A woman armed with a Kalashnikov prepares an evening meal with her child in a homestead in Rumbek, 900 km south of Khartoum, in September 2003. © Patrick Olum/Reuters

Persistent Instability
ARMED VIOLENCE AND INSECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN

10

INTRODUCTION

Since January 2005 Sudan has been implementing a fragile peace deal. After 37 years of conflict in two North–South civil wars (1956–72 and 1983–2005), the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) marked the official beginning of a transition to peace and sustainable development. Yet the 'post-conflict' environment in the south of the country remains inherently unstable: small arms and light weapons are ubiquitous.

South Sudan remains a highly militarized society with few employment opportunities, a large number of armed groups, a heavily armed civilian population, and intractable local conflicts. Many sources of instability lie outside the framework of the two civil wars (and therefore beyond the influence of the CPA), particularly those related to access to scarce natural resources. All the actors—including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), government security forces, militias, Other Armed Groups, paramilitaries, and civilians—have access to and (mis)use small arms and light weapons.

Given its porous borders with five other countries and the proximity to war-torn Darfur, South Sudan must become stable if the region as a whole is to achieve stability. Sudan is at the epicentre of one of the most vibrant arms markets in the world, resulting from decades of insurgencies, civil wars, proxy wars, communal clashes, weak governance, and criminal violence in the region. The Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda have all been scenes of recent intra-state or inter-state wars. Most other countries in the greater Horn of Africa, such as Kenya, have also hosted lethal communal clashes. UN arms embargoes have been imposed on several states, including Sudan, but remain extremely difficult to enforce. Their enforcement is of increasing importance to international peace and security. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that Sudan, DRC, and Somalia are among the top ten refugee-producing states in the world.[1] The US State Department also unofficially refers to the Horn as a second front in the war on terror.[2]

This chapter analyses some of the threats facing South Sudan in the wake of the signing of the CPA. It examines the political transition, the proliferation of armed groups, the role and effects of armed violence on its communities, and the emerging framework for making it more secure. In so doing, it draws on research by the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) research project on Sudan.[3]

These are the chapter's main findings:

- The official end of the second civil war has failed to improve security for much of South Sudan's population.
- Inter-personal armed violence and criminality remain pervasive.
- Small arms are highly accessible and (mis)used by all sectors of society.
- Armed violence frequently involves inter-ethnic or intra-clan hostility over access to natural resources.
- Endemic poverty and a lack of educational and employment opportunities sustain armed violence.

- A robust demand for small arms is driven by the perceived need for protection in the absence of functioning security institutions.
- Disarmament of civilians must be transparent, reciprocal, and civilian-led to avoid igniting conflict.
- Counter-productive elements in the National Congress Party (NCP) continue to undermine the CPA.
- Sudan's natural resources are likely to be the cause of future North–South conflict.
- 'Post-conflict' South Sudan needs sustained international attention to prevent the CPA from breaking down.

The chapter concludes that the CPA and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) have yet to deliver many of the expected peace dividends. It maintains that greater international focus and funding[4] are required if the region is to implement the peace agreement and undertake crucial disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), civilian disarmament, and security sector reform (SSR). Almost half of all countries emerging from armed conflict have a tendency to suffer a relapse within five years of signing a peace agreement (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 267). South Sudan is in danger of becoming one of them.

'POST-CONFLICT' POLITICAL TRANSITION

On 9 January 2005, the SPLM/A signed a peace agreement with the Government of Sudan (GoS), officially ending the country's second North–South civil war. At the heart of the country's longest conflict—which was responsible for the death of some two million people (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005, p. 159)[5] and the displacement of more than five million others[6]—was a struggle for political, economic, religious, and cultural autonomy for the southern region, and its resistance to exclusionary government policies and repression that had lasted decades.

Sudan's natural resources are likely to be the cause of future North–South conflict.

