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Norway

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Introduction

THIS PAPER IS MAINLY BASED on information from Norwegian Government ministries and agencies involved in the stockpile management and disposal of surplus small arms and light weapons (SALW). In the few cases where additional sources have been used, this is indicated in a footnote. Where the requested information could not be obtained due to confidentiality, this is indicated in the text.

Norway's national rules and regulations regarding SALW were considered to be in accordance with the OSCE Document when it was adopted in November 2000. Generally speaking, Norwegian policies and practices regarding the management and disposal of surplus SALW have therefore remained unchanged since its adoption and there are currently no plans to alter existing practices. At the same time, the OSCE Document has helped focus the attention of national authorities on norms, standards and best practice in this area.

Stocks and determination of surplus

National stocks of SALW and ammunition

Norwegian legislation allows two Government agencies to hold SALW in their inventory: the Norwegian Armed Forces and the Norwegian Police Force. Some 300,000 SALW are currently held by the Armed Forces. The amount of SALW ammunition in their inventory is considered confidential information, and was therefore not available for this survey.

In total, some 14,000 SALW and 2.4 million rounds of ammunition are held in storage for the Police Force. The Police Procurement Service (PPS) controls all stored weapons and ammunition used by the Police Force. As a standard operating procedure, the Police Force carries out its duties unarmed. Consequently, all SALW and ammunition held by the Police are normally stored in designated sites. Most stocks of SALW and ammunition are stored at the headquarters of the various police districts, while a relatively small number are stored in central facilities at the PPS. Under certain task-related circumstances, Norwegian legislation allows the Police Force to carry weapons. The approval of high-level officials (normally the Chief of a police district) is necessary for SALW and ammunition to be signed out of storage for use during a specific task. At the end of such a mission, the SALW are returned to designated storage sites under close control by officials. All transfers in and out of storage are registered.

No private people or organisations are allowed to hold SALW as defined by the OSCE.

Determination of surplus stocks

The Government distinguishes between weapons in active service, weapons in reserve, and surplus weapons – with surplus holdings being reviewed on an annual basis.

The Defence Command Norway is authorised to define and identify surplus stocks of SALW and ammunition in the inventory of the Armed Forces, while this authority rests with the PPS for weapons and ammunition in use by the police.

Surplus SALW and ammunition can arise due to a number of reasons, including technological change, changing missions and military reductions. However, technological changes and military reductions/structural reform are normally used as criteria for defining surplus stocks in the Armed Forces, while expiry and technological innovation are the most common reasons for defining surplus stocks in the Police Force.

Policies

Export of SALW and ammunition

National/OSCE common export control criteria and other international commitments

Norway controls the export of SALW on the basis of national legislation for armaments, equipment and technology, including the Act of 18 December 1987 relating to control of the export of strategic goods, services, technology. Export control practices are strict, taking into account criteria such as international security, stability and non-proliferation concerns. No licences are issued to embargoed destinations or areas of concern.

Norway follows the criteria and principles of the EU Code of Conduct, the UN Register on Conventional Arms Transfers, The Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and various regional initiatives.

Types of licences

An individual licence, issued by the licensing authority (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) authorises the export of one or several pieces to a recipient upon application. Collective licences are not issued for defence-related exports.

Number of licences and members of staff

15 SALW licences that led to exports were issued in 2001. Three MFA employees are engaged in the export licensing procedures for every licence issued. Transfer records are kept for 10 years.

Period of validity, revocation and exceptions

The period of validity for SALW export licences is normally up to three months. Licences for temporary export are issued in cases of repairs, demonstrations and exhibition purposes.

Licences are not required when SALW are used by national contingents participating in peacekeeping operations and military training exercises. Private persons on temporary travel with legally owned weapons are exempted from the licence requirements.

An export licence granted in accordance with the regulations may be revoked if the licence holder to a considerable extent misuses the licence or to a considerable extent fails to fulfil the terms specified therein. A licence may also be revoked if new facts or changes in the facts become known, or the political situation in the recipient state or area changes, so that the basis on which permission was granted is significantly altered. General rules concerning the reversal of individual decisions also apply.

