



# NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON ARMS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT

2025-2029

By the Sierra Leone  
Commission on Arms  
and Ammunition



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The Sierra Leone National Action Plan on Arms and Ammunition Management was developed by the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition with the technical support of the Small Arms Survey.

The Small Arms Survey is a centre for applied knowledge dedicated to preventing and reducing illicit small arms proliferation and armed violence. The Survey informs policy and practice through a combination of data, evidence-based knowledge, authoritative resources and tools, and tailored expert advice and training, and by bringing together practitioners and policymakers.

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Together, these efforts have laid a solid foundation for enhancing arms and ammunition management in Sierra Leone, contributing to peace and security in the region.



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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAM	Arms and Ammunition Management
ATT	The Arms Trade Treaty
CCM	The Convention on Cluster Munitions
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS Convention	ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ITI	International Tracing Instrument
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MOSAIC	Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium
MTNDP	Medium Term National Development Plan (Sierra Leone)
NAP	National Action Plan
NFC	National Focal Committee
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ONS	Office of National Security
PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SLNAPAAM	Sierra Leone National Action Plan for Arms and Ammunition Management
SLANSA	Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms
SLE	Sierra Leonean Leone currency
SLeCAA	Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition
SLeNCSA	Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms

SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats analysis
TOCU	Transnational Organized Crime Unit
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN PoA	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
WAM	Weapons and Ammunition Management
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

# FOREWORD



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The ECOWAS region continues to grapple with the adverse impacts of violent conflicts and crimes, largely fueled by the illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). These conflicts have created a volatile security situation in the region. Due to this, the ECOWAS remains resolute in fully implementing its Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention) (ECOWAS, 2006). Establishing national commissions on small arms and light weapons across member states is another testimony of ECOWAS' commitment to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. From 1991 to 2002, Sierra Leone experienced one of the most violent and brutal civil wars on the African continent, resulting in many people being killed or displaced (Le Bras, 2021).

The Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms (SLeNCSA), which is now known as the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition (SLeCAA), was established by The Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms Act (2010, No. 6), and charged with the responsibility to control the proliferation and illicit circulation of arms and ammunition (Sierra Leone, 2010).

Over the years, SLeCAA, in collaboration with partners and stakeholders, has worked tirelessly to make Sierra Leone free from unregulated firearms. The Commission's first National Action Plan (NAP) expired in 2016. The late Brigadier General (Retired) T.R. Allieu, was dedicated to reviewing the expired NAP and developing a new one. Unfortunately, this endeavor was interrupted by his untimely passing. In March 2022, a retreat was held in Bo City to initiate the review of the NAP. However, the outcomes fell short of expectations. The SLeCAA then initiated a process to review the expired NAP by seeking the support of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to aid the commission in developing a new NAP. MAG collaborated with the Small Arms Survey to provide technical support during the development process.


This new NAP, which aligns with the Sierra Leone National Development Plan, will serve as a guiding framework for the implementation of the Sierra Leone Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) Strategy over the next five years. It is anticipated that this document will significantly enhance the Commission's efforts in combating the proliferation of SALW in Sierra Leone.

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Minister of Internal Affairs, Republic of Sierra Leone

A handwritten signature in green ink, consisting of several overlapping, slanted lines that form a stylized representation of the name.

# INTRODUCTION



## 1.1 Historical background

Sierra Leone has a long history of internal conflicts that are the root cause of the current challenges associated with the proliferation of illicit arms in the country. By their very nature, internal conflicts destroy the fabric of social trust, interrupt social safety networks, create room for criminality, and cause instability long after a conflict has ended. The trail of destruction that such conflicts inflict does not spare government security infrastructure and facilities. It, therefore, takes time to eventually restore law and order and develop trust in government security systems where civilians no longer want to secure their safety through self-armament.

Long-term conflict can create a culture where small arms are integrated into community life to the extent that they are used in cultural and social ceremonies (Boine et al., 2020, p. 2). Sierra Leone's path to peace has not been easy. Its concerted efforts, however, have been fruitful—including working in close partnership with communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the international community (Bobolicu et al., 2021, p. 2).

From 1991 to 2002, Sierra Leone experienced one of the most violent and brutal civil wars on the African continent, killing 50,000 to 200,000 and displacing more than half a million people (Le Bras, 2021). This period inevitably saw a dramatic increase in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In 1998, these weapons played a major role in the intensity and violence of the conflict and were subject to an embargo following UN Security Council Resolution 1171 (Callamand, 2008, p. 3).

The sale and supply of arms and other related material to Sierra Leone were prohibited except by the Sierra Leone government. The heavy flow of arms into and within the country after Resolution 1171 passed showed that the embargo was not respected. The UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone identified arms that had come from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Libya, and Niger, among other countries (Callamand, 2008, p. 7).

Today, twenty years after the end of the conflict, the country is still marked by violence from the civil war. The disarmament process, which began in May 2001, resulted in the recovery of approximately 25,000 small arms, 1,000 light weapons, and nearly a million rounds of ammunition (Bobolicu et al., 2021, p. 5). It is plausible that many weapons are still in circulation and continue to pose a risk to the safety and security of the population—and, potentially, to the stability of both national and regional levels. Identifying the root causes and factors that drive civilians to hold weapons legally or illegally will support efforts to design appropriate interventions to control and manage the proliferation and use of small arms. It seems that poverty and a lack of access to basic services—such as education, justice, and healthcare—contribute to the cycle of violence.

Many national-level efforts have been made, especially with the support of international organizations, to reduce the impact of small arms proliferation in the country. Measures to control small arms have improved significantly, including rehabilitating state armouries, marking weapons, and destroying surplus and illicit weapons and ammunition (Bobolicu et al., 2021, p. 5).

## 1.2 The nexus between small arms proliferation and sustainable development

Unregulated small arms can threaten human development, good governance, and democratic consolidation. The interdependence of security, peace, and development can be understood through the relationship between poverty, inequality, lack of opportunity, and causes of violence. The goal of a stable democracy and a thriving economy for Sierra Leone will slow if the management and regulation of both licit and illicit arms are not integrated as enablers to stabilization.

In Sierra Leone's national development plan, the government has defined immediate and long-term objectives to 'transform the country from a fragile state into a stable and prosperous democracy' by 2039 (Sierra Leone, 2019a). The national development plan aligns with regional and international programmes and agendas such as the African Union's Agenda 2063, the G7+ Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals, the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and the Mano River strategy (Sierra Leone, 2024). Sierra Leone's Arms and Ammunition Management (AAM) strategy also relies on these agendas and programmes.

Sierra Leone's national development plan defined five goals:

- Goal 1: Sierra Leone will be food secure by 2030.
- Goal 2: A highly skilled, healthy, inclusive, and gender-sensitive labour force, with a substantial share of mid-level workforce and highly developed talents for professional jobs in the private sector and the civil service by 2030.
- Goal 3: Creating 500,000 jobs for the youth—with at least a 30 per cent representation of women—including skilled and unskilled, long-term, and seasonal jobs across all sectors by 2030.
- Goal 4: A cashless economy with increased financial inclusion, vibrant e-government and public administration, expanded energy production, and advanced road and general transport systems, well-linked with production centres to markets by 2030.
- Goal 5: A streamlined public service that attracts and keeps the brightest national talents and is generally robust in tackling challenges to sustainable development by 2030 (Sierra Leone, 2024).

Four strategic enablers have been identified to support achieving the goals:

- Enabler 1: Diversifying the economy and promoting growth;
- Enabler 2: Governance and accountability;
- Enabler 3: Advancing climate resilience and environmental action; and
- Enabler 4: Gender mainstreaming, partnership and implementation, and risk mitigation.

The second enabler, 'governance and accountability', aligns closely with the objectives of the current Sierra Leone National Action Plan for Arms and Ammunition Management (SLNAPAAM). Both the SLNAPAAM and the Medium Term National Development Plan (MTNDP) emphasize the institutional strengthening of the SLeCAA and other security institutions.

One of the strategic objectives of the MTNDP is to have a security sector that is efficient, effective, highly apolitical, and professional. It aims to be one that can contribute significantly to sustainable development and the advancement of democracy and the rule of law, and ensure a robust response to national threats and emergencies (Sierra Leone, 2024).

Table 1. Key targets of security institutions in the MTNDP 2024–2030

<b>Key targets of security institutions in the MTNDP 2024–2030</b>	
1.	By 2030, the national crime rate will be reduced by 25 per cent from a caseload of 27,018 in 2022.
2.	By 2030, the RSLAF will be more modernized and robust than in 2023.
3.	By 2030, early warning and response capacity of the security institutions will be significantly higher than in 2023.
4.	By 2030, community engagement in security processes and functions will be greater than in 2023.

Source: Sierra Leone (2024).

