisms are lacking for weapons and ammunition that peacekeepers recover outside of formal collection programmes.

The MPOME project addresses these concerns in four ways:

- by deepening understandings of the loss of materiel from peace operations through a series of regional conferences;
- by developing training modules and good practice guidelines to counter losses in cooperation with major troop- and police-contributing countries;
- by working directly with the UN and regional organizations to develop mechanisms to improve stockpile security and administrative oversight of materiel; and
- by highlighting findings and initiatives with policymakers, programmers, and experts at relevant international forums (such as at the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and the UN General Assembly).

The MPOME project is supported by Global Affairs Canada with additional assistance from the German Federal Foreign Office and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. It draws on research undertaken with the backing of Denmark, Norway, and the United States.

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Monday 24 April

19:00–21:00  ‘Icebreaker’ and Dinner (Terrace Bar/Swiss Spirit Hotel)

Tuesday 25 April

08:30–09:00  Registration

09:00–09:45  Welcome and Overview
Dr Kwesi Aning, Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, KAIPTC  
AVM G.S. Evans, Commandant, KAIPTC  
Eric G. Berman, Director, Small Arms Survey  
Piex Joseph Aipri Ahoba, Head of Small Arms Division, ECOWAS Commission  
H.E. Heather Cameron, High Commissioner of Canada to Ghana

09:45–10:15  Group Photo and Coffee

10:15–12:00  Session 1: Understanding the Challenge
Moderator: Eric G. Berman  
Presenters: Eric G. Berman; Brig.Gen. Benjamin Kusi (Ghana)

12:00–13:30  Lunch

13:30–15:00  Session 2: ECOWAS and Management of Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE)
Moderator: Emile LeBrun, MPOME Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
Presenters: Maj-Gen. Shehu Usman Abdulkadir (Nigeria);
Col-Maj. Gnimbanga Barro, Force Commander, ECOWAS Mission in
Guinea-Bissau;
Col. Daniel Ladzekpo, ECOWAS Team Coordinator, Defence and SSR
Programme in Guinea-Bissau

15:00–15:30  Coffee Break

15:30–17:00  Session 3: UN Peace Operations and Management of COE
Moderator: Mihaela Racovita, Associate Researcher, Small Arms Survey
Presenters: Lt-Gen. Babacar Gaye (Senegal); Col. Dan Asare, UNOCI

Wednesday 26 April

09:00–10:30  Recap of Day 1
Presenter: John Pokoo, Head of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Programme, KAIPTC

10:30–11:00  Coffee Break

11:00–12:30  Session 4: Typologies of Loss Events . . . and Assumptions
Moderator: Mihaela Racovita
Discussion

12:30–13:30  Lunch

13:30–15:00  Session 5: Response Measures and Charting the Way Forwards
Moderator: Emile LeBrun
Presenter: Dr Issa Sidibé, Director of Analysis and Research,
Sahel-Sahara Center, EMP

15:00–15:30  Coffee Break

15:30–16:00  Wrap-up and Closing Ceremony
Closing statements:
Col-Maj. Seidou Maiga Morou, Chief of Staff, ECOWAS Standby Force
John Pokoo, KAIPTC
Eric G. Berman, Small Arms Survey
Opening statements
Air Vice Marshall Griffith S. Evans
Commandant, KAIPTC

Your Excellency, Heather Cameron, High Commissioner of Canada to Ghana, Mr Piex Joseph Aipri Ahoba, representing the ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Mr Eric Berman of the Small Arms Survey, Senior Officers here present, diplomats, participants, ladies and gentlemen.

Enhancing the effectiveness of international peacekeeping operations is at the core of the mandate of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which I have the honour to lead as Commandant.

We pursue this agenda through training, research and education, and policy support. More importantly, our implementation approach is rooted in the principle of collaboration with like-minded actors either at the multilateral or bilateral levels.

Our historic relationship with ECOWAS, which join us up with the peacekeeping school in Mali and the National Defense College in Nigeria as the training centres of excellence, highlights our leverage and relevance in this endeavour.

Working with the Small Arms Survey and ECOWAS in conducting this interactive workshop to discuss a range of issues around the loss of weapons and ammunition from peace operations is in line with our established mandate.

I have been briefed that the primary audiences for the workshop are ECOWAS and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) from ECOWAS Member States. And that this workshop is the first in a series of regional workshops to be held as part of the activities of the project Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) implemented by the Small Arms Survey.

I also understand that the output of this workshop and the ones to follow will inform a global discussion of guidelines, standard operating procedures, and the documentation of losses, as well as possible linkages with human casualties.

Ladies and gentlemen, to my mind, we have gathered here to set the tone for constructive discussions that will have an impact on the way arms are managed during peace operations.

Indeed, under the leadership of ECOWAS, West Africa is noted for its coordinated approach to arms management expressed in the adoption of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Material on 14 June 2006. As a Centre, we have noted that national-level ratification of the Convention has been successful in leading to the entry into force of the Convention in September 2009.

The Convention, among other requirements, enjoins Member States to develop a number of registers including a register of arms meant for international peacekeeping. Even though these principles in the Convention are yet to be incorporated into national
legislation, ECOWAS, in cooperation with the United Nations, continues to apply these principles from a policy perspective.

At the same time, however, it is critical for national arms management protocols to include the emerging principles from ECOWAS and the United Nations especially for the emerging troop-contributing countries. This is because what usually happens in the peacekeeping theatres is critical for preventing arms leakages. In the above regard, the KAIPTC notes with gratification that steady progress is being achieved in the area of national arms and ammunition legislation reforms across the sub-region. We hope that the individual national processes could be fast-tracked and also benefit from the outcome of the deliberations of this workshop.

While thanking the partners, the Small Arms Survey and the ECOWAS Commission, I wish you all healthy discussions over the next two days. Thank you.
Let me begin my opening remarks with sincere appreciation to our co-hosts, our donors, and our participants.

Commandant Air Vice Marshall GS Evans, it is a pleasure to return to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and to join you and your colleagues for this First Workshop of the Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project. The Survey’s relationship with KAIPTC is long-standing. We have been pleased to have had the chance to contribute to your courses held here in Accra, and note that you created a space for us to discuss the topic of loss of arms and ammunition from peace operations before our initial study was finalized, and when it was still a somewhat sensitive topic. And we have worked with KAIPTC researchers at international forums and at conferences across the globe. We see the MPOME project as giving us a sturdy platform upon which to develop our partnership and look forward to next steps that will come from discussions over the next two days.

The Survey’s engagement with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) goes back more than ten years, when your former Executive Secretary, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, supported an ambitious study we undertook on armed groups and the proliferation of illicit weapons in the ECOWAS region. Our relationship exemplifies the positive relationships that exist between civil society and regional organizations. We are committed to working with you, Mr Piex Joseph Aipri Ahoba, Head of Small Arms Division, and ECOWAS officials, to help implement the ECOWAS Small Arms Convention and are pleased that so many of your colleagues have joined you here for this meeting.

This workshop would not be possible without the assistance we have received from two important Survey partners: Canada and Switzerland. The Survey is grateful to the Government of Canada and Her Excellency Heather Cameron, the Canadian High Commissioner to Ghana, for their generous support for the MPOME project and for the way it is structured to permit maximum flexibility to take advantage of opportunities to build on existing commitments. As for Switzerland, the Survey could not function without its long-standing commitment to our work. We are glad that the MPOME project can complement Bern’s interest in promoting its Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition (SSMA) initiative.

Let me also say a word of thanks to our participants for your time and expertise, especially to our three resource persons: Lt-Gen. Babacar Gaye, Maj-Gen. Shehu Usman Abdulkadir, and Brig-Gen. Benjamin Kusi—all of whom have provided excellent background papers to help us structure the workshop’s proceedings.

Secondly, let me provide a bit of context for this workshop. As Session I will go into this matter in greater detail, let me simply say now that what was once seen as not a problem or as too sensitive to discuss, is now viewed as something that needs to be addressed.
and is no longer taboo. It is clear that troop-contributing countries are willing to discuss the loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations, and that they want to improve on present practice.

Thirdly and lastly, let me close by saying something about our aspirations for this two-day conference. We want to learn from you to improve our knowledge—and also to improve our assumptions. We want to establish a dialogue and a network for moving forward. That we have managed to assemble so much experience in this room, that the background papers are as strong as they are, and that you have made such efforts to be here all speak well for this workshop’s prospects for success. Thank you.
Piex Joseph Aipri Ahoba
Head of Small Arms Division, ECOWAS Commission

Your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.

I have the honour to present greetings from ECOWAS Commission at this very important regional workshop. This is a good occasion for looking at the subject matter and its significance in addressing issues relating to incidences of loss of weapons/ammunition and other military equipment deployed in peacekeeping theatres by our Member States.

The ECOWAS Commission is therefore pleased to be part of this tripartite effort in collaboration with Small Arms Survey and the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre. It is on record that the Member States in the region are very active in supporting peace operations within and outside the region. This accounted for the huge successes we recorded, particularly in the ongoing missions in Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and only recently in the Gambia.

I therefore use this opportunity to thank the Member States in the region for the continuous support and in particular, the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs). At the regional level, I wish to assure you that the ECOWAS Commission, through the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), will continue to make available the required policies, doctrines, and strategies for peace-support operations based on the Directives of the Authority of Heads of States and Government in the region.

In the same vein, I wish to disclose to you all that ECOWAS is heading to the Continental obligations, being one of the pillars of the African Standby Force (ASF) towards making ESF attain full operational capability. In this regard, we are continuing in 2017–2018 to strengthen our past efforts by further undertaking Command Post Exercises (CPX) as well as Scenario Planning Exercises (SPX) in order to further consolidate the state of readiness of our troops.

While we are making efforts at ensuring that conflicts and crises in our Member States are promptly addressed, the ECOWAS Commission is also conscious of the need to insist that our Member States strictly comply with regional, continental, and international control instruments for standards and best practices. It is obvious from the lack of compliance with these standards that issues relating to weapons loss during peace support operations are becoming recurring dismal episodes and now on the front burner.

At the regional level, for instance, the Commission remained committed towards ensuring compliance with ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (SALW). This informed the various support provided by ECOWAS Commission to our Member States based on Article 25 of the Convention that obligates the Commission to accompany State Parties technically and financially.
It is also in this regard that we are gathered here to support our Member States to put in place effective measures towards partly fulfilling provisions of Article 11 of ECOWAS Convention on SALW. This provision calls on Member States to:

a. establish a register of SALW destined for use in peacekeeping operations;
b. declare to ECOWAS Commission all SALW used in peace operations; and
c. declare to ECOWAS Commission all SALW seized, collected, or destroyed during peace operations.

I am constrained to observe that only few Member States are advancing these practices in their national policies. As such, I wish to use this platform to call on all Member States and particularly the TCCs/PCCs to ensure compliance with provisions in the Convention.

