

Bosnia and Herzegovina



1 SALW problem

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) faces a number of important challenges related to SALW control at the present time. These include the ready availability of illicit SALW; some difficulties with inter-agency co-ordination at the state level; inconsistent legislation governing civilian weapons possession; and ongoing problems with the management of large surplus stocks of weaponry and ammunition. In addition, the national system for arms transfer control is currently under development, and some gaps in capacity, legislation and practice still remain.

According to recent research, a significant proportion of Bosnians possess firearms, many of which (perhaps three quarters) are unregistered.¹ The widespread availability of SALW in BiH is obviously of significant concern, given their destabilising potential. Further, both organised crime and an unregulated private security industry continue to pose a threat to both the rule of law and to human security.

The highly complex constitutional arrangement of BiH has undermined SALW control in the country in a number of ways.² For example, although the production of SALW is regulated in BiH at state level by the *Law on Production of Arms and Military Equipment*,³ civilian firearms possession is regulated differently in the entity of Republika Srpska (RS), the Federation of BiH (FBiH), and within the district of Brcko. Accordingly, there is currently a desire within BiH for the introduction of state-level legislation to harmonise civilian possession rules across all cantons and entities.⁴ Similarly, the array of actors who play a role in the regulation of international arms transfers to, and from, BiH creates potential for confusion. For example, national, entity, cantonal and international institutions, including the Ministries

¹ Bonn International Centre for Conversion, *Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey Bosnia and Herzegovina*, (BICC, July 2004), pp. 19-23 (hereafter *SALW Survey BiH*).

² As a result of the Dayton Accord, BiH is divided into two entities, the mainly Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Serb dominated Republika Srpska (RS). There is a three-person Presidency at the state level and an international governance structure, headed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which maintains overall control over the country. However, in late 2005, a consensus was reached to achieve agreement on key constitutional changes during 2006.

³ *Official Gazette of BiH* No. 09/04, 29 March 2004.

⁴ *Reporting and the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects*, (2005) (hereafter *PoA Report 2005*). Available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/nationalreports/2005/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.pdf> accessed 18 May 2006.

of Security, Defence and Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Affairs (MOFTER), take responsibility for various elements of the authorisation, sale and shipment of arms transfers. Ownership of these processes by national actors is naturally diminished by the fact that EUFOR maintains ultimate control in many areas. In addition, the relationships between the state of BiH and its two entities are especially complicated with regard to SALW transfers, as each level shares responsibility for all elements of SALW transfer.

Further, although the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports have been included in various pieces of national legislation, there are indications that the various mechanisms contained within it are neither fully understood nor substantively implemented. Key problems in this regard include a lack of inter-agency consultation when considering arms transfer licence applications (which though not a Code requirement, forms part of EU Best Practice); inadequate referencing of the EU Code's export criteria in key pieces of legislation; and a lack of clarity in the application of the Code with respect to transfers of dual-use goods and technology in both law and practice. Ministry of Security (MoS) officials have also raised concerns that current border controls with respect to SALW transfers are not satisfactory due to a lack of trained customs officials, which results in arbitrary implementation of current legislation. The MoS has therefore expressed a desire to reduce the total number of border crossings at which transfer of SALW is permissible to only five, with an added requirement that any intended transfer be pre-registered.⁵

Recently however, transfers of SALW to destinations that are unstable or present a significant diversion risk have proved highly controversial. According to recent reports, between July 2004 and August 2005, around 290,000 weapons and 64 million rounds of ammunition were exported by the BiH MoD, many of them to arm the new security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁶ Given the ongoing violence in both countries, and growing evidence that some Iraqi police and army recruits have collaborated with militias and rebel groups, concerns have been voiced that these SALW may have been diverted and misused. Unfortunately, without provision having been made by EUFOR or the BiH MoD to physically verify and monitor the end-use of these shipments, this possibility cannot be ruled out. Concerns have also been raised by SEESAC and UNDP Bosnia about a lack of transparency on the part of the BiH MoD during 2004 - 2005, since the above transfers ran completely counter to agreements brokered between the MoD and UNDP Bosnia to destroy the bulk of the Bosnian armed forces' surplus SALW.⁷ The Bosnian Government published reports on national arms transfer practices for both 2003 and 2004 early in the following year. Unfortunately, the report for 2005 is as yet unpublished, though it is understood that one will eventually be produced.

