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# Conclusion

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*Note: While the authors of this chapter have built on the work of all Study participants, the chapter and its concluding section do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants.*

## Surveying the case studies<sup>1</sup>

**THE 10 CASE STUDIES** provide a wealth of detail that cannot be reproduced in the following review. This concluding chapter will draw out points of general interest and comment on them. The key issue will be the extent to which the policies and practices of the 10 countries reviewed reflect the provisions of the OSCE Document (2000) concerning surplus small arms. As in the case studies, small arms ammunition is discussed here, as well as the weapons themselves, although as stated earlier, the former is not covered by the OSCE definition of small arms.

## Stocks and determination of surplus

### Agencies in charge of SALW stocks

In most countries, SALW and ammunition holdings are regulated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). These two ministries generally account for military holdings as well as weapons held by federal and local police forces, and in the majority of cases they also regulate weapons held by customs service, border police, intelligence and security services.

Some exceptions stand out. In the UK, only the military and the police are authorised to hold SALW. All other agencies rely on the police to provide armed support for operations where necessary. By contrast, the Russian Federal Law on Arms allows about 15 federal agencies to arm their officials and some others to borrow combat small arms from MoI bodies for security operations. And in the USA, there are over 30 federal agencies, apart from the military, that may authorise their employees to carry firearms. For some of these US federal agencies this right can also be extended to contractors and subcontractors. In addition, there are over 17,000 state and local enforcement agencies authorised to carry firearms in the USA.

### Size of stocks

The Armed Forces undoubtedly hold the largest share of SALW and ammunition, but only three of the ten countries actually provided numbers of military arms holdings. In most cases, the data is confidential and was not made available. The same usually

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<sup>1</sup> All information on the ten countries provided in this chapter is taken from the individual case studies. Sources can be found in the relevant case studies.

holds for SALW and ammunition held by federal and local police forces. The countries that did report numbers were Norway, Switzerland and the USA. Norway was the only country reporting the amount of ammunition held by police forces, although information on military ammunition was not disclosed.

In some case studies, estimates were used, depending on the ratio of arms to soldiers. This ratio is usually classified. The Small Arms Survey 2002 assumes that on average, Armed Forces have 2.25 firearms per member. However, the Small Arms Survey also notes that “(w)hile this appears to lead to a reliable, conservative estimate of global military small arms, it can lead to a distorted impression of the stockpiles of individual countries”.<sup>2</sup> In practice, estimates on the arms-to soldier ratio differ widely.

In the USA, this ratio has been falling. In the early 1990’s, the US Army had 2.3 arms per uniformed member, as opposed to 1.3 today.<sup>3</sup> The ratio for the entire American military is even lower. In 2001, the US military had 2,688,000 military firearms, a total of 2.5 million active and reserve personnel and 1.05 firearms per uniformed member.

In Germany, the amount of SALW held by the *Bundeswehr* (ie the military) probably lies somewhere between 570,000 and 1,220,000. The lower figure is based on the US ratio, and the higher one is based on the ratio used by the Small Arms Survey. Whatever the exact figure, it is almost certainly declining as force levels are being reduced.

Force reductions are currently taking place in Bulgaria, Germany and Romania, amongst other countries. Bulgarian wartime strength (including all reservists) will have fallen from 250,000 in 1999 to 100,000 by 2004. The Romanian Government is implementing similar reductions. Large stocks of SALW and ammunition stocks will become redundant as a result of these reductions.

### **Private possession of SALW**

With two exceptions, the private possession of all SALW as defined by the OSCE Document is prohibited in all countries examined in this study. However, regulations on the civilian possession of non-military firearms vary widely, with some governments being stricter than others. The UK has introduced severe limits on the legal private possession of firearms since 1996. Further changes were confirmed in 2003 in response to a sharp increase in the criminal use of guns. The weapons held by radical groups in Northern Ireland represent a separate problem. The IRA in particular is believed to have a significant stock of SALW. In Germany, police officers are allowed to privately hold their weapons. There is evidence that police guns are sometimes sold back to arms manufacturers, who can then sell them in the private market, provided that the purchaser is in the possession of a gun licence.

