

Fighting for spoils

Armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile

Introduction

Beginning in the aftermath of state and national elections in April 2010, South Sudan has faced an eruption of armed insurgencies, the majority of them led by former Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders in the Greater Upper Nile region. The conflicts sparked by these insurgent commanders, and SPLA counter-measures, have directly or indirectly caused the deaths of thousands of South Sudanese, provoked mass displacement of communities in Greater Upper Nile, and challenged the government's ability to secure this strategic and volatile region.

In a number of cases, the rebellions are closely connected to state and national politics and governance challenges, and the often-contradictory responses to them have exposed deep rifts both within and between the SPLA and the government. At a time when the Republic of South Sudan faces multiple other threats along its border with Sudan, its authorities have made some short-term gains in countering the insurgencies, but have ultimately failed to contain the rebel threat. This current stalemate leaves the new country vulnerable and unstable.

This *Issue Brief* reviews the roots of the armed insurgencies led by George Athor, Peter Gadet, and other Southern commanders—all of whom have claimed to seek systemic changes to the Juba-based government or to overthrow it. It assesses the current approach of the SPLA and the government of the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) to containing them, concluding that it is both ad hoc and unsustainable. Furthermore, the response fails to address the griev-

ances of the communities that joined the insurgent leaders in taking up arms against the government and the army. Key findings include:

- As of late October 2011 the major insurgents in Greater Upper Nile have not made significant headway in achieving their purported political objectives. Commanders formerly loyal to Peter Gadet, as well as two Shilluk commanders, continue to pose active military threats.
- With the arguable exception of the Shilluk groups, the main insurgencies are not authentic expressions of discontent in marginalized communities. Instead, the commanders have manipulated legitimate local grievances, mobilizing supporters—particularly idle young men—to fight on their behalf for their own objectives.
- Despite claims by rebel leaders, the insurgencies have remained almost completely operationally independent of one another, and the self-interested motivations of the commanders make a future unified rebellion unlikely.
- There is strong circumstantial evidence that the forces of Peter Gadet and George Athor have received logistical and materiel support, including small arms and ammunition, from Khartoum and other external sources.
- The SPLA's at times indiscriminate attempts to crush the insurgencies have increased the deep-seated anger among many of the disenfranchised minority communities most affected by the violence.
- The repeated outbreaks of violence during the integration of former militias into the SPLA reveal a sharp



▲ Fighters loyal to Gatluak Gai awaiting integration into the SPLA at an assembly area outside Bentiu, Unity state, August 2011.

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Table 1 South Sudanese insurgent commanders as of November 2011¹

Commander	Force name/ affiliation	Location	Status	Notes
Peter Gadet	Formerly South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SSLM/A)	Mayom county (Unity) and the Unity-South Kordofan border area	Dormant; signed a ceasefire deal with the government in early August 2011	Some of Gadet's forces moved from a rear base in South Kordofan to Mayom after the cease- fire was signed; Gadet approved the relocation of these forces to the Mapel area in Western Bahr al Ghazal state in early September so that the integration process with the SPLA could begin; since then, neither side has pub- licly released details regarding this pending process. There are 980 soldiers awaiting inte- gration near Mapel.
Gadet breakaways (James Gai Yoach, Kol Chara Nyang, Bapiny Monituel, and Matthew Puljang)	SSLM/A	Koch, Mayom, and Rubkona counties (Unity); Unity-South Kordofan border areas, including Nyama and Timsah in South Kordofan state	Active	These rebels, who at various points have fought together and/or under Gadet's command, act independently from one another for the most part. Yoach launched an attack on Mayom town on 29 October and is believed to have laid new landmines near Bentiu in August.
George Athor	South Sudan Democratic Movement / South Sudan Army	Ayod, Fangak, and Pigi ² counties, and possibly Akobo (Jonglei)	Dormant, but at large; a January 2011 ³ cease- fire agreement collapsed	Precise whereabouts unknown since last clashes with the SPLA in March-April 2011 reportedly dislodged him from northern Jonglei. Given a series of recent minor inci- dents, forces loyal to Athor are believed to pose a continued threat to stability in this area.
Gatluak Gai	n/a	Koch county (Unity) and Unity-South Kordofan border area	Killed in July 2011 in disputed circumstances immediately after he signed a ceasefire brokered by the Unity state government	His forces have yet to begin integrating with the SPLA; immediately following Gai's death, they were relocated to an assembly point near Bentiu, and then on to the Mapel area in Western Bahr al Ghazal where Gadet's forces were transferred in early September. There are 350 soldiers awaiting integration near Mapel.
Shilluk rebels (Robert Gwang, Alyuak Ogot, and Johnson Olonyi)	n/a	Western bank of the River Nile in Upper Nile state, including Fashoda, Malakal, Manyo, Melut, and Panyikang counties; and Akoka county (Upper Nile)	Gwang: inactive (signed a peace deal with the government in August 2010 and was integrated into the SPLA with the rank of major general); Ogot and Olonyi: active and at large	Ogot's and Olonyi's forces attacked the village of Kaka in Fashoda county in August; the SPLA has recently said that it believes Ogot, Olonyi, and their forces are hiding out in rear bases in South Kordofan and/or White Nile states.
David Yau Yau	n/a	Pibor county (Jonglei)	Inactive; signed a ceasefire deal with the government in June 2011	Like Gatluak Gai's troops, Yau Yau's forces are awaiting integration, but neither Yau Yau nor the government has announced a firm plan for this process. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) airlifted the majority of the forces Yau Yau claimed to command from Pibor to the village of Owinykibol in Eastern Equatoria to await integration. They are estimated to number 200 fighters.
Gabriel Tang-Ginye	n/a	Fangak county (Jonglei); rumoured troop movements from White Nile state into Upper Nile state along the western bank of the River Nile into northern Jonglei	Inactive; since April 2011, Tang-Ginye has remained under house arrest in Juba and the SPLA has not released details about his precise whereabouts or the conditions of his detention. His forces, meanwhile, suffered heavy casual- ties in the village of Kaldak in northern Jonglei in an April clash with SPLA commando forces that resulted in the capture of Tang-Ginye and several of his top commanders. Integration of these forces into the SPLA has not yet occurred, but nearly 500 of Tang-Ginye's men are receiv- ing monthly salaries from the SPLA as they await integration in Mapel.	Holds Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) major gen- eral rank, but expressed intent to rejoin SPLA in October 2010. Was rumoured to be allied with Athor, and was active in the same area where Athor's forces clashed heavily with SPLA troops in February-April following the breakdown of Athor's ceasefire with the SPLA.

Sources: Small Arms Survey (2011c-h); field research August-October 2011

disconnect between the government's accommodation policy and the deep animosity of some key players in the army towards the armed groups.