In addition to the significant concerns surrounding SALW transfers, the ongoing need for Bosnia's armed forces to ensure the security of large, and in some cases unstable

⁵ Interview, Ministry of Security representative, 25 April 2006.

⁶ More recently, in May 2006, a request was made by the US Administration for the MoD of BiH to give 8,500 AK-47s and 39 mm cartridges to Afghanistan. Interviews with several representatives from international organisations, April 2006.

⁷ According to reports by Amnesty International and BBC Radio 4, these exports were arranged at the behest of the US Government, without the knowledge and support of UNDP and SEESAC, and against the wishes of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). See BBC Radio Four, 'File on 4' report, 23 May 2006. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/file_on_4/5006196.stm, accessed 25 May 2006 and Amnesty International, *Dead on Time - arms transportation, brokering and the threat to human rights*, 10 May 2006. Available at: [http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ACT300082006ENGLISH/\\$File/ACT3000806.pdf](http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ACT300082006ENGLISH/$File/ACT3000806.pdf), accessed 24 May 2006.

ammunition stocks, presents safety and security challenges. Storage standards remain below those used by NATO countries, largely as a result of the design of the depots and the lack of professionally trained staff.⁸ Some storage sites are also physically inadequate, and problems such as water leakage, have led to a situation in which ammunition may have become unstable.⁹ Security is also less than perfect, largely due to insufficient financial resources.¹⁰ This issue is of particular concern considering the theft of 5,000 explosive detonators from the Jahorinski Potok site in October 2005,¹¹ items that are of particular interest to organised crime and terrorist groups for use in improvised explosive devices (IED). Unfortunately, much-needed ammunition destruction programmes in BiH are also hampered by the country's constitutional setup, since the true extent of BiH's ammunition stockpiles and surpluses cannot be determined until politically difficult reforms of the country's armed forces is complete.¹²

2 SALW policy and practice

Over recent years, the Government of BiH has shown a degree of commitment towards international arms control, acceding to a number of documents and initiatives (see Table 1). As discussed above, difficulties arising from the complicated political system in BiH continue to present a challenge for those attempting to address the issue of SALW proliferation in the country. However, in October 2005, the previously informal Coordinating Body for SALW was endorsed and made operational as the Coordination Board for Control of SALW (CB).¹³ Composed of representatives from the BiH MoS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defence (MoD), MOFTER, Tax Authority, and the Entity level Ministries of Defence and Interior, the CB meets on an *ad hoc*, but regular basis, and has made significant progress since its inception, most notably in developing a National Strategy for SALW Control that was subsequently approved by the Council of Ministers in May 2006.¹⁴

⁸ Interview with EUFOR personnel: J Botelho; Captain Sinconi (Carabinieri) and Colonel Ozuak, Sarajevo, 27 April 2006.

⁹ It is estimated that between 30 and 40 Tonnes of ammunition is unstable due to this problem. Interview with EUFOR personnel, *Op Cit*.

¹⁰ SALW Survey BiH, p. 52.

¹¹ However, it should be noted that the stolen items were recovered within days of their theft. Interview with EUFOR personnel: J Botelho; Captain Sinconi (Carabinieri) and Colonel Ozuak, Sarajevo, 27 April 2006.

¹² Interview with EUFOR personnel: J Botelho; Captain Sinconi (Carabinieri) and Colonel Ozuak, Sarajevo, 27 April 2006.

¹³ 'Decision on Naming the National Coordinating Agency for SALW', *Official Gazette of BiH*, No. 72/05, (17 October 2005), p. 5536.

¹⁴ Correspondence with Svetozar Miletic, SALW NFP.

ARMS OR SALW CONTROL AGREEMENT	BIH'S COMMITMENTS
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports	2002
OSCE Document on SALW	November 2000
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition	November 2003
OSCE Decision on MANPADS	2003
OSCE Decision on End User Certificates	2004
OSCE Decision on Brokering	2004
Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	November 2001
UN Firearms Protocol	No
UN Programme of Action on SALW	2001
UN Register of Conventional Arms	Submitted returns since 1999 (with the exception of 2003)