Compared with the other eight countries, laws on the private possession of guns are less strict in Switzerland and the USA. In Switzerland, civilians may hold certain types of firearms, some of which fall under the OSCE definition, if they have previously obtained a licence. These are not recorded by the state. Retiring soldiers are allowed to keep their service weapons if these have been modified to fire single shots only. These holdings are recorded. Swiss Army reservists are required to store their service weapons and a certain amount of ammunition securely at home. The military also lend weapons to recognised shooting clubs.

In the USA, state and local rules on the private possession of firearms vary greatly. There are restrictions (but no general prohibition) on the private possession of military SALW. Under a 1994 presidential decree, new automatic rifles (as opposed to used ones) may not be sold to private citizens. Under the National Firearms Act, some military-type SALW may be privately held, but they must be registered. Private citizens and organisations possess something between 200 and 250 million firearms of all

<sup>2</sup> *Small Arms Survey 2002*. Geneva, 2002, p 75.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

types, including 65 to 80 million handguns. There are over 80,000 federally licensed arms dealers, more than three times the number of McDonald's franchises, and 238 active federally licensed SALW manufacturers, which produced over 1.2 million handguns in 1998.

### **Identification of surplus**

The responsibility of defining and identifying SALW surplus stocks generally lies with the national agencies that hold SALW. There usually is no central body for this purpose. Special planning directorates of the ministries, the military and police forces individually deal with their own equipment. In most cases, countries define SALW surplus as what remains after requirements for weapons in active and reserve service have been fulfilled. The needs of agencies are reviewed and compared with the available stocks. Anything not required for active service or as a reserve is deemed surplus. Some countries follow the indicators provided by the OSCE Document. Switzerland was the only country – among those reporting on the issue – to indicate that no precise formulas are used when determining small arms and ammunition requirements and the resulting amount of surplus. For some countries the formulas used to calculate the military need for SALW and ammunition is classified information, whereas others did not specifically discuss this issue. Although the formulas are said to be unclassified in Germany and Belarus, they were not made available. All ten countries reported that they review their surplus holdings regularly, most of them annually to this survey.

### **Conclusions**

Reviewing these results, we get the impression that the identification of surplus in the countries reviewed mostly conforms to the practices required by the OSCE Document.

All ten governments reported that they distinguish between weapons in active service, weapons in reserve and surplus weapons, although in some cases this distinction was not entirely clear. Often weapons that are no longer in service remain in reserve for years before they are declared surplus and disposed of. In Russia, weapons in active service are occasionally transferred to foreign governments and non-state actors without being declared surplus. This is not consistent with the OSCE guidelines for the determination of surplus.

The causes of surplus are very similar across the ten countries: technologies and requirements change, forces are reorganised and reduced. In addition to the usual factors, the German Armed Forces in the early 1990s had to deal with the stocks of the East German Army. Belarus inherited arms stockpiles from the Soviet military that were, it states, unrelated in type and quantity to its perceived defence needs and not competitive in terms of the international arms trade. In Poland, the quest for interoperability with NATO forces led to arms being declared redundant.

In most cases, responsibility for the possession, storage, maintenance and use of service weapons is clearly assigned to a government agency. However in our opinion, practices like the lending of weapons to other state agencies (Russia), the sale of used military weapons to civilians (USA) and the private possession of service weapons by retired soldiers (Switzerland) and police officers (Germany) could potentially compromise effective weapons control.

Chapter Six of The Best Practice Handbook on SALW recommends assigning a weapon to individual members of military and security agencies that are required to be armed. There are clear advantages if this were to become standard practice. Weapons control will be enhanced if each soldier and police officer must account for

## Policies on exports, stockpile management and destruction

his or her own weapon and ammunition. It is said that in the British Army, one of the quickest ways to end your military career is to lose your personal weapon.<sup>4</sup>

### Export controls

During the last decade, arms export controls have become more strict and detailed, taking into account a variety of international and regional agreements. Several countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which have been accused of improper arms sales in the past, have sought to exercise greater control over their SALW trade by reforming their export control regimes. Consultation with EU member states and other countries in the region, as well as the prospect of joining the EU and NATO were clearly major factors in this process. The OSCE Document may also have contributed.

Since the late 1990s, reports of controversial arms sales involving Bulgaria and Romania have become rare. On the basis of the few reports available, it is hard to tell when the deliveries were made, and whether government officials were aware of them. In 2002, the Romanian National Agency for Export Control issued the country's first report on its arms exports. Although the level of information provided does not allow for a judgement on how Romania is applying its commitment at the national and international level the report represents a positive move towards increased public transparency.