The ECOWAS Commission is partnering at the moment with the Small Arms Survey, the Geneva-based agency, towards accomplishing these objectives. I am glad that the US State Department and the Government of Canada are supporting us in this endeavour. I therefore use this opportunity to convey the appreciation of the ECOWAS Management for the show of support by our partners.

I am also happy to note that today’s workshop is one of the series of upcoming interventions towards allowing us to stem the incidences of loss of weapons during peace operations. I am optimistic that Member States will promptly establish the enabling mechanisms for effective documentation of all weapons/ammunition and other military equipment due for deployment into and out of mission support areas.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion, I am delighted to acknowledge the strong support and collaboration between the Commission and the KAIPTC, one of our Centres of Excellence. The successful hosting of this workshop further confirms the strength of this collaboration and I therefore wish to sincerely thank the Commandant and Staff of the Centre for the good work.

And for the participants and resource persons, I urge you to talk freely, frankly and express your experiences/candid views in the next two days so that the outcome of this workshop will be useful for the region and the Member States. I therefore look forward to the report and particularly your key observations and recommendations relating to weapon loss during peace operations.

And for ECOWAS Commission, I wish to reiterate our continuous commitment and engagements with our Member States and to assure you that we shall at all times live up to our responsibilities.

I thank you for your attention.
Africa has made impressive progress in the quest for peace and security and the continent today is experiencing less violence than at any other time in its recent history. While armed conflicts remain all too common, our response is intensifying and the number of peacekeeping forces deployed is at its peak. However, these forces are now facing greater risks in the context of increasingly complex missions.

These increased risks, and greater complexity, are what make today’s workshop so important. Although the global scope of the problem remains poorly understood, the initial research has shown that the diversion and loss of weapons and ammunition from peace operations is both notable and consequential. It places peacekeepers, and communities, at increased risk and perpetuates the violence they are there to end.

In this context, Canada is pleased to support the work of the Small Arms Survey, and the Making Peace Operations More Effective project, which includes this workshop as a key component. Through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, the Government of Canada will support this project over three years. By helping to train peacekeeping forces, by working to turn lessons learned into lessons applied, and most importantly by undertaking concrete action to tackle weapons loss and diversion in peace operations, we want to make our collective efforts to build peace and stability around the world more effective.

Canada is committed to working with our African, United Nations, and civil society partners to advance the cause of peace and security in Africa, taking a comprehensive approach to promote sustainable peace, which includes a commitment to addressing the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict, and of small arms, on women. This project is therefore only a component of Canada’s renewed peace and security engagement on the continent. It complements our support to the UN Department of Political Affairs and to the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Fund, as well as our targeted support to UN peace operations, conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict recovery work in the field. We are also working on new initiatives, such as support for the UN Senior Mission Leaders Course and new programmes of cooperation with peacekeeping training centres.

Of course, Canada cannot do any of this work alone, and we rely on strong partnerships with regional partners and experts. Today’s workshop is no different. In particular, I would like to recognize ECOWAS for its leadership role. ECOWAS and its Member States have played a vital role in responding to increasingly complex crises and conflicts.
They have brought diplomatic weight to bear to addressing political crises from Mali to Burkina Faso and more recently in the Gambia, and Member States’ peacekeepers are actively engaged in some of the continent’s most difficult missions. ECOWAS’ co-hosting of, and active participation in, this important discussion is a testament to its commitment, and that of its Member States, to the protection of its peacekeepers, and to improving peace and security in its region.

I would also like to thank the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre for hosting today’s event. In doing so, the Centre is continuing a process of learning and reflection on peacekeeping that has earned it its ranking as sub-Saharan Africa’s leading think tank on foreign policy and defence. Canada is proud of its support to the KAIPTC and I look forward to our continued collaboration.

I would be remiss if I did not also recognize the important contribution of the Swiss government which, through its support for the Small Arms Survey and its commitment to safe and secure ammunition storage, was instrumental in the development of this project.

Finally, I would like to thank you for taking the time to travel to Accra to share your expertise. We welcome the opportunity to work with you and your governments, as well as with the United Nations and regional organizations, to improve the effectiveness of our peace operations and to protect those who take great risks to promote peace beyond their borders.
Session summaries
Session 1: Understanding the challenge

Eric G. Berman opened the session by putting the problem of the loss of weapons and ammunition in peace operations in the global context. He noted that the Small Arms Survey believes that peacekeeping plays an important role in promoting peace and that the environment in which peacekeepers work will become more challenging as the demands for peacekeepers grow. He described the early phases of the research in Sudan and South Sudan. He noted that at least some kinds of losses were not just ‘the cost of doing business’. He outlined the Survey’s categorization of loss incidents by magnitude, summarized the findings from the initial research in Sudan and South Sudan, and the overall conclusion that the loss of material is neither infrequent nor negligible. Speaking about recovered weapons outside Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) exercises, Mr Berman stated that the UN has no existing established procedure for dealing with such materiel.

He then underlined and explained the components of the MPOME project, which include:

- Deepening understanding of the challenges through a series of regional workshops;
- Developing training modules and good practices by engaging troop- and police-contributing countries;
- Working directly with the UN and regional organizations to improve stockpile management and administrative oversight of contingent-owned equipment (COE); and
- Sharing findings and initiatives with policy-makers and programmers.

In addition, the project is contributing to the development of a global database on losses; training and briefings on stockpile management; and improved checks and balances.

Mr Berman outlined what the Small Arms Survey hoped to gain from the workshop, including:

- Augmenting existing information on notable incidents;
- Examples of national guidelines concerning good practices on loss prevention;
- Ideas for developing course modules/scripting scenarios for command post exercises (CPXs) and computer-assisted exercises (CAXs); and
- Assistance in supporting UN and regional reform efforts.

Brig-Gen. General Benjamin Kusi then presented on Ghana’s experiences in peace operations and weapons management based on his experiences as a retired brigadier of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). He also shared his experiences in missions in which Ghana contributed troops and discussed the decision-making process to deploy troops in peace operations. Ghana’s experience in peacekeeping dates back to the 1960s.
Pre-deployment training is conducted at the Field Training School of the Ghana Armed Forces at Bundase, where nominated personnel undergo training in civilian protection, internal defence, and anti-ambush drills to rehearse the troops. Specific COE maintenance training is carried out only for key post-holders such as the commanding officer and the logistics officer during pre-deployment training. Ghana has had issues in the past with poor maintenance of the COE and therefore created the position of Unit COE Officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to oversee the battalion’s COE matters.

Brig-Gen. Kusi mentioned that one problem facing ECOWAS is that the troops are available but there is a lack of equipment, leading them often to be deployed with relatively low-standard, worn-out, and used equipment. Similarly, even though AU and ECOWAS have adapted to the UN logistics concept, they are not as stringent as the UN in their verification-enforcement procedures; this can lead to instances where specification issues are overlooked. With regard to personal and crew-served weapons, in the GAF, officers deploy a side arm while soldiers deploy a rifle. Each soldier has a personal responsibility to keep his weapon safe and in good working order at all times. The units also deploy crew-served weapons, which are guarded 24/7 with armoury clerks who maintain a record of the weapons and ammunition.

Brig-Gen. Kusi informed the workshop participants that losses, no matter how they occur, are reported through the normal chain of command within the battalion. If a loss occurs as a result of an incident, an incident report will be filed. In all cases of loss, a Board of Inquiry (BOI) would be convened to investigate the loss and the report forwarded to the Force Headquarters (FHQ) for appropriate action to be taken.

In the eight UN missions in which Brig-Gen. Kusi had personally participated, there have been instances where weapons have been lost either through attack by hostile armed elements or through careless mishandling of weapons by peacekeepers. He noted specific examples in UN missions in the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, and Sierra Leone.

Brig-Gen. Kusi outlined training, camp security, periodic inspection of weapons, and a good communication network within the operational area as some of the measures to prevent or minimize loss. He concluded by stating that Ghana has managed to keep its weapons and ammunition loss at a minimum through training and strict maintenance procedures.

**Discussion**

Answering a question on how countries react when weapons are lost, Brig-Gen. Kusi said that when Ghanaian forces lose weapons, it is important to answer ‘how’ the weapons were lost and to investigate whether negligence is a factor. If that is the case, then the person responsible is punished.

Another contributor stated that because the UN reimburses the TCCs, they usually take the maintenance of their COEs very seriously, whereas ECOWAS does not reimburse for
lost COEs. Are contingents trained for peacekeeping (rather than conflict) not more susceptible to theft from rebels? Brig-Gen. Kusi said that usually it is the mission’s posture that will determine whether or not you will be attacked.

The issue of equipment not working was also raised.

One participant noted that the use of force becomes very important in many peace operations. He gave an example of Nepalese troops whose barge was attacked yet managed to fight their way back and take control of the situation. Another speaker mentioned that there are contingents which, although not very keen on using force, will do so to ensure that they do not lose any weapons as a matter of national pride.

Another participant stated that an important regional contributor of troops had taken the loss of arms more seriously in recent years, with some people responsible for losses now in jail and others undergoing court martial. The loss of weapons can be dangerous to a whole contingent as you do not know into whose hands they will fall. He added that the UN should follow up on cases of weapons loss, come up with criteria for judging performance, and at the end of a mission submit a report on each contingent to the AU and ECOWAS. He continued that the TCCs must see peace operations as serious business and ensure that all those deployed are trained to a certain level of competence. He also cautioned against the hurried nature with which some peacekeeping operations are organized as it affects the performance of the mission.

A participant proposed that performance criteria are needed for TCCs—and end-of-mission reports sent to TCCs, ECOWAS, and the UN. But another opined/cautioned that since some states are already reluctant to send troops, this idea may further limit the pool of qualified troops. In addition, ECOWAS deploys troops quickly, often without time to undertake pre-deployment inspections and evaluations.

In the context of evaluating TCC performance, it was noted that the UN once proposed the introduction of an office of a mission inspector-general, but UN Member States rejected it.

Adding to what Brig-Gen. Kusi said about Ghana, a contributor stated that Ghana has strict measures of stockpile management, which is transmitted to the troops. There is also a strict accounting system which helps keep track of all the weapons in the mission. He mentioned that, to avoid incidences of loss, there should be strict compliance with safety rules. In relation to the treatment of retrieved weapons, he stressed the need for a well-defined destruction procedure so that nobody else might have access to them.

One participant added that some of the contingents in the mission areas (outside the ECOWAS sub-region) had given out ammunition on occasion. When asked why they do that, they claimed that in their country, returning with a weapon (rather than the ammunition) is what is important.
Another contributor reminded the group that home countries are important stakeholders in this discussion and that mechanisms such as parliamentary inquiries on events such as weapons losses can be used as a way to engage them more actively.