Differences of religion and ethnicity were manipulated and politicized on all sides to produce the clichéd paradigm of an Arab–Muslim north fighting an African–Christian/animist south. In fact, large numbers of Muslims also fought against the government, which in turn struck tactical agreements with many non-Muslim groups in the south in a divide-and-rule strategy. The GoS 'outsourced' the conflict to numerous militias and paramilitary outfits. Traditional rivalries over cattle, water, and grazing were exploited, with the ensuing struggles dividing along ethnic lines. Following a 1991 split in the SPLM/A, intra-south factional fighting produced a patchwork of territories under the control of different militias, which at various times had been aligned with the GoS (Young, 2006c, p. 19).

The CPA,[7] signed by the ruling NCP and the SPLM/A, was the fruit of a decade of negotiations. The deal included a historic compromise: the 'Islamist' government in Khartoum was granted *sharia* law in the north, while the south obtained the pledge of a referendum on independence after a transitional period of six years. With further provisions on an internationally monitored ceasefire, participation in central government, access to oil wealth, the separation of religion and state, autonomy in the interim period, and a southern army to act as guarantor should the agreement break down, the CPA addressed a number of key southern grievances. The agreement was designed to be implemented over a six-and-a-half-year period, consisting of a pre-interim period of six months (January–July 2005) and a six-year transitional period (July 2005–July 2011), culminating in the referendum on secession.

The use of the word 'comprehensive' in the name of the peace agreement is misleading. In reality, the CPA is an agreement between two dominant military elites, the NCP and the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A controls most, but not all, of South Sudan. The many other militias operating in the region, termed Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the CPA,

Women celebrate after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLM/A
and the Government of Sudan. Malakal, South Sudan, 11 January 2005. © Reuters

were excluded from negotiations, giving rise to further internecine conflict. This approach was carefully incorporated into the peace agreement, which stipulates that no groups allied to either the SPLA or the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) shall be allowed to operate in the post-CPA environment.[8]

Since the death of the former vice-president of Sudan and GoSS president John Garang in a helicopter crash in July 2005, his successor, Salva Kiir, has introduced a more conciliatory tone (Young, 2006c, p. 25). The 8 January 2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the SPLM/A and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF),[9] a loose umbrella of government-aligned armed groups, was the culmination of this rapprochement. Since then a ceasefire has been in place between the SPLM and the SSDF and many—but not all—OAGs have aligned themselves with the SPLA.[10] Yet the risk of outbreaks of fighting involving 'rump' SSDF members remains. November 2006 saw two days of heavy clashes among SPLA forces (largely comprising former SSDF members), SAF, and the SAF-aligned militia of Gabriel Tang-Ginya in Malakal, the capital of the oil-rich Upper Nile region, in which an estimated 150 people were killed. This fighting, which led to a decisive victory for the SPLA, remains the most serious violation of the ceasefire to date.

Meanwhile, the Government of National Unity (GNU), in which the SPLM is a minority partner, has had to face armed conflict on two other fronts. The CPA's exclusivist nature and widespread grievances in other marginalized areas of Sudan have inspired groups in the west and east to challenge Khartoum through armed insurgencies. The bitter conflict in the western region of Darfur simmered for years, and then exploded in early 2003. A scorched-earth policy by government security forces and Khartoum-backed militia groups from Sudan and Chad has displaced more

than two million people in Darfur and 230,000 in Chad[11] and resulted in the deaths of several hundred thousand.[12] The signing of the CPA, several cessation of hostilities agreements,[13] UN Security Council resolutions,[14] and arms embargoes coupled with the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping mission, have failed to bring peace to the region. The Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by the GoS and just one of several rebel factions on 5 May 2006, was widely rejected by the Darfurians themselves and is now considered a failure.[15] Far from bringing peace to the region, it splintered the anti-agreement bloc and resulted in a further surge of violence,[16] internecine fighting, and diminished humanitarian access[17] as the signatories tried to implement it by brute force. A proxy war with Chad has further exacerbated the situation, with both countries aiding the other's respective rebel groups[18] and increased fighting on Chadian soil. Flows of weapons to dozens of militias and armed groups in Darfur, Chad, and Central African Republic[19] risk further expanding the conflict, including to South Sudan.