Although not explicitly mentioned, the fight against small arms proliferation and armed violence is intrinsically linked to these objectives. By reducing violence and insecurity and strengthening institutions, arms control contributes to the long-term socio-economic development of a population. This objective aligns with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which calls for 2 'promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, providing access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels' (UN, 2015). The national development plan also includes specific pillars for women, children, persons with disabilities, and youth. The AAM strategy aligns with this dynamic by adapting its responses to the different needs of the population according to their age, gender, and disability.

The AAM strategy builds on national gender and inclusive policies, including the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 2019–2023 (Sierra Leone, 2019b) and Sierra Leone's Persons with Disabilities Act, 2011 (Sierra Leone, 2011a). Many synergies exist between arms control programmes and these policies in terms of inclusion and protection, particularly on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence. In Sierra Leone, 14 per cent of students—including all genders—have experienced sexual abuse, and 67 per cent of girls have reported experiencing sexual violence, with 30 per cent of incidents being school-related (Humanity and Inclusion, n.d.). Studies have also shown that the presence of a firearm in the family home increases the probability that violence will occur and result in death (Perdrix, 2023).

The integration of gender perspectives in arms control policies and the promotion of the full, equal, meaningful, and effective participation of women is at the heart of the AAM strategy, contributing to the objectives of the national gender strategic plan, the draft Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy, and the Gender Empowerment Act of 2022 (Sierra Leone, 2022), among others. While the linkages with arms control have not been articulated in these gender and disability policies or the national development plan, the AAM strategy aims to bring more coordination in initiatives, including consultations and research.



# M E T H O D O L O G Y



## 2.1 The AAM strategy development process

The AAM strategy aims to reduce the impact of armed violence on human and state security by strengthening AAM, which is the oversight, accountability, and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle. This governance includes the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes, and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, end-use control, tracing, and disposal. AAM does not only focus on small arms and light weapons but also on a broader range of conventional weapons, related systems, and ammunition (De Tessieres and Shiotani, 2020).

Considering the changing context in the region and the challenges encountered in implementing the national development plan, the Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms (SLeNCSA), now known as the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition (SLeCAA), initiated the process of developing a AAM strategy for 2024 to 2028 with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Small Arms Survey in August 2022. Due to a delay in resource disbursement, the period has been adjusted to 2025 to 2029.

The step-by-step progression of the AAM strategy development was built on previous engagement with most participants, during which an analysis of the prevailing situation regarding small arms control and management in Sierra Leone occurred in the diagnostic workshop. The deliberations resulted in identifying strategic objectives and associated strategic pillars to drive SLeCAA's interventions for the next five years.

The development of the AAM strategic plan was inclusive and participatory. Consultations with national stakeholders were held during a three-day capacity-building workshop conducted in December 2022 in Freetown. The participants included SLeCAA staff, representatives from the Handicap International, Mano River Union, Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Youth, National Early Warning Response Mechanism Center, National Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate, Network Research Consulting Services, Office of National Security (ONS), Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA), Sierra Leone Police, Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU), UNDP, and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding.

Figure 1. The five stages of a NAP development process, according to the Small Arms Survey



Source: Small Arms Survey

To facilitate the development of the AAM strategy, the SLeCAA created two committees: a steering committee and a drafting committee. The steering committee participated in consultations to develop the AAM strategy, and members met in two workshops to identify arms control needs and collectively define and validate the directions of the strategic plan. The committee comprises SLeCAA members, governmental actors, regional and international organizations, and civil society organizations (CSOs). Diversity in the committee's composition was a major criterion in the selection process conducted by the SLeCAA. The drafting committee was established by

the SLeCAA and comprised six members of the Commission: the commissioner, the monitoring and evaluation officer, the programme officer, the assistant commissioner, the communications officer, and the assistant programme officer. This committee's main role was to draft the strategy based on the consultation findings.

## 2.2 The approach to develop the SLNAPAAM


To develop a comprehensive and tailored national action plan (NAP) for Sierra Leone, the Small Arms Survey followed a five-step methodology. The first step consisted of laying the foundations to ensure that essential preconditions for developing a NAP are met, including effective national authority, coordination mechanisms, relevant legal frameworks, and political support. This step was completed in September 2021, when the Survey conducted a preliminary assessment in Sierra Leone in collaboration with MAG.

The second step involved a comprehensive assessment of weapons and ammunition management, identifying drivers of small arms proliferation and armed violence and examining linkages to broader security and socio-economic policies. This assessment was completed in October 2022 through a three-day workshop involving diverse national, regional, and international stakeholders.

In the third step, a strategic framework for small arms control was developed to set priorities and define goals based on the assessment findings, with input from key stakeholders. A workshop was organized in December 2022 in Freetown with the technical committee established by the SLeCAA. In July 2024, the fourth step was carried out with a workshop dedicated to designing an operational plan to translate strategic goals into actionable tasks, assigning responsibilities, establishing timelines, and allocating resources through a multi-sectoral approach.

The fifth and final step occurred in September 2024 with two validation workshops—one technical and one political—to ensure thorough review and endorsement by relevant stakeholders, aligning the NAP with national development priorities and securing political commitment. A formal launch of the finalized NAP will occur in December 2024 at an official ceremony in Freetown.

Figure 2. The NAP development process in Sierra Leone



Source: Small Arms Survey

Building on a decade of experience supporting national authorities, the Small Arms Survey’s approach to NAP development aims to ensure that small arms control initiatives are relevant, effective, coherent, inclusive, and bespoke to the needs of the country. Employing a results-based management framework ensures the effectiveness and accountability of NAPs by emphasizing outcomes and impacts rather than merely outputs.



# DIAGNOSTIC



### 3.1 Analysis of Sierra Leone's institutional structure

The government established the SLeCAA through The Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunitions Act of 2023, No. 24 (Sierra Leone, 2023) to demonstrate its commitment to addressing AAM challenges. This act laid out the SLeCAA's roles, responsibilities, and composition. The Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition Act of 2023, repealed and replaced the Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms Act of 2010, No. 6 (Sierra Leone, 2010), to provide for the continuing existence of the SLeNCSA as the SLeCAA. In this capacity, the SLeCAA is entrusted with managing and controlling arms, ammunition, and related materials in Sierra Leone and the country's compliance with international and regional instruments to which it is a party.

Before establishing the SLeNCSA in 2010, Sierra Leone had set up a national focal committee (NFC) within the Ministry of Defence in 2003 to work towards establishing a national commission on small arms. The ONS incorporated the NFC, and in 2008, it was eligible to become a directorate within the ONS. In 2010, the SLeNCSA was established in compliance with the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA), the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), and the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention) (Bobolicu et al., 2021, p. 8).

The SLeCAA is the sole focal point for all matters relating to firearms and advises the Government of Sierra Leone on formulating policies and strategies to control the illicit proliferation and circulation of small arms in Sierra Leone. Prior to the passing of Sierra Leone's Arms and Ammunition Act of 2012 (Sierra Leone, 2012) and the Arms and Ammunition Regulations of 2014 (Sierra Leone, 2014), the country captured its aspirations to fulfil its obligations and mandate under the ECOWAS Convention (ECOWAS, 2006) and the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN PoA) (UNODA, 2001) in a five-year NAP that was developed in 2011 and expired in December 2016.

The first NAP aimed 'to secure a safer environment and control small arms and light weapons within society to promote the conditions that will encourage continued social and economic development' (Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms, 2011). Implementing the first NAP did not lead to the expected changes, mainly due to a lack of coordination among institutions in charge of security issues and limited financial resources.


The main functions of the SLeCAA are to:

- Regulate and supervise the manufacture, trade, possession, and use of arms, their ammunition, and other related materials;
- Set in place programmes of action to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit proliferation, manufacture, trade, and use of arms and ammunition in all its aspects;
- Educate and sensitize the public and provide information on the dangers associated with the illicit manufacture, trade, and use of arms and ammunition;
- Ensure that the obligations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are complied with;
- Establish and maintain an arms register for transmission to the ECOWAS Secretariat; and

- Control the legitimate use of firearms and advise the minister of internal affairs on formulating policies and strategies as contained in the ECOWAS Convention (ECOWAS, 2006) and any other relevant international conventions to which Sierra Leone is a party.

Below is the structure and composition of the SLeCAA as of November 2024:

Figure 3. Organizational structure of the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition



Source: SLeCAA

## 3.2 Analysis of the legal framework

At the national level, Sierra Leone started to regulate firearms and ammunition in 1955 with the Arms and Ammunition Act. Given the changing national context, the Arms and Ammunition Act of 2012, No. 9 (Sierra Leone, 2012) replaced the act issued in 1955. In 2010, the Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms Act established the SLeNCSA (Sierra Leone, 2010)—now the SLeCAA—which aims to control the proliferation and the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, and other related materials. In 2014, the Arms and Ammunition Regulations (Sierra Leone, 2014) were established to specify certain aspects of the previous law, such as licensing. The Arms and Ammunition Act of 2021 (Sierra Leone, 2021) then repealed and replaced the Arms and Ammunition Act of 2012, No. 9 (Sierra Leone, 2012), to provide for the safe and effective management, storage, and security of arms stockpiles, ammunitions, and other related materials within Sierra Leone.