- The current approach of integrating insurgent commanders—with inflated ranks—and their men is not sustainable and may act as an incentive for potential future rebels.

Roots of rebellion

By September 2011 at least a dozen individuals had launched or coordinated at least seven insurgencies against the Southern government since the April 2010 elections (see Table 1). At its peak, rebel militia activity stretched from near the South's border with Ethiopia to multiple points along its border with Sudan, including Darfur. The most powerful groups have mainly conducted their operations in the Greater Upper Nile region—encompassing Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. The strength and stamina of the rebellions have varied dramatically over the course of each movement, as have the threats that each group poses to government authority and stability.

With some important exceptions, the insurgencies have similar roots and dynamics. In most cases, they are led by opportunistic individuals set on exploiting local resentment towards the South's government institutions and security sector, which are perceived as exclusionary by many citizens. Despite their rhetoric, the primary aim of the rebel leaders has been to increase their own power within these institutions, however, rather than to improve them for the betterment of their communities.

The civil war and its aftermath

It is not surprising that the majority of the rebellions have occurred in the strategic, oil-producing Greater Upper Nile region. Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states are most representative of the serious governance and security challenges that plagued South Sudan during its six-year Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period. Following independence, the region, part of which forms much of the South's border with Sudan, remains a volatile zone that the

Southern government does not fully control. Small arms stocks are widespread in the region, despite numerous civilian disarmament campaigns, which continue.⁴

Home to a number of sub-clans from the Dinka and Nuer tribes, among others, the region was the site of brutal Southern infighting during the civil war that resulted from the 1991 split in the SPLA.⁵ The division eventually led to the formation of a host of militias under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), a loose coalition of Khartoum-supported commanders who stoked much of the deadly Southern infighting. Intra-Southern conflict split largely along ethnic lines, with the Dinka-dominated SPLA fighting dozens of SSDF-affiliated tribal militias.

After the official end of the civil war, President Salva Kiir opened the door to former SSDF commanders to rejoin the SPLA with the 2006 Juba Declaration.⁶ The agreement was an implicit recognition of the fact that SSDF commanders still retained significant local authority and control. By bringing the commanders into the army with high ranks and absorbing their men, the president hoped to neutralize the former enemies. While militia integration has continued to pose a persistent problem for the SPLA, this initial gamble was largely successful—following the signing of the Juba Declaration there were relatively few incidents of serious intra-Southern militia-related conflict.

Nevertheless, the legacy of the Northern-backed militias casts a shadow over efforts to implement important aspects of the CPA's security arrangements. Deadly fighting broke out in November 2006 and February 2009 between SPLA and SAF components of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) stationed in Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile, involving forces loyal to Gabriel Tang-Ginye.⁷ Land-related conflict between the Shilluk and Dinka tribes along the banks of the River Nile in Upper Nile and all-out conflict involving a number of tribes in Jonglei also escalated in the post-CPA period. The violence worsened state-level tensions and strengthened a widespread local perception that the Juba government has failed to intervene to stop Southern communities from using violence against one another.⁸

April 2010 elections

The CPA enshrined national elections as a milestone to be held before South Sudan's January 2011 referendum on self-determination. They were included primarily at the behest of the international community as a means of consolidating the peace-building process.⁹ But by April 2010, more than five years after the agreement was signed, other than the Juba Declaration virtually no substantive efforts had been made to reconcile former enemies in the South. The disputed 2009 national census moved local tensions to the political forefront and the disputed state elections proved to be the flashpoint that reactivated intra-Southern conflict.

The conduct of the state elections was a bitter disappointment for many communities and outside observers. Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) politicians and allied security forces allegedly committed widespread human rights abuses, arbitrarily arrested opposition members and observers, and created a climate of oppression and intimidation that called into question the results of several high-stakes gubernatorial races in strategic states.¹⁰ The international community, focusing on January 2011 and the likelihood of Southern secession, largely failed to criticize the polls or call for official investigations into allegations of fraud. Less than a month after the elections, three Southern dissidents had launched insurgencies against the government, citing disputed elections in Jonglei and Unity.¹¹ Others would soon follow, inspired by the military gains these early insurgent commanders made. Given the lack of opportunities, economic and otherwise, for unemployed, idle young men in many communities in Greater Upper Nile, these self-styled rebel commanders succeeded in mobilizing local support relatively quickly. Aside from the prospect of minor material gains in the form of weapons, food, and the freedom to loot, the rebellions arguably provided a sense of purpose for young, disenfranchised Southerners living outside the reach of government authority where they have not benefited from any 'peace dividends' promised in the CPA.

Key insurgents

This section focuses on the insurgent commanders who have posed the greatest threat to the authority of the Southern government and to general stability in South Sudan since the April 2010 elections. Some insurgencies—namely the Shilluk-led revolts over land issues in Upper Nile state—did not fundamentally challenge the government’s national authority. However, the unresolved status of these revolts highlights the ability of marginalized minority groups in a strategic oil-producing zone to pose a persistent threat, and their areas of control remain significant (see map).


Peter Gadet

Peter Gadet’s proven military capabilities were both an asset and a threat to the SPLA during the second civil war. A key player during the most brutal periods of the conflict in oil-rich western Upper Nile (now Unity state), his loyalties changed multiple times over

more than two decades of conflict. Alternately an asset to both the Garang-led SPLA and, during key periods in the war, to the SSDF, Gadet recently boasted of his importance as a ‘commander in the oil fields’ during the war.¹² His command over loyal forces in this strategic border area enabled him to implement the opposing military objectives of both the SPLA and the SSDF, often at great cost to civilian populations.¹³ Viewed with suspicion in the initial stages of the integration process for temporarily remaining with SAF Military Intelligence after the Juba Declaration, he subsequently agreed to join the SPLA with the rank of major general.¹⁴

The timing of his rebellion is significant. When the first wave of armed insurrections against the government began following the elections, Gadet, who was serving at the time as the air defence commander at SPLA General Headquarters (GHQ) in Juba, remained in his post. In late October 2010 the SPLA commander-in-chief, President

Salva Kiir, approved a process of internal promotions and reappointments that worsened already strained relationships among some senior SPLA officers and former militia fighters integrated at the officer level.¹⁵ When it became clear that powerful former militia leaders had been overlooked for promotion while lower-ranking, mainly Dinka, officers were given higher ranks, Gadet (a Bul Nuer) and others became concerned. In December 2010, more than a month after his new appointment was confirmed by the SPLA, he first visited 3rd Division HQ in Northern Bahr al Ghazal state, where he had been appointed as deputy division commander.¹⁶ He reportedly viewed this position as below his station and resented serving as deputy to a Dinka division commander.¹⁷ While George Athor used what he claimed was his unfair defeat in the polls as a pretext for rebellion, Gadet’s motivation thus likely stemmed from frustration with his position within the SPLA.