Simmering resentment in eastern Sudan resulted in the Beja Congress political group taking up arms in 1995 and launching its first anti-government attacks the following year. In February 2005 the Beja Congress merged with the smaller Rashaida Free Lions rebel group to form the Eastern Front. In June 2006 the Eastern Front signed a declaration of principles for the resolution of the conflict, culminating in the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement of 14 October 2006, which is deemed largely a deal between the governments of Sudan and Eritrea and offers little hope for the people of the region (Young, 2007a, p. 1).[20] Since then implementation of the agreement has stagnated (UNSC, 2007c, para. 21).

South Sudan's armed groups can be broken down into Khartoum-aligned, foreign, and community-based.

Against this background of widespread violence, the SPLM faces the challenge of transforming itself from a guerrilla movement into a functioning member of the GNU and a senior partner in the GoSS.[21] The GoSS was established on 22 October 2005, but its acute lack of experience in governance, institutional incapacity, administrative weakness, and the near-total absence of educated personnel hamper its ability to formulate and implement policy, and to professionalize itself. Allegations of corruption are rife (UNSC, 2007c, para. 16). Military costs continue to consume substantial resources[22] and sufficient priority is not being given to setting up viable systems of local government. Donors are keen to support the fragile government but are still failing to exert the necessary pressure on Khartoum to honour the CPA fully.

ARMED GROUPS IN SOUTH SUDAN

South Sudan has long been a particularly fluid political, military, and security environment. One of its most striking features is the array of armed groups operating within its borders, or transiting through them. Another is the blurred distinction that exists between civilians and combatants, most of whom are equipped with small arms. Outside the core SPLA forces, the majority of OAGs and community-based armed groups are 'harvest guerillas' who are not permanently engaged in military operations and can be mobilized as required. Many civilians who fall outside the ambit of these groups are also armed and operate either as part of or in conjunction with the formal armed groups.

Despite their overlapping roles, South Sudan's armed groups can be broken down into the following categories: Khartoum-aligned militias; foreign armed groups; and community-based armed groups. Small arms and light weapons have circulated freely to these groups from a combination of sources, foreign and domestic. For decades the principal source of weapons entering Sudan has been neighbouring states. Within Sudan sources of weapons include: the SPLA, SAF, and militia groups who distribute weapons in parallel system of patronage; pooled community arms for 'self-defence' forces; local militias; theft, desertion, purchases, and barter; cross-border trafficking and raiding; and aban-

doned stockpiles and battlefield losses (IDDRP, 2005, p. 9). In addition, arms distributions by the GoS have spiked since oil revenues began to flow in 2001. GoS channelling of weapons to local proxies has facilitated proliferation, which is further eased by the almost total absence of transparency in stockpile management. In recent years a booming private arms market operated by international traffickers has also thrived in the region (Small Arms Survey, 2007b).

As in other parts of Africa, multiple motivations drive the use of small arms and membership of armed groups, including forcible conscription into these groups, the dearth of employment and educational opportunities, poverty, and opportunities for pillage (Small Arms Survey, 2006a, p. 252). Ideological convictions are frequently absent, or evaporate in the face of opportunities for self-aggrandizement (Florquin and Berman, 2005, p. 386).

Khartoum-aligned militias[23] (see Annexe 1)

Throughout the CPA negotiations the SPLM/A maintained an inflexible approach to the way in which OAGs were addressed and, despite resistance from the Khartoum delegation and some concerns expressed by international advisers and observers, this position is reflected in the final wording of the peace agreement. Firstly, the SPLM insisted that the SPLA alone would be the lawful armed force of the GoSS. Secondly, OAGs could choose only between joining the SPLA or the SAF: no third-party armed groups would be accepted or recognized following the signature of the agreement. Finally, no framework for integrating OAGs into the lawful armed forces of the GoSS was considered—other than direct integration into the SPLA.

Despite this hard-line posture during negotiations, differences existed within the SPLM/A between Garang and his military commanders, notably the then chief of staff, Salva Kiir, on how to handle the OAGs. Garang's position reflected a belief that they should effectively surrender to the SPLA. Kiir and the majority of SPLA commanders favoured a more flexible approach. Subsequently, and despite Garang's replacement by Kiir, the absence of a clearly defined process of integration for the OAGs has undermined efforts to neutralize the threat they still pose in South Sudan. The piecemeal integration of various groups has been based largely on political inducements to OAG leaders, leaving some individual members resistant to, and fearful of, integration.