In 2011, Sierra Leone also established the Customs Act to prohibit and control the import and export of certain goods, which includes weapons (Sierra Leone, 2011b). Section 63 of this act provides that the import or export of specific goods is prohibited for ‘security, in respect of imports and exports of weapons, ammunition, and articles of war, and goods and materials for the supply of a military establishment’ (Sierra Leone, 2011b, subs. j–ii). The Criminal Procedure Act of 2015 is

also an important text as it provides the ability to seize offensive weapons (Sierra Leone, 2015, s. 9).

One achievement of the national legal framework is the criminalization of arms-related activities such as illicit manufacturing, trade, use, possession, or trafficking. Furthermore, the government created a licensing process for civilian firearm possession that led to the establishment of a registry.

At the regional level, Sierra Leone is one of the founding member states of ECOWAS. Adopted on 14 June 2006, the ECOWAS Convention became a legally binding instrument (ECOWAS, 2006). This text provides a regional harmonization of definitions used within the region to facilitate the fight against the excessive proliferation of small arms and light weapons. At the international level, Sierra Leone has shown a strong commitment to arms control.

Table 2. International legal instruments to which Sierra Leone is committed, as of December 2024

International legal texts	Date of signature	Description
The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA)	20 July 2001	The UN PoA is a policy framework with political commitments by states. It covers many fields, such as possession, manufacturing, or illicit transfers.
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (The Firearms Protocol)	27 November 2001	Its ratification was on 12 August 2014. It aims at preventing and eradicating the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms and ammunition.
International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (The International Tracing Instrument (ITI))	8 December 2005	The ITI is a politically binding instrument outlining requirements for marking, record-keeping, and international cooperation to trace illicit small arms and light weapons.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)	25 September 2013 with entry into force on 24 December 2014	This treaty establishes common standards for the international trade of conventional weapons to reduce illicit arms trade. Since its accession, Sierra Leone has published and delivered all its annual reports on time.
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)	23 August 2024	The CCM prohibits all use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles within the CCM speak to the destruction of stockpiles, clearance of contaminated areas, assistance to victims, submission of transparency reports, and adoption of domestic legislation.

Source: Parker and Wilson (2016); UNODA (n.d).

### 3.3 Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis

This section highlights the results of SLeCAA's micro-factors as summarized in the form of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT).

Table 3. Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition SWOT analysis

Strengths	Opportunities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An existing legal framework that gives the legal mandate to the SLeCAA.</li> <li>• Trained, qualified, and available staff.</li> <li>• Data on gun manufacturers and licensed firearm owners from a civilian owners database is available and disaggregated by gender and region.</li> <li>• A mandated and autonomous national commission within the national security architecture.</li> <li>• Collaboration and coordination with stakeholders and local authorities.</li> <li>• Implementation of activities despite limited funds.</li> <li>• Decentralization of SLeCAA offices in the north and south regions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development partnerships, including with the media and technical and financial assistance.</li> <li>• Availability of potential donors and partners.</li> <li>• Political will.</li> <li>• Coordination and collaboration with CSOs and relevant ministries, departments, and agencies.</li> <li>• Capacity-building for staff.</li> <li>• Networking and lobbying.</li> </ul>
Weaknesses	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inadequate logistics and technical support.</li> <li>• Insufficient human resources.</li> <li>• Current staff designations are demotivating.</li> <li>• Inadequate financing and limited budgets.</li> <li>• Limited presence of the SLeCAA at regional and district levels.</li> <li>• Infrastructure constraints, such as the office space in Freetown.</li> <li>• Limited visibility in scope and presence.</li> <li>• Weak sub-regional cooperation, especially at the Mud River Union.</li> <li>• Funding delays.</li> <li>• Limited monitoring and evaluation in planning and implementation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of unlicensed weapons.</li> <li>• Insufficient awareness by the public.</li> <li>• Donor fatigue.</li> <li>• Porous borders.</li> <li>• Epidemics and natural disasters.</li> <li>• Limited budgetary support.</li> <li>• Limited logistics support.</li> <li>• Poor road networks in project intervention areas.</li> <li>• Mandate disagreements with local government officials on the licensing of rifle weapons.</li> <li>• Judiciary noncompliance in the delivery of exhibit weapons to the SLeCAA.</li> <li>• Limited cooperation and coordination among stakeholders.</li> <li>• Transnational organized crime networks.</li> <li>• Old and dilapidated weapon stores for both the police and the military.</li> </ul>

Note: This table is the result of a SWOT analysis conducted in December 2022 in Sierra Leone as part of a workshop organized with the technical committee of the NAP.

## 3.4 Stakeholder analysis

Coordination between arms control actors and inter-ministerial cooperation is necessary to implement the AAM strategy effectively. The illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition requires a comprehensive response that calls for the collaboration of multiple actors. The stakeholder analysis conducted in December 2022 aimed to understand who the SLeCAA's stakeholders are and who will affect or be affected by its operations and programmes. Four categories of actors have been identified according to their level of interest and influence:

- **Promoters (high influence, low interest):** All actors who directly or indirectly share common objectives with the SLeCAA regarding security, development, or peace. These are mainly high-level institutional actors who can influence the work of the SLeCAA, particularly through funding and political support. These actors must be informed and satisfied with the work of the SLeCAA to secure their commitment. Examples include the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Office of the President, and parliament, among others.
- **Defenders (high influence, high interest):** All stakeholders who directly share the mission and vision of the SLeCAA. They influence the SLeCAA by contributing to the NAP development process. These stakeholders play a role before, during, and after the NAP, particularly in ensuring the buy-in of the institutions they represent. They are kept regularly informed of progress and actively participate in the activities of the action plan. Examples include the MAG, Ministry of Defence, ONS, RSLAF, Sierra Leone Police, Small Arms Survey, TOCU, and UNDP.
- **Latent (low influence, low interest):** All actors who do not share the same interests and objectives of the SLeCAA, although they could potentially be involved in the activities of the NAP due to their status and role in society. The SLeCAA is interested in considering them and monitoring their activities to find common objectives. Examples include the Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs, Ministry of Local Government and Community Affairs, private security companies, and youth.
- **Apathetic (low influence, high interest):** All actors who directly share the mission and vision of the SLeCAA. Their status and role do not allow them to influence the work of the SLeCAA; however, they have a network and the capacity to influence society. For this reason, the SLeCAA must keep them informed of their activities and identify synergies to maximize impact. These are mainly civil society actors, and examples include community leaders, NGOs, and SLANSA.

### 3.5 Strategic gaps

The environmental scan carried out in December 2022 identified a set of five strategic gaps. It was based on the SWOT analysis, stakeholder analysis, and strategic planning efforts. These gaps need to be closed so that the SLeCAA can sustain its operations for the 2025 to 2029 strategic period.

Table 4. Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition strategic gap analysis

	Strategic gaps	Intervention objective
A.	Inadequate institutional capacity.	Institutional strengthening.
B.	Low collaboration and coordination.	Institutional strengthening.
C.	Inadequate arms, ammunition, and related material management.	Enhanced physical stockpile security and management.
D.	Inadequate awareness and information generation and sharing.	Research and awareness building.
E.	Inadequate activity monitoring and evaluation.	Enhanced project management and institutional strengthening.
F.	Porous borders and limited cross-border collaboration.	Institutional strengthening and regional collaboration.

Note: The strategic gaps were defined by the technical committee of the NAP and translated into intervention objectives.

#### A. Inadequate institutional capacity

One of the weaknesses of the 2011 NAP was the lack of institutional capacities dedicated to implementing and monitoring the NAP. While the Arms and Ammunition Act of 2012 (Sierra Leone, 2012) clearly outlines the SLeCAA's mandate, its implementation has posed some challenges. Despite the SLeCAA's strong presence in Freetown, its influence is limited (Sierra Leone, 2012). The SLeCAA improved its representation by creating two regional offices; however, it is not enough to ensure proper implementation of arms control regulations throughout the territory. Another institutional challenge was the lack of a dedicated national budget for implementing the NAP, limiting the SLeCAA's activities. As a result, the SLeCAA has had to rely on funding from international organizations, whose priorities do not always align with its own.

Although a legal framework in Sierra Leone exists, improving the SLeCAA's efficiency will require filling some gaps, including craft firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and compliance with Sierra Leone's international commitments. Efforts must be made to improve technical and material capacities to strengthen the SLeCAA's existence in the institutional landscape in Sierra Leone. The SLeCAA's current office space cannot accommodate all staff or receive partners for meetings or conferences. It requires urgent attention.