Source: Small Arms Survey

Before Gadet's defection from the SPLA in March 2011, the security situation in his home area of Mayom county was already volatile due to the ongoing activities of other Nuer rebels conducting operations against the SPLA using rear bases in the disputed, but SAF-occupied, oil fields on the Unity–South Kordofan border. In mid-April Gadet issued the Mayom Declaration, accusing the Southern government and army of corruption and tribalism and calling for Southerners to join a new 'liberation struggle against unjust rule by our sons and daughters in the SPLM led government'.¹⁸ He organized his forces under the name of the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army.

On 21 April, less than a week after he issued his declaration, Gadet's forces launched a serious assault on the town of Mankien, south of the county capital of Mayom, seizing it for a day before SPLA reinforcements arrived and recaptured it. After his forces took Mankien, they advanced toward Mayom town, causing significant civilian displacement, destroying the local market and some homes, and looting and severely damaging the compound of an international NGO with an office in Mankien.¹⁹ The second attack by his forces on Mankien was equally destructive: UN sources estimate that more than 250 people were killed and more than 20,000 displaced as a direct result of Gadet–SPLA fighting in Mayom county, mainly during the April and May clashes.²⁰ These two clashes had an enduring impact on stability in Unity state in the immediate run-up to and aftermath of secession in July.

Gadet himself spent little time in Mayom during his forces' campaigns; he shuttled from Nairobi to Khartoum and the border area out of reach of the SPLA 4th Division in Bentiu. He travelled to Jordan in July, purportedly for medical treatment, then to Nairobi for discussions with representatives of President Salva Kiir on the terms of a ceasefire, which was signed in early August. His extensive travels provided ample opportunity to secure external support for his insurgency.

Soon after the agreement was signed, his forces began moving south from the Unity–South Kordofan border area to Mayom to assemble for an

ill-defined integration process with the SPLA. He visited them with an UNMIS delegation in mid-August. On 6 September his spokesman told reporters that Gadet had reached an agreement with the SPLA for his men to be relocated to Western Bahr al Ghazal state. Moving these forces out of the battlefield area may ultimately increase the chances of peaceful integration, but the process has since stalled.

Gadet breakaway militias

During their various revolts against the Southern government, James Gai Yoach, Kol Chara Nyang, Bapiny Monituel, and Matthew Puljang—all Nuer men from Unity state, several with SAF backgrounds—have sometimes acted in coordination under the banner of the SSLM/A. Although these men launched their insurgencies over election grievances and other complaints against the SPLM/A, they joined Gadet in a fragile alliance of Unity state-based forces after he launched the SSLM/A in early April.

On 3 August Gadet's spokesman, Bol Gatkuoth, announced the decision to sign a ceasefire with the government and begin integration. The following day, Yoach, Nyang, Monituel, and Puljang split from Gadet (but retained the SSLM/A identity), releasing an open letter accusing Gadet and Gatkuoth of accepting a bribe from President Salva Kiir.²¹ Their decision to opt out of the ceasefire poses both a significant new risk of insecurity and a challenge to militia integration efforts.

The four leaders did not communicate publicly again until 27 October, when they released another joint letter condemning Unity governor Taban Deng, warning of a forthcoming military campaign to oust him, and advising NGOs and UN personnel to leave the state.²² Two days later their forces clashed with the SPLA around Mayom town.²³ The SPLA claimed it had evicted the rebels from Mayom county, killing 60 insurgents with the loss of 15 civilians in the process. The insurgents, by contrast, claimed to have taken both Mayom town and Tomor, capturing SPLA soldiers, gaining new recruits from the army, and seizing weapons in the process.²⁴ As this *Issue Brief* was being finalized, there were conflicting

reports about the location of these forces and their intentions, but given recent rhetoric, they are believed to have their sights on the state capital, Bentiu. A number of anti-tank landmine explosions in the first week of November along the Bentiu–Mayom road are also believed to have been caused by mines planted by the same forces who launched the assault on Mayom.

In a long and detailed communication on 3 November, the commanders accused the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) of supporting the SPLA in its military engagement with the SSLA through the provision of vehicles, fuel, and accommodation to SPLA and state officials in UN compounds, in violation of its mandate.²⁵

George Athor

Lt. Gen. George Athor, a member of the Padang sub-clan of the Dinka tribe and a former member of the SPLA, holds the highest public profile of the insurgent leaders, in part due to his senior stature in the SPLA prior to his resignation in the run-up to the April 2010 elections. Athor, who served after 2005 as a former deputy chief of staff and as commander of the 8th Division forces in Jonglei, resigned from his post at SPLA GHQ in Juba in order to run for governor in Jonglei, his home state. The SPLM leadership actively discouraged his candidacy, instead backing incumbent governor Kuol Manyang.²⁶

Unlike some of the other rebel commanders, Athor had been a true SPLA loyalist since he joined the guerrilla movement in 1983. He was never a part of the SSDF. Shortly after his defeat in the Jonglei state elections, however, he and his forces—some of whom reportedly defected immediately from the 8th Division in Jonglei and the 3rd Division in Northern Bahr al Ghazal²⁷—began launching attacks on SPLA installations in south-western Upper Nile and in Athor's home area in northern Jonglei. As a former high-ranking SPLA officer trained as an engineer, he quickly proved his operational capabilities as a commander as his forces gained ground across northern Jonglei state, preventing humanitarian access and gaining local support that proved useful in eluding the SPLA's subsequent counter-attacks.

From the early days of his rebellion, Athor insisted in statements made by satellite phone from his bush hideout that his movement—under the banner of the South Sudan Democratic Movement and its military wing, the South Sudan Army—was fighting for political and military reform. His strategies, however, which included laying landmines and distributing arms in civilian areas, have further destabilized large areas of Jonglei, which since the signing of the CPA has been among the most volatile and insecure states in the South.

To date, the SPLM/A's alternating attempts to militarily defeat and politically reconcile with Athor and his forces have failed. A 5 January ceasefire agreement broke down, partly over the question of military ranks for him and his inner circle, and was followed by a wave of fighting in February and March. Since then, he and his forces have remained relatively quiet, although there were reports of minor clashes in September and October in Ayod county. He is said to have recently spent time in Sennar and Blue Nile states in Sudan and, more recently, back in Jonglei near the border with Ethiopia. Despite his frequent absences from Jonglei, his alleged provision of weapons to youths from several disenfranchised minority groups in the state, namely the Lou and Jikany Nuer (see Box 1), underscores his ability to continue indirectly to destabilize the area by fuelling local conflicts and eroding state authority.