Table 1: Bosnia and Herzegovina's commitments to arms or SALW control agreements

3. SALW progress 2005–2006

3.1 Legislative and Regulatory Issues

Transfer controls

In July 2005, following large shipments of surplus SALW in 2004 - 2005 (see above), a legal moratorium on the export of surplus SALW eventually entered into force.¹⁵ Six months later, in January 2006, the EU lifted the embargo on arms exports to BiH, thus legalising such transfers from EU member states. The underlying legal foundation for arms transfers to, and from, BiH, is the *Law on Import and Export of Arms and Military Equipment*, which was amended in 2005¹⁶ and incorporates the EC Dual-Use Regulation.¹⁷ This is reinforced by a series of 'Instructions' and a 'Direction' enacted in July 2005, which seek to better regulate transfers of arms and military equipment, and assist the Customs authorities in the execution of their duties.¹⁸ Among the most important of the regulatory changes introduced in 2005 is the requirement for end-user certificates to be presented by applicants wishing

¹⁵ 'Instruction on the definition and obligation to comply with deadlines on the prohibition of trade of small arms and light weapons of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina', declared pursuant to Article 99 paragraph 3 of the 'Law on Administration', *Official Gazette BiH* No. 32/02 and Articles 14 f), 16 a), 40 c) and g) and 80 of the 'Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Official Gazette BiH* No. 43/03.

¹⁶ *Official Gazette BiH*, No. 05/03, 33/03, 14/05.

¹⁷ 'Council Regulation 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology'. *Official Journal L* 159, 30 June 2000 p. 0001 – 0215. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000R1334:EN:HTML> accessed 22 May 2006.

¹⁸ 'Instruction Regulating the Procedures of Export, Import and Transit in the trade of Dual Use Items and Technologies', No. 01-1-02-8706/05, (05 July 2005); 'Instruction on the Methodology and Procedure of Regulating the Temporary Import, Temporary Export and Transit of Sports and Hunting Weapons and Ammunition', No. 01-01-02-8705/05, (05 July 2005); 'Instruction on Regulating Export, Import, Transit and Mediation in Trade of Armaments and Military Equipment', No. 01-1-02-8703/05, (05 July 2005); 'Instruction on the Obligations of Customs Authorities in the Implementation of the Law on Import and Export of Arms and Military Equipment and the Control of Export and Import of Dual Use Items', No. 01-1-02-8702/05, (05 July 2005); 'Direction on the Obligations to Obtain the EUFOR Permit for Export, Import, Transit and Mediation in the Arms and Military Equipment Trade', No. 01-1-02-8704/05, (05 August 2005).

to transfer arms, and an accompanying requirement for the Government of BiH to be informed of any re-transfer.¹⁹

FEATURES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA'S LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK	BIH
NATIONAL	
National Co-coordinating Agency	Yes
National Point of Contact	Yes, MFA
LAWS AND PROCEDURES ON PRODUCTION, IMPORT, EXPORT AND TRANSIT	
Legislation	Yes
Production	Yes
Export	Yes
Import	Yes
Transit	Yes
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF EXPORT AND IMPORT LICENSING OR AUTHORISATION	
Diversion risk	Yes, MFA to assess
End User Certificate	Yes
Verification (pre/post)	Yes
Brokering Controls	Yes
Verification (pre/post)	Yes
DOMESTIC POSSESSION, STOCKPILING & TRADE	
Manufacture	Federation
	RS
	Brcko District
Marking and Tracing	Yes for 'hand firearms', e.g. rifles, handguns, revolvers ²⁰
Possession	Federation
	RS
	Brcko District
Stockpiling	No, there is only limited reference to safe storage of possessed weapons by civilians and trading entities in the possession legislation of the entities and Brcko District.
Trade	Federation
	RS
	Brcko District

Table 2: Features of Bosnia and Herzegovina's legislative and regulatory framework

¹⁹ Interview with Berin Kurspahic, MOFTER, 25 April 2006.

²⁰ The 'Law on Testing, Stamping and Marking Hand Fire Arms and Ammunition' (Official Gazette of BiH, No.21/03) rules that all 'hand firearms', whether manufactured in BiH or imported from abroad, must be tested, stamped and marked according to its provisions (Article 1). Exceptions to this general rule are laid down in Article 4.

Domestic possession and use

There have been no reported changes to legislation or regulation in this area for the 2005 period.