## **B. Low collaboration and coordination**

According to the 2021 preliminary assessment conducted by the Small Arms Survey, with the support of MAG, the 2011 NAP was developed and implemented in isolation. The lack of collaboration prevented the document from being owned by other security and development actors. Absence of a clear collaboration mechanism with CSOs was a barrier to their involvement or knowledge of the operations of the SLeCAA. The 2011 NAP did not sufficiently define collaboration with women's CSOs and WPS actors, resulting in duplicated interventions and uncoordinated activities that created gaps and reduced impact.

Inter-ministerial coordination has also been a weakness to date. The work of the SLeCAA is not necessarily shared with non-traditional ministries—except the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Internal Affairs—such as the Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, or Ministry of Social Welfare. The absence of arms issues in the national development plan illustrates this lack of coordination (Sierra Leone, 2019a).

Another instance of low collaboration and coordination is when bureaucracy delays necessary decisions or interventions by the SLeCAA. This delay could be reduced by establishing regular and formal information-sharing guidelines. The issue of seized weapons is an example of where collaboration and coordination can improve between the police, courts, and SLeCAA. Matters regarding custody of weapons and ammunition while the cases are in progress or when weapons are stored or disposed of present clear gaps and limited collaboration among these three institutions.

## **C. Inadequate arms, ammunition, and related materiel management**

Although the SLeCAA has made significant efforts on the AAM since the 2011 NAP, many challenges remain. The main challenges in Sierra Leone include arms marking, the civilian licensing process, craft production, firearm disposal, and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). These challenges are mainly due to a lack of human, technical, and financial resources. There needs to be more trained arms markers, for instance, and the machines cannot conduct all the marking exercises. For PSSM, the lack of financing and procedures has led to some armouries' deterioration, posing serious security and safety threats.

The SLeCAA has been failing to ensure compliance with the law regarding civilian weapons. As the licensing process is centralized in Freetown, some civilians do not take the steps to comply with national legislation, and others ignore the law. Additionally, it remains a challenge to the arms marking process when local blacksmiths craft-produce arms because the producers are not registered, and the weapons do not have serial numbers.

The lack of standardized procedures and inadequate record-keeping prevent the SLeCAA and its partners from monitoring and managing weapons and ammunition flows in the country.

## **D. Inadequate awareness and information generation and sharing**

The SLeCAA has little capacity to collect and share information as its limited research capacity leads it to outsource research to other organizations. Creating a research capacity within the SLeCAA could increase the efficiency of its interventions.

The consultations conducted from 2021 to 2022 by MAG and the Small Arms Survey highlight a lack of understanding of the issues and challenges of arms proliferation in Sierra Leone. Arms control actors, including the SLeCAA, do not always understand the scale, causes, and consequences of the problems due to a lack of reliable data on the topic. Very little data exists on the links between weapons and domestic violence in Sierra Leone, for example. This lack of information limits the SLeCAA's ability to address the problem and propose an adequate response.

The lack of data, including disaggregated data, also limits the SLeCAA's ability to raise awareness about issues related to weapons proliferation. Although knowledge and information would enhance support for the SLeCAA's mandate from other institutions and the public, the lack of data and funding for outreach sessions and public awareness has hindered this critical process.

### **E. Inadequate activity monitoring and evaluation**

The SLeCAA's capacity to monitor and evaluate activities is new and limited. The monitoring and evaluation unit is comprised of only one officer, who oversees the evaluation of all the SLeCAA's activities. In addition to the insufficient human resources, the lack of tools and procedures restricts the unit's effectiveness.

The SLeCAA's staff was the basis of its institutional memory for a long time. Changes in personnel—particularly at the management level—compromised the preservation and sharing of information. The inadequate monitoring and evaluation of activities also hinders the SLeCAA's ability to seek funding to finance activities within the NAP.

### **F. Porous borders and limited cross-border collaboration**

The capacity to monitor the movement of people along porous borders remains a challenge to the government despite national and regional initiatives. In most cases, border initiatives have limited personnel to monitor the many illegal border crossing points. This limit is associated with financial and logistical constraints for effective border monitoring.

At the regional level, the absence of a sub-regional strategy to effectively address arms control across the porous border within the Mud River Union region is a major gap. At the national level, there needs to be a clearly defined channel for tracing weapons and ammunition intercepted by border security personnel. In 2021, over 10,000 boxes of shotgun cartridges were intercepted at the border location in Gbalamuya, Kambia District (Gbla, 2021).

Most border areas also lack basic technological infrastructure, such as connectivity to the internet or metal detectors at strategic crossing points, to facilitate information-sharing and security response.

An abstract graphic consisting of numerous thin, parallel lines in shades of green and blue, arranged in a curved, fan-like pattern that originates from the top left and spreads towards the right.

# ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY



The section below outlines the strategic vision, core values, mission, and key elements that will shape the national arms and ammunition management approach to achieve the desired strategic impacts by 2029.

All the strategy elements outlined below were developed through an inclusive and participatory process during various workshops held in Sierra Leone with the Technical Steering Committee of the NAP.

## 4.1. Vision and mission

Sierra Leone's long-term ambition is to achieve a developed, peaceful, and secure country free from unregulated arms, ammunition, and other related materials. To reach this vision, the mission of the SLeCAA is to effectively coordinate a national response to reduce armed violence through collaborative engagement with national, regional, and international stakeholders.

The integration of the phrase 'other related materials', as formulated in the ECOWAS Convention (ECOWAS, 2006), was key to ensuring that the issue of improvised explosive devices is captured in the SLeCAA strategy and mandate.

## 4.2. Core values

The core values that will guide the implementation of the AAM strategy are:

- **Integrity:** The SLeCAA's integrity in licensing, procurement, and disposal processes of arms and ammunition will prevent corruption and foster public trust in the arms management system.
- **Transparency and accountability:** The SLeCAA's openness and clarity in decision-making processes and actions will ensure that responsible entities answer for their decisions and mechanisms are in place to monitor and evaluate compliance with set regulations.
- **Partnership and collaboration:** The SLeCAA will enhance relationships with various stakeholders, including government agencies, international organizations, CSOs, and neighbouring countries, to collectively address common challenges.
- **Professionalism:** The SLeCAA will promote professionalism that encompasses the conduct, competence, and ethical standards expected of individuals in the mandated field. In the context of arms and ammunition management, professionalism is crucial for ensuring that those involved demonstrate expertise, adhere to ethical standards, and act in a manner that upholds the integrity of the process.
- **Promotion of gender, inclusion, and diversity:** The SLeCAA will recognize and value the diverse needs, perspectives, and contributions of individuals, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, or other considerations. This value involves promoting equal opportunities and addressing the unique impact of arms on different populations.

These core values collectively contribute to developing and implementing a AAM strategy that is effective, ethical, and responsive to the complex challenges associated with arms control.

## 4.3. Expected impacts

The expected impacts of implementing the AAM strategy are:

**Impact 1: Sierra Leone's national institutions will have the capacity and knowledge for effective small arms control in the country.**

- **Enhanced institutional capacity:** Sierra Leone's national institutions, particularly the SLeCAA, will have strengthened capacities to develop, implement, and enforce policies and regulations aimed at small arms control. This strengthening includes improved infrastructure, resources, and human capacities to effectively monitor and prevent the illicit proliferation of small arms within the country.
- **Improved legal and regulatory frameworks:** National institutions will possess the knowledge and expertise to update and harmonize laws, regulations, and administrative procedures in line with international standards and procedures on small arms control.
- **Effective data collection and analysis:** Sierra Leone will have systems for reliable data collection, reporting, and analysis on small arms flows and effects. The SLeCAA will be equipped with the technical skills to monitor trends and threats related to arms proliferation, enhancing its ability to respond to emerging challenges effectively.
- **Increased coordination among national and regional stakeholders:** Strengthened partnerships and coordination mechanisms among national institutions and regional stakeholders will be fostered, ensuring a comprehensive and multi-level approach to small arms control. These mechanisms include enhanced collaboration with CSOs, local communities, and international partners.

**Impact 2: State- and civilian-held arms and ammunition will be held legally and safely in accordance with national, regional, and international standards.**

- **Reduced armed violence:** A well-crafted arms and ammunition strategy aims to reduce armed violence and the negative impact of weapons on communities. This strategy includes addressing issues such as gun-related crimes, conflicts, and the misuse of firearms.
- **Enhanced public safety:** The strategy seeks to enhance public safety by minimizing the availability of illicit arms and ensuring responsible arms management. The decreased availability will contribute to a safer environment for individuals and communities.
- **Improved national security:** An effective strategy contributes to national security by preventing the proliferation of weapons used for criminal activities or acts of terrorism. It addresses threats posed by illegal arms circulation.

**Impact 3: National and regional arms control programmes and policies will address the specific needs of women, youth, and people with disabilities.**

- **Improved understanding of the gendered impact of small arms:** The SLeCAA will develop and use tools for collecting and analysing gender-disaggregated data on small arms violence. This analysis will also include recognizing how gender roles and gender dynamics influence the impact of small arms and exploring the links between small arms proliferation and gender-based violence. Disaggregated data will enable better tracking

of how armed violence impacts men and women differently, supporting evidence-based interventions.