End-use, verification and re-transfer

An End User Certificate, International Import Certificate or other official authorisation issued by the receiving state is required. Verification can be carried out when there is reason to suspect a violation of export control rules. In certain cases, re-transfer is restricted by a specific clause in the End User Certificate.

Assistance

Provision of assistance to other states with regard to export controls occurs in the form of bilateral talks and co-operation between Norwegian and different foreign authorities such as export control officials, customs officials etc.

Law enforcement and penalties

According to the Act of 18 December 1987 relating to control of the export of strategic goods, services, technology, persons resident or staying in Norway, as well as Norwegian companies, foundations and associations, are prohibited from trading, negotiating or otherwise assisting in the sale of arms and defence materiel from one foreign country to another without special permission. Unless the matter is subject to a more severe penalty otherwise provided by statute, a penalty may be imposed of fines or imprisonment for up to five years, or both.

Storage of SALW and ammunition

Legislation or regulations covering stockpile security issues:

- Basic Regulations on the Responsibilities Concerning Stockpile Security (MoD, KtF I/12 1976)
- MoD Regulations on Stockpiling and Securing of Attractive Materiel (MoD, KtF I/8 1976)
- MoD Regulations for the Arming of Civilian Guards (MoD, KtF I/2 1978)
- Chief of Defence Directive for the Stockpiling and Securing of Armed Forces Equipment. (CHOD DSFM 1976)
- Chief of Defence Guidelines for the Stockpiling and Safekeeping of Materiel and Documents (VSF)
- Service Regulations for the Armed Forces Class 7 – materiel management (Tff KI 7)
- Regulations on the linking of electronic alarms to local police units (Dep of Justice, 27 Feb 1980)
- Various local regulations

Storage safety measures

There are four defined protection levels for military materiel in storage. The defined protection levels have two elements: physical security and surveillance. Dangerous or attractive materiel should be kept at protection level II or better (reinforced concrete and protection delaying an intruder for at least 30 minutes), unless they are at sites with continuous surveillance.

Storage buildings are increasingly centralised. The areas are restricted, no-photo zones and they do not appear on public maps. Arms and ammunition are stored separately, but weapons are stored assembled in the central depots. Locks are of an approved non-pickable type. Keys are kept in safes, and are signed in and out. Storage doors have double locks and are built with measures to delay cutting by torch or grinding tools.

Stores are fenced in, and most have alarm systems and continuous lighting. The alarm systems are centralised in regions. All central depots have alarm systems giving silent

alarm to a central alarm point. These systems are subject to quality control. Local, smaller sites may still have alarms without systematic follow-up, but the number of such sites is decreasing.

The site chief is responsible for granting access to the storage site. He formally authorises all personnel requesting admittance including visitors. The site chief has an obligation to judge the competence and the physical and psychological fitness of his staff. Furthermore, access can only be granted if there is a professional need, and all military and civilian personnel requesting admittance are subject to security clearance.

The authorisation for access is in most cases general, with keys to the arms and ammunition stores being available during working hours against signature. Within military units at company level, the same person may be allowed access to both the arms and ammunition store. Within the logistics organisation, the same person never has access to both arms and ammunition. Personnel not belonging to the site are normally escorted inside storage buildings.

Weapons held by the Police are mainly kept in a storage facility monitored and controlled by the PPS. Storage, registration, transport and management of these weapons are regulated by internal rules and routines.

Inspections of storage facilities

Storage buildings are inspected daily by verifying from the outside that no intrusion has taken place. The frequency of inspections may vary depending on access to the location, content, intrusion protection and alarm. The inspections are carried out by military guards or civilians hired for the task. The unit responsible for the storage performs periodic overall inspections of materiel, buildings, fencing and surroundings. These take place at intervals ranging from one week to two months in length depending on the site's contents, intrusion protection and alarm. The central defence authorities perform a main inspection at intervals of less than four years. These inspections entail a systematic revision of buildings and materiel, the storage site, stockpile accounts and all paperwork.

Registration, inventory management and accounting control procedures

All weapons, including stored weapons, are registered in central databases and remain in these databases until every weapon of a specific type has been destroyed, lost or otherwise disposed of. Full records are kept of holdings, use, expenditure and disposal. The records are kept for at least 10 years after the last entry. The transaction history for ammunition is available longer for logistic purposes. Central defence authorities inspect records at least once every four years as mentioned above. The local commanders, however, are responsible for the local, smaller scale inspections, and decide how frequently they take place.