3.2 SALW Collection programmes and capacities

Since 1999, there has been a continual amnesty, 'Operation Harvest', in force throughout the territory of BiH for those citizens who voluntarily surrender illicit SALW. Focusing largely on populous areas, 'Operation Harvest' is administered in conjunction with 'Operation Harvest Plus', a search and seizure programme designed to collect illegal SALW. According to EUFOR interviewees, collection mechanisms have recently begun to target rural areas as well. From 2005 to 2006, EUFOR reports that 2,500 weapons have been collected and destroyed as a result of Operation Harvest.²¹

3.3 SALW Destruction programmes and capacities

BiH maintains destruction capabilities at several sites, including the Mittal Steel Zenica factory, Steel factory Jelsingrad Banja Luka (weapons) and the UNIS Prentis facility (ammunition). Current destruction programmes are mainly administered by UNDP, and funded by the British Government²² and the Government of the Netherlands.²³

EUFOR are currently investigating opportunities for destruction programmes at new sites such as the BiH MoD's 'GOF 18' factory, which would prove capable of destroying artillery shells and cartridges with some modifications,²⁴ although this is contrary to the demilitarization plan developed by UNDP and the findings of a 2004 demilitarization feasibility study. As well as funding the operation of a mobile explosive waste incinerator (EWI),²⁵ UNDP is also working to upgrade demolition grounds, such as those at BiH Kalinovik, Manjaca and Glamoc.²⁶

Despite previously noted difficulties, significant progress has been made with the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition since mid-2005 (see Table 3).

²¹ Interview with EUFOR personnel: J Botelho; Captain Sinconi (Carabinieri) and Colonel Ozuak, Sarajevo, 27 April 2006.

²² The UK Government has given US \$ 955,000 to aid destruction efforts in BiH. http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_article&ArticleID=216 accessed 18 May 2006.

²³ The Netherlands has provided € 440,000 for ammunition disposal. http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_article&ArticleID=216 accessed 18 May 2006.

²⁴ Interview with EUFOR personnel: J Botelho; Captain Sinconi (Carabinieri) and Colonel Ozuak, 27 April 2006.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ The Kalinovik upgrade is part of a project in which 88 Tonnes of unstable ammunition will eventually be destroyed. SEESAC, *Clearing Guns*, December 2005, p. 7 (hereafter *Clearing Guns*, December 2005). Available at: http://www.seesac.org/Newsletter_December_2005.pdf, accessed 22 May 2006.

EXECUTING AGENCY	SALW	AMMUNITION	REMARKS
UNDP SACBiH	29,988 (Army FBiH) ²⁷		Observed by CSS, Sarajevo
UNDP SACBiH	53,300 (Army RS) ²⁸		Observed by CSS, Sarajevo
UNDP SACBiH	5,599 ²⁹		Destroyed in Mittal Steel Zenica.
UNDP SACBiH		132 Tonnes (120 mm and 82 mm)	Destroyed at UNIS Prentis
UNDP SACBiH	3,011		SALW collected through Operation Harvest
UNDP SACBiH		55 Tonnes of Nitrocellulose ammunition	
UNDP SACBiH / EUFOR		700 anti-tank mines ³⁰	Destroyed at UNIS Prentis
Army of RS		4 Tonnes ³¹	Witnessed by EUFOR. Part of the Defence Reform Commission's programme to reduce munitions.
TOTAL	91,898	191 Tonnes	

Table 3: Summary of SALW Destruction in BiH during 2005-2006 ³²

3.4 SALW Stockpile Management programmes and capacities

BiH currently maintains 24 storage depots for weapons and 30 for ammunition.³³ The BiH MoD has also formulated a proposal, in co-operation with NATO, to reduce the number to just seven sites, but this is unachievable to acceptable safety standards whilst the current large stockpiles of ammunition and explosives exist. Since 2005, responsibility for the maintenance and security of military depots has been assumed by the Entity components of the BiH Armed Forces (the FBiH Army and the RS Army).³⁴ From 01 January 2006, this responsibility has been assumed by the armed forces of BiH. The MoD and armed forces of BiH are currently undergoing restructuring and are expected to declare a surplus of around 35,000 Tonnes of ammunition in July 2006. Of these stocks, 250 million rounds

²⁷ Amna Berbic, UNDP BiH.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Clearing Guns*, December 2005, p. 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Amna Berbic, UNDP BiH.