Dr Kwesi Aning rounded up the first session with some questions for reflection to be taken into the next sessions:

- What is the quality of the current training provided in relation to this issue?
- How do we recognize the changing operational environment into which our troops are being deployed and how do we ensure that the training provided gives them a better understanding of how to respond?
- How does political control affect Member States’ willingness to bring the issue of weapons loss to the fore?
**Session 2: ECOWAS and management of COE**

**Maj-Gen. Shehu Usman Abdulkadir** opened the session with a presentation informed by his experience as the first force commander of the Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Due to the hasty way in which the mission was organized, he said, it faced many challenges. First, the force commander went to Mali initially only for six months. As such, he was ill-prepared for the mission.

With regard to COE, he never met with ECOWAS on this issue. He made suggestions and requests to TCCs but many did not arrive with their pledged weapons. He was forced to keep troops in Bamako for three weeks before the required heavy weapons arrived. Normally, the force commander should have important input into decisions about what TCCs bring with them to the mission area. But in this case, he did not know how ECOWAS and the TCCs had negotiated COE requirements. The TCCs did not make a pre-deployment visit.

Because of a lack of clarity about what COE was brought into the mission area by whom and when, he put in place a marking system which he believed would help in tracing the weapons back to the contingent should there be any losses. This involved adding an indicator of the battalion on the weapon stock. He did this on his own initiative. With assistance from the French, weekly reporting to the force commander about arms and ammunition recovered were instituted, as were periodic inspections of improvised armouries that each contingent had to construct using perimeter fencing and three to four tiers of defence personnel. Transport was a problem as he had no vehicle and could not visit his troops; there was also a lack of equipment. Summarizing the measures taken to secure COE, these were as follows:

- Periodic inspection of armouries;
- A proper accounting system;
- Using the logistics team to conduct in-theatre training in ammunition management;
- Securing the armouries; and
- Marking of weapons to identify peacekeepers’ weapons.

Gen. Abdulkadir then made the following suggestions on how to improve COE management practice:

- The sub-regional body should produce a template on how TCCs should source their equipment.
- ECOWAS should determine they will pay for each item of equipment to encourage the TCCs to also bring equipment to the missions.
- There should be harmonization between the UN and regional bodies.
- Force commanders need to be organized, respected, and kept informed by contingent commanders.
- Force commanders should have a say in issues from the conception of the mission to the kind of equipment used in the mission.

After giving a brief history of Guinea-Bissau, a participant stated that the country faces a multitude of problems, including the theft of arms due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in neighbouring Niger. He stated that although many measures have been put in place to address the issue, there are still considerable arms in circulation in the country because of bandits at the border. Because of its reputation as a drug-trafficking state, there are also elements in the country who are interested in obtaining arms. They noticed, however, that once ECOWAS began to conduct inspections, the loss of arms reduced; but some measures at both the strategic and operational level are still needed.

He made a number of suggestions based on his experiences related to the discussion of small arms and light weapons controls:

- At the operational level, before ECOWAS deploys troops to a country, a multi-level threat assessment should be undertaken.
- ECOWAS should be responsive when the mission evolves, whereby SOPs and other key documents can be adjusted in real time.
- The importance of well-trained officers cannot be underestimated.
- Force commanders must be relied on for the strict enforcement of rules and regulations and the inspection of forces.

At the strategic level he mentioned that border security measures should be put in place to reduce the cross-border proliferation of arms.

Another speaker discussed the December 2016 elections held in the Gambia and highlighted the role played by ECOWAS after it was realized that Yahya Jammeh would not step down. ECOWAS was able to mobilize 4,000 soldiers after the failure of diplomatic means. Following Jammeh’s departure from the country and Adama Barrow’s return due to the presence of ECOMIG, the mission was restructured and reduced in size to a stabilization force. During this period, caches of weapons held by Mr Jammeh were discovered at both his private residence and the state house. A month after Mr Jammeh left the country, ECOWAS reduced the number of personnel in the mission. The remaining soldiers were charged with verifying if there were further weapon stocks or mass graves in the Gambia. He concluded by saying that the country has been able to hold its parliamentary elections—an indication that the most recent mission of ECOWAS has been successful.
This was accomplished due to a number of factors, including the following:

- A number of countries were eager to help, especially Senegal and Nigeria.
- Mr Jammeh finally left the country willingly.
- Senegal took strong leadership, and when a country does this a mission goes well.

**Discussion**

The discussion that followed the presentations raised a number of salient points:

- ECOWAS missions tend to record fewer weapons losses than UN missions for two reasons: the reimbursement policy of the UN makes the TCCs careless with their equipment; and there is an ECOWAS convention which dictates that when a country goes to a mission it should notify the commission of the number of weapons brought into the mission.
- Most of the problems faced by Guinea-Bissau are a result of the lack of control of the stockpiles in neighbouring countries.
- With regard to the harmonization of training raised by Gen. Abdulkadir, there is indeed harmonization between the Training Centres of Excellence (TCEs) as they meet six-monthly to appraise the training in compliance with UN standards. However, such harmonization does not occur at other training schools beyond the TCEs.
- In the Gambia, more weapons remain to be found and the mission should redouble its efforts to locate them. Further, there should be a better way to secure the weapons found in Mr Jammeh’s residence.
- While one participant asked for clarification on the policy of destruction with regard to weapons retrieved in the Gambia, another indicated that destroying the weapons may not be permissible as they are the property of the Gambian state. He noted however that ECOWAS planned to destroy the anti-tank and anti-personnel mines found and argued that better stockpile-management practices were the best route to help ensure better control of the weapons.
- When asked about the official ECOWAS position on weapons found in the Gambia, an assurance was given that there are discussions being held at the highest level on the issue. It was, however, added that there is no question of the Gambia using the ECOWAS exemption certificate process. There was reference to ongoing high-level discussions on options to support stockpile-management systems in the Gambia.
- Gen. Abdulkadir recommended ECOWAS institutionalize an early-warning system specific to its conduct of peace operations. When asked if the marking of weapons was something he had seen or heard other force commanders do, he said not, and that he marked the weapons as a form of additional security due to the proliferation of arms in Mali.
Another participant noted that the threats to peace in Guinea-Bissau are multidimensional. Although the people of Guinea-Bissau united for many years to fight for independence, there are now ethnic divisions in the country. There are also numerous political issues. He added that because the state is the only employer, everyone wants to have access to the state and its resources. He ended by stating that the application of the Conakry Accord presents the best option for getting the country out of the problems it is facing.
Session 3: UN peace operations and management of COE

To open the session, Lt-Gen. Babacar Gaye noted three logics affecting a discussion of COE: that of UN Security Council; that of UN Member States; and that of the UN General Assembly and UN Secretariat. The task is how to manage these three logics and their impacts and he outlined three major challenges faced in this context:

- Most peacekeeping missions have a mandate to protect civilians, which means that they are mandated to use ‘all resources’ to protect the population in the mission area. However, the often low ratio of peacekeepers to the population constrains use of force options. There are usually insufficient peacekeepers to effectively protect everybody.
- There are contingents who are reluctant to use force because it would cause opponents (e.g. rebel forces) to do likewise.
- The attitude of the host nation towards the mission is a major challenge. For instance, the Sudanese government is not happy about the presence of the UN and therefore obstructs them.

In addition to these challenges, he noted some gaps affecting the effectiveness of peace operations including the mental state of the peacekeepers—especially, for example, special forces who may be small in number but strong in action. There is also a lack of intelligence in missions and although we do not use this word, we should. It is a cornerstone of removing risks and when it is not addressed the effects are clear (e.g. Somalia). Of additional concern is the fact that logistics are in the hands of civilians; the UN is oriented towards reimbursement; TCCs are often not familiar with MoUs; and the management of ammunition is often weak.

Finally, there is a gap in leadership. He added that when people operate under their country’s flag, they know what lies ahead—but when they work under the UN, the dynamics change. A proliferation of restrictions and obligations—on human rights, gender, and so on—make it difficult for the leaders to operate as they are afraid of violating the many rules and being held accountable.

The UN Infantry Battalion Manual specifies the requisite equipment, but ironically some of the sophisticated equipment can attract negative forces, which seek them as trophies. For example, in Sudan and Lebanon, some battalion vehicles were highly desired for this reason. The COE manual details reimbursements but ammunition use levels are not tailored to the context and this leaves a gap for troops to ‘lose’ and misreport ammunition use with impunity. UN observers might correct this. Furthermore, the sale of fuel, food, and other materials can develop a culture and mindset where other transactions may be allowed to take place. These are some of the factors that make it clear why negative forces have their own opinions about which TCCs they would prefer to see in a mission zone (that is to say: which TCCs they will be able to exploit).
The UN has an assessment and evaluation mechanism because everything refers to money. Boards of Inquiries conduct investigations and adjudicate. He concluded by noting an important recent development: the UN used not to reimburse losses under $250,000 but that had been reduced to $100,000. The UN is now also more interested in how items or equipment are lost.

**Follow-up questions for Gen. Gaye**

Q: How can force commanders be made more powerful in exercising sanctions?
A: The primary responsibility of the force commander is to build a relationship of trust and confidence with his contingent commanders because when this is the case, issues of sanctions become easier.

Q: Why do UN forces retaliate [or not] under chapter 7?
A: There are situations where the mandates include many things that cannot be accomplished. Thus, in some situations you have been given the necessary authorization but the rest is up to the soldier.

Q: In your experience what can you say about the situation in Mali with regard to the use of force?
A: The Blue Helmets are not perfect and can only be effective if they are covered by a political process.

Q: How is it that the ECOWAS missions tend to be the lowest in terms of quality even though it has the blessing of the UN? Does the Security Council give them limited resources?
A: The only mission funded by assessed contributions is AMISOM. The UN refuses to fund what it does not control. However, the implementation plans and assertiveness of the AU is praiseworthy.

Q: Can intelligence gathering be scaled down to the level of the contingents? Can the UN sanction countries that do not use the money given them to purchase the needed equipment?
A: Repatriating troops because of lack of equipment is a major diplomatic and political issue. Also, since the UN is expanding, being selective is not an option.

Another participant took the floor to state that Ghana’s 60 years of peacekeeping experience helps the country in its preparations for missions. From the inception of the mission soldiers are trained depending on the type of mission they will be undertaking. Soldiers are taken through weapons training and each soldier is expected to keep his weapon with him at all times. On the issue of camp security, he mentioned that when Ghana goes to the mission area they ask for sandbags and concertina wires to fortify their positions. Also, to avoid infiltrations, they have dogs to alert the sentries to strangers.
In case of an attack in the mission area there are well-rehearsed drills that are activated by codes. He added that most of the countries taking better care of their COE are able to:

- Pass the operational readiness inspection;
- Maximize reimbursements;
- Enhance the efficiency of troops; and
- Enhance the image of the country.