Gatluak Gai

The late Lt. Gen. Gatluak Gai, a Nuer from the Jagei sub-clan and a former colonel in the Unity state prisons system, succeeded in dramatically elevating his stature in Unity when he launched his insurgency in the aftermath of the elections. Unlike Athor and Yau Yau, Gai did not compete in the elections, although he did back the independent gubernatorial candidate Angelina Teny, wife of Southern vice president Riek Machar. His support for Teny was reportedly due to his resentment of incumbent governor Taban Deng, who refused to appoint Gai as commissioner of his native Koch county in 2008.

Box 1 Arms, cattle raiding, and insurgencies in Jonglei

Since early 2009 resource competition and cattle-related conflict in several Southern states have changed from a common, but relatively low-level security threat to an increasingly deadly and politically sensitive phenomenon with much wider implications.²⁸ The pre-independence Southern government attempted to address the cattle-raiding violence in 2009-10 using a tactic it had deployed since 2005: SPLA-led civilian disarmament campaigns.²⁹ Previous research has indicated that the often-repressive campaigns have stoked rather than reduced inter-communal conflict.³⁰

For Athor, the volatile security context in Jonglei—coupled with his senior stature in the army and local relationships in his home state—gave him ample opportunity to procure small arms and munitions and mobilize local support in northern Jonglei, his principal area of operations. His successful mobilization of communities on the basis of election-related and other grievances made him the most threatening rebel leader in the pre-referendum period.³¹ Discontented, unemployed, and idle young men from the Lou Nuer tribe in Akobo county, which borders Ethiopia, are believed to have joined his rebellion—less for ideological reasons than for the practical purpose of gaining access to weapons that would improve their strength in battles with neighbouring rivals. Some reports indicate that Athor explicitly provided Lou Nuer youths with weapons so that they could attack their enemies—namely the Murle—on condition that they would also fight against his enemy, Jonglei state governor Kuol Manyang.³²

In recent months inter-communal violence and cattle raiding in Pibor and Uror counties between the rival Lou Nuer and Murle tribes have increased dramatically. The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that some 2,000 people had been killed and more than 130,000 people displaced in inter-tribal conflict from 1 January through 31 October 2011.³³ A number of sources cite a link between Athor's rebellion and the April-August 2011 series of cattle raids and clashes between well-armed Lou Nuer and Murle youth. A Lou Nuer spiritual leader named Dak Kueth Deng stands accused by some government officials of organizing youths from his tribe in Akobo and other counties, including Uror, and obtaining weapons from Athor.³⁴ He is also believed to have mobilized—even urged—Lou Nuer youths to launch raids against the Murle in Pibor in June.

More recently, Athor has reportedly lost authority in the area as some of the Lou Nuer youths have split from him to protect their families and fellow tribespeople from further conflict.

Although his wartime history is less well known than other Unity state strongmen such as Gadet and Paulino Matiep, Gai is remembered by some Unity citizens for his brutal actions during the war as a member of various Khartoum-backed militias responsible for civilian deaths and displacement during oil field-clearing campaigns.³⁵

Following their first attacks on SPLA bases in Abiemnhom and Mayom counties near Unity's border with South Kordofan, Gai's forces continued their low-level insurgency throughout 2010 in attacks on SPLA and Southern police convoys and bases in Koch county. Rumours circulated during this period that he was ill or injured and had been transported with assistance from the government of Sudan to Khartoum for treatment, or that he was merely in hiding in border areas in and around the Heglig oil fields.

His attacks alerted the Unity and Juba governments to the fact that insecurity could disrupt the all-important January 2011 self-determination referendum. In November 2010 Vice President Machar and his wife, the defeated gubernatorial candidate, visited Bentiu.

At a rally, Machar publicly endorsed a state-level reconciliation process and later travelled with a delegation that included his wife and the governor throughout Unity to encourage citizens to participate peacefully in the referendum.³⁶

Governor Taban Deng led the state-led reconciliation process; however, his near-authoritarian control of the political and military hierarchies of the oil-rich state has made him widely unpopular.³⁷ Following Southern secession, Gai came to Bentiu for more intense negotiations. On 20 July he signed a ceasefire agreement that reportedly granted him the rank of lieutenant general in the SPLA. This was a dramatic promotion into the upper echelons of the army from his pre-rebellion title of colonel in the Unity state prisons system. But three days later, on 23 July, he was shot dead under disputed circumstances.³⁸ The killing has deepened mistrust between the army and the rebel forces and increased wariness among commanders considering integration.

Despite rumours of links between Gai and other rebel groups, interviews

with former militiamen and others familiar with the movement indicate that his own hubris prevented strategic alliances that could have given the disparate movements a better chance of credibly challenging the Southern government.³⁹ Even if he had lived to begin the integration process of his forces into the SPLA,⁴⁰ the precedent set by his meteoric promotion would have endangered the SPLM/A's ability to accommodate other insurgents.

The Shilluk rebels

The numerous Shilluk-led rebellions in Upper Nile dating from before the April 2010 elections to the present differ in many respects from the other rebellions examined in this *Issue Brief*. Robert Gwang, Alyuak Ogot, and Johnson Olonyi initially each led separate insurgencies. All of them served at various times in branches of the Southern security forces, but their stated reasons for rebelling were not explicitly linked to discontent with the leadership of the SPLA, police, or prisons services. Instead, each of their rebellions has aimed to draw attention to Shilluk community-wide land-related grievances against Dinka populations in Upper Nile. In the Shilluk kingdom—on the western bank and parts of the eastern bank of the Nile—popular support for the rebellions stemmed from widely held perceptions of a pro-Dinka Upper Nile state government and an openly hostile SPLA presence in the area.⁴¹

Gwang declared his opposition to the government prior to the April 2010 elections and signed a peace deal with the government—in exchange for a dramatic promotion to the rank of major general—in August 2010. Ogot's and Olonyi's activities in Upper Nile intensified in 2011. Two major incidents in March underscored the threats that these two groups were capable of posing even in an area with a relatively heavy SPLA presence.⁴² Olonyi's forces who had assembled—along with civilians loyal to or associated with the group—next to the 7th Division HQ in the riverside town of Owachi south of Malakal clashed with the SPLA on 6–7 March. At least 60 Shilluk were killed, according to a Human Rights Watch investigation.⁴³ Less than

a week later, Olonyi's forces launched an early morning raid on the Upper Nile state capital of Malakal. The SPLA quickly repulsed the attack, leaving at least 30 rebels and several government soldiers dead, according to early SPLA estimates.⁴⁴ The aggressive rebel assault on the state capital provoked a harsh response from the army, which used the incident as rationale for rounding up scores of Shilluk youths, arbitrarily detaining them, and generally worsening relations between the Shilluk community and the Dinka and Nuer populations in Malakal.