- **Strengthened integration of gender perspectives in small arms control programmes and policies:** This ensures that arms control efforts not only address basic security concerns but also consider the unique needs and experiences of different genders in armed violence.
- **Improved diverse and meaningful participation:** The NAP promotes creating an environment that facilitates the meaningful participation of women and underrepresented groups in arms control initiatives at the political, strategic, technical, and operational levels. The NAP also addresses, in a sustainable manner, the barriers that hinder the participation of women and underrepresented groups in decision-making and small arms control policies and programmes.
- **Peacebuilding and conflict prevention:** A comprehensive strategy will contribute to peacebuilding efforts by addressing the root causes of armed conflict, including gender dynamics, preventing the escalation of violence, and promoting stability.



# RESULTS FRAMEWORK



Three strategic focus areas have been defined based on the diagnostic analysis and identification of the strategic gaps. For the strategic period 2025 to 2029, the SLeCAA and its partners will focus on:

1. Improving the institutional and operational capacities of the SLeCAA and its partners;
2. Reducing the risks of unregulated arms, ammunition, and other related materials; and
3. Ensuring the integration of the population's needs based on different factors, including gender, age, and disability status, and their meaningful participation in arms control policies and programmes

Table 5. National strategic framework for arms and ammunition management

<b>Sierra Leone: National strategic framework for arms and ammunition management</b>					
<b>Vision</b>	A developed, peaceful, and secure Sierra Leone free from unregulated arms, ammunition, and other related materials.				
<b>Global objective</b>	Strengthen development, peace, and security in Sierra Leone through more effective arms, ammunition, and other materials control.				
<b>Expected impacts</b>	<p><b>Impact 1:</b> Sierra Leone national institutions will have the capacity and knowledge for effective small arms control in the country.</p> <p><b>Impact 2:</b> State- and civilian-held arms and ammunition will be held legally and safely in accordance with national, regional, and international standards.</p> <p><b>Impact 3:</b> National and regional arms control programmes and policies will address the specific needs of women, youth, and people with disabilities.</p>				
<b>Focus</b>	<b>Strategic objective (SO)</b>	<b>Expected outcome (EO)</b>	<b>Action</b>	<b>Budget in SLE</b>	<b>Budget in USD (based on OANDA rates 25.11.2024)</b>
<b>FOCUS 1:</b>  <b>Improve the institutional and operational capacities of the SLeCAA and its partners.</b>	SO 1.1: Strengthen Sierra Leone's legal framework for effective Arms and Ammunition Management.	EO 1.1.1: The legal framework for arms control aligns with regional and international standards.	Action 1.1.1.1: Ensure the popularization and implementation of the SLeCAA's Arms and Ammunition Act of 2023 at the national level.	<b>21,700,550</b>	<b>944,098</b>
	SO 1.2: Strengthen the SLeCAA's capabilities and knowledge.	EO 1.2.1: The SLeCAA has adequate management and financial capabilities to deliver its mandate.	Action 1.2.1.1: Strengthen the SLeCAA's national, regional, and international visibility.  Action 1.2.1.2: Organize and facilitate the	<b>18,060,373</b>	<b>785,729</b>

			<p>decentralization of the SLeCAA</p> <p>Action 1.2.1.3: Improve the human resources capacities of the SLeCAA</p> <p>Action 1.2.1.4: Develop a resource mobilization strategy for the SLeCAA</p> <p>Action 1.2.1.5: Improve the material capacities of the SLeCAA</p>		
		EO 1.2.2: The SLeCAA has strengthened technical expertise on small arms and light weapons, including IED threats.	Action 1.2.2.1: Develop a capacity-building strategy for the SLeCAA.	<b>60,000</b>	<b>2,610</b>
		EO 1.2.3: The SLeCAA understands the drivers of weapons proliferation in Sierra Leone, including gender dynamics.	<p>Action 1.2.3.1: Enhance the operational capacity in collecting disaggregated data by sex on arms proliferation and impact.</p> <p>Action 1.2.3.2: Conduct regular studies of the drivers of insecurity in the country and share the findings with relevant stakeholders to alleviate these drivers.</p>	<b>980,000</b>	<b>42,636</b>
		EO 1.2.4: The gender focal point of the SLeCAA	Action 1.2.4.1: Institutionalize the gender national focal	<b>115,000</b>	<b>3,045</b>

		regularly informs the SLeCAA and its partners about gender issues and supports decision-making.	point position within the SLeCAA.  Action 1.2.4.2: Enhance coordination between the gender focal point with WPS and gender actors at the national and regional levels.		
SO 1.3: Strengthen national awareness and coordination on small arms and ammunition control.	EO 1.3.1: Line ministries and government bodies effectively coordinate on small arms and ammunition control.		Action 1.3.1.1: Ensure coordination and communication between small arms control actors at the national and regional levels.  Action 1.3.1.2: Strengthen the capacities of the chieftom security task force on arms and ammunition.  Action 1.3.1.3: Establish partnership with other relevant institutions that are not part of the National Security Council Coordinating Group.	<b>3,407,975</b>	<b>148,266</b>
	EO 1.3.2: State actors, such as ministries or parliament, are regularly informed about the work of the SLeCAA, its impact, and the impact of arms and ammunition proliferation.		Action 1.3.2.1: Strengthen the knowledge of state actors.	<b>110,000</b>	<b>4,786</b>
	EO 1.3.3: The public is regularly		Action 1.3.3.1: Prepare awareness-	<b>1,897,600</b>	<b>82,556</b>

		<p>informed about the work of the SLeCAA, the legal framework, and the dangers of arms and ammunition proliferation. Civil society is involved in risk identification and awareness-raising activities at the government and community levels.</p>	<p>raising materials on the work of the SLeCAA, the legal framework, and the dangers of arms proliferation.</p> <p>Action 1.3.3.2: Organize a public awareness-raising campaign on the work of the SLeCAA, the legal framework, and the dangers of arms proliferation.</p> <p>Action 1.3.3.3: Co-develop and co-implement activities with CSOs.</p> <p>Action 1.3.3.4: Develop targeted training for civil societies to increase knowledge on the proliferation of small arms and ammunition.</p>		
SO 1.4: Regularly review and adapt national arms and ammunition control frameworks.	EO 1.4.1: The NAP implementation is regularly monitored, evaluated, and adapted according to changing needs and context.	Action 1.4.1.1: Enhance the monitoring and evaluation system in implementing the action plan that allows the adaptation according to the changing needs and context.	<b>1,340,000</b>	<b>58,298</b>	
	EO 1.4.2: The capacity of the SLeCAA's monitoring and evaluation unit is strengthened.	Action 1.4.2.1: Enhance human resources for the monitoring and evaluation unit.	<b>255,200</b>	<b>11,103</b>	
	EO 1.4.3: Partners and other relevant national actors can monitor and	Action 1.4.3.1: Ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of the NAP.	<b>238,000</b>	<b>10,354</b>	

		evaluate the plan through consultations.			
		EO 1.4.4: Donors and international actors are regularly informed of the achievements and challenges encountered in implementing the NAP.	Action 1.4.4.1: Regularly inform partners, donors, and other relevant actors on the NAP implementation.  Action 1.4.4.2: Develop tools on resource mobilization to share regularly with donors and partners.	695,000	30,236
<b>FOCUS 1 BUDGET</b>				<b>48'859'698</b>	<b>2,125,675</b>
<b>FOCUS 2:</b>  <b>Reduce the risks of unregulated arms, ammunition, and other related materials.</b>	SO 2.1: Secure government-managed arms and ammunition stockpiles, aligned with regional and international standards.	EO 2.1.1: Weapons held by security forces are marked, registered, and destroyed when they become obsolete.	Action 2.1.1.1: Provide the scheme for weapon marking and registration of state-owned arms and identify obsolete arms and ammunition.  Action 2.1.1.2: Verify and re-mark state-owned weapons.	7,680,000	334,124
		EO 2.1.2: Arms and ammunition stockpile management meets the minimum international standards outlined in the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs) or Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC).	Action 2.1.2.1: Develop a standard operating procedure for stockpile management.  Action 2.1.2.2: Construct and rehabilitate armouries and explosive stores for primary security forces.	6,104,500	265,581
	SO 2.2: Reduce the illegal production and	EO 2.2.1: There is a reduction in the illicit trafficking of	Action 2.2.1.1: Engage stakeholders in border	4,263,608	185,491

	circulation of arms and ammunition among civilians.	arms and ammunition throughout Sierra Leone, particularly in the border regions.	communities effectively.  Action 2.2.1.2: Improve cross-border collaboration.  Action 2.2.1.3: Collect arms and ammunition illicitly held by civilians.		
		EO 2.2.2: Seized, found, and collected illegal arms and ammunition are marked, registered and destroyed.	Action 2.2.2.1: Collaborate with the judiciary and primary security sector effectively.  Action 2.2.2.2: Develop a national SOP on seized, found, and collected illicit arms and ammunition.  Action 2.2.2.3: Mark and keep a record of seized, found, and collected weapons.  Action 2.2.2.4: Regularly destroy seized, found, collected, and obsolete stockpiles.	<b>2,987,500</b>	<b>129,973</b>
		EO 2.2.3: Craft firearms are regulated, marked, and registered according to national standards.	Action 2.2.3.1: Conduct an annual national reassessment of craft producers and repairers.  Action 2.2.3.2: Coordinate the provision of alternative livelihood skills for those who opt to quit the trade.	<b>7,279,900</b>	<b>316,717</b>