Some causes for concerns remain. Even if states within or outside the OSCE are clearly determined to exercise tight control over their stocks of SALW and the disposal of surpluses, and have the institutions, laws and policies they need to turn this determination into action, they often lack the necessary personnel and the money they need for the implementation and execution of their policies. This is one of the areas in which international assistance is most needed (see below).

In most countries, the rules governing the export of surplus weapons are the same as for new arms. Germany has two different systems of arms export rules, one for 'war weapons' and one for other kinds of arms. Most SALW as defined by the OSCE are considered war weapons in Germany, but some of the smaller types are not. The restrictive political principles for arms exports proclaimed by the Berlin Government in 2000 are the same for war weapons and other weapons, but in the case of war weapons the Government is free to grant or refuse an export licence as it sees fit. Whereas in the case of other weapons, the Government must be able to make a case for withholding such a licence.

In Russia, only state-controlled designers and manufacturers of military-purpose goods as well as Government brokers have the right to export SALW. The Government brokers are in fact specialized federal companies owned by the state and established by presidential decree. Since November 2000, there is only one Government agent for arms exports, *Rosoboronexport*. Russia's current system of arms export control gives the President almost unlimited power to determine arms export policy. Various ministries and departments are consulted on applications for arms export licences. Neither the companies nor the Government agencies are required to report to Parliament and the public. A reliable source in the Russian Government confirms that while in Soviet days, arms exports were 90 percent politics and 10 percent commerce, this ratio has been reversed since the end of communist rule. In Russia, it is our impression that the diversity of controlling agencies and the vagueness of criteria for decision-making stand in the way of transparency and accountability.

The Arms Export Control Act in the USA authorises the US President to control the export and import of controlled munitions, including SALW. In 1996, the Defense Authorization Act was amended to prevent the Army from destroying "collectable"

<sup>4</sup> Personal Communication to Sami Faltas by a retired officer, 10 July 2001.

guns. This amendment has been passed every year since, creating a growing stockpile of surplus weapons that gun advocates hoped would be made available for sale. A 1994 presidential decree prohibits the sale of new automatic rifles to the American public, but not second-hand weapons. In 1995, the Army began transferring its surplus stocks to foreign governments under the Excess Defense Articles Program. The main beneficiaries were the Baltic States, Israel (which got the arms for free) and the Philippines. There is a blanket prohibition on retransfer without US Government permission of military equipment supplied by the US, and there is no evidence to suggest that the above-mentioned recipients did retransfer such equipment.

### **Stockpile management**

Strict and detailed rules seem to be in place in all ten countries in our survey to ensure the safety and security of SALW storage and transportation. That is not to say that the rules are always fully implemented and enforced. In most cases, every agency holding SALW has its own rules and instructions, and stores arms and ammunition in special facilities, such as military depots or police storage facilities. Losses or thefts of SALW from the storage sites are reported and investigated immediately. Figures on thefts or losses are not available in most cases, but statistics published in Germany for instance suggest they are rare occurrences. Belarus reported no incidents of theft or loss in 2001, but the Government admits that it needs international assistance to address challenges related to the stockpile of surplus SALW inherited from the Soviet Army.

Advanced record-keeping procedures have been established in Germany, Norway and the USA. Reportedly, a national weapons registry of private firearms will soon be established in Norway. The US military has a comprehensive inventory control system that tracks every firearm from its initial receipt to its final disposal and records them in the Department of Defense's (DoD) Central Registry. The Bulgarian system has been improved by the introduction of the 'Tracker' system, donated by the USA, to provide centralized access to information on weaponry for stockpile management and export control.

### **Destruction**

Both military and police authorities have special regulations for the destruction of surplus weapons. In Germany for example, the War Weapons Control Act provides rules for demilitarisation, including rules for the destruction of small arms. For weapons held by the US military, rules for destruction are laid down by the DoD's Defense Demilitarization Manual.

The most commonly used destruction techniques for military and police weapons are cutting, crushing and melting.

Surplus weapons for destruction are sent to specific locations. The US Government has a large destruction facility at the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois. In Bulgaria, destruction is carried out by the state-owned company *Terem*, which is located next to a large military depot that serves as a collection point and temporary storage facility.