³² Destruction figures were obtained from several organisations in BiH. Any discrepancies have been resolved by using data from the lead agency for SALW Destruction, UNDP.

³³ Interview with EUFOR personnel, *Op Cit.*

³⁴ Interview with Mr Mehmed Hrnjic, Chief of the Sector for the Infrastructure Management in the Department for Supplies and Logistics, Ministry of Defence BiH, Sarajevo, 15 February 2005.

will likely be small arms ammunition.³⁵ A surplus of around 250,000 weapons was also anticipated,³⁶ but this is very likely to be much reduced due to transfers to the USA.

As previously noted, weapon and ammunition storage depots do not meet minimum safety and security standards, let alone those of NATO. EUFOR reports that there has been progressive improvement in inventory management in recent years,³⁷ though SEESAC remains concerned as neither EUFOR nor the AFBiH have been able to provide agreed stockpile statistics to UNDP for over a year.³⁸ Stockpiles are currently managed according to national 'instructions', and NATO guidelines,³⁹ and improvements have been facilitated by EUFOR-organised training programmes as well as *ad hoc* inspections. In October 2005, eleven officers and ten non-commissioned officers qualified as military site inspectors. No changes have been made to procedures regulating the safeguarding of stockpiles during the last year.

3.5 SALW Awareness activities

SALW Awareness activities are conducted by both EUFOR (public information only) and civil society in BiH. For example, EUFOR public information campaigns are always carried out using the mass media prior to an Operation Harvest collection operation.⁴⁰ Within civil society, the EU and UK Government funded project 'Challenging insecurity: engaging civil society in decision making on arms control and community safety' has been implemented in BiH since early 2005. As part of the project, the NGO Centre for Security Studies (CSS) opened a resource centre in September 2005 at their office, which functions as an accessible source of material on SALW, arms control, SSR and wider security and conflict issues. The centre is regularly used by students at the University of Sarajevo and is also available on the CSS website. In addition to the 'Challenging insecurity' project, there has been significant civil society involvement in this area in 2005 (see Table 4).

³⁵ Interview with EUFOR personnel, *Op Cit*.

³⁶ SEESAC, *Clearing Guns*, April 2006, p. 6 (hereafter *Clearing Guns* April 2006). Available at: http://www.seesac.org/Newsletter_April_2006.pdf, accessed 22 May 2006.

³⁷ Interview with EUFOR personnel, *Op Cit*.

³⁸ Adrian Wilkinson, Head SEESAC, 02 June 2006. SEESAC have made numerous requests for statistics on weapons exports and stockpile levels during 2005, and have been waiting for agreed statistics on ammunition stockpiles by Tonnes (All Up Weight) since September 2004.

³⁹ 'Instruction on Storing, Safekeeping and Maintenance of the Ammunition and Lethal Devices, and The NATO Handbook on Security Principles for the Storing of the Military Ammunition and Explosives'. *UN PoA Report 2005*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ Interview with EUFOR personnel, *Op Cit*.

DATES AND LOCATION	ORGANISATION	PROJECT TITLE	TYPE OF PROJECT	COMMENTS
Aug–Oct 2005, Canton of Sarajevo and Eastern Sarajevo	CSS	Increasing awareness of school children on the dangers related to the possession and handling of SALW	Awareness raising project/art workshop	Approximately 1,500 children were involved. The project was financed by the Swiss Embassy, Sarajevo.
Dec 2005–Jan 2006	CSS	'Campaign against Celebratory Gunfire'	Campaign to decrease the incidents of such gunfire over the holiday period and thus reduce casualties	Funded by UNDP. This campaign succeeded in reducing celebratory gunfire casualties from 14 in 2004/2005 to only two in 2005/2006. ⁴¹
Ongoing	Handicap International in co-operation with the Ministries of Education	SALW Risk Education Curriculum for Schools	Project to develop and implement an education curriculum for school children on the risks associated with SALW and landmines	
Ongoing	UNDP (SACBiH)	'Small Arms, Light Weapons and Ammunition Control and Destruction': 'Sensitise the BiH population'	Grassroots awareness-raising campaign to increase understanding among citizens with respect to the dangers posed by SALW	

Table 4: Summary of SALW Awareness activities, 2005/2006

3.6 SALW Survey activities

The only research on SALW issues known to have been carried out during 2005- 2006 is a national analysis of legislation and practice in the field of arms exports and transfers, currently being undertaken by Saferworld in line with the European Commission (EC) developed 'Western Balkans Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control Support Plan'. This study, due to be published in mid 2006, will include a series of recommendations designed to ensure that the legislative framework is compliant with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