Speaking on some of the gaps in mission areas which lead to the leakage of weapons, he noted that:

- Ill-trained soldiers do not appreciate the need to keep their weapons on them always.
- The lack of right posture emboldens rebels to attack.
- Infiltration can occur due to over-fraternization with locals.
- Lack of discipline on the soldier’s part is a factor.

**Discussion**

One participant stated that armies that are not disciplined at home are seldom disciplined in the mission area. He agreed that Ghana has not lost weapons because it has been engaged in peacekeeping missions for a long time, which has improved its performance. He believed, however, that the TCEs are involved in research instead of training on the core issues of peacekeeping. In fact, KAIPTC has a field training team that helps with the ACOTA and ACRI training programmes; EMP in Bamako is responsible for tactical training; and KAIPTC is in charge of the operational training while the NDC in Nigeria is responsible for strategic training. There is also training for force commanders organized in Abuja. However, running these courses is dependent on funding.

Adding to the importance of posture in the mission area, another participant stated that when a country deploys troops, rebel factions will test them to see how well prepared they are. He then stressed the need to be prepared at all times to avoid surprises.

Another participant cautioned the TCCs against having too much of a financial and commercial interest in the peacekeeping mission. He also mentioned that dogs used in a mission area must be vaccinated to avoid diseases like rabies.

Finally, a participant talked about the importance of training with regard to performance. He stated that, when deployed, the behaviour of certain troops shows that they are incapable of ensuring even their own security much less the security of the equipment. This poor performance can in turn lead to losses in the mission area. He concluded by saying that training is the best way to ensure the safety of the equipment and logistics.
Session 4: Typologies of loss events . . . and assumptions

This session highlighted the circumstances through which losses take place and distinguished between accidental and preventable losses. There were discussions on losses that occur during transport as well as those that occur when the mission is winding down. The moderator Mihaela Racovita invited participants to share their experiences on the loss of weapons during missions.

One participant stated that the UN manual on COE has a chapter on responsibility in relation to loss and provisions for all the measures to be taken when there are losses. He continued that in his opinion it is not activities such as patrolling that cause the loss of weapons but rather the situation or circumstance at hand. He then gave examples of situations that have led to the loss of arms. In Sudan, he cited the poor relationship between the host nation and the mission as one of the contexts that can lead to the loss of arms. In the Democratic Republic of Congo there was a tense situation in 2007 when forces loyal to Laurent Kabila wanted to overrun the peacekeepers and enter Goma. There are, however, instances where the loss of arms is the result of a mistake made by the peacekeeper. For example, a peacekeeper who leaves the camp to visit his girlfriend in town and ends up being killed.

He stressed that weapons can also be lost when peacekeepers find themselves in a hostile environment. For instance, when out on patrol they can be outnumbered by rebels who assault them and seize their weapons. It is important to determine if the non-accidental losses happen during periods of tension or during normal operating periods.

Another participant stated that there are instances where the rebels are better armed than the peacekeepers, making it difficult for them to defend themselves. However, the posture of a contingent is very important and it is important not to fall into routine and become relaxed. He gave an example of a contingent which was attacked on its way to fetch water as the rebels had been studying them and were familiar with all their routines.

Another participant outlined three factors that could lead to the loss of weapons in a mission area:

- Over-fraternization is dangerous as some local people are double agents who come into the camp to study how things are done and report back.
- Excessive alcohol consumption in the contingent can lead to losses.
- The posture of a contingent is very important because when the rebels know that you can fight back, they will not attack. In South Sudan, for example, one of the contingent’s barges was attacked by rebels. The Nepalese peacekeeping force fought back gallantly and lost no weapons, which was a major success story at that time.

One participant offered the following typology of losses: a) mistakes; b) losses due to being overpowered by negative forces; c) losses due to the failure to discharge one’s
responsibilities; and d) corruption. Another participant added that ‘poor procedures’ can also lead to either permanent or temporary loss of arms. In South Sudan, for example, it was later found that a container wrongly labelled ‘general stores’ had weapons in it. This caused many problems for the contingent as the container was temporarily seized by the South Sudanese authorities. This points to the need for thorough preparations, as the battalion in this case did not prepare well with regard to packing.

There are not only different contexts but different situations within a context—e.g. those of ‘high tension’ and ‘low tension’—and we should look into whether these situations affect different kinds of loss. Such differences are understood and recognized by UN crisis centres.

Force abandonment can also lead to losses. For example, in Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Forces (RPF), when advancing on Kigali, gave the contingents very short notice to withdraw from their positions. In their haste, some ammunition was left behind as not everything could be carried.

One participant wanted to know if anybody knew of COE being transported by private or commercial entities. In response, another participant mentioned that Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) was contracted to transport equipment, under the instructions of the troops. Despite adding that the transport was successful with no losses, there were concerns raised about the use of private entities to conduct such transfers. Assurance was given by one participant that he had once flown from Liberia to Sierra Leone with PAE transporting APCs and ammunition, all with the blessing of ECOWAS.

Refining assumptions about minimum losses

In this session, the participants were asked about the minimum assumptions of what is lost when a squad, section, platoon, or company is attacked—taking into consideration the typical number of machine guns, mortars, anti-tank vehicles, armoured cars, and ammunition held by each type of formation. Among the responses:

- Much depends on the doctrine of the army, but there is usually some flexibility on what each unit holds depending on the kind of operation. Depending on the intelligence gathered on adversaries and the situation on the ground, equipment may be added.
- For UN missions, this information can be found in the equipment table that the UN has provided for the mission on what kind of weapons are to be used. Estimates will depend on the type of operation and the basic unit involved.
- When the UN accepts a country’s pledge, it provides a force requirement document, usually setting out what the UN expects in terms of the country’s capacities. The country’s pledge should thus be in line with the force requirement.
Session 5: Response measures and charting the way forward

In this final session, moderator Emile LeBrun reviewed some of the themes emerging from the previous discussions, highlighting the often repeated importance of training; and asked the group to take what had been discussed and reflect on response measures that can be implemented to prevent the loss of COE in ECOWAS missions.

One speaker, focusing specifically on the situation in Mali, noted that although the mission is not a normal one, the loss of arms rarely occurs, because the recognized rebel groups have not exchanged fire with the Malian forces or with the peacekeepers since the ceasefire agreement was signed. Even known terrorist groups do not attack positions to obtain weapons but rather to inflict harm and cause fear and chaos. He mentioned that whenever there is an attack, it is to harass and contain peacekeeping troops. He urged the specific case of Mali to be taken into account in training modules.

The next speaker proposed a set of measures to be used to militate against the loss of weapons:

- As a criterion for deployment, the UN or the regional bodies should focus on Member States that have committed to relevant international legal and policy initiatives. Also, those who are accepting pledges should pay attention to countries that have faced incidents concerning the security of their armouries or countries where the dissemination of weapons is well known.
- Training modules should be developed on the loss of weapons and security of armouries just as there are training modules on human rights and gender.
- The UN should implement the provisions of the ECOWAS Convention on small arms.
- Cases of loss or diversion of weapons should be investigated by the UN and the host country informed of the reason for the investigation. The UN should also conduct regular inspections of the weapons in the contingents and repatriate commanders who are found guilty of not reporting weapon losses.

There was a suggestion for a KAIPTC course on the loss of weapons or, as another participant recommended, an entire programme on weapon loss and diversion at KAIPTC or another ECOWAS TCE.

Similarly, it was suggested that ECOWAS should have a small procedure manual for deployed troops to inform them about weapon loss and diversion and, given the importance of this project, to establish a partnership to ensure its continuation.

The participants were urged to not wait for publication of the workshop report before taking action. They were encouraged to begin talking to people who would actually listen. A suggestion was then made to increase the number of vacancies on the leadership courses organized by the TCEs. One participant noted that as loss of weapons is
often linked to discipline, this is where the emphasis should be placed. Moreover, the TCC selection process should be made more stringent to ensure that the soldiers who are sent to the mission areas understand the risks involved.

During the discussion it also came up that although national caveats do not exist on paper, the attitude of the troops demonstrates that there are things they would—and would not—do. In addition, some orders are referred back to the capital for clearance before they are acted on. The participant also stressed the need to check the selection process to ensure that troops deployed under Chapter 7 are combat-ready.

In relation to best practices in terms of security and stockpile management, it was mentioned that TCCs should look at what other countries are doing well and emulate them to ensure that all TCCs are at the level where they can all prevent the loss of weapons.

It was reiterated that when the contingent does not have a strong defensive posture, it makes them susceptible to attacks. Mali and Niger are two cases in which weapons were lost to non-state armed groups. How to develop a system of tracking and tracing in cases of diversion and losses? One participant said ECOWAS Member States should adhere to the steps on the marking of equipment and stockpile management set out in the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

To sum up, one participant stated that to prevent the loss of weapons, there are three areas of interest: security, safety, and accountability. He continued that although each person has a role to play, it is the duty of the TCCs to ensure that troops are well trained. He added that soldiers must be closely monitored to ensure that they are generally disciplined, with measures put in place to check the movement of ammunition.

Wrap-up and closing ceremony

On behalf of the ECOWAS Commission, Col. Seidou Maiga Morou expressed his appreciation to the Government of Ghana, the Small Arms Survey, and KAIPTC for organizing the workshop. He thanked Brig-Gen. Benjamin Kusi, Maj-Gen. Shehu Usman Abdulkadir, and Lt-Gen. Babacar Gaye for sharing their experiences. He expressed his appreciation to all the participants for effectively contributing to a successful workshop through their questions and suggestions. Speaking on behalf of the President of the ECOWAS Commission, he assured all present that the recommendations made will be given the appropriate attention.

Mr John Pokoo, delivering closing remarks on behalf of the Commandant of KAIPTC, thanked everyone for coming and stressed the importance of networking and the need to stay in touch to ensure the continuation of this project. Finally, he stated that he would like to see this topic being run as a course in one of the ECOWAS TCEs in the future.
On behalf of the Small Arms Survey, Mr Eric G. Berman mentioned that he was very satisfied and honoured to have been part of the workshop. He hoped that the workshop report would serve as a useful resource and would capture some of the important experiences of ECOWAS Member States in peacekeeping. He once again thanked all present and brought the workshop to a close.
Subject matter expert background papers
Ghana’s experiences in peace operations and contingent weapons management
Brig-Gen. Benjamin Kusi (Ghana)

Ghana, as a major troop- and police-contributing country (TCC/PCC), has been involved in peace operations for nearly 60 years since it first deployed troops in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. Since then, Ghana has been involved in more than 30 UN missions and several regional and sub-regional peace missions under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the African Union (AU). Even though Ghana has not been involved in any major incidents of weapons losses during peace operations apart from, perhaps, during the Port Franqui massacre of April 1961, it is still worth sharing some of the country’s experiences in peace missions over the last nearly six decades.

