The proliferation of small arms:
A threat to international human rights

by Camilla Waszink, Small Arms Survey, January 2001

[A version of this paper will appear in "Jahrbuch Menschenrechte 2002" (Suhrkamp Verlag).]

Introduction

In recent years, increased attention has been focused on the ways in which the  proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons contribute to the incidence of armed conflicts, violent death and massive human rights abuses. Although the presence of weapons does not directly cause conflicts, the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of small arms in vulnerable commonities may increase tension,  escalate and prolong ongoing conflicts and contribute to the recurrence or even outbreak of fighting. The presence of small arms in post-conflict areas can undermine fragile peace-agreements and hinder peace-building and reconstruction. Even in peaceful societies, high numbers of military-style weapons in civilian hands are likely to lead to an increase in armed crime, encourage violent means of conflict-resolution, threaten economic and social development and ultimately contribute to the creation of ‘cultures of violence’. Small arms are also a principal tool employed by repressive regimes and security forces to intimidate dissidents and control popular opposition. This article will focus on the threat that the proliferation and misuse of small arms constitute to international human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Although the Declaration does not have treaty status it is generally accepted and used as a means of judging compliance with human rights obligations under the UN Charter. It is also one of the three main instruments of international human rights law, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol (1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976). Violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the body of rules that govern conduct in armed conflict by restricting the methods and means of warfare employed and protecting persons who are not or are no longer taking part in hostilities, will not be directly dealt with in this paper. It will be mentioned in passing however, since gross violations of IHL also constitute violations of human rights, and in practice it is therefore often difficult to distinguish between the two. Although certain human rights provisions can be suspended in times of war, those most likely to be breached by the abuse of small arms such as the right to life still apply.

Small arms and light weapons are broadly defined as weapons that can be handled by one or two people, and include pistols, rifles, carbines, machine-guns, mortars, rocket-launchers, grenade-launchers, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems including their ammunition (hereafter the term ‘small arms’ will be used to refer to both small arms and light weapons). Some of their distinguishing features are that they are relatively cheap and thus affordable to many non-state actors, that they are easy to transport, conceal and smuggle into conflict areas, and that they are easy to maintain and use including by untrained civilians or children. In addition, the increasing sophistication and firepower of these weapons enable a single armed individual or small group to cause heavy casualties among a civilian population when used indiscriminately.

A global threat

After the end of the cold war, the nature of conflict seems to have shifted from predominantly inter-state to intra-state, often involving a wide variety of actors such as governments, rebel groups, militias and criminal organisations who use small arms and light weapons as their weapons of choice. One of the defining characteristics of these local armed conflicts is that a large proportion of the victims are civilians, constituting between 30 and 90 percent of all conflict-related deaths (Small Arms Survey, 2001). The total number of casualties caused by small arms in armed conflict is estimated to be around 300,000 per year (Krug, 2000). The deliberate targeting of civilians by many of the armed groups involved in these conflicts, both government and rebel groups, constitute blatant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Field investigators from non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have been instrumental in uncovering small arms transfers to abusive armed groups, identifying the perpetrators and documenting the killing and abuse of civilian populations in cases like Rwanda, the Sudan and Colombia. The arms in question have in some cases been transferred legally through government-to government sales and gifts, or through commercial transfers from private firms, while others have ended up the region via illicit channels. The illicit trafficking of weapons often occur in violation of existing arms embargoes.

Although the majority of killings caused by small arms occur in the context of armed conflict and the bulk of research to date has focused on this aspect, they also claim a considerable number of lives in so-called ‘peaceful environments’. About 200,000 deaths are caused by gun-inflicted homicides and suicides per year (Krug, 2000). In addition, substantial costs are inflicted upon societies because of the negative socio-economic impacts related to small arms proliferation and misuse. Some examples include expenditures in the areas of public health and law enforcement, rising costs of doing business due to an increase in armed robberies and crime which in turn leads to more money needed for security measures, and the loss of foreign investment for countries which are known to be affected by arms-related problems. The spread of small arms can also create a climate of insecurity which may inhibit or discourage people from going to school or work, or participate in public life. Although the problem is often attributed to the civilian possession of military-style weapons, handguns like pistols and revolvers are responsible for the majority of firearms-related homicides in a number of countries such as Japan, South Africa, Colombia and the United Kingdom.

It is evident that the contribution of small arms to the occurrence of armed violence, whether in conflict zones or peaceful societies constitute a threat to basic human rights such as the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3). Additionally, because of the way their proliferation undermines the social and economic development of societies, they clearly jeopardise social and economic rights such as the right to work, food, health care, adequate social services and education (Articles 23, 25 and 26). Furthermore, small arms in the hands of repressive regimes, can contribute to violations of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression (Articles 18 and 19).