Theft or loss

There are procedures for the reporting of losses. Thefts are reported to the civil police, who are responsible for the investigation. There are also routines for reporting within the Armed Forces. Embezzlement is generally rather complicated to discover and prove.

There are plans for physical protection, alarm systems, response to detected intrusions, and detailed checks of records. Programmes for increasing physical security have been going on for decades.

Very few thefts have been reported over the last 10 years. Cases of disciplinary action based on negligence in the performance of duties are also extremely rare. No statistics are available on either type of incident.

Security measures for emergency situations

With regard to security measures, the depot staff depend entirely on alarm systems. There are reaction plans for sites equipped with alarm systems, and they are practised regularly. Some sites have assigned military response forces, while others depend on police response. The time for response may be relative to the level of physical protection of the site.

General training on security and stockpile management is provided for staff. Basic training programmes are provided to all ammunition personnel, and specialised training to personnel in key positions. Staff are trained to handle emergency situations like fires and accidents, but there is currently no specific training for depot staff with regard to armed attacks.

Transportation security

There are regulations for transporting ammunition, mainly concerning explosive safety. Arms and ammunition are never transported in the same vehicle. Arms are rarely disabled before transportation. The transports are planned in advance, and only the depots involved know the transportation route and arrival time. The transport documents specifying type of materiel are protected. The load is sealed and the transports have communication equipment.

Armed escorts are not provided as a general rule and will always have to be cleared with police authorities. Additional measures are being discussed, including the use of armed guards in specific cases, alarms on vehicles, and the use of electronic equipment such as tracers.

Destruction of SALW and ammunition

Weapons to be destroyed are transported by the responsible agency to a civilian facility that carries out the destruction. A list of all weapons (with serial numbers) is drawn up for each shipment. Agency personnel monitor the destruction process and check the data on the weapons destroyed against the lists issued by the sending authority. The weapons are then labelled “Destroyed” in the central register of weapons. All weapons remain in the database(s) until every weapon of a specific type has been destroyed, lost or otherwise disposed of.

Decisions to destroy individual weapons are taken by the Norwegian Defence Logistic Organisation (FLO) and the PPS respectively. Weapons designated for destruction usually display such a degree of wear or damage that it is no longer cost-effective to repair them.

As a rule, all weapons are cut into pieces of roughly 25 x 25 mm. This is standard procedure for all weapons types falling within the definition provided in the OSCE Document.

Structures and practices

Disposal of surplus stocks

When it comes to the actual disposal of surplus weapons, the FLO is in charge of this for the Armed Forces and the Police Directorate/PPS for the Police. The National Bureau of Crime Investigation (KRIPOS), in co-operation with local police, is in charge of the disposal of collected and confiscated SALW and ammunition. Both stated-owned and private contractors execute SALW destruction, monitored and controlled by representatives of the Armed Forces or the Police.

With regard to the number of SALW and rounds of ammunition categorised as surplus stocks, no exact figures can be given for the Armed Forces as the number varies over time. The Government reviews its surplus holdings on an annual basis, and there is a continuous and ongoing process of destruction of surplus stocks in the Armed

Forces. Stocks are destroyed after a relatively short period following the decision to categorise them as surplus stocks. During the last two years, some 14,000 SALW have been destroyed.

In the Police Force, some 6,400 SALW and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition are categorised as surplus stocks and stored at present. Over the last 5–6 years, some 8,000 SALW and 100,000 rounds of ammunition have been destroyed.

No surplus SALW or rounds of ammunition have so far been exported. Some 14,000 old model army rifles (Mauser 98 k) have been sold on the domestic commercial market over the last five years. These are sold to licensed persons and mainly used for hunting and competition. No rounds of ammunition have been made available on the commercial market. Revenues from sales are transferred to the defence budget (not applicable with regard to the police).