Formed in 1997, the SSDF became the umbrella for the majority of South Sudan's government-aligned armed groups.

The SSDF—the most significant component of the OAGs—has a long history of causing disruption to civilian life in South Sudan. The SSDF derives its origins from two sources: local, tribal armed groups that formed to protect their communities from the SPLA; and the forces that followed commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol when they split from Garang in 1991 (Young, 2006c, p. 13). The first was composed of militias from Equatoria with no articulate political programme. The second was made up of Nuer from Upper Nile who broke with Garang because of his authoritarianism and his commitment to a united Sudan, while Machar and his followers favoured southern self-determination.

Formed in 1997 after the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement between the GoS, the South Sudan Independence Movement, and five other southern factions, the SSDF became the umbrella for the majority of South Sudan's government-aligned armed groups. These groups shared a commitment to the Khartoum agreement, which held the GoS to a vote on self-determination for the south,[24] and an opposition to the SPLM/A and Garang. It gave its southern signatories a sense of identity, a rationale for tactical alliance with the GoS, and a measure of confidence that others would come to their aid if they were attacked. It also served as a rallying point for the large group of southerners who were left outside the peace process that led to the CPA but wanted their interests recognized. In return for their allegiance, the NCP rewarded SSDF officers, particularly those it favoured, with high ranks, generous salaries, houses, cars, and other material benefits. Rank-and-file soldiers, on the other hand, were provided with little more than guns and ammunition, forcing them to resort to looting to survive (Young, 2006c, p. 28).

Map 10.1 **Other Armed Groups in South Sudan: main areas of operation as of September 2006**

From the NCP's perspective, the SSDF was an effective ally because it could challenge the SPLA militarily; was successful in defending government assets, notably the oilfields; was economical (most of its members received limited training and weapons); and because it deepened divisions in the south, weakening the SPLA politically (Young, 2006c, p. 23).

The signing of the CPA effectively killed the Khartoum agreement and precluded the continued existence of the OAGs. The CPA stipulates that all OAGs in Sudan are required to declare their alignment to either the SPLA or the SAF within one year of the signing of the agreement.[25] Those remaining aligned with Khartoum were then expected to redeploy to northern Sudan to be integrated into the SAF, form part of the SAF component of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) which will serve as combined SPLA–SAF units until the 2011 referendum, or be demobilized.[26] This forced alignment led to much resentment and many analysts believed that Garang was laying the groundwork for another civil war in the south. When Kiir became president of South Sudan, he adopted a diametrically opposed approach

Paulino Matieb and Salva Kiir clasp hands during a ceremony
in Juba, January 2006. © AFP/Getty Images

to the issue (Young, 2006c, p. 25). During his inauguration visit to Khartoum in August 2005, he held a number of informal meetings with the SSDF leadership, followed by a decision to appoint some 20 SSDF cadres as commissioners, and to assign an unspecified number to state legislatures. The 8 January 2006 Juba Declaration, which formally merged the SSDF and the SPLM, followed. Since then an alignment process has occurred with most commanders and soldiers within the formal SSDF ranks declaring their allegiance to the SPLA (see Map 10.1). As part of this process, former SSDF leader Paulino Matieb was appointed Kiir's deputy in the military structure of the GoSS, and therefore nominally the second most powerful figure in the SPLA. Since then there has been a consolidation of power within the SPLM/A between both men (Young, 2007a, p. 6).

While the Juba Declaration can be considered a success, a number of difficulties could trigger future insecurity in South Sudan: first, reaching agreement in the SPLA on the ranks that SSDF officers will hold—made difficult because the latter were promoted too rapidly by SAF to gain their allegiance; second, reaching agreement (and implementing it) on whether absorbed officers will be retired, placed on non-active lists, or given active commands; third, providing provisions and salaries to a large number of new members; and, finally, integrating high-ranking SSDF members into the SPLA, thereby bringing former enemies into positions of leadership.