This background paper is an attempt to share Ghana’s experiences, practices, and lessons learned in peace operations with the aim of helping to better understand and reduce the loss of arms and ammunitions from peace operations while improving security for peacekeepers and their beneficiaries. It will examine how weapons get lost or diverted in the operational area and suggest ways of improving weapons and ammunition safety and personal security for peacekeepers.

Personal and Ghanaian experiences in the field

Ghana has been contributing troops and police to UN peace operations since the early 1960s. Since their first participation in ONUC, over 80,000 Ghanaian military, police, and civilian personnel have served in various capacities in more than 30 UN missions. I have personally participated in eight of them. In most of these operations there have been instances where weapons have been lost either through attacks by hostile armed elements or through careless mishandling of weapons by peacekeepers. A few examples will suffice, including of losses experienced by UN troops from countries other than Ghana.

By far the highest number of weapons and ammunition lost by Ghanaian troops during peace operations occurred in the UN operations in the Congo. This was during the Port Franqui shooting incident, which culminated in the unfortunate massacre of 43 Ghanaian military personnel and two of their British officers in April 1961. Some of the Ghanaian troops were alleged to have drowned while attempting to escape the shooting. The incident is reported to have happened when the Congolese interior minister, who was visiting Port Franqui on 27 April, publicly criticized the local Armée nationale congolaise (Congolese National Army, or ANC) forces of being anti-Lulua and a source of unrest in the ethnic conflict rocking northern Kasai. He threatened to have them disarmed by the UN forces if this did not change. The following day, the ONUC garrison at Port
Franqui was attacked by ANC troops, who thought it shared the pro-Lulua bias of the interior minister. Forty-seven UN troops (Ghanaian, Swedish, and British) were killed, some of them after they had been disarmed (Cremer, 2003, pp. 52–59; Dorn and Bell, 2003, p. 272; Hoskyns, 1965, p. 49; Packham, 2004, p. 185).

It has not been possible to ascertain the quantities of weapons and ammunition that were lost as a result of this unfortunate incident. It is still not clear whether the lost weapons corresponded to the number of persons killed or that some weapons belonging to dead personnel were later retrieved. No official records are available on this subject.

With regard to the various Ghanaian contingents, there is another case of ammunition loss through forced abandonment during operations with the UN Mission in Rwanda. A Ghanaian battalion was initially based at Byumba, but was forced to vacate its position at short notice due to an incursion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994. On 6 April 1994 President Habyarimama’s plane was shot down, killing him and several of his close advisers. It is believed that the attack was carried out by Hutu extremists who believed the president was about to sign the Arusha peace accords, not by the RPF, a Tutsi military organization stationed outside the country at the time, whom the Hutus blamed. In any event, Hutu extremists in the military, led by Colonel Bagosora, immediately went into action, murdering Tutsis and moderate Hutus within hours of the plane crash.

In response to these attacks the RPF decided to intervene to save its kith and kin. Ghanaian troops in their line of march—about 225 in number—were given short notice to move out of their base in Byumba and relocate to Kigali. In beating a hasty withdrawal under harassing fire from RPF forces, some ammunition was left behind. The quantities and type(s) are yet to be determined. An attempt to obtain information from the Directorate of Army Peacekeeping Operations proved futile, apparently because records have been destroyed in the course of time.

Other UN troops suffered similar losses for one reason or another. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group seized Freetown in January 1999 and in the process killed several Nigerian troops serving with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Nothing was said about what happened to their weapons, but it is obvious that some weapons and other equipment might have fallen into the hands of the RUF rebels. The RUF were notorious for their attacks on peacekeepers and for seizing their weapons and equipment.

These attacks did not cease after ECOMOG was rehatted as the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. In May 2000 the RUF occupied and looted disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration facilities in Makeni and Magburaka in Sierra Leone. This was not the first time the RUF had seized weapons from the UN. There were reported incidents in the Kambia and Port Loko axis where weapons had also been seized.
In Guiglo in the west of Côte d’Ivoire, militant Young Patriots loyal to ex-President Gbagbo stormed the Bangladeshi contingent’s camp on 18 January 2006 and overran it, forcing the peacekeepers to flee and leave their weapons and equipment behind. This led to the repatriation of the whole battalion. To date, no information on weapons, ammunition, and other equipment lost or destroyed has been made available.

Also in Côte d’Ivoire, Bangladeshi troops found themselves in a number of other unfortunate situations. In one such incident, a convoy of troops on its way to Abidjan from their base in Daloa in the west lost their way and found themselves in Yopougon, a pro-Gbagbo suburb of Abidjan. They were attacked by the Young Patriots, who seized their weapons and burned one of their vehicles.

In another incident, a Bangladeshi patrol escorting food supplies to the Golf Hotel for President-elect Alassane Ouattara and some members of his blockaded and marooned government was set upon by Young Patriots and their equipment was seized from them. These two incidents were widely reported on local media and even appeared on YouTube.

Peacekeepers have been attacked on and off duty in the operational area with the aim of stealing or seizing their weapons. I had a personal experience in Côte d’Ivoire when as deputy force commander I was invited by Blé Goude, then minister for youth and leader of the Young Patriots, to a meeting at the Hotel Tiana in the Plateau district of Abidjan. While waiting inside the hotel for the arrival of the minister, I heard a commotion outside and went out to see what was happening. Outside the hotel lobby I saw my bodyguards—mostly Senegalese soldiers—struggling with a Young Patriot group called La Sorbonne. One of the soldiers was trying to hold onto his rifle, which the Young Patriots were trying to snatch from him. I quickly went to his aid and managed to retrieve the weapon for him, but unfortunately they were able to steal his self-loading pistol while he was struggling to retrieve the rifle. All attempts to retrieve the pistol proved futile until the crisis came to a head.

Often, peacekeepers have been accessories to the loss or diversion of weapons and ammunition because of carelessness or poor security measures. Once in Lebanon a machine gun was stolen from one of the Ghanaian positions at night. Apparently, the guards had all fallen asleep and Lebanese armed elements sneak ed in to steal that valuable weapon. All initial efforts to retrieve the weapon proved futile. However, on a happier note, persistent enquiries through local leaders led to the discovery of the people who took the weapon. The battalion literally had to buy back the weapon.

There was another incident in which a Lebanese national took undue advantage of his friendship with a Ghanaian soldier and over-fraternization by the soldiers in the camp to steal the soldier’s personal rifle. In this case too the weapon had to be bought back.

Such cases are too many to recount across missions, but mostly as a result of national sensitivities they are treated as an internal issue and are hardly reported officially.
Another incident involving Ghanaian troops that led to a temporary seizure of weapons in South Sudan is worth mentioning. Following a request to Ghana to send additional troops to South Sudan, it was decided to withdraw the 300 requested troops from the Ghanaian contingent serving with the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, which was about to be down-sized as a result of the draw down of the mission. In packing up their stores and equipment to be shipped to South Sudan, one container was filled with a mix of weapons and logistics stores, but was mislabeled as ‘construction materials’. On arrival in South Sudan in February 2014, a scan of the container revealed the presence of some arms and ammunition among the stores. This raised suspicion among the South Sudanese authorities, especially since the containers were to be shipped overland through rebel-held territory to their final destination, instead of being airfreighted, as was preferred by the South Sudanese authorities. The authorities thought that it was a ploy to supply the rebels with arms and ammunition, so they seized the container. It took a high-powered Ghanaian delegation led by the then deputy defence minister to have the weapons released in June 2014 after nearly five months of back-and-forth negotiations.

Ways of preventing weapons and ammunition loss

Given the fact that weapons that are stolen or diverted become a double-edged sword capable of hurting their original owners, how can we ensure that weapons and ammunition are safeguarded to ensure the better protection and personal security of peacekeepers and the civilian population they are required to protect?

Weapons and ammunition fall under the general umbrella of contingent-owned equipment (COE). The whole prevention framework therefore should be subsumed under COE management.

In the Ghanaian military context, specific COE maintenance training is carried out for key appointment holders during pre-deployment training. The training focuses on the sustaining and management of all deployed COE. The logistics officer normally oversees a unit’s COE and executes this role in conjunction with the company quartermaster sergeant and company sergeant majors at the company level. It must be noted that the ultimate responsibility for COE management lies with the unit commander and the company commanders. The commanding officer needs to keep abreast of the COE role because he countersigns the UN verification report.

Under the wet-lease system, TCCs/PCCs are reimbursed for various equipment and services provided in the mission area. There are strict inspection criteria that must be adhered to before a TCC/PCC can be fully reimbursed for equipment fielded in the operational theatre.

In the past there had been serious problems with the COE profile of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) mainly because of disregard for the existing memorandum of understanding.
requirements and the poor maintenance of COE. Ghana had not been deriving maximum returns from the wet-lease reimbursement as a result of lapses in record keeping, and poor maintenance and reporting procedures, among other things. To address this problem, GAF has in the past year created the position of unit COE officer with lieutenant colonel rank to oversee a battalion’s COE matters during peace operations.

Topmost among the preventive measures should be training. Training must be continuous and must cover personal security, camp security, field security, and stockpile management. Much focus must be placed on pre-deployment training. Training in stockpile management for relevant personnel covering record keeping, storage, control, and maintenance of weapons and ammunition in the field will go a long way in preventing or minimizing losses.

Peacekeepers should be more concerned with their personal security and the security of their personal weapons. It is their first line of defence. They have to stay alert at all times, whether on or off duty. They have to be able to defend themselves and stay alive before they can protect others. While on patrols, peacekeepers must be on the alert and adopt appropriate anti-ambush skills to counter possible ambushes.

The next important preventive measure should be a good reporting system based on daily and periodic inspection routines. Periodic inspections of weapons and ammunition, as well as security measures covering their safety, will go a long way in preventing or minimizing losses. Losses, no matter how they occur, must be reported through the normal chain of command within the battalion. Routine weapons and ammunition checks and inspections must be carried out at various levels of command. When a loss is detected it must be reported through the normal chain of command at the unit level. If a loss occurs as a result of an incident, an incident report should be filed. In all cases, a board of inquiry should be convened to investigate the loss and the report forwarded to force headquarters for appropriate action to be taken. The convening authority at the unit level is the commanding officer, who has the sole responsibility, but delegates responsibility for the inquiry to a subordinate officer who submits a comprehensive report covering the terms of reference in the convening order. The terms of reference may include, but not be limited to, the following:

a. the circumstances leading to the loss of the weapon or ammunition;
b. the date and time of the loss;
c. who is responsible for the loss; and
d. whether the loss could have been avoided.