The SPLA response and rhetoric added additional fuel to the Shilluk grievances. In nearly all of the commentary on violent incidents between the SPLA and these rebels over the past 18 months, Southern officials underscored the role of Dr Lam Akol, the dissenting Southern (Shilluk) figure with a long history of involvement with the National Congress Party who is deeply mistrusted by many Southerners. The SPLM claims that Akol's SPLM–Democratic Change party, launched in 2009, is a 'front' for his Khartoum-backed military ambitions in the South.⁴⁵ While he may be supporting Ogot's and Olonyi's forces, the problems between the Shilluk and the Juba government go far beyond the question of Akol's support, however.

The most recent clashes between SPLA forces and Shilluk rebels occurred in the town of Kaka in northern Upper Nile state on 19–20 August. The SPLA says its soldiers stationed near Kaka were initially 'overwhelmed' by militia forces who attacked the town after crossing the border from a rear base in South Kordofan.⁴⁶ Of all the insurgencies, the Shilluk rebellions perhaps most clearly illustrate the deep-seated nature of local community grievances and the challenges the Southern government faces in reconciling not only with the rebel groups, but also with the communities allied to them.

David Yau Yau

David Yau Yau's rebellion in his native Pibor county, home to largely disenfranchised Murle, stands out from the other insurrections launched in the post-elections period because of his notable lack of military experience.

He studied theology in Kenya and South Sudan before taking a civilian job in Pibor county with the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. Like Athor, he competed as an independent candidate in the Jonglei state elections, but for a much more junior post as a state assembly member. After his electoral defeat, reportedly by a large margin, Yau Yau and forces allied to him launched a series of attacks beginning in mid-May 2010. Many of his armed engagements with the SPLA over the next several months resembled minor banditry attacks more than full military operations. Despite the relatively low death tolls from these clashes, ongoing insecurity in the latter half of 2010 forced aid groups to reduce their activities almost exclusively to Pibor town, resulting in many outlying areas of the county receiving little or no assistance.⁴⁷

Prior to President Salva Kiir's first amnesty offer to the rebels at large in Greater Upper Nile in late September 2010 (see below), Yau Yau agreed to begin negotiations with the government, but these talks came to a standstill after he was accused of attacking a group of civilians in late October 2010 in a remote area of Pibor.

The latest negotiations between Yau Yau and the SPLA are the most important aspect of his rebellion in relation to the other insurgencies. In April 2011 the SPLA initiated a second negotiations process through 8th Division commander Bol Kong and Pibor county commissioner Akot Maze.⁴⁸ In mid-June UNMIS transported Yau Yau to Juba, where he told reporters that he had already signed a ceasefire agreement and was prepared to finalize details of the integration process of his troops into the SPLA.⁴⁹ Since then he has remained in Juba while his forces continue to await an SPLA-led integration process to be held in Owinykibol, a small village in Eastern Equatoria state,⁵⁰ where they were transferred after he travelled to Juba. While he enjoys comfortable accommodation in the Southern capital, his armed men are waiting in the bush for their integration process to begin.

Given the unstable situation in Pibor county following a series of raids from April to June 2011 and, more recently, a serious counter-attack by Murle youths

in neighbouring Uror county, the presence of fewer armed men in the area is likely a positive development. It is believed, but not confirmed, that Yau Yau's men may have distributed some of their weapons to the Murle youths for the August attack.

Meanwhile, Yau Yau is expected to enter the SPLA with the rank of major general, a surprisingly senior rank, given his civilian background. If this goes through, the high rank will make the SPLA's task of reconciling with other commanders still in the bush—namely Athor, the Shilluk rebels, and the Gadet breakaway militias—much more difficult.

Coordination?

Despite repeated claims by various insurgent leaders—and the SPLA—there is little evidence of significant joint military operations by Upper Nile rebel movements over the past 18 months. One exception was the brief, loose, and now-defunct alliance among some of the western Unity state-based rebels, including Matthew Puljang and Kol Chara Nyang, under Gadet's command from April to June 2011. For example, in March Khartoum-based SAF major general Bapiny Monituel, whose forces had recently clashed with SPLA troops in Unity, signalled his intention to form a rebel coalition with George Athor.⁵¹ If such an alliance took place, it did not succeed in challenging the SPLA in a unified manner.

Another exception is the possible collaboration of Yau Yau's forces with the much larger and stronger forces of George Athor. Yau Yau's sole area of operation, Pibor county, was included in the now-defunct January 2011 ceasefire agreement between Athor and the SPLA. In the February–March SPLA–Athor clashes in northern Jonglei following the ceasefire breakdown, reports emerged that Yau Yau's forces had moved north out of Pibor county to join forces with Athor's troops. Given the limited force strength of Yau Yau's group—estimated to be 200 at the most—and the limited supply of heavy weapons it reportedly possessed, the joining of forces between Athor and Yau Yau may have been engineered as a means to boost the credibility of the notion of a 'unified rebel front' rather than as a tactical move.⁵²

Box 2 Materiel support to the insurgents

Khartoum's wartime policy of backing Southern and external militias as a means of countering the SPLA, stoking internal Southern violence, and prolonging the war has been well documented.⁵³ The SPLM/A has repeatedly claimed that the National Congress Party has continued to back the rebels; in some cases, the insurgents themselves have proclaimed this. Bol Gatkuoth said in August 2011 that Gadet's group had received funding from Khartoum from oil revenues intended for the South as part of the CPA. According to Bol, 'there are lots of [weapons] factories in Khartoum if you have money'.⁵⁴ In late October Bol reiterated to the Small Arms Survey that Khartoum was a significant source of weapons to the group.⁵⁵

It is also clear that logistical support is being provided. Many of the insurgent leaders have spent time in Khartoum or operated rear bases from the Northern side of North-South border areas. There are also credible reports of the forcible recruitment of Northerners in Khartoum to fight in Gadet's rebellion in Unity state⁵⁶ and strong circumstantial evidence of external support based on the number and types of weapons captured from insurgent forces (see below).