3.7 Civil society involvement in SALW interventions

As noted above, there has been significant involvement from civil society on SALW issues over the last few years, most notably by CSS. As part of CSS's involvement in SEENCA, the South Eastern Europe Network for the Control of Arms, staff from the organisation have attended the UN Programme of Action Biennial Meeting of States and Preparatory Conference in New York in July 2005 and January 2006, working alongside other NGOs to

⁴¹ *Clearing Guns* April 2006, p. 16.

lobby government delegations for the development and elaboration of the PoA document. In August 2005, CSS lobbied the BiH Authorities for the signing and ratification of the UN Firearms Protocol, and in January 2006, the organisation petitioned the MFA to support the international campaign for an Arms Transfer Treaty (ATT) and to work for more detailed provisions on the control of international arms transfers within the scope of the UN PoA. Further, since the inception of the CB, CSS has held the status of 'observer', and has provided comments on Bosnia's National SALW Strategy. The organisation has also observed UNDP administered weapons destruction during 2005.

As part of the 'Challenging insecurity' project, CSS has also founded a National Arms Control Working Group (NAWCG), which currently has five members; CSS, Handicap International, the Red Cross BiH, Genesis (Banja Luka) and the Campaign for Conscientious Objection (Sarajevo). Regular communication and meetings allow the members to co-ordinate their activities and jointly monitor governmental policy and practice. In contrast to the work of the NGO sector, however, Bosnian academics and journalists are not typically active in this field.

3.8 Cross-border SALW control initiatives

BiH has displayed an ongoing commitment to co-operative partnerships aimed at controlling illegal trafficking and organised crime. In addition to a number of bilateral agreements in this area,⁴² an 'Instruction' pertaining to Customs activities in the implementation of transfer legislation was passed by the Government in 2005.⁴³

3.9 SALW Management Information and exchange systems and protocols

According to the Bosnian National Focal Point (NFP) for SALW, in the past year BiH has exchanged SALW-related information internationally with the EU, OSCE, and UN DDA, as well as with key partners within the region.⁴⁴ Further, reporting mechanisms on arms exports are now being improved. Following their attendance at a regional Arms Export Reporting Seminar in February 2006, BiH officials agreed to produce future annual reports on arms exports in a manner consistent with the EU Code of Conduct. If fulfilled, this commitment will, as a result of improved reporting procedures, increase the levels of transparency relating to this issue.⁴⁵

⁴² For example, with Hungary, Turkey, and Croatia. *UN PoA Report 2005*, p. 15.

⁴³ 'Instruction on the obligations of customs authorities in the implementation of the Law on Import and Export on Arms and Military Equipment and the Control of Export and Import of Dual Use Items', *Official Gazette BiH*, No. 01-1-02-8702/05, (05 July 2005).

⁴⁴ Correspondence with Svetozar Miletic, SALW NFP.

⁴⁵ Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, Head SEESAC.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PROTOCOLS	BiH
INTERNATIONAL	
Reporting to the UN DDA on the Programme of Action (PoA)	2005
Reporting to the UN Register of Conventional Arms	2004 (submitted in 2005)
Reporting to the Wassenaar Arrangement	NA. BiH is not a member, but claims to respect the Best Practice Guidelines for Exports.
INTERPOL/EUROPOL	Yes/Yes
REGIONAL	
OSCE Document on SALW	Yes
Information exchange with EU	-
SECI Regional Centre intelligence exchange	Yes
Other states	Yes
NATIONAL	
Transparency on SALW imports, exports and decision-making	Yes. All legislation published in the Official Gazette of BiH.
Publication of national reports on arms/SALW transfers	Yes. Report produced by MOFTER.
Publication of SALW national strategy	Yes, limited strategy detailed in UN PoA Report.

Table 5: Information systems and protocols

3.10 Additional SALW related activities

UNDP has recently developed a SALW Control and Reduction Project (SACBiH), which is designed to promote and assist in various areas of SALW reduction and control. Endorsed by the CB, this four-year plan also has a capacity-building element, with state-level institutions as the intended beneficiaries.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ UN PoA Report 2005, p. 3.