Another important preventive measure is good camp security. There should be all-round camp security with perimeter fencing and adequate lighting. Armouries, magazines, and ammunition dumps must be well sited and protected with perimeter fencing and appropriate security and safety measures.
Good communications within the operational area could also help to prevent or minimize losses. A good communications network that links all positions to a central source will ensure the quick and efficient passage of information. Suspicious movements and possible attacks on any position can easily be relayed to other positions to raise the alarm for all positions to be on the alert and take the necessary precautions to avoid being overrun.

Commitment to robust peacekeeping techniques and the elimination of national prejudices would also in no small measure contribute to the prevention or minimization of weapons and ammunition losses in peace operations. The selection of personnel by TCCs/PCCs is very important in this regard. Often TCCs/PCCS treat peace operations as a welfare issue and therefore select personnel who are in the terminal stages of their career, the aim being to help them acquire some money before finally leaving the service. Such personnel are often too old to endure the physical hardships of peacekeeping and are often incapable of engaging in combat or reluctant to do so when required and therefore prone to compromise on the strict application of correct procedures.

Another effective way of preventing or minimizing losses is the adoption of best practices. Many countries have long-standing histories of participation in peace operations and have acquired invaluable experiences in the process. The sharing of such experiences among TCCs/PCCs could go a long way to plug loopholes through which weapons/ammunition losses occur.

**Conclusion**

Ghana has been a regular contributor of troops and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations and regional arrangements under the auspices of the AU and ECOWAS for nearly six decades.

Because of the wet-lease system operated by the UN, training in COE management is one of the priority areas for Ghanaian contingents in order to qualify them for reimbursement at the appropriate rates. This training also ensures that equipment is properly maintained so as to attain a reasonable life span in the field.

During these operations weapons and ammunition have been lost either through hostile action or through carelessness or lax security by individual peacekeepers. To ensure accountability, mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that weapons/ammunition losses are reported within the chain of command and appropriate investigations conducted through the convening of boards of inquiry.

Through training and strict maintenance procedures, weapons/ammunition losses experienced by Ghanaian peacekeepers during peace operations have been kept to a negligible minimum.
References


The management of arms and ammunition for more effective peacekeeping operations
Lt-Gen. Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

Introduction
As part of the Making Peace Operations More Effective project, the Small Arms Survey initiated a study into the loss of arms and ammunition during peacekeeping operations (PKOs). At first glance, this problem may appear inconsequential, but the observations of Berman and Racovita (2015) regarding peace missions in Sudan and South Sudan in the period 2005–14 are likely to temper such a judgement, in spite of the specific nature of the Sudanese theatre of operations. Meanwhile the UN is taking this problem seriously, highlighting in the Secretary-General’s 2013 report on small arms (which is one of a number that have been submitted to the Security Council every two years since 2007) that:

In the context of peacekeeping operations, the diversion of arms and ammunition from stockpiles of troop-contributing countries or from collected weapons creates additional force protection issues for peacekeepers, making an already challenging job more difficult (UNSC, 2013, I, para. 11).

What policies should troop-contributing countries (TCCs) adopt for the management of arms and ammunition in PKOs in order to respond to this problem, bearing in mind that they have been asked to improve their weapons and ammunition management capacities by the UN Secretary-General (UNSC, 2015, Recommendation 10, pp. 16/20–17/20)? Should such policies comply with UN rules for the management of contingent-owned equipment (COE)? How will such policies and these rules apply, particularly when troops are ‘rehatted’ or when arms are recovered? Research into these issues has shown that, in current conflicts in which PKOs are deployed, the attitudes of state and non-state actors are likely to exacerbate the shortcomings of national policies and UN rules.

There follows an analysis of the policy of one TCC, Senegal. Its compliance with UN rules will be measured and we will then look at the implementation of this policy and these rules when troops are rehatted and arms are recovered more generally.

Senegalese policy for the management of arms and ammunition
The Senegalese Army, which came into existence immediately after independence in 1960, took its inspiration, like many African armies, from the regulations, practices, and even traditions of the colonial army. Arms are obviously at the heart of military activity: never to be apart from one’s weapon is the first reflex inculcated into a soldier. The
allocation of a firearm to a soldier who knows the weapon’s identification number and who becomes, according to the Règlement du Service du Matériel des Armées sénégalaises (Regulations of the Military Equipment Department of the Senegalese Army), the holder-user, marks the entry of that individual into an elementary unit at the end of his or her initial training. Weapons security is also covered by regulations whose application is a primary responsibility of all ranks in the army. In fact, the loss of or damage to a weapon is generally perceived as serious misconduct, which, in the short term, has a negative impact on the career of the person responsible. Any loss triggers a series of alerts and thorough investigations, in proportion to the seriousness of the event.

This mindset and these practices have been strengthened by the civil authorities of young African states that often had to deal with military coups d’état. In the case of Senegal, the Service du Matériel des Armées (Military Equipment Department) does an annual check and produces a report on the existence, operation, and proper storage of all the arms and ammunition held by the military and paramilitary forces throughout national territory. The implementation of the recommendations in these reports has helped to save Senegal from the accidents at ammunition storage depots that have occurred in other African countries (Balde, 2015).

Overall, the mindset instilled during training, through hierarchical control, and by the seriousness of the administrative and financial penalties imposed in the event of the loss of or damage to weapons have created among Senegalese soldiers of all ranks a mindset and practices that are favourable to the proper management of arms and ammunition. In consequence, Senegal has not encountered any major difficulties in implementing the June 2006 Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention), particularly the creation of databases and a register of firearms.

Nevertheless, its commitment in PKOs does not facilitate the implementation of two of the pillars of national policy on the management of arms and ammunition: (1) the intensity of operations results in administrative procedures being relaxed, which is prejudicial to the implementation of disciplinary and administrative proceedings; and (2) preventive hierarchical control is de facto transferred to the UN, which is supposed to have total operational authority over the peacekeeping contingents, including the management of their weapons and ammunition.

National policy on the management of arms and ammunition, UN rules, and the management of COE

The documents that are used as points of reference when memorandums of understanding (MOUs) are drawn up between the UN and TCCs, particularly the concept of
operations, the force requirements, and the UN manual relating to COE (UN, 2014), take account of the reality of the ‘new wars’ (Badie and Vidal, 2016) in which peacekeeping soldiers are de facto parties to the conflict. The manual envisages situations in which ‘major equipment’ is ‘lost or damaged as a result of a single hostile action’ (UNGA, 2014, ch. 2, para. 18, b(i)).

As its title states, the manual, subsequent to Resolution 50/222 of 11 April 1996, deals with *Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions* (COE Manual) (UNGA, 2014). All in all, the management of arms and ammunition remains a national prerogative. The UN checks quantities when it carries out pre-deployment visits and quality as part of half-yearly inspections of COE. The UN also deals with the normal expenditure of ammunition, and with damage to arms and ammunition, which is an exceptional situation. The determination of responsibility for such losses and damage is subject to well-established criteria and procedures.

The limitations are already apparent in the reimbursement procedures that apply to ammunition that is expended. Few objective means are available to check the accuracy of the amount of ammunition used that is declared by the contingent after each operation. The COE Manual states that:

> Ammunition expended on operations or special training authorized and directed by the Force Commander will be reported in the reports of the Force Commander/Police Commissioner at the conclusion of individual operations and be reimbursed the initial price of ammunition on presentation of a claim by the Government and an operational ammunition expenditure certificate from the mission (UNGA, 2014, ch. 3, annex A, para. 32).

There is nothing to stop a contingent from making false declarations about the expenditure of ammunition to the force commander in order to make the actions of the contingent sound more impressive, or for criminal purposes involving the trafficking of ammunition, or in order to gain undue reimbursements for its government. There have been cases where a contingent, after an exchange of fire with an armed group, billed so much for the amount of ammunition expended that it cast doubt, without realizing it, upon its own tactical capacity (lack of fire discipline, inaccurate shooting, poor assessment of the balance of force, etc.). This limitation in the procedures for the reimbursement for ammunition is all the more concerning in that ammunition lies outside the scope of the International Tracing Instrument, which was adopted in December 2005 by the UN General Assembly (Bevan and McDonald, 2012).

The nature of the conflicts in which peacekeepers are involved is also reflected in the fact that there has been a considerable increase in the amount of damaged equipment after hostile actions. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a good example of this. The COE Manual provides that:
In cases of loss or damage resulting from a single hostile action or forced abandonment, troop/police contributors will assume liability for each item of equipment when the collective generic fair market value (GFMV) is below the threshold value of [US]$250,000. For major equipment lost or damaged as a result of a single hostile action or forced abandonment, the United Nations will assume liability for each item of major equipment whose GFMV equals or exceeds [US]$250,000 or for major equipment lost or damaged when the collective GFMV of such equipment equals or exceeds [US]$250,000 (UNGA, 2014, ch. 2, para. 18, b(i–ii)).

At the most recent Working Group on COE a request was made for the eligibility threshold for compensation to be lowered to USD 100,000, and that the principle of aggregating the damage sustained by the same contingent be accepted. Made available on 16 January 2017, a consensus was only reached on this issue on the last day of the work. The conclusions were as follows: (1) the UN will henceforth reimburse the owner for each major item of equipment destroyed in a hostile action, when the value equals or exceeds USD 100,000; (2) damage sustained by contingents may be aggregated over a UN budgetary year, and the owners will be reimbursed if the threshold of USD 250,000 is reached; and (3) a projected annual budget of USD 5,000,000 is allocated for that purpose. This consensus remains one of the most important measures adopted in favour of TCC for the 2017 session of the Working Group on COE.

It is clear that the reimbursement for damaged COE, the validation of certain equipment deployed by contingents (for example 4×2 vehicles instead of 4×4s), and responsibility for the cost of transporting armoured vehicles to be replaced after intensive use in missions are the major challenges for TCC contingents in the management of COE.

Rehatting, and the recovery and loss of arms

Rehatting operations highlight the benefits of waiting for the UN regulations and practices to be aligned with those of a regional organization like ECOWAS.

The transformation of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic into the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) highlights two facts. While the African Union had to deal with troops who were sometimes thrown hastily into action in Bangui, whose arms and ammunition it was not able, in consequence, to inventory, the COE Manual provides for situations where ‘the equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the MOU is concluded’ (UNGA, 2014, ch. 2, para. 29(a)). Accordingly, in spite of the ongoing military operations, the dispersal of the units, and troops’ lack of experience of UN practices, MINUSCA followed the COE Manual, which states that:

Major equipment will be counted/inspected in order to ensure categories and groups and the number delivered corresponds with the MOU and that they are
This UN inventory of the arms and ammunition of the African contingents had a positive impact on the attitude of these troops to their weapons and the care that had to be taken with them. There is good reason to think that even more care would have been taken if they had followed the ECOWAS Convention, which requires member states to establish a register of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and other related material destined for use in peacekeeping operations both inside and outside the ECOWAS territory under the ECOWAS Executive Secretary as a way of ensuring the control of movements of small arms and light weapons and their effective withdrawal at the end of peace operations in which Member States are participating (ECOWAS Convention, art. 11, 1a).