Fieldwork, interviews, and inspections of captured weapons suggest that Peter Gadet's forces are extremely well equipped with small arms and light weapons. Videos released by Bol Gatkuoth⁵⁷ show possibly hundreds of Gadet's forces marching in an undisclosed location (possibly Mayom county) carrying what appear to be new Chinese Type-56-1 assault rifles (a variant of the Soviet AKS-47). This new arsenal stands in contrast to those of other insurgent groups in South Sudan and the region, which typically rely primarily on older weapons, whether in general circulation or captured from army forces during the course of fighting. In one of the undated videos, the uniformed men on parade chant in their native Nuer language about Gadet's ability to obtain weapons for them.⁵⁸ His men have also laid significant numbers of landmines. The UN Mine Action Office recorded six explosions in Mayom and neighbouring Abiemnhom county in the first half of May in areas controlled by Gadet.⁵⁹

In early 2011 the SPLA captured hundreds of weapons in battles with insurgents in western Unity state.⁶⁰ Among the items seized, which the Small Arms Survey has viewed, were more than 100 new Type-56-1 assault rifles, which appear to be identical to the kind featured in the Bol videos, suggesting similar sourcing. The SPLA-captured rifles were fully loaded with a single variety of ammunition with head stamps and casing construction that appear to be similar to varieties manufactured in Khartoum. In a separate sample of weapons that were seized during fighting with Athor's forces in northern Jonglei, the same type of ammunition was also observed. In addition, SPLA forces confiscated four relatively new Chinese-produced Type-80 general-purpose machine guns (a variant of the Soviet PKM) and eight rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers that resemble Iranian-manufactured varieties.⁶¹

During the same period, the SPLA captured weapons from various insurgent forces along the border of Upper Nile and Jonglei states. Among other items, the SPLA seized one Chinese-manufactured Type-85 heavy machine gun (a variant of the Soviet DShK) and a crate of 7.62 x 54R ammunition (for general-purpose machine guns) manufactured in China in 2009 from Athor's forces during fighting in March 2011. The history of Northern backing of Southern militias fighting the SPLA, the repeated claims of Gadet's group, the type of weapons and ammunition recovered from the insurgent forces, and the fact that China and Iran are top exporters to Sudan all point to Northern arming of at least Peter Gadet and George Athor. The Small Arms Survey has begun tracing arms and ammunition captured by the SPLA to further clarify their possible chains of custody.⁶²

Insurgent leaders have also sought support in the Horn of Africa and beyond. George Athor visited Asmara, Eritrea, in early 2011. In its 2011 final report the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea documented a correlation between RPG rounds that Eritrea supplied to an Ethiopian opposition group and RPGs that had been seized from Athor's militia. The report does not describe how and by whom those weapons were supplied.⁶³ As noted above, Gadet was also in Jordan in July.



Chinese Type-85 12.7mm heavy machine gun (copy of the DShK) seized from George Athor's forces in Jonglei state. Photo taken April 2011. © Jonah Leff

Probably the most important reason alliances have not materialized is the egotism of individual commanders and their overwhelmingly selfish motivations for rebelling. According to Gatluak Gai's former operations commander, Gai said of a possible alliance with Athor: '[I want] no one in front of [me] but God.'⁶⁴ Historical disputes between insurgent leaders, particularly between Gai and Gadet—who were once related through marriage—may also have prevented collaboration between rebel leaders.

Official responses

Government and army responses to the insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile have fluctuated between military engagement and attempts at political accommodation. But the enormous pressures facing the new republic, and fractures within and between Juba's political administration and military, have contributed to the lack of a coordinated, cohesive counterinsurgency strategy. Militarily the SPLA has suffered from the distances involved in reaching the insurgents, the refusal of some of its forces and ground commanders to willingly accept the integration of their 'enemies', and the guerrilla-style tactics of some of the rebels. In general, the army has gained and lost territory in equal measure, and 18 months after the 2010 elections rebels continue to elude government control in large areas of the region.

The severity and breadth of the military response have sometimes betrayed a sense of panic within an army that believes the insurgents to be the 'front line' of a possible wider conflict with Sudan. With ongoing conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and the stalemate in Abyei, this is a legitimate concern. But in a number of instances in which the SPLM/A has used heavy-handed measures to attempt to suppress opposition parties or to stamp out militia activity, the results have been nearly uniformly counterproductive. Reported violent engagements, 'scorched earth' campaigns, and 'clean-up' operations have often succeeded in angering local communities and creating the conditions for continued instability.⁶⁵ The clashes in February–April 2011 between SPLA

troops and forces loyal to George Athor and Gabriel Tang-Ginye, respectively, in remote areas near the Jonglei–Upper Nile border killed hundreds of civilians and combatants and nearly completely restricted UNMIS and NGO access for weeks, for example. In these instances, civilians in affected areas, some of whom were affiliated with insurgent forces, bore the brunt of the SPLA–rebel fighting. There is a risk that these populations may resist—and possibly spoil—peace negotiations in the short term or join future insurgent movements in the longer term.

Ceasefires and peace processes

President Salva Kiir has initiated two amnesty drives since the outbreak of the first rebellions. In early October 2010, immediately before the All Southern Sudanese Political Parties Conference, he issued an executive order pardoning the army officers who had rebelled and calling for them to return to the SPLA.⁶⁶ On 9 July 2011, during his Independence Day speech, he issued another amnesty call, appealing to 'all those who may have taken up arms for one reason or another to lay down those arms and come to join your brothers and sisters to build this new nation'.⁶⁷

His initial call was heeded not by the most prominent of the insurgents at the time, George Athor, but by SAF major general Gabriel Tang-Ginye—the powerful wartime Nuer militia leader who was granted a senior SAF rank shortly before the signing of the CPA.⁶⁸ Tang-Ginye's reconciliatory visit to the South in October 2010 did not result in a lasting settlement with the SPLM/A, however. In early 2011 a series of security incidents in Upper Nile and Jonglei involving militia forces loyal to him and SAF components of the Malakal-based JIUs underscored the influence he still holds among forces he commanded during the war. In April SPLA commandos clashed with his forces that had assembled in the village of Kaldak in northern Jonglei, supposedly for integration; casualties were in the hundreds, and the presence of landmines and continued insecurity severely limited access to the area by the UN for weeks after the battle.⁶⁹ During the fighting, Tang-Ginye either surrendered or was captured and trans-

ported to Juba, where he remains under house arrest. The prospects for the integration of his more than 1,000 men into the SPLA are uncertain at best. His soldiers in Mapel are the only ones to have undergone disarmament and receive salaries so far. Their weapons are being held in Yirol.

Several months after Salva's first amnesty offer, his government, with logistical assistance from UNMIS, formed a presidential committee to attempt negotiations with George Athor, who remained in an unknown bush hideout in northern Jonglei.⁷⁰ Days before the January 2011 independence referendum, a deal between the SPLA—not the government—and his forces was brokered and signed in Juba, but Athor's men were absent from the 5 January ceremony. His forces did not ultimately disrupt the peaceful conduct of the referendum, but the deal soon fell apart. Moreover, subsequent clashes between Athor's troops and the SPLA in February and March 2011 further damaged relations between local communities in northern Jonglei and the government.⁷¹

More recently the government brokered ceasefire agreements with Peter Gadet and David Yau Yau. As discussed below, the real challenge to these efforts comes in peacefully integrating their forces into the SPLA.