Destruction of surplus SALW is mostly carried out by both state-owned agencies and private contractors, often working together. In Germany for instance, the Army hires a hydraulic press with shears from a private contractor for a small fee, uses the press to reduce weapons to scrap and leaves the scrap for use by the contractor.

## **Disposal practices**

### **Disposal of surplus stocks**

Once surplus is identified, the disposal of surplus SALW and ammunition stocks is generally carried out by the MoD or the military for military weapons, and by the MoI

for police weapons. Special departments or agencies within the military are responsible for this process. However, in Bulgaria, the MoD disposes of surplus SALW stocks from both the military and the police.

There is considerable diversity in the disposal policies and practices of the ten countries studied. Usually, countries do not follow one specific policy. Disposal is mostly carried out by a combination of destruction, storage and export.

Our case studies suggest that Germany and Norway appear to follow the OSCE Document closely in terms of surplus SALW destruction. Over the last five to six years, Norway has not exported any SALW or ammunition from military or police stocks. However, old models of rifles were sold on the domestic market to licensed persons for hunting and marksmanship. Ammunition was not sold on the domestic market.

During the 1990s, Germany had to deal with large SALW stockpiles inherited from the East German National People's Army (NVA). At the same time, it reduced the stocks of the *Bundeswehr*. Now the Armed Forces of unified Germany, the *Bundeswehr* were originally the West German Armed Forces. Although much of the weaponry (some 1.5 million arms from NVA and *Bundeswehr* stocks) was destroyed, large quantities were exported. The number of surplus SALW exported by unified Germany is not known, but the country is believed to have sold or given away at least 50,000 tons of ammunition from NVA stocks alone. In recent years, the *Bundeswehr* has made a habit of destroying its surplus SALW, but not the associated ammunition. This can be exported, though military sources say most of it will be expended in training.

In the United Kingdom, surplus SALW from military stocks are disposed of by the Disposal Services Agency (DSA) within the MoD. The DSA enjoys considerable autonomy over its finances and planning, and one of its major aims is to generate revenue from the sale of surplus equipment and to open markets for further agreements. The objectives of the DSA are therefore in conflict with the OSCE principles governing the disposal of surplus SALW. In 2000, the UK Government announced that surplus small arms (excluding automatic weapons) would be made available for export. The UK Government routinely destroys all automatic firearms that are declared surplus. The same holds for all surplus police weapons.

The Romanian Government plans to destroy surplus SALW with the support of external funding. In 2001, 195,510 SALW were deemed surplus. The Romanian Government is currently working with Norway and the USA on a project for destroying its surplus stocks. At present, due to a lack of finances, surplus weapons are mostly kept in military or police storage facilities.

The same holds for Belarus. Surplus weapons are presently in storage, which constitutes a financial drain on the MoD. The Government states that there were no exports during 2001, and has made no indication that the situation has subsequently changed.

Yet another practice is followed by the USA. The current practice in the USA is to find alternative uses for SALW surpluses. Any weapons identified as surplus are screened through the DoD Inventory Control Point to decide their destination. The first consideration is whether the items can still be used by a Government agency. Although the Defense Demilitarization Manual forbids the sale of weapons to commercial firms for resale to foreign governments, it is not uncommon to sell such weapons to the American public. Vintage weapons are sold "for marksmanship". Finally, surplus military weapons are transferred to federal and state law enforcement agencies. The remaining items are earmarked for destruction. Between 1995 and early 1998, the US Government exported some 320,000 redundant SALW to friendly governments. In 2001, exports of some 65,000 surplus guns were authorised. This accounts for most, but by no means all, of the SALW stocks that became redundant after the end of the Cold War. In 2002, a large part of the approximately 18,000 surplus military rifles discarded were transferred to civilian ownership through the marksmanship programme. In the same year,

12,000 surplus military weapons were destroyed, plus an unspecified number of weapons taken from the population.

Poland also exchanges weapons between agencies, thus the number of surplus weapons that are destroyed is very small. In 2001, less than 15 items of surplus SALW were destroyed. According to the general rules for arms exports, surplus SALW can be exported. The same is true for Switzerland.