This measure, which satisfies regional security concerns and is facilitated by the tracing of arms, has no equivalent in the COE Manual. But it should form part of the UN system of hierarchical control that is one of the three major means deployed to combat the loss of arms during operations, the other two being penalties and training.

The UN and ECOWAS regulations are now better aligned with respect to the management of arms recovered by peacekeeping soldiers from belligerents outside disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes. Otherwise, the two sets of regulations have the same weakness in their procedures, namely that the troops engaged in the recovery have little control over the relationship between the seizure and the circumstances of that seizure. When a firearm is recovered, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Group of Experts are actively involved in procedures to reconstitute the history of the firearm and then to store it in a safe place before it is destroyed. The UNMAS storage form has the following sections: (a) Verification: operational, not in use, repairable or not; (b) Registration number; (c) Identification: type, calibre, model; (d) Origin; and (e) Incriminating evidence or ordinary seizure. It should be stressed that both the UN and ECOWAS are determined to identify the recovered arms by their serial numbers and to trace them. ECOWAS requires member states to

Declare to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary all the small arms and light weapons seized, collected and/or destroyed during peace operations on their territory and in the ECOWAS region (ECOWAS Convention, art. 11, para. 1c).

The best way to prevent losses of arms and ammunition is to carry out an analytical inventory of the circumstances in which such losses are likely to occur.

UN contingents’ equipment, as described in the UN Infantry Battalion Manual, is intended to give them the capacities (particularly self-protection and the ability to operate at
night) that will enable them to make a difference in theatre (UNDPKO and DFS, 2012, secs. 8.3.1, 8.7). This equipment is naturally coveted by various other actors with various motivations.

Psychologically, all equipment stolen or snatched from a UN force is a trophy, a small victory in an exercise (peacekeeping) where being seen to have the upper hand is an important factor. It is therefore essential to keep all equipment, particularly arms and ammunition, secure. This practice should be enhanced in situations where the accidental loss of arms, such as night convoys, crossing wet areas (rivers, etc.), or helicopter transport, is more likely.

The actors who take UN force weapons may have specific targets. They may wish to increase their mobility (in Sudan, for example, Toyota and Buffalo vehicles were targeted) or protection (by taking helmets and bulletproof vests), or seek other advantages. Some incidents and situations are vulnerable to armed robbery; for example, troop movements and/or traffic accidents involving single vehicles. Measures must therefore be taken to deal with such circumstances.

Finally, actors may have material reasons to procure UN equipment, wishing to compensate for their own lack of equipment and supplies in actions against UN forces. In fact, the most significant losses of arms and ammunition occur during hostile actions. According to the COE Manual:

**Hostile action** is defined as an incident of short or sustained duration resulting from the action(s) of one or more belligerents that has a direct and significant hostile impact on the personnel and/or equipment of a troop/police contributor (UNGA, 2014, ch. 6, para. 7).

The extent of the losses therefore depends mainly on the resistance put up by the UN forces concerned. For example, in Sudan and South Sudan, there was a clear correlation between the inadequacy of such resistance and the deterioration of relations between the government and the peacekeeping forces. On certain occasions, where the loss of arms could not be explained by the balance of force, which was favourable to the UN forces, the latter’s passivity was sanctioned by the repatriation of units due to the inadequacy of their performance. In the Central African Republic, most of the rare losses of arms that were registered were either due to ill-intentioned elements among crowds or isolated individuals taking advantage of a moment of inattention on the part a UN peacekeeper. In both cases, the arms were simply snatched from the hands of UN soldiers.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, UN member states have made an effort to adapt the UN regulations to the nature of the conflicts in which PKOs are deployed. This effort still has limitations
with respect to preventive hierarchical control, which is one of the three pillars of Senegalese policy for the management of arms and ammunition, and with respect to control of the expenditure of ammunition.

The following measures can therefore still be envisaged as a means of ensuring that the three methods of combating losses of arms, namely training, hierarchical control, and sanctions, are fully effective:

- UN member states should be advised to ratify the instruments relating to the security of arms and ammunition and to apply the decisions contained in these instruments. In the longer term, respect for these international commitments and the existence or non-existence of the diversion of arms in countries wishing to join PKOs should be included in the selection criteria.
- Training modules dealing specifically with the problem of the diversion of arms should be devised, like those dealing with human rights, gender, etc.
- UN regulations should be brought into line with those of ECOWAS with respect to the registration of firearms’ identification numbers. Peacekeeping missions should systematically conduct investigations in the event of arms and ammunition being lost, and inform the host state of the results of these investigations.

While it is true that these diversions and losses pose problems for peacekeepers’ ability to provide protection and damage the credibility of the UN to some extent, we must still recognize that, set against the background of the many UN PKOs over the last ten years, the percentage of losses remains very low in relation to the large number of arms that are circulating illegally due to the porosity of borders.

Finally, there is no doubt that force commanders are aware of the risk that the repetition of such diversions and losses will have an adverse impact on the reputation of their contingents—that is, their professionalism and commitment to the ideals of the UN.

References


COE challenges in MISMA/AFISMA and Nigeria’s small arms control measures

Maj-Gen. Shehu Usman Abdulkadir (Nigeria)

Introduction

1. This background paper has two separate but related parts. In the first part I reflect on my experiences as Force Commander of the Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) January–June 2013 on issues related to administrative oversight of contingent-owned equipment (COE). The second part describes Nigeria’s efforts to establish and implement measures to control the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons.

COE challenges in MISMA/AFISMA

2. In January 2013, I was appointed the first Force Commander of AFISMA, an ECOWAS mission established to support the government of Mali to overcome the menace of the Islamist rebels in the Northern part of the country. The mission was authorized vide UNSC Resolution 2085, passed on 20 December 2012, which authorized the deployment of AFISMA troops for an initial period of one year. The troop contributing countries (TCC) then included Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

3. In considering the details that follow, it should be kept in mind that the mission was originally slated to begin operations in September 2013. However, due to offensives by rebel forces and the subsequent rapid intervention of the French, the timeline for AFISMA deployment was significantly moved up. The arrival of the Nigerian troops into the theatre began less than 30 days after the resolution, on 17 January 2013. Within three weeks some 5,146 troops had been deployed from the above-mentioned countries, about 67% of the force that was required. The hastiness of this deployment affected a number of the matters under discussion, including the type and quantities of COE brought into the mission area and record keeping.

4. For example, good practice for the initial deployment of peace operations should include pre-deployment visits by TCCs to help them determine the kind of combat to be expected and therefore the types and numbers of weapons to deploy with their troops; this analysis would then inform the Memorandum of Understanding between the mission parties. This did not occur in the case of AFISMA contingents because of the hastiness of the deployment schedule.

5. In fact, there was no transparency in the case of AFISMA about what COE the TCCs were bringing into the mission; neither were standards regarding their transport into the mission observed, as many forces simply crossed their common borders with Mali with their weapons. Further, most mission-requested weapons and ammunition never arrived. These facts handicapped the mission’s effectiveness.
6. Under these circumstances, upon my assumption of the command, the management of contingent weapons and ammunition became an important focus. Being a peace enforcement mission, troops were expected to engage in limited combat, with possible personnel and equipment losses. Hence adequate steps had to be taken to secure lives of personnel as well as arms and ammunition. This was also important considering the fact that each contingent signed for their personal weapons in addition to the support weapons they deployed with. Consequently, the safe handling of these weapons was not only paramount for the success of the mission but equally important for the various contingents’ armouries. In addition, the conflict in Mali was fuelled by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the society. This was equally another challenge since establishing an enduring peace would mean disarming the militants and disposing of the weapons.

7. In the case of AFISMA’s initial configuration, there were no acceptable facilities for their storage of mission weapons; hence each contingent had to construct its own armoury (in some cases, the contingents were able to convert existing structures). The importance of strong, well-protected armouries in northern Mali was clear given the level of rebel violence and their access to small arms and light weapons within the region. I worked to ensure that a number of standards be observed in the construction and defence of armouries, including their strategic placement; adequate perimeter fencing; and the detailing of 3–4 armed guards at all times. In this way, adequate security was provided for all arms and ammunition of contingent. In order to avoid surprise attack, which could lead to loss of arms and ammunition, defensive positions were established and routines in defence were thoroughly observed.

8. In addition to the establishment of well defended armouries, it was necessary to implement a number of processes and procedures to manage COE in AFISMA:

   a. **Arms and ammunition returns.** The TCCs in AFISMA were required to send weekly and monthly arms and ammunition returns stating the quantity of arms and ammunition in stock. While reduction in the quantity of ammunition is used to determine urgency for replenishment, reduction in quantity of arms needed to be explained, as well as describing actions taken.

   b. **Periodic inspections.** Contingent commanders carried out periodic inspection of armouries to ensure that the integrity of the facility remained intact at all times. Such inspections kept the unit quartermasters and unit commanders on their toes as regards arms and ammunition handling. Lapses observed during the inspections are immediately dealt with.

   c. **Accounting system.** A proper accounting system was put in place, which ensured that troops going out of the area of responsibility (AOR) for whatever reason could sign out their weapons and sign in on return. The accounting system also ensured a smooth transfer of duty between armourers. Although most of the armouries
remained almost empty because most troops were in possession of their weapons, it was still necessary to maintain a system to register every weapon that entered and left the armoury.

d. **Continuous training in ammunition management.** Continuous training in ammunition management is a necessity in the mission area. This was aimed at forestalling the poor handling of ammunition and explosives, which could pose grave danger to personnel and civilians in the case of explosion or pilferage.

e. **Marking of arms.** In an effort to further disincentivize COE loss and to trace lost COE should it occur, I introduced a marking system whereby each contingent weapon would be given a distinctive mark on the stock of the weapon (in the case of rifles) that would identify the contingent and unit.

f. **Temperature control.** Given the extreme temperatures in the region and the desert terrain, the temperature inside the armouries had to be kept suitable for the weapons and ammunition. Weapon cleaning was also conducted regularly because of constant accumulation of dust and sand particles in the chamber of weapons.

9. Under my command, I was not aware of any loss of COE outside of that resulting from military engagement with hostile forces that resulted in the peacekeepers’ loss of life, such as the deaths of 26 Chadians in February 2013 in the Ifoghas mountains in northern Mali.