Box 10.1 **Pitfalls to accurate estimates of SSDF force size**

There is no doubt that the SSDF comprised a significant number of fighters at the peak of its activity. During the latter stages of the second civil war, components of the SSDF (of which there were more than 30) controlled large parts of western, central, and eastern Upper Nile; parts of northern and western Bahr El Ghazal; and areas of Eastern Equatoria, where they provided security for GoS garrisons and the country's emergent oil industry. These achievements required large numbers of men in different places simultaneously.

But arriving at an accurate count of SSDF forces remains problematic. First, the numbers change constantly as recruitment in some groups is ongoing. Secondly, the SSDF is made up largely of irregular forces. Thirdly, some individuals may identify themselves as affiliated at one moment, but reject the label once a specific objective has been achieved.

Before the SPLA–SSDF merger, the latter's number was estimated to range from 10,000 to 30,000 (Small Arms Survey, 2006c, p. 3), but all such figures must be treated with caution.

Source: Small Arms Survey (2006c, p. 4)

As of March 2007 groups of former SSDF leaders and their followers, including Gordon Kong, Gabriel Tang-Ginya, Thomas Maboir, and Atom al-Nour, remained allied to Khartoum and based in South Sudan. In return, some of them were promised posts in the JIUs. Recent alignments with the SPLA include remnants of the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) under John Belgium and some of al-Nour's Fertit militia in Wau (Young, 2007a, p. 12). Others have not yet declared their allegiance, or continue to change alignment. Most of those who have switched sides have done so from the SAF to the SPLA to avoid having to move to northern Sudan (UNMIS, 2007, p. 58). Indeed, more than 7,700 troops have been 'voluntarily discharged' by the SAF because of their unwillingness to redeploy to the north (UNMIS, 2007, p. 53).

Ongoing GoS support for these groups[27] is widely interpreted as part of an effort to foster insecurity and destabilize the fledgling GoSS. Following the violence that erupted in Malakal in November 2006, which involved Tang-Ginya's forces, there are fears of a repetition in other cities, such as Wau and possibly the southern capital, Juba.[28]

Box 10.2 **Alignment with Khartoum in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration**

Gordon Kong, who is one of the more formidable holdouts to the SPLA–SSDF merger, controls areas of particular significance to South Sudan's overall peace. Kong assumed leadership of the SSDF after Paulino Matieb aligned with the SPLA. His forces are based north of Nasir in Upper Nile State. As of August 2006 he claimed approximately 75–85 'active' forces, though he could also count on about 300 'reserve' forces in the surrounding area. Most of the weapons used by his militia are small arms, though there appear to be light machine guns and mortars scattered throughout militia camps.[29] Kong's core faction, the Nasir Peace Force, is based in Ketbek, a village a few kilometres north of Nasir.

Kong has publicly rejected alignment with the SPLM/A and denounced the Juba Declaration, although his motives are hard to discern. As with other militias who have not aligned themselves with the SPLM/A, his primary objective appears to be to retain his power base until the 2011 referendum on secession. By staying out of the SPLA, he expects to gain more leverage and authority. For this reason, it is likely that Kong's forces will resist all DDR efforts before the referendum.

A contingent of Kong's forces is located near Adar in northern Upper Nile State, as well as other small towns in the vicinity. These include two groups of some 200 fighters. Until spring 2006, the Adar unit also maintained a base in Guelguk, to the west of Adar. The proximity of these forces to one another, to local oilfields, and to the border with northern Sudan makes the area potentially incendiary. Particularly important is the Adar oilfield, which is currently operational.[30] According to SPLM/A sources, Adar will be a key strategic location for the GoS should hostilities between SAF and the SPLM/A reignite.[31] Logistical support to and command of these SAF-aligned forces comes from its bases in Kosti and Adar[32] (an assembly point for SAF forces in the south, under the CPA). Estimates vary, but in August 2006 there were reportedly 300–400 active SSDF forces in and around the area.[33] These included the arrival in July 2006 of four busloads of SSDF recruits previously based in Khartoum.[34]

Source: Small Arms Survey (2006c, p. 5)