			<p>Action 2.2.3.3: Regulate craft producers willing to continue with the trade.</p> <p>Action 2.2.3.4: Avail arms marking and recordkeeping capability to craft arms manufacturers.</p>		
		EO 2.2.4: Civilian-owned weapons are marked and registered according to national standards.	<p>Action 2.2.4.1: Establish a one-stop shop for issuing civilian licenses to avoid process delays.</p> <p>Action 2.2.4.2: Decentralize the civilians' firearm license process at the regional level.</p> <p>Action 2.2.4.3: Enhance compliance with national laws on civilian possession and firearm regulations.</p> <p>Action 2.2.4.4: Enhance the local administration's capacity to support surveillance and compliance with firearm-related laws and regulations.</p> <p>Action 2.2.4.5: Raise awareness on civilian-owned marking and registration.</p>	<b>7,246,500</b>	<b>315,264</b>
<b>FOCUS 2 BUDGET</b>				<b>35,562,008</b>	<b>1,547,150</b>
<b>FOCUS 3:</b>	SO 3.1:	EO 3.1.1: Women participate	Action 3.1.1.1: Promote women's	<b>500,000</b>	<b>21,753</b>

<p><b>Ensure the integration of the population's needs based on different factors, including gender, age, and disability status and their meaningful participation in arms control policies and programmes.</b></p>	<p>Ensure the creation of decision-making and consultative spaces that allow for the meaningful participation of diverse groups.</p>	<p>meaningfully in the SLeCAA, including in senior and technical positions, and influence decision-making on arms and ammunition control.</p>	<p>participation in high-level positions in the SLeCAA through developing policies and creating opportunities.</p> <p>Action 3.1.1.2: Strengthen women's capacities on arms and ammunition issues to support their participation in decision-making.</p>		
		<p>EO 3.1.2: CSOs representing women, men, youth, and people with disabilities play a role in the steering committee of the NAP.</p>	<p>Action 3.1.2.1: Formalize and strengthen the steering committee for monitoring, reviewing, and implementing the NAP.</p> <p>Action 3.1.2.2: Create and ensure an enabling environment to sustain diverse and meaningful participation in the steering committee.</p>	<p><b>215,000</b></p>	<p><b>9,354</b></p>
	<p>SO 3.2: Integrate an intersectional gender, age, and disability dimension into arms control policies and programmes.</p>	<p>EO 3.2.1: Arms control activities and policies are tailored to the specific needs of women, men, girls, and boys, including youth and people with disabilities.</p>	<p>Action 3.2.1.1: Partner with ministries, departments, and agencies responsible for the various groups.</p> <p>Action 3.2.1.2: Engage with the affected groups to strengthen the SLeCAA's understanding of the specific needs.</p>	<p><b>484,000</b></p>	<p><b>21,057</b></p>

			<p>Action 3.2.1.3: Adapt existing gender policies and programs towards small arms and ammunition issues.</p> <p>Action 3.2.1.4: Support institutional actors, including security actors, in understanding and addressing the gender impact of small arms and ammunition proliferation.</p>		
		EO 3.2.2: Women, men, youth, and people with disabilities are less exposed to armed violence.	<p>Action 3.2.2.1: Raise awareness of the linkages between small arms proliferation and gender-based violence.</p> <p>Action 3.2.2.2: Improve the socio-economic conditions of the population to reduce the demand for small arms.</p>	<b>1,345,500</b>	<b>58,537</b>
<b>FOCUS 3 BUDGET</b>				<b>2,544,500</b>	<b>110,700</b>
<b>TOTAL BUDGET</b>				<b>86,966,206</b>	<b>3,783,526</b>

# IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY



The following section outlines mechanisms to support the successful implementation of the NAP. It provides guidelines on:

- a. Coordination mechanisms to facilitate collaboration, information sharing, and synergies among stakeholders;
- b. Implementation actors to define the roles and responsibilities of those involved in executing the NAP;
- c. Monitoring and evaluation to regularly align the NAP with the country's needs and evolving context;
- d. Resource mechanisms to assist the SLeCAA in identifying opportunities for sustainable collaboration and support; and
- e. Funding mechanisms to explore potential sources of funding.

## 6.1. Coordination mechanisms

The success of the 2025 to 2029 NAP implementation will greatly depend on enhanced collaboration of key stakeholders within government institutions and CSOs. The national law enforcement and security agencies, such as the police, judiciary, and ONS, will need to coordinate to deliver on the aspirations outlined in the NAP.

The SLeCAA and partners, in recognition of the importance of local involvement, will need to enhance and engage community-based approaches to small arms control. This engagement includes public awareness campaigns and grassroots initiatives to reduce the demand for illegal weapons and foster a culture of peace. Community leaders and local organizations will play a vital role in promoting disarmament and advocating for non-violence.

As part of the West African region, Sierra Leone shares the challenge of small arms proliferation with its neighbours. Regional frameworks, agreements, and associations—such as the ECOWAS Convention (ECOWAS, 2006), the forthcoming ECOWAS Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Strategy, and the Mano River Union—are integral to coordinating efforts across borders. More efforts are required to engage with neighbouring countries to address the transnational aspects of small arms trafficking and to enhance collective security measures.

Small arms control coordination is a complex, multifaceted endeavour involving national, regional, and international efforts. Though Sierra Leone has made significant progress since the end of the civil war, ongoing vigilance and commitment are necessary to ensure that small arms do not undermine the country's hard-won peace and stability. Continued international support, effective legislation, and community engagement will be crucial in maintaining control over small arms and promoting a secure and peaceful environment in Sierra Leone.

## 6.2. Implementation actors

The successful implementation of the 2025 to 2029 NAP and its AAM strategy requires the involvement of diverse stakeholders at the public, private, and community levels, as well as technical and financial partners.

- **State actors:** These include state institutions, ministries, and their decentralized structures. Following their mandates, these actors must play a role in combating the proliferation of illicit small arms and their ammunition.
- **Communities and local authorities:** As key grassroots actors, communities and local authorities will directly intervene. The desired changes in the fight against illicit small arms proliferation must be realized at the community level. Local development actors are, therefore, essential partners for implementing this strategy. Local authorities must prioritize the fight against illicit small arms and ammunition proliferation through their involvement and commitment to the NAP implementation.
- **CSOs:** These organizations will be crucial in implementing the NAP strategy. Existing CSOs will be called upon for field actions and monitoring efforts. They will be particularly valuable in areas where the state has a limited presence due to security challenges. Specifically, CSOs focusing on gender issues, especially women's organizations, must collaborate more closely with the SLeCAA to ensure meaningful participation of women in managing arms control activities and integrating the specific needs of women and other under-represented groups in small arms control policies.
- **Technical and financial partners:** These partners are necessary to implement the NAP strategy. They will support the state in operationalizing the strategy, which is essential given the many challenges the SLeCAA faced in recent years that hindered the implementation of its activities.
- **Private sector actors:** Private sector stakeholders, such as gunsmiths, artisanal arms manufacturers, and private security companies, are also key players in improving arms management and combating the proliferation of illicit small arms.

The success of the strategy depends on the collective commitment of all stakeholders, regional coordination, and sustained international support. Maintaining vigilance will ensure Sierra Leone's progress toward long-term peace and security.

## 6.3 Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

Policy, political, and security environments in and around Sierra Leone will influence the implementation of the 2025 to 2029 NAP, in addition to Sierra Leone's ability to muster resources to support implementing this framework.

This section outlines a lean learning framework designed to support the implementation of the NAP. Responsibilities to implement and report on the proposed framework sit with the SLeCAA. The proposed approach is 'light touch' within the existing constraints of the SLeCAA's limited resources for monitoring, evaluation, and learning.

The SLeCAA's monitoring and evaluation officer may facilitate annual reviews based on what is proposed below. Reviews will involve all members of the steering committee. Should the need arise, other partners may support the SLeCAA's monitoring and evaluation officer.