Small arms fueling a genocide: The case of Rwanda

Violence obviously has other root causes and is not by itself caused by the presence of arms.  Nevertheless, when both the quantity and quality of available weapons increase, they can contribute to the likelihood, lethality and duration of armed conflicts, and facilitate and exacerbate violations of human rights. This has never been more clearly demonstrated than in the case of the Rwandan genocide.

During the course of just a few months in 1994, between half a million and a million Rwandans were killed in acts of politically-motivated ethnic violence. The genocide was led by the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government, armed forces, militias and civilian mobs, and it was targeted against the Tutsi, the other major ethnic group in the country as well as certain pro-democratic sections of the Hutu commonity. The genocide was preceded by a low-intensity armed conflict between the two groups that erupted in 1990, when the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) composed mainly of Tutsi refugees who had spent decades in exile, launched an invasion from neighbouring Uganda in an attempt to overthrow the government. When the war started in October 1990, Rwanda’s army was made up of 5,000 soldiers, armed with a modest amount of small arms. By the end of the war, the number of soldiers had increased to 30,000 equipped with a wide range of small arms and light weapons, including grenade-launchers, anti-personnel landmines and mid- and long-range artillery (Human Rights Watch, 1994). During this period, the Rwandan army also trained and armed civilian militias, and just prior to the start of the massacres peacekeepers estimated that 85 tons of weapons had been distributed throughout the country. More than a dozen countries helped fuel the war, with the majority of weapons being provided by France, apartheid-era South Africa and Egypt. 

Although the genocide had its roots in a long history of conflict between the two groups and much of the actual killing was conducted with machetes normally used for agriculture, the large influx of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the Hutu-dominated government and militias tipped the power balance clearly in their favour and provided the perpetrators with the necessary support and encouragement.   By providing these weapons, the arms-supplying states assisted in creating a tragedy of such proportions. Evidence provided by investigators in the field implies that arms shipments and military assistance continued to flow from or through countries like Zaire, South Africa, France and Bulgaria, even after the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda in May 1994, and after the facts of the genocide had been revealed (Human Rights Watch, 1995). This allowed the violence and killings to continue even within the “safe areas” and refugee camps set up and monitored by the international commonity.

How to limit transfers to abusive end-users?

It has been established that transfers of arms to areas where human rights violations occur can exacerbate the scope and intensity of such abuses. What measures can be taken to prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of human rights abusers?

As long as there is a demand, it is obviously unrealistic to expect that the trade in small arms and light weapons will stop.  However, this does not imply that it should be allowed to continue unchecked. There are a number of actions that governments can take to better control the arms trade and reduce arms flows into conflict-affected areas. Although the current campaign to address the problem of small arms does not target the legal arms trade, it is a fact that most of the illegal weapons in circulation today originated in the legal market. Therefore, the international commonity cannot hope to tackle the problem of small arms without also establishing stricter regulation on legal transfers, both those conducted by governments and by private companies. A number of different and complementary measures are thus needed in order to design an effective response to this problem. For the sake of brevity however, only three priority areas will be discussed here: export controls in the form of  ‘codes of conduct’, the implementation and enforcement of United Nations arms embargoes and regulation of arms brokering activities.

Codes of conduct

Codes of conduct that regulate arms transfers can help ensure that legally traded weapons do not fall into the hands of regimes that threaten peace and stability or violate human rights and international humanitarian law.  In June 1998 for example, the European Union adopted the most comprehensive multilateral code of conduct to date. The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports establishes criteria that must be taken into account before licensing exports of all types of conventional arms. Some of the factors to be considered include the human rights record of the recipient state, its internal political situation, its external behaviour with regard to the international commonity, and the relative proportion of the country’s resources which is spent on security and defence. The Code has been criticised for various reasons, one of which is that several of the criteria are ambiguous, particularly those pertaining to human rights. The interpretation is therefore, to a large extent, left up to the discretion of each individuals state. Also, in cases where violations of international humanitarian law occur States are not obligated to refuse a license, but only consider such abuses a factor to be taken into account in the assessment. Other criticisms  include the fact that it is merely a political declaration and not a legally binding document and that it does not provide for a sufficient degree of transparency. Furthermore,  it fails to address brokering and licensed production of weapons. Nevertheless, the Code is considered to represent an important improvement in EU standards and some of its features could be expanded and form the basis of a potential international code of conduct. The EU Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the members of the European Economic Area and the European Free Trade Association as well as Canada and the US have already endorsed the principles of the Code. Furthermore, in November 2000 the Forum for Security Co-operation of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) adopted the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Among others it establishes common export criteria,  which elaborate upon principles contained in an OSCE document from 1993 entitled ‘Criteria on Conventional Arms Transfers’. These include a provision for the refusal of licences in cases where there is a clear risk that the exported arms will be used for human rights violations. Although the Document is a non-binding statement of intent, it might contribute significantly to the development of global standards, since the OSCE’s participating States account for just over half of the world’s legal exporters of small arms, including three of the four biggest exporters – the US, the Russian Federation and Germany.