After these clashes, GoS Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed made a statement ordering militias in South Sudan to either choose the SPLA or move to North Sudan to join the SAF (*Sudan Tribune,* 2006). In so doing, he effectively acknowledged ongoing support from Khartoum for the militia (Young 2007a, p. 11). Since then security in South Sudan, and in particular greater Upper Nile, has improved (Young, 2007a, p. 20) apart from civil disturbances related to the non-payment of salaries. But the political wing of the SSDF, the South Sudan United Democratic Alliance (SSUDA), has issued a clear warning about possible future clashes. 'The SPLM/A cannot possibly claim, and misleads the world, that they are the only people who have fought in South Sudan liberation,' said a spokesman for the group in March 2007.[35] 'We could have a messy situation in the South because no members of the SSUDA/SSDF will move to the north against their free will,' he warned.

Foreign armed groups[36]

A number of foreign armed groups operate within, or transit through, South Sudan en route to neighbouring states. Among the best known is the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),[37] which has had bases in Sudan since 1994. During the 1990s, Khartoum supplied the LRA with arms, provisions, and shelter in its stronghold of Juba in return for weakening SPLA control of areas in Eastern Equatoria. Since 1994 the LRA has been a major source of regional insecurity, although some of its reported attacks against civilians may have been committed by members of the SPLA, the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF), bandits, or SAF-aligned components of the (EDF) militia. For the GoSS, neutralizing the group is a precondition to restoring security in Eastern and Western Equatoria, and implementing the CPA. Furthermore, the UPDF has had an unpopular official presence on Sudanese soil since 2002, when Khartoum issued a military protocol allowing it to operate against the LRA.

Although Khartoum officially stopped equipping the LRA in 1999, following another agreement with the Government of Uganda (GoU), sources say that it continued to send supplies for a long time after (Schomerus, 2006, p. 1). Local people reported seeing air drops as late as 2006, but these may have been directed at other GoS-backed militias, some of them EDF splinter groups. While the LRA says its relationship with Khartoum was severed in 2005, the SPLA reported an airdrop near an LRA base in March 2006, just before the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, moved his base into the DRC.[38] UN troops subsequently moved to Juba and this supply line was cut. The LRA has ensured the continuation of its weapons supply by seizing arms in battles with the UPDF, the SPLA, and even the SAF. Even without external support, however, it is certain that LRA weapons caches in Uganda and Sudan are sufficient for it to sustain an armed insurrection (Schomerus, 2006, p. 2).

Arms are readily available through the porous borders between Uganda, DRC, and Ethiopia.

Arms are readily available through the porous borders between the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Most small arms in Western Equatoria are traded across the Ugandan border, with Torit and Nimule acting as the main trading centres. Some of the newer weapons carried by the LRA bear Arabic inscriptions. At various stages in the Ugandan conflict, the group used a collection of Russian landmines and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), with the larger weapons usually acquired in combat. The main emphasis, however, has been on small arms, which enable the group to maintain the high level of mobility it needs to survive. Soviet-designed recoilless guns are commonly used, with the majority being standard 7.62 mm/short M43s (M-1943), AK-47s, and AKMs, but also FNs, Heckler & Koch firearms (mainly G3s, 7.62 mm), and a number of Browning pistols. Better-equipped LRA units at times carried general-purpose machine guns, most commonly the 7.62 mm RPK, single-barrel M79 40 mm grenade launchers or 40 mm grenade launchers. More expensive guns, such as new Dragunov SVDs and M60s with ample ammunition, were on display when the LRA attended peace talks in Juba in 2006.

The GoSS initiated these talks in 2006 after repeated attempts to establish contact with the LRA high command to offer it three options: withdraw from Sudan; declare war on the SPLA; or negotiate. The LRA chose to talk, leading to the first meeting between Joseph Kony and GoSS Vice-President Riek Machar near the border with the DRC on 3 May 2006. Peace talks between the GoU and the LRA began in July, leading to the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement on 26 August 2006.

Since then both sides have violated the agreement; on 30 November the UPDF launched a helicopter gunship attack against the group after moving more troops into Sudan. In early 2007, the peace process remained extremely volatile after the LRA demanded a change of venue outside South Sudan and the cessation of hostilities agreement expired on 28 February. Peace talks resumed in Juba on 26 April.