In Russia, surplus SALW are either exported through *Rosoboronexport*, sold domestically after modification for service or civilian use, or destroyed. Arms currently declared surplus are nearly always antiques dating back to the Second or First World War, though many of them are in good working order and could be put to legitimate or illegitimate use if transferred. Disposal as a separate process began in 1994, but no funds were allocated for this purpose. Apparently, it was believed that the expenses of SALW disposal would be covered by the sale of recycled materials. Between 2002 and 2005, the Armed Forces are planning to decommission one million SALW, as well as 140 million rounds of ammunition for foreign-made small arms in Army stocks. An MoD official says that since the beginning of the planned disposal, there has not been a single case of surplus SALW sales to a foreign buyer. However, *Rosoboronexport* does export SALW from Russian Army stocks that have not been declared surplus, such as anti-tank missile systems for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 and MANPADS equipment for Malaysia in 2002. In 1999, the MoD transferred 4,000 SKS combat carbines from its operational stocks to militia units in Dagestan.

### **Confiscated SALW**

Seized or confiscated weapons usually fall under the responsibility of the MoI and the police forces. Again, Bulgaria follows a different practice, with the MoD disposing of confiscated weapons. Most countries destroy weapons that are confiscated from civilians, unless they are required for evidence in legal proceedings. A certain amount may also be kept for training, forensic analysis or display in museums, or stored for future disposal.

In some US states, weapons confiscated by the police are sold on the open market. Although numbers vary widely, each year police forces collect large numbers of illicit weapons from civilians. In Poland, the police confiscate around 2,500 firearms and around 100,000 rounds of ammunition annually.

### **International assistance**

Most of the countries we examined are involved in international assistance with regard to the elimination of surplus weapons. Bulgaria and Romania are recipients of international financial and technical support. Both countries co-operate closely with Norway and the USA on the destruction of large quantities of surplus weapons. In addition, Bulgaria received a 'Tracker' system from the USA for record keeping. Bulgaria has large destruction facilities and is interested in destroying equipment from other countries.

Neither Belarus nor Russia currently receives any foreign assistance for the disposal or management of SALW, but they are seeking co-operation and financial aid.

Germany, Norway, the UK and the USA are major providers of international assistance related to curbing proliferation and misuse of SALW.

Norway is currently involved in almost 20 programmes of this type, mostly in Africa and the Balkans. The Norwegian Government spends about US\$2 million per year on these, with a focus on SALW destruction. It also funded this study on the disposal of surplus SALW stocks in OSCE countries.

### Summing up

Disposal practices vary considerably, both from country to country and from agency to agency. In the USA the emphasis is on finding alternative users for redundant SALW within the Government, in the population, or abroad. Initially, at least, this is a thrifty approach, but when it leads to military weapons, even automatic arms, being made available to civilians, and arms being exported to governments and non-state actors involved in violent conflict, we would in most instances consider it problematic. Even though there is no evidence of US surplus stocks being exported to conflict zones, the policy of exporting surplus is not consistent with the OSCE Document, which recommends the destruction of small arms surplus.

We also doubt whether the UK policy of seeking to export surplus military stocks of SALW is consistent with the OSCE Document. This also contrasts sharply with the policy of destroying all redundant British police weapons.

In most cases, exports or sales of SALW generate revenue for the exporting (selling) state. While there may be countervailing costs as a result of the misuse of the SALW in question, these are normally borne by the importing state or population. It could therefore be argued that it is rational and cost-effective for a particular state to export or sell SALW, even to questionable recipients or regions of conflict. However, from a multilateral perspective, such sales are almost always irresponsible and may create net costs for all states taken together. This includes the costs incurred by a government to counter the adverse effects of its own transfers. In many cases, destruction would have been cheaper. Initially, therefore, the destruction of surplus SALW stocks may seem a costly option, but taking a longer (and broader) view, it is often the most cost-effective method.

Russia's policy of selling surplus SALW through its arms export agency is a cause for concern in our opinion, especially as huge stocks of weapons and ammunition are being released for disposal between 2002 and 2005. This concern is heightened by the Russian practice of taking arms out of active service and exporting them, which in our view is in conflict with the letter and spirit of the OSCE Document.

In many other OSCE countries, there is a welcome trend for governments to destroy their surplus SALW, the method of disposal recommended by the OSCE Document. Yet, although their stated policy is to destroy surplus stocks, actual practice does not always reflect this policy. Germany has virtually stopped exporting surplus military small arms and light weapons and is destroying them instead, in a process that we would consider effective, cheap and fairly transparent. However, this policy does not apply to surplus military stocks of SALW ammunition and auxiliary equipment. Besides, the police forces of the autonomous German provinces in some cases sell off their redundant weapons instead of destroying them.