The challenges of integration

The implementation challenges that emerged following the Juba Declaration showed the many difficulties of bringing former enemy forces into the national army.⁷² The army remains divided internally along tribal and ethnic lines. Although the SPLA leadership has reportedly been hesitant to grant insurgent leaders the unreasonably senior ranks they are demanding,⁷³ 'integration' has often ended up being a euphemism for inflated ranks and other financial incentives, leaving the rank and file vulnerable within a wider army that still regards them as outsiders. The SPLA faces numerous challenges, not least its slow transformation into a civilian-led professional army. It is the slow pace of this transformation that is hindering effective integration.⁷⁴

With the important exceptions of a loose coalition of Unity state rebels

opposed to Gadet's ceasefire deal and one of the Shilluk insurgents, a number of key rebels have participated in amnesty processes. But all of the planned rebel integration processes⁷⁵ have reached stalemate or violently collapsed.⁷⁶ In fact, the SPLA–rebel clashes that occurred when insurgent forces assembled at predetermined locations to await integration were among the most deadly battles fought in the pre-independence period.⁷⁷ They have also caused further anger among marginalized communities already susceptible to rebellions.

Technical and logistical problems are partly responsible for the failures to date. The assembly points for insurgents awaiting integration have often been established in close proximity to SPLA bases or division headquarters. The army may have opted to conduct integration near SPLA installations in order to attempt to safeguard its own forces in the event of security problems, but by doing so, low-level skirmishes have quickly escalated into battles involving large numbers of forces.

The integration processes that have in theory begun with the relocation of forces to assembly and/or integration points—namely those for men loyal to Gai and Yau Yau, respectively—have also dragged on for weeks or months after the signing of amnesty deals.⁷⁸ On occasion this has occurred when rebel leaders have refused to provide a list of the number and ranks of troops ready to integrate—as in the case of Gai. Logistical problems have also hampered progress. The SPLM/A has not always ensured that the fighters have been adequately fed. With sizeable groups of armed men being forced to wait for undetermined periods of time for poorly planned and executed integration, tensions and misunderstandings have inevitably escalated.

Ultimately, however, the failure of integration is indicative of both sides' resistance to accommodation and compromise.⁷⁹ While some SPLA officers charged with implementing integration orders have been reticent about or opposed outright to integrating their enemies,⁸⁰ rebel commanders also bear some of the blame for their refusal to accept proposed ranks for their men.

Reflections

While the government may have succeeded in temporarily neutralizing several rebel leaders, it has failed to manage the threat in the long term. The dangers of other dissenting Southerners opting to mobilize against Juba in new rebellions, potentially with external support, are clear and persistent. The history of the second civil war and its aftermath in South Sudan suggests that the SPLA cannot defeat the insurgencies militarily. To date, the alternating approaches of the government and the army to addressing the insurrections have neither yielded significant dividends nor supported a sustainable peace in the region. In some cases, their actions have actually worsened relations with the communities in which rebel commanders have found support. In addition to the internal divides within the Southern government and military, the enormous external economic, military, and development pressures the new republic faces have necessarily exacerbated the fractured response.

Even when the government and army have eschewed military action for negotiations, the insurgent commanders have been the main beneficiaries, while their men have faced integration into a hostile army with neither the space nor the desire to include them. Their future is uncertain, not least because they will be among the first forces to be pushed out of the army if and when downsizing takes place. The 'integration' model is, therefore, an unsustainable band-aid approach to an intractable and complex problem.

A new model is needed, one that emphasizes long-term reconciliation with communities rather than accommodation with military commanders. The RoSS has never openly addressed the brutal wartime history of Greater Upper Nile and the roles of key Southern leaders in it, nor has it held the insurgents and the SPLA accountable for abuses in the post-CPA period. Through government inaction and silence, impunity has become the norm. Amnesties that turn a blind eye to violence still fresh in people's minds only make old wounds worse.

Good governance is probably the best weapon the RoSS can deploy against the insurgents. Extending

security to marginalized and peripheral regions, providing services to communities that have not yet been made to feel welcome as citizens in the new country, and promoting transparency and curtailing corruption are all long-term goals worth pursuing vigorously. Publicly acknowledging the genuine grievances of marginalized communities—rather than blaming the actions of these groups on Khartoum—and ending the demonization of specific ethnic groups would also be steps in the right direction.

The preamble of the 2006 Juba Declaration emphasized 'building trust and confidence' between former enemies in order to 'avoid past mistakes that have led to divisions and internecine conflict'.⁸¹ But the agreement itself focused almost exclusively on the modalities of the integration of forces and the assigning of ranks to commanders—as if these steps alone could address the deep and bitter enmity of the civil war years. In the post-CPA period the government has continued in a similar vein, deferring the hard work of reconciliation in favour of amnesties and quick fixes. Until Juba opts to take a more active and impartial role in the difficult task of reconciling Southern Sudanese, the threats posed by remaining insurgent groups and other disgruntled factions will continue to plague efforts to stabilize the fledgling country. ■

Notes

- 1 This table does not include Abdel Bagi Ayii from Northern Bahr al Ghazal, who accepted President Salva Kiir's amnesty offer in early October 2011.
- 2 Also known as Khorfulus/Canal.
- 3 Ceasefire Framework Agreement (2011).
- 4 O'Brien (2009a); Young (2010); Taban (2011a; 2011b).
- 5 Young (2006, pp. 15–18).
- 6 GoSS (2006).
- 7 For background on these incidents, see Mc Evoy and LeBrun (2010, p. 29).
- 8 Mc Evoy and LeBrun (2010, pp. 22–27).
- 9 NED (2008, p. 14).
- 10 HRW (2010).
- 11 Small Arms Survey (2011b).
- 12 Interview with Peter Gadet, Juba, August 2011.
- 13 For background on Gadet's wartime role in the oil areas of Greater Upper Nile, see HRW (2003, pp. 56–59).
- 14 Rands (2010, p. 15).
- 15 Interview with a security adviser, Juba, August 2011.