Community-based armed groups: the white army[39]

Not all armed activity in South Sudan has been a source of insecurity. As in West Africa, research has shown that some armed groups evolved as, or continue to be, a source of security in the absence of functioning security institutions (Small Arms Survey, 2006a, p. 250). Local militias and tribal 'self-defence' organizations were common throughout the second civil war in South Sudan, particularly in Nuer areas. Their members were mostly young men aged 14–25 (Young, 2006a).

In eastern and central Upper Nile State, young men in cattle camps developed greater capabilities than elsewhere because of the martial values of pastoralist life, limited government authority, and the weapons supplied by the GoS through Riek Machar. Anxious to win local support, he distributed thousands of guns in the camps after his split with the SPLA in 1991. Initially the weapons were regarded as a collective resource to protect the community's cattle and were controlled by the tribal elders, but local chiefs soon lost their ability to monitor the use and whereabouts of these guns.

The dissolution of the white army produced a large number of armed, disaffected youths.

In 1991 the so-called white army self-defence units launched an attack against the Bor Dinka, precipitating long-lasting enmity between the two ethnic groups. Although the white army had no central leadership, structure, or guiding ideology, it was drawn into the civil war, albeit on its own terms. From the beginning, it acquired its weapons piecemeal from Machar's SAF suppliers, traders (particularly from those who had moved across the Ethiopian border), SPLA soldiers who sold their guns for food, or as loot acquired in battle. The army was never a standing body, but at times it could mobilize more fighters than either the SSDF or the SPLA, making it a formidable force.

Generally, competition between the SSDF and the SPLA for white army support resulted in the former winning because it provided weapons. The best examples of such 'bargaining' were in Mading, Upper Nile, and Akobo, Jonglei, which changed hands about six times in the three years prior to the CPA. More recently, the SPLM/A's refusal to permit the existence of OAGs and the SPLM's new focus on civilian disarmament have signalled the death knell for the white army.

While it unlikely to rise again as an armed force, its dissolution has produced a large number of armed and disaffected youths who are in danger of resorting to further violence. Research shows that young men who engage in armed violence tend to emerge in contexts of social and economic marginalization (Small Arms Survey, 2006a, p. 298; Hagedorn, 2001, pp. 42–45). When high unemployment, poverty, and relatively high levels of community violence come together, as they do in South Sudan, they produce environments in which youth find armed violence a rational, attractive, and even necessary course of action (Small Arms Survey, 2006a, pp. 302–07).

HUMAN INSECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN[40]

While it is recognized that the proliferation of armed groups and accompanying firearms continues to contribute to widespread insecurity in South Sudan, quantitative and qualitative information on the extent and frequency of armed violence remains elusive, as does reliable information on the prevalence of civilian gun ownership. Despite these lacunae, the GoSS is actively engaging in civilian disarmament and laying the groundwork for formal DDR. To support their efforts, the Small Arms Survey has begun to conduct a series of household surveys to gather data on the effects and prevalence of both armed violence and small arms. These provide a baseline of information against which future security assessments can be measured. They will measure changes over time, and help assess the impact of both the CPA in general and specific initiatives aimed at reducing violence. Obtaining a baseline of reliable data is particularly important as a means of measuring the success rate of disarmament efforts.

The first survey—the first to address security perceptions and levels of firearm-related crime and victimization since the CPA and prior to post-war disarmament efforts—was undertaken in Lakes State in April 2006. Worryingly, and contrary to expectations, it found that security is widely perceived to have deteriorated in the post-CPA period, mostly due to the misuse of small arms. This follows an established pattern in 'post-conflict' settings in which levels of violence remain surprisingly high, often presenting more threats to civilians than the armed conflict itself (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 267).

The Lakes State survey focused on six counties: Rumbek East and Centre, Yirol East and West, Cueibet, and Wulu (see Map 10.2). The state was selected because pre-survey interviews indicated that firearms and explosives were often used in disputes and cattle-rustling episodes. Residents indicated that the police—whose presence was grow-ing—and local authorities were working together to reduce lawlessness in towns, but violent outbreaks were still frequent and preventive police work minimal. This combination of lawlessness and the desire to create order made Lakes a suitable location for an initial survey.