A proposal for an International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers was presented already in 1997 by a group of Nobel Peace Prize laureates led by former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. The criteria set up are more comprehensive than both the EU Code and the OSCE Document and they include compliance with international standards of human rights and humanitarian law, respect for democratic rights, adherence to international arms embargoes and military sanctions, participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the promotion of human development. The Code covers transfers of all types of police, military and security equipment, technology, training and personnel, and it calls for the monitoring of all actors involved in the process. The Costa Rican government has now announced its support for the Code and submitted it as an official document for the upcoming UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to be held in July 2001.

Arms embargoes

All states have a legal obligation under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter to abide by arms embargoes enacted by the Security Council under its mandate to maintain international peace and security.  They also have a duty to implement measures to ensure that individuals and companies operating within their jurisdiction comply with UN embargoes. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Council has increasingly made use of arms embargoes as a means of punishing governments or non-state actors responsible for ‘a threat to the peace, breaches of the peace or act of aggression’ under Article 39 of the UN Charter, expanding its interpretation to include situations where gross violations of human rights occur. However, their enforcement has generally been inadequate and violations have been common. Both governments and private traffickers have been involved in ‘embargo busting’ and apart from the threat of public exposure, these violators are seldom held accountable for their actions. The argument has been made that if not properly enforced, an embargo does more harm than good, as it makes a mockery of the international commonities commitment to punish abusive regimes and sends a signal that impunity is the norm (Human Rights Watch, 2000)). This is in addition to the unintended ‘side-effect’ of creating a black market in the region concerned.

Nevertheless, the UN Security Council has in recent years focused increased attention and resources on the issue of arms embargoes and their enforcement as reflected in the special investigations undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the embargoes imposed on Rwanda and UNITA in Angola. Still, a combination of factors are needed to improve the effectiveness of arms embargoes including increased political commitment, the closing of loopholes in national legislation, strengthening of law enforcement capacities and border control and improved monitoring mechanisms. The illicit acquisition of arms are often financed through the sale of one or more primary commodities like diamonds, ivory, timber or drugs, so in a number of cases parallel sanctions on these goods would also need to be put in place, such as the diamond ban imposed by the Security Council on Sierra Leone in July 2000. 

Regulation of arms brokering

Brokers are the middlemen who organise arms transactions between two or more parties, in return for a commission from either the recipient, the supplier or a combination of the two. Although much of the existing international arms brokering activity is legitimate, many brokers are also involved in the very profitable illicit arms trade. This traffic often takes place in violation of arms embargoes, with weapons flowing to pariah governments responsible for gross violations of human rights and humanitarian standards. There is a general lack of legislation with regard to the control of arms brokering. An aspect that adds to the complexity of regulating brokering activities, is the fact that brokers conduct most of their dubious transactions outside the jurisdiction where they reside or have their business, typically in countries with lax legislation and/or enforcement capacities. Due to the widespread practice of such ‘third-country brokering’, an extraterritorial dimension must be incorporated into national legislation in order for it to be effective.  At the operational level, improved law enforcement capacities and increased information-exchange between national authorities are key conditions to provide arms brokering legislation with the necessary teeth.

The United Nations 2001 Small Arms Conference

From July 9 to July 20, 2001, UN Member States, UN specialised agencies, regional and international organisations as well as representatives from civil society will gather at the UN headquarters in New York in order to devise a global response to address the small arms problem. The decision was made by the General Assembly in 1999 to organise a United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The outcome of the Conference is expected to be a ‘plan of action’ for governments, containing or accompanied by a political declaration. At the time of writing, the format and content of both is still uncertain. It is therefore too early to say to what extent and in what form the measures outlined above will be included in the final document of the Conference. Any international agreement is likely to build on and complement the many norms, standards and initiatives already underway on the regional, national and local levels. So far, governments have roughly been divided into two camps, those that favour a law-enforcement approach to the problem limiting the scope to targeting the illicit trafficking of arms, and on the other hand, those which advocate a more comprehensive approach, including for example increased controls on the legal trade and efforts to address the demand-side factors as well as the negative effects of small arms proliferation. The complex nature of the problem and the devastating impacts that the excessive availability and misuse of small arms have on a number of different issues such as humanitarian assistance, social and political development, crime, public health and international human rights, suggest that the more comprehensive approach is necessary to effectively tackle the many different facets of the problem.

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