Very few SALW or rounds of ammunition have been retrieved from the civilian population, but exact figures are not available since parameters in the current statistics do not correspond to the definition of SALW contained in the OSCE Document. However, it is worth noting that in the course of 2003, a countrywide amnesty will be introduced so that people can turn in unregistered weapons without penalty. Although the majority of the estimated 500,000 unregistered weapons in civilian hands are believed to be shotguns, the objective is also to collect unregistered military-style weapons. At the same time, a national weapons register is being established. The amnesty programme was first introduced as a pilot project in four police districts, resulting in the collection of 5,000 weapons.¹ All weapons retrieved from the civilian population have been destroyed.

International assistance and co-operation

Norway is currently involved in close to 20 international co-operation and assistance programmes in the area of SALW, mainly focused on Africa and the Balkans. It spends about US\$2 million annually on such programmes. Assistance for destruction of surplus SALW is a key component of Norwegian SALW policy – indeed it funded the present study.

The largest project Norway is involved in is a bilateral agreement between Norway and South Africa on the destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons and ammunition held by the South African Defence Force and by the South African Police Service. Furthermore, in collaboration with the United States, Norway offers to send evaluation teams to countries asking for assistance to review surplus stocks. Assessments have so far been carried out in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania. Norway has also provided personnel to the OSCE for training/briefing purposes during seminars conducted in Central Asia.

Norway supports collection and destruction programmes in several regions, in particular in the Balkans, and has so far been a main contributor to the UNDP Trust Fund for Small Arms. In addition, Norway is involved in a number of peace-building projects where small arms is one of several components, such as the ‘Training for Peace’ programme in the region of the Southern African Development Community.²

Concluding remarks

The Armed Forces and the Norwegian Police Force are the only two Norwegian Government agencies with stocks of SALW as defined in the OSCE Document. No private individuals or organisations are allowed to hold SALW that fall under this

¹ ‘Våpenamnesti over hele landet’, *Aftenposten* online edition, 28 August 2002; ‘En halv million uregistrerte hagler i Norge’, *Aftenposten* online edition, 21 January 2003.

² A complete list of Norwegian SALW projects will be communicated to the Small Arms Survey, DFID/UK and other databases.

definition. There are detailed regulations for the management of Government stockpiles of SALW and ammunition and full records are kept for at least 10 years of SALW holdings, use, expenditure and disposal. The current policies and practices are considered by Norway to be in accordance with the standards established in the OSCE SALW Document, and there are currently no plans for significant reforms.

The Government distinguishes between weapons in active service, in reserve and surplus weapons, and conducts annual reviews of surplus stocks. Surplus holdings for the Armed Forces generally arise due to technological development and structural reforms, while technological innovation and expiry are the most common reasons for surplus holdings in the Police Force. In the Armed Forces, there is a continuous process of surplus destruction, and surplus stocks are therefore not stored long before being destroyed. Norway has so far not exported any of its surplus SALW or ammunition.

Assistance for stockpile management and surplus destruction are key elements of Norway's policy to improve international control of small arms and light weapons. It is currently engaged in a number of co-operation and assistance projects, so far focused mainly on the Balkan and Southern African regions.

This chapter is part of a wider research study entitled *Disposal of surplus small arms* which examines the policies and practices of ten Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) countries concerning surplus small arms. The report's ten case studies focus on stocks and determination of surpluses, as well as policies on exports, stockpile management and destruction. The report was initiated and co-ordinated by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and carried out in close co-operation with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Saferworld and the Small Arms Survey.

To obtain a copy of the complete report contact bicc@bicc.de, basicuk@basicint.org, general@saferworld.org.uk or smallarm@hei.unige.ch

About the author

Camilla Waszink Camilla Waszink wrote this case study for the Small Arms Survey, where she worked as a full-time researcher from January 2001–October 2002. Before that, she worked for BICC in Germany and the Program on Security and Development at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (USA) where she completed an MA in International Policy. She has written extensively on weapons collection and destruction programmes and the role of small arms in peace processes. Ms Waszink currently holds a position with the Mines-Arms Unit of the International Committee of the Red Cross, where she acts as a focal point for National Red Cross and Red Crescent bodies on issues related to weapons and international humanitarian law. Ms Waszink is a graduate of the University of Oslo and a citizen of Norway.