Map 10.2 **Surveyed clusters in Lakes State, Sudan**

Box 10.3 **Survey demographics**

Eighty-five per cent of respondents interviewed for the Lakes State household survey were between the ages of 21 and 59; their average age was 35. The following pie charts reveal further demographic details.

SEX

ETHNIC GROUP

RESIDENCE

■ Female (53%)
■ Male (47%)

■ Dinka (73%)
■ Jur Bel (10%)
■ Gok (8%)
■ Other (9%)

■ Urban areas/small towns (54%)
■ Populous rural areas near towns (35%)
■ Dispersed rural communities (11%)

Source: Garfield (2007, p. 19)

The survey instrument, developed with a group of experts from academic and aid organizations, draws on established epidemiological techniques to review mortality, morbidity, and victimization trends in affected communities. The survey contains more than 140 questions divided into a number of general areas, including: perceptions of security since the CPA; individual and family victimization; sexual assault and access to health services; weapons carrying and use (including small arms and light weapons); and perceived ways of reducing armed violence.

Twelve two-person teams were recruited, each of which was asked to administer 60 interviews with heads of households in a preselected area. In the absence of national or regional census data to construct a representative sample, a semi-representative selection of rural, semi-urban, and urban areas in six of the eight counties of the state was established. The average duration of each interview was slightly more than 30 minutes. More than 670 surveys were administered out of the initial target of 740, producing an overall response rate of 94 per cent, although not all questions were answered all of the time.

Figure 10.1 **Safety and security since the CPA (N=579, 621)**

PER CENT

■ Beginning of survey
■ End of survey

Source: Garfield (2007, p. 23)

The key findings of the survey include the following (Garfield, 2007, pp. 22–37):

- Respondents were asked twice whether security had improved since the CPA. In both cases, fewer than half reported that security had improved, with about one-third (35 per cent) claiming security had deteriorated since early 2005 (see Figure 10.1). Well under half of respondents claimed to feel safe walking alone at night or to another village (see Table 10.1). Even more dramatically, one-third reported feeling unsafe walking alone during the day.

- More than one-third (35 per cent) of respondents admitted that they or someone in their compound possessed a firearm. Among respondents reporting weapons ownership, the most commonly held arms included AK-47 automatic rifles (31 per cent), revolvers and pistols (26 per cent), shotguns (10 per cent), air guns (4 per cent), and RPG launchers (1 per cent). Firearm carrying outside family compounds was found to have decreased from 30 per cent before the CPA to approximately 15 per cent thereafter, although the reasons for this are unclear.

- Sixty-three per cent of respondents said there were too many guns in the community. The primary group perceived as over-armed was civilians (31 per cent), followed by youths (19 per cent), criminals (16 per cent), and ex-combatants (13 per cent). Civilians, youths, criminals, and private security companies—in addition to ex-combatants— were identified as important target groups of future disarmament programmes.

- More than half of all households reported that members had been robbed and involved in a physical fight with someone from outside their compound since the CPA (see Figure 10.2). More than one in 10 households experienced a sexual assault during the same period—one-third of which were committed by an armed assailant. Almost half of respondents claimed that armed robbery was the most common violent crime they had experienced since the CPA. On average, households were found to have experienced at least one robbery, nearly two fights, and close to one armed attack since the CPA (see Figure 10.3).

- The majority of both victims and perpetrators of all victimization events were found to be men in their twenties. Robberies, armed attacks, and intentional fatal injuries were most commonly attributed to conflicts over livestock. Violent deaths were also frequently linked to 'fights with enemies', usually over cattle, grazing, and water. Within compounds, such fights were most commonly associated with 'disobedience'.

- Guns were the predominant weapon used in each type of violent event (28–72 per cent). Guns were most frequently used in robberies, attacks with a weapon, and deaths from injuries or accidents. Although the use of RPGs or machine guns was reported less frequently, they were more frequently associated with