- 16 E-mail communication with a Juba-based security adviser, 7 September 2011.
- 17 Interview with a security adviser, Juba, August 2011.
- 18 SSLM/A (2011a).
- 19 Interviews with UN, SPLA, and international NGO sources, Bentiu and Juba, August 2011.
- 20 Internal document provided by a UN source, Juba, August 2011.
- 21 SSLM/A (2011b).
- 22 *Sudan Tribune* (2011).
- 23 Interview with SSLA/Gadet spokesman Bol Gatkuoth, Juba, October 2011.
- 24 SSLM/A (2011c); *Sudan Tribune* (2011).
- 25 SSLM/A (2011c).
- 26 E-mail communication from South Sudan analyst, 9 September 2011.
- 27 *Sudan Tribune* (2010a).
- 28 ICG (2009); Small Arms Survey (2009, pp. 22–27).
- 29 O'Brien (2009b); Young (2010).
- 30 ICG (2009); Small Arms Survey (2009, pp. 4–7).
- 31 E-mail correspondence from South Sudan expert, 8 September 2011.
- 32 E-mail correspondence with Juba-based international official, 26 September 2011.
- 33 Figures are compiled on the basis of reports from local authorities and/or assessment teams. E-mail correspondence with UN OCHA, 9 November 2011.
- 34 E-mail correspondence with Juba-based international official, 9 September 2011.
- 35 Interviews with Bentiu residents, Bentiu, August 2011.
- 36 Small Arms Survey (2011h, p. 2).
- 37 Interview with Rev. Matthew Deang, chairperson of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee, South Sudan National Legislative Assembly, Juba, August 2011.
- 38 Small Arms Survey (2011h, p. 3).
- 39 Interview with Apollo Mayang Maluit, former deputy commander to the late Gatluak Gai, Juba, August 2011.
- 40 As his soldiers await integration, Gadet and his inner circle are reportedly representing them in negotiations with the SPLA.
- 41 Governor Simon Kun Puoch is a Nuer from Nasir county, but his administration is perceived by the Shilluk community in Upper Nile state to be actively anti-Shilluk and thus pro-Dinka.
- 42 In interviews conducted in August 2011 with SPLA officers at 7th Division HQ in Owachi, south-west of Malakal, the officers claimed that prior to the March 2011 violence in Upper Nile, soldiers from the 7th Division had been redeployed to northern Jonglei to fight against Athor's forces after the January 2011 ceasefire broke down. However, during a Small Arms Survey researcher's boat trip on the River Nile north of Malakal to Fashoda county in mid-August, the presence of significant numbers of SPLA forces and multiple river checkpoints manned by security forces indicated that the SPLA is maintaining a sizeable presence in these predominantly Shilluk areas.
- 43 In a 19 April 2011 statement, Human Rights Watch reported that it 'documented evidence that soldiers fired indiscriminately at civilians and burned and looted homes' in the clashes with Olonyi's men on 6 and 7 March in the Owachi area (HRW, 2011).
- 44 Small Arms Survey (2011e, p. 3).
- 45 Small Arms Survey (2011e, p. 2). Lam returned to Juba in early October 2011—an attempt, perhaps, at reconciliation.
- 46 Interview with SPLA spokesman Col. Philip Aguer, Juba, August 2011.
- 47 Interview with UN official familiar with NGO activities in South Sudan, Juba, August 2011.
- 48 Interviews with SPLA and UNMISS officials, Juba, August 2011.
- 49 Sudan Radio Service (2011).
- 50 Also spelled Awinkibol, the home village of Obote Mamur, a high-ranking but erratic SPLA general. Yau Yau has been staying with Mamur in Juba.
- 51 Boswell (2011).
- 52 Interview with UNMISS official, Juba, August 2011.
- 53 Young (2006); Schomerus (2007).
- 54 Interview with Gadet spokesman Bol Gatkuoth, Juba, August 2011.
- 55 Interview with Gadet spokesman Bol Gatkuoth, Juba, October 2011.
- 56 Bubna (2011) cites separate UN military observer interviews with captured militia members in Riak, Unity state, that corroborate one another.
- 57 SSLM/A (n. d.).
- 58 'Gadet and [Matthew] Puljang have brought us some rifles. We want to chase Salva [Kiir] away. Salva should go away! We will capture the responsibility of oil with the power of our rifles. Puljang and Gatluak [Gai] shall come together and Gadet will supply us with guns!' (translation of the videos provided by a native Nuer speaker in Bentiu, August 2011).
- 59 Fick (2011c). Athor's forces have also laid mines in Jonglei.
- 60 Interview with small arms tracing analyst who viewed the weapons, September 2011.
- 61 There are other credible reports that the SPLA captured 82 mm mortars with Chinese-made rounds, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel mines (correspondence with UN representative, October 2011).
- 62 For more information, see <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-weapons-tracing-desk.php>>.
- 63 UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2011, paras. 328–35).
- 64 Interview with Apollo Mayang Maluit, a former deputy commander to the late Gatluak Gai, Juba, August 2011.
- 65 E-mail communication from South Sudan analyst, 7 September 2011.
- 66 *Sudan Tribune* (2010b).
- 67 Kiir (2011).
- 68 Fick (2010a).
- 69 Fick (2011b).
- 70 Interviews with UNMIS and GoSS officials, Juba, December 2010 and January 2011.
- 71 Officials from Fangak county, the site of the most deadly battle between Athor's forces and Southern security forces, accused the government of bringing the 'Athor problem' into their community, which had not previously been a site of Athor-SPLA fighting (interviews with GoSS officials and telephone interview with Fangak county commissioner, Juba, February 2011).
- 72 See, for example, Small Arms Survey (2008).
- 73 The SPLA is reportedly refusing to maintain the rank of the 4 brigadier generals, 1 major general, and 10 colonels in Gadet's forces (communications with Apollo Mayang Maluit and Bol Gatkuoth, November 2011).
- 74 See Rands (2010).
- 75 The failed integration processes include those of forces loyal to George Athor, Johnson Olonyi, and Gabriel Tang-Ginye. The integration processes for forces loyal to Gatluak Gai, Peter Gadet, and David Yau Yau have neither a clear timeline nor a publicly disclosed plan.
- 76 Between February and April 2011 hundreds of SPLA soldiers, rebel fighters, and civilians were killed before or during attempts at the integration of rebel forces into the SPLA in northern Jonglei and southern Upper Nile states.
- 77 The most important example is the engagement between the SPLA and Gabriel Tang-Ginye's forces in Kaldak, northern Jonglei, on 23–24 April 2011.
- 78 Small Arms Survey field research conducted in late October 2011 indicated that in one area near Mapel, Western Bahr al Ghazal, 980 of Gadet's men, 486 of Tang-Ginye's men, 784 SAF JIUs, and an unknown number of Gai's men were all waiting for integration.
- 79 E-mail communication from former Southern Sudan NGO worker, 7 September 2011.
- 80 A number of SPLA field commanders in Unity and Upper Nile states expressed their opposition to integration in interviews conducted for this *Issue Brief* in August 2011.
- 81 GoSS (2006).

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HSBA project summary

The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan/South Sudan is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It was developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, as well as security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.

Issue Briefs are designed to provide timely periodic snapshots of baseline information in a reader-friendly format. The HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed Working Papers. All publications are available in English and Arabic at <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org>>. We also produce monthly "Facts and Figures" reports on key security issues at <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures.php>>.

The HSBA receives direct financial support from the US Department of State, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the United

States Institute of Peace. It has received support in the past from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool. Additional support has previously been provided by the Danish Demining Group and the National Endowment for Democracy.

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