Some states of Central and Eastern Europe have other problems disposing of their surplus SALW by destruction, because they claim they lack the necessary resources. While the destruction of most small arms and light weapons – per unit – is cheap, and easy as far as the technical process is concerned, costs can be considerable if large numbers of weapons need to be destroyed. In such cases, countries benefit considerably from international financial and technical assistance.

When it comes to confiscated weapons, most OSCE states seem to destroy them. It is regrettable in our opinion that some police forces in the USA sell such weapons on the open market, thereby going against the recommendation of the OSCE Document.

### Reforms

We found little direct evidence of reforms being undertaken or new measures introduced by the ten countries to implement the OSCE Document. Germany and Norway considered their policies consistent with the Document when it was adopted in 2000,

though Germany says that its definition of surplus is guided by OSCE criteria. The German Government acknowledges the need for more consistent and transparent reporting on SALW, bringing federal and provincial data together in a coherent form.

Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain a clear and general picture of recent and planned reforms, much less determine to what extent these were triggered by the OSCE Document.

## Recommendations

### Definition and scope

- Participating States should strive to agree on the scope of the measures agreed in the OSCE Document. Legally, politically and logically, it seems best to take the view that with the exception of the sharing of information, the OSCE Document could be applied universally.
- Participating States should consider adding ammunition and explosives to their definition of SALW, as in the 1997 definition of the UN Panel of Experts, which the OSCE took as a model, but did not fully apply.
- Participating States should consider applying the provisions of the OSCE Document to all categories of items that fall under the OSCE definition of SALW, irrespective of the military, police or other context in which they are used.

### Transparency and accountability

- We encourage participating States to make their submissions to the OSCE Information Exchange on SALW public.
- The Best Practice Handbook should be a living document, regularly amended, improved and updated to provide the best possible guidance. Chapter Six on surplus stocks needs to be expanded to cover the disposal of surplus stocks.
- Participating States should consider exchanging information on the appropriate levels of weapons and ammunition stocks for military, police and other armed government units and publish appropriate standards in the Best Practice Handbook.
- Participating States should consider regularly reporting to each other on their use of the Best Practice Handbook.
- Military and security agencies should hold their members personally accountable for service weapons issued for their use.

### Control mechanisms

- Many governments within and outside the OSCE need assistance in developing, staffing and running the institutions for the effective control of arms exports.
- Many governments within and outside the OSCE need assistance in stockpile management. While most governments have rules for safety, security, record-keeping, and so forth, many are unable to implement and enforce them effectively and consistently.
- The OSCE member states should consider setting up an assistance fund for arms export control and stockpile management.
- It is not advisable in our opinion for governments to permit the private possession of SALW as defined by the OSCE, much less for them to transfer or to lend surplus military SALW to private users.

### Disposal practices

Destruction is the only way in which surplus and collected weapons are permanently removed and cannot re-enter the supply chain. Most OSCE states seem capable of destroying surplus stocks of SALW without international assistance, and many are doing so.

- When government stocks of SALW become redundant, and there is no alternative official use for them, it is better to destroy them rather than to store them indefinitely, transfer them to private users, or export them.
- Participating States should, where appropriate, develop national policies for the disposal of surplus SALW stocks and report them in the OSCE Information Exchange.
- The growing practice of destroying all confiscated SALW is welcome and should be encouraged as standard practice throughout the OSCE.
- We welcome the trend toward mutual assistance between OSCE countries in dealing with surplus SALW and encourage governments to focus these efforts on the areas where help is most urgently required.

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This chapter is part of a wider research study entitled *Disposal of surplus small arms* which examines the policies and practices of ten Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) countries concerning surplus small arms. The report's ten case studies focus on stocks and determination of surpluses, as well as policies on exports, stockpile management and destruction. The report was initiated and co-ordinated by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and carried out in close co-operation with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Saferworld and the Small Arms Survey.

To obtain a copy of the complete report contact [bicc@bicc.de](mailto:bicc@bicc.de), [basicuk@basicint.org](mailto:basicuk@basicint.org), [general@saferworld.org.uk](mailto:general@saferworld.org.uk) or [smallarm@hei.unige.ch](mailto:smallarm@hei.unige.ch)

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