10. In my role as force commander, I had a number of additional relevant observations concerning how COE was managed in this African-led operation, which lead to some recommendations about how to improve practices. These include the following:

a. **ECOWAS depended on TCCs with significantly different levels of professionalism and numbers and types of weapons, which created asymmetries between contingents and affected morale.** For, even with the best equipment, if it is not of sufficient quantity, mission effectiveness will be jeopardized, as troops will be reluctant to engage attacking forces.

b. **ECOWAS needs to have lists of equipment and schedules of reimbursement to avoid situations in which TCCs pledge what they do not have.** Furthermore, the ECOWAS schedule of reimbursement should be harmonized with that of the UN.

c. Relatedly, there is a need for templates that include compatible terms, as the interoperability of COE is key.

d. The multitude of languages within a mission can generate problems as contingents may not always understand commanders and important guidance on COE may get lost in translation.

e. Accountability and information on COE-related matters is needed at all levels.

f. A formal arms register could be used to catalog all of the arms holdings of a contingent in PSO. This is to ensure that the movement of arms within the contingent area
of responsibility can be monitored, as each contingent will have to sign for the use of such weapon, and state in the register the specific assignment for which they are to be employed. The arms register could be replicated and given to the COE team for their record and inspection, which could be done on monthly or quarterly basis.

g. The responsibility for the mandatory daily/routine monitoring of arms stockpiles should be solely the responsibility of a contingent logistic team. However, it is important that the report of such monitoring should be forwarded to the COE team for record keeping purposes and follow up verification. I wish to suggest here the need for a follow-up verification inspection by the team to confirm veracity.

h. Loss/damage to weapons cannot be ruled out in peace support operations. But it is important that when it occurs, national pride should not be an overriding factor. It is important to note that such weapons can end up in the hands of non-state actors. Therefore it is necessary that loss/damage of weapons should be reported and thoroughly investigated.

i. Faithful implementation of punitive and remedial actions is key in maintaining the integrity of a contingent in PSO. Where loss/damage occurs and investigations are thoroughly conducted, troops found culpable should be appropriately punished and mission headquarters informed. Such action could deter further incidents.

j. Cases of loss/damage to arms have occurred on a number of occasions from UN and regional peace operations; some of these cases were treated at the contingent level without recourse to mission headquarters. This practice is further encouraged by the lack of weapons and ammunitions management policy at either the UN or regional level. The formulation of such an important policy will in no small measure curtail a lot of cases, especially of loss of arms by contingents.

Nigeria’s illicit small arms control measures

11. This section describes Nigeria’s efforts to establish and maintain effective small arms control measures in line with international and regional instruments. Nigeria has made a number of multilateral commitments in recent years to address the flow of illicit small arms, including the 2001 UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol); the 2001 UN Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; the 2005 International Tracing Instrument (ITI); the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials; and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty. This work is coordinated by the national Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM), established in 2013.

12. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s reporting on its progress in implementing the PoA and ITI has been spotty. Between 2002 and 2016 Nigeria only submitted three national reports
in compliance with its obligations under the PoA (in 2005, 2008, and 2016) and two under the ITI (2008 and 2016). This represents an area for future improvement (Small Arms Survey and GRIP, 2017).

13. Current small arms legislation in Nigeria includes the Firearms Act (FA) of 1959 and the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act of 1984 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1990). The PRESCOM has proposed a Bill to replace FA 1959, which as of mid-2017 has passed second reading at the National Assembly. The FA 1959 thus remains the existing generic law for the control of SALWs in Nigeria and the legal backbone for the regulation of weapons and ammunition in the armed services and security agencies.

14. The FA expressly permits only the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN), the Nigeria Police (NP), and designated security agencies to possess arms and ammunition. Indeed, the FA prohibits the possession of any firearm by an individual, except by licence, on the approval of the President. However, the Inspector General of Police or a Commissioner of Police may exercise discretionary approval of the President to issue firearms subject to approval by the National Council of Ministers or State Governors, respectively. The FA also specifies fines and terms of imprisonment for illegal importation, possession, and manufacture of small arms and light weapons. Implementation is the responsibility of all security agencies but the roles of the AFN, NP, and Nigerian Custom Service at border entry points are crucial.

15. Despite the thoroughness of the legal framework, the law’s implementation has been hurt by bureaucratic bottlenecks in the processing of licences, rising insecurity, and relatively small fines for violations. Together, these inadvertently encourage an “amenable atmosphere” for the violations. Indeed, small arms also find their way into the civilian population due to a breakdown of state structures, lax control over legal armouries, and poor conditions of service of security personnel. This is why the military has created additional checks and balances.

16. Military regulations for the control of weapons and ammunition are typified by the operating procedures in the Nigerian Army (NA). The NA has a longstanding commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. This is in furtherance of its international security objectives, while at the same time ensuring that its defence obligations are met and the full range of its missions are fulfilled. The NA promotes this philosophy of security at the highest and lowest possible levels of forces. It therefore actively contributes to effective and verifiable arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts through its policies and activities.

17. Every unit in the NA is expected to have a standard procedure and armoury/magazine rules and regulations. These directives guide the control of arms and ammunition to units/soldier and cascade from Army Headquarters (AHQ) to the lowest level of the military engagement. The basic principles of these regulations are:
a. **Organisation and authority.** The Director of Army Policy and Plans (DAPP) at AHQ is responsible to the Chief of Army Staff for the control and general administration of arms, ammunition and other related equipment. He oversees a centralized Ordnance Depot for this purpose. Arms and ammunition are allocated to AHQ, Division, and Brigade garrisons as well as units as approved on a Combined Indent and Voucher Form AFB 1033 used for that purpose. These establishments maintain armouries managed by professional Armourers under the authority of their Commander.

b. **Security of armouries.** Armouries maintain exacting standards of safety as well as continuous defence in-depth. For instance, magazines are required to be monitored electronically and physically; seals are changed daily; and subjected to daily and routine checks.

c. **Personalisation of weapons.** The basic principle for the security, safety, and control in the NA is to dedicate weapons to personnel. This system facilitates record keeping as well as internal [*marking and tracing*](#).

d. **Record keeping.** The DAPP maintains a universal register of arms and ammunition holding in the NA while armourers maintain such registers in their Areas of Responsibility. The register includes such details as the type/class, quantity, calibre, disposition, location, operational status, unique identification number, and attached personnel.

e. **Conditions for issuance.** Weapons/ammunition are issued on a need-to-have basis. At all times, high calibre weapons are issued in-bulk to units only. In peacetime, weapons are issued to individuals on guard duties or exercises. Other individuals authorized to possess weapons are issued such weapons with assigned Control Numbers on AFB 1033. In times of conflict, weapons are assigned to personnel for the entire duration of operations.

f. **Monitoring.** In peacetime, unit weapon holdings are verified daily through the Issuing Register and periodically through a *Scale a Parade*. In times of conflict, units conduct daily *Stand To* at designated times. During these parades, personnel are required to assume the highest level of operational readiness and fall-in with their assigned personal weapons and ammunition including associated operational gears.

g. **Loss and damage procedures.** Units are obliged to formally report and thoroughly investigate damage/loss of weapons/ammunition to higher levels of command. All such cases are to be procedurally concluded before actions such as punishment, striking-off strength, or replacement are taken. The Armed Forces Act expressly forbids the loss of weapons/ammunition (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1975).

18. **Individual responsibility.** The NA personnel have certain obligations towards the control and handling of weapons and ammunition. These include:

a. *Zeroing* and *classification* of assigned weapons during Classification Exercises.

b. Physical security and safety for assigned weapons and ammunition during duty, exercise, or operations.
c. Ensuring good condition of assigned weapons.
d. Immediately report on damage/loss of weapons and ammunition to higher authority.

Conclusion

19. This paper provides my personal experience in MISMA/AFISMA, identifying some of the challenges that were specific to those missions relating to the deployment, handling, and storage of the missions’ lethal COE. It also provides a brief examination of the procedures for the control and handling of weapons and ammunition in the NA. These procedures are applicable in a peace operation field except as otherwise directed in the MoU or SOFA. The regulations draw strength from national and international goals of limiting the risks of global proliferation of SALWs as a means of improving global security. It is also evident that there is the absence of a clear weapons and ammunition management policy which makes it difficult to coordinate weapons and ammunition management in peace operations.

References

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Endnotes

1 Cf. the Secretary-General’s recommendation in UNSC (2013, Recommendation 3, p. 6/19) to ‘improve weapons stockpile management and reduce diversion of weapons into illicit use’. Here the Secretary-General is talking specifically about using ‘new technologies, such as time limitation or geographical limitation devices, or biometric or radio frequency identification’ to achieve better stockpile management, but the basic plea is the same.

2 For a discussion of the entry of women into the Senegalese Army, see Colombant (2009).

3 The loss of a firearm triggers two types of proceedings:
   - **Disciplinary proceedings**, which mean opening a disciplinary file (military sanction) in the place where the person guilty of the misconduct is located. A brief description of the circumstances in which the loss occurred is prepared. This enables the various ranks to which the ‘punishment report’ is sent to come to a decision on the nature of the loss and to recommend suitable penalties. In the event of wilful misconduct, the accused may be sent before a court of inquiry with a view to being dismissed from the army. This is the worst penalty that can be imposed. A complaint may also lead to the accused appearing before a court martial.
   - **Administrative proceedings**, which involve opening a file known as a management file. This enables the Military Equipment Department to recommend administrative measures (removal of the firearm from the registers of the unit concerned) and financial measures (reimbursement by the person responsible for all or any part of the price of the lost firearm).

   When, due to the circumstances of the loss of the firearm, it is not possible to identify the person responsible (in the event of theft), the matter is referred to the police, who will investigate. When the disciplinary, management, or police investigation files show that the security measures relating to firearms were not applied correctly, sanctions may be imposed on the responsible authority (the company or battalion commander). It should be noted that arms should always be kept under surveillance: the weapons store guard must remain in the weapons store at all times.

4 Prior to the introduction of the 2014 manual, there was a ‘previous methodology whereby troop/police contributors were reimbursed based on the in and out surveys and depreciation of equipment’ (UN, 2014, I, para. 1).
A no-fault incident is defined as an incident resulting from a mishap that is not ‘attributable to willful misconduct or gross negligence, on the part of an operator/custodian of equipment’ (UN, 2014, ch. 2, annex A, para. 26).

The credibility of the expenditure of ammunition declared by contingents after an exchange of fire can only be measured by reference to the circumstances of the exchange: duration, evaluation of the adversary’s manpower, report on the exchange, etc. The assessment criteria are based on the notion of ‘unit of fire: UF’ (a logistical norm used in traditional wars determining the daily expenditure of ammunition per firearm) and experience. In the example given, the expenditure of ammunition declared by the contingent was disproportionate to the nature of the incident and the results of the shots fired. The reasons behind this declaration are yet to be determined.

It is possible to imagine that arms and ammunition have been lost during MINUSMA’s deployment as the result of accidents or mines exploding beneath vehicles (damaged or stolen arms) or when UN positions have been attacked (arms taken from injured or dead soldiers, etc.).

A firearm lost by the Guatemalan contingent in a serious engagement with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Garamba National Park was later found in the possession of dead LRA combatants, which confirmed several hypotheses about the engagement.