The main goal of the proposed monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework is four-pronged:

- Regularly assess progress made towards achieving the outcomes laid out in the NAP;
- Assess the extent to which contextual and policy changes may affect the relevance of the approach laid out in the NAP and if changes are required;
- Assess if the proposed approach is responsive to the diverse needs and perspectives of men, women, and youth in the country; and
- Ensure a clear reporting flow system among the SLeCAA's partners.

### 6.3.1 Monitoring

Every six months, the monitoring and evaluation officer will organize consultations with individual members of the steering committee and representatives of Sierra Leone's relevant security and law enforcement agencies to compile and consolidate inputs to answer the following set of questions:

- What progress has occurred on the implementation of the NAP per outcome, output, and activity, and whether progress is on track or not;
- In case of a lack of sufficient progress, what factors may explain it;
- What risks may impact the implementation of the NAP;
- What support, if any, may be needed from other Sierra Leone stakeholders and government bodies to support the effective and timely implementation of the NAP; and
- Recommendations to the steering committee.

The monitoring and evaluation officer will compile the findings into short briefing notes every six months for submission to the SLeCAA.

### 6.3.2 Learning

Annual reviews will be held for the duration of the NAP to review progress at the outcome level and forge consensus on the way forward. The annual reviews will gather all organizations represented within the steering committee and at the senior decision-making level.

The SLeCAA's monitoring and evaluation officer shall prepare a consolidated progress report ahead of the annual review. This report will outline key achievements at the outcome level and build on reports from the previous period. The annual review will enable members of the steering committee to discuss key findings and options from the annual review report and decide upon the following:

- Which outcomes may or may not be on track and why;
- What lessons emerged from the past 12 months of implementing the NAP, and do these lessons suggest a need to change part of the approach in the future; and
- Whether changes to the NAP logical framework and workplan are necessary. If so, a group decision will need to occur, and a revised version of the NAP may be circulated upon completion of the annual review.

Annual review reports and minutes will be shared among Sierra Leone's national and international partners to create a common understanding of and promote coordinated approaches to the country's arms and ammunition challenge.

## **6.4. Resource mobilization**

Resource mobilization for small arms control is crucial for sustaining the country's efforts to manage and reduce the proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition. Financial, technical, and human resources must mobilize strategically to effectively strengthen arms and ammunition management. These resources will be essential in supporting comprehensive disarmament efforts where necessary, as well as in advancing control initiatives aimed at curbing the spread of illegal weapons.

The fulfilment of the SLeCAA's mandate and strategy, as outlined in the NAP, depends on sustained funding to implement its strategic objectives. The need to enhance the core funding from the government with programme and project funding from donors or development partners remains critical. Dependence on project funding can undermine the organization's ability to pursue strategic priorities and weaken overall organizational capacities. The intervention in AAM requires long-term plans and sustained engagement for transformational impact.

The Government of Sierra Leone allocates a portion of its budget to arms and ammunition control, focusing on legislative enforcement, law enforcement training, administrative costs associated with staffing and running the SLeCAA, and support for arms registration and regulations, among others. This domestic funding is crucial for sustaining long-term efforts and ensuring that initiatives are adapted to local needs. The SLeCAA will need to be more strategic to ensure the NAP's priorities align with national development strategies and attract more budgetary allocations from the government. Engaging the private sector, including businesses and philanthropic entities, can provide additional funding and in-kind support. Companies may contribute through corporate social responsibility programmes or partnerships with NGOs working on small arms issues.

Over the years, Sierra Leone has benefited significantly from international support, including funding and expertise from the UN, the European Union, bilateral donor funding, international organizations, and various NGOs. These resources have proved essential for implementing arms and ammunition programmes, enhancing security infrastructure, and conducting awareness campaigns. More efforts will be required to sustain and increase this stream of funding.

Collaboration with neighbouring countries and regional bodies, such as ECOWAS, is essential for sharing resources and expertise. Regional initiatives and frameworks often provide financial and technical support, enhancing Sierra Leone's ability to tackle cross-border arms trafficking and implement regional and international agreements on arms and ammunition control.

Mobilizing resources for arms and ammunition control in Sierra Leone will involve a combination of government funding, international aid, community engagement, regional cooperation, and private sector involvement. Effective resource mobilization ensures that the country can maintain its arms and ammunition management efforts, enforce regulations, and foster a safer, more stable environment for development.

#### **6.4.1 Strategy for mobilizing complementary resources**

A resource mobilization plan will be developed and monitored at the national, regional, sub-regional, and international levels to mobilize the additional resources required to fund the NAP. The plan should consider the following elements:

- An analysis of the overall AAM environment, considering:
  - The funding capacities at the local and national levels;
  - The evolution of the national and international AAM context; and
  - The areas of interest for stakeholders involved in AAM.
- Identification of key potential partners, traditional and new, who are interested and capable of providing financial support for implementing the AAM strategy.
- Setting of periodic resource mobilization objectives and the associated mobilization tools in line with the communications plan.
- A proposal of resource mobilization actions:
  - Participation in international meetings and forums related to AAM.
  - Organized advocacy actions:
    - Advocacy efforts will be led by the SLeCAA, with funding partners and the state, to secure funds for NAP projects and integrate these activities into their programmes.
- Strengthened communication:
  - Communication is crucial for the implementation of the strategic plan. The SLeCAA and its partners will develop a communication plan to raise awareness about the issues regarding the fight against the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons and the financial, material, and human resources needed.

## **6.5 Funding mechanism**

The effective implementation of this NAP requires a robust and sustainable funding mechanism. This funding mechanism should be multifaceted, drawing from various sources to ensure comprehensive arms and ammunition management and enhance public safety in Sierra Leone.

### **6.5.1 Government funding**

The primary source of funding should come from national government budgets. Dedicated arms and ammunition control allocations can be integrated into the broader security, defence, and public safety budgets to ensure consistent resources for staffing, training, infrastructure development, coordination with relevant ministries and departments, and community engagement. The SLNAPAAM, aligned with the MTNDP, will strengthen the national security sector and ensure a comprehensive and effective response to national threats.

### **6.5.2 International assistance**

Through the SLeCAA, Sierra Leone will seek financial support from international organizations and donor countries. UN entities such as the Ammunition Management Advisory Team, ATT Secretariat, UNDP, UNIDIR, and UNODA, as well as regional bodies like the African Union and the ECOWAS, often provide grants and technical assistance for arms and ammunition control initiatives. The Commission will develop projects and programs derived from the NAP and approach these entities for support.

### **6.5.3 NGOs**

NGOs often have access to international funding sources and can implement projects that align with the NAP's objectives, thereby attracting additional resources. Partnerships with NGOs will be enhanced to tap into funding opportunities through grants and joint fundraising efforts.

### **6.5.4 Private Sector Partnerships**

The private sector will be engaged through innovative approaches to attract their funding. Collaborations with businesses, especially those affected by gun violence, can lead to sponsorships and investments in community safety programs. Corporate social responsibility initiatives will be pursued to support awareness campaigns and educational programs.

### **6.5.5 Community Initiatives**

Local communities will be empowered to contribute to funding through grassroots initiatives. These initiatives could include sponsorship by local administrations and in-kind community contributions to safety- and awareness-raising in their localities. Engaging communities fosters ownership and accountability in arms and ammunition control efforts.

## 6.6 Overall budget

The overall budget for the 2025 to 2029 NAP amounts to **86'966'206** SLE (USD 3,783,526 based on OANDA rates 25.11.2024), and is broken down by strategic focus and year.

Table 6. Sierra Leone National Action Plan for Arms and Ammunition Management 2025 to 2029 budget, by year

Strategic focus	Budget in SLE	Budget in %	Annual financial planning				
			Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5
<b>Focus 1:</b> Improve the institutional and operational capacities of the SLeCAA and its partners.	48,859,698	56.2 %	8,474,260	20,601,587	8,465,937	6,027,027	5,290,887
<b>Focus 2:</b> Reduce the risks of unregulated arms, ammunition, and other related materials.	35,562,008	40.9 %	8,081,154	7,885,321	7,987,509	5,740,159	5,867,865
<b>Focus 3:</b> Ensure the integration of the population's needs based on different factors, including gender, age, and disability status, and their meaningful participation in arms control policies and programmes.	2,544,500	2.9%	453,500	579,500	381,500	883,500	246,500
<b>Total in SLE</b>	<b>86,966,206</b>		<b>17,008,914</b>	<b>29,066,408</b>	<b>16,834,946</b>	<b>12,650,686</b>	<b>11,405,252</b>
<b>Total in USD</b> Based on OANDA rates (25.11.2024)	3,783,526		739,985	1,264,554	732,416	550,377	496,193

Notes: This table summarizes SLeCAA's planning tool, detailing the cost of each activity along a timeline set in July 2024 by the NAP technical committee. Costs are subject to change based on inflation and evolving needs, with adjustments made as part of the periodic evaluation of the NAP's implementation.

Source: SLeCAA NAP operational framework (2024).

## 6.7 Risk management matrix

Ahead of the NAP validation session, the SLeCAA and NAP technical committee developed the below risk matrix in September 2024. The table outlines potential risks that could threaten the implementation of the NAP. The 'Risks' column defines each risk, while the 'Level of risk' column assesses the likelihood and potential impact of each risk as follows:

- **Low:** Unlikely to occur, with minimal impact on NAP implementation.
- **Medium:** There is a chance of occurrence; while the impact on NAP implementation could be significant, the risk is manageable.
- **High:** A high probability of occurrence, severely impacting NAP implementation.

The 'Source' column specifies the origin of each risk, categorized as internal, external, or both. Internal risks arise from within the SLeCAA, including issues related to organization, human resources management, and financial or material resources. External risks arise from factors or actors outside of SLeCAA's control.

Finally, the 'Mitigation measures' column proposes actions or strategies to reduce each risk's likelihood or to minimize its impact.

Table 7. Risk management matrix for the Sierra Leone National Action Plan for Arms and Ammunition Management

Risks	Level of risk (high, medium, low)	Source (internal, external)	Mitigation measures
1. Inadequate funding for the full implementation of the NAP.	High	Internal external	<p>Diversify funding sources:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Government allocation: Advocate for increased national budget allocations specifically for the NAP.</li> <li>2. International engagement: Engage with international organizations early to secure funding.</li> <li>3. Private sector engagement: Explore partnerships with foundations with aligned interests in peacebuilding, security, armed violence reduction, or human rights.</li> <li>4. Multi-stakeholder collaborations: Share the costs by partnering with CSOs, the private sector, and international agencies to co-fund specific activities of the NAP.</li> </ol>

<p>2. An abrupt change of SLeCAA leadership due to a political transition.</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>Internal</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Create political assurance of tenure for the commissioner’s office while fully implementing the NAP.</li> <li>2. Conduct engagement meetings with traditional leaders and other community stakeholders organized by The Peace Commission.</li> <li>3. Sign a political peace agreement before, during, and after an election, especially between the main political parties.</li> <li>4. Develop leadership handover guidelines to create clear guidelines for leadership transitions within the SLeCAA, ensuring a smooth handover of responsibilities and priorities, including NAP implementation.</li> <li>5. Strengthen institutional memory to ensure documentation of decisions, ongoing projects, and key policies are maintained and accessible to facilitate the new leadership.</li> </ol>
<p>3. Political instability and deterioration of security.</p>	<p>High</p>	<p>Internal</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regularly assess the political and security situation to anticipate potential disruptions. Use early warning systems to predict political instability or security threats.</li> <li>2. Shift some NAP implementation responsibilities to local or regional authorities, CSOs, and community groups to ensure continuity, even if national-level institutions are disrupted.</li> <li>3. Engage local leaders (traditional, religious, or community leaders) who can continue to drive NAP initiatives during political instability.</li> <li>4. Conduct regular risk reviews and adjust NAP priorities or activities accordingly, ensuring a flexible approach.</li> <li>5. Request flexible funding that allows for adaptive management and reallocation of resources, which can help respond to emerging needs and changes in the political or security context.</li> </ol>
<p>4. Lack of cooperation by stakeholders and development partners for implementing the NAP.</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>Internal/ external</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implement transparent monitoring and reporting systems that hold stakeholders accountable for their contributions. Share regular reports on progress, achievements, and challenges to encourage sustained engagement.</li> <li>2. Secure political commitments from high-level leaders to encourage cooperation.</li> <li>3. Align SLeCAA and partner interests by identifying and communicating how the NAP aligns with the priorities and goals of different stakeholders.</li> </ol>

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Use memorandums of understanding, partnership agreements, or other formal commitments to secure stakeholder cooperation. These agreements should include clear deliverables and timelines for action.</li> </ol>
5. Donor fatigue.	Medium	External	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Seek national funding through national government allocations to reduce dependence on international donors.</li> <li>2. Explore partnerships with the private sector and CSOs to co-fund activities within the NAP.</li> </ol>
6. An outbreak of contagious diseases or an epidemic in the country.	Low	External/ internal	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Work with the Ministry of Health and other international health organizations to maintain the well-being and health security in the country.</li> <li>2. Where possible, align NAP activities with efforts to strengthen local health systems.</li> <li>3. Ensure that the NAP's funding mechanisms are flexible and can be adjusted to meet emerging needs during a health crisis. This approach could involve reallocating resources to support epidemic response measures.</li> <li>4. Where training and capacity-building are involved, use e-learning platforms, webinars, and telecommunication to ensure continuity during the outbreak.</li> <li>5. Ensure that all NAP-related activities follow public health guidelines such as social distancing, hygiene measures, use of personal protective equipment, or vaccination, where applicable.</li> </ol>

Note: This table presents an analysis of potential threats to the implementation of the NAP in Sierra Leone and will be regularly updated by the SLeCAA to ensure timely and effective risk management.

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
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# ANNEXE



## Sierra Leone's Roadmap for National C-IED Development

The aim of the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition (SLeCAA) is to control the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms, light weapons, their ammunition, and other related materials, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) falling under the category of 'other materials'. In June 2006, Sierra Leone adopted the legally binding Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention). Integrating the expression 'other related materials,' as formulated in the ECOWAS Convention, was key to ensuring that the issue of IEDs is captured in the strategy and mandate of the SLeCAA. Other related materials refer to all components, parts or spare parts for small arms or light weapons, ammunition necessary for its functioning, or any chemical substance serving as active material used as a propelling or explosive agent.

This roadmap intends to outline the steps and milestones needed for Sierra Leone to effectively respond to—and ultimately prevent—the use of IEDs under the SLeCAA as part of the wider SLNAPAAM. The SLNAPAAM intends to reduce armed violence through collaborative engagement with national, regional, and international stakeholders. Expected impacts of a national C-IED enterprise are reduced armed violence, enhanced public safety, improved national security, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, and increased gender-responsive approaches to countering IED use. In line with the SLNAPAAM's expected outcome 1.2.2, the SLeCAA would have strengthened technical expertise related to IED threats.

One option in developing a national C-IED enterprise is establishing a national focal committee (NFC) within the SLeCAA to design and establish this enterprise. Such an NFC should be legally empowered and appropriately structured for effective and efficient management to ensure threat alignment and remain capable of responding to and preventing IED use. One specific task of an NFC would be to fill the identified efficiency gap of the SLeCAA on IEDs and its compliance with Sierra Leone's international and regional commitments, particularly the emerging ECOWAS C-IED strategy. Among the other roles and responsibilities of such an NFC would be the following:

- Development and subsequent implementation of a national C-IED strategy;
- Emphasis on the oversight of collaboration and coordination between the different stakeholders involved;
- Mobilization and prioritization of investment of the required financial resources;
- Promotion for awareness and information generation and sharing among stakeholders, as well as to target audiences to ensure an optimized understanding of the threat, C-IED enterprise, and efforts invested to support it;
- Work with the broader SLeCAA arms and ammunition management initiatives regarding arms and ammunition and related material management to secure national and commercial stockpiles of items used in the manufacture of IEDs;

- Engagement with the appropriate national entities involved in border security to effectively address the transnational challenges posed by those who employ IEDs, such as engaging with the Mano River Union in efforts to counter the use of IEDs, as appropriate; and
- Monitoring and evaluation of the C-IED strategic plan's progress.

An NFC will oversee collaboration and coordination between the stakeholders involved in the national C-IED enterprise to collectively address the challenges IEDs pose through a whole-of-society approach to countering their use. A whole-of-society approach to C-IED is a comprehensive method involving various stakeholders contributing to the enterprise. The stakeholder community involved in a whole-of-society national C-IED enterprise should involve ministries, government agencies, international organizations, technical and financial partners, industry representative organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs)—in particular women's CSOs and women, peace, and security actors—along with neighbouring and regional countries. The ministries involved should comprise the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, and Ministry of Social Welfare. Whole-of-society C-IED approaches often have stakeholders with complex institutional structures and procedures requiring internal coherence, and a cooperative and collaborative culture among members to support effective C-IED efforts through a shared understanding of the IED threat. The NFC would be primarily responsible for ensuring this.

Including the role and functions of the national C-IED enterprise in future national development plans is necessary to emphasize the importance of this initiative in supporting a secure, stable, and prosperous Sierra Leone. Building upon the national C-IED baseline assessment conducted in December 2023, the SLeCAA—by way of an NFC or other appropriate entity—can develop C-IED nationally through the design and subsequent establishment of a national C-IED enterprise by:

1. Assessing potential IED threats, under the coordination of the SLeCAA and in collaboration with relevant state entities and members of the C-IED enterprise;
2. Building an appropriate C-IED enterprise based on the results of the C-IED self-assessment;
3. Developing a national C-IED strategic plan identifying the roles and responsibilities of each national entity; and
4. Operationalizing the national C-IED strategic plan through an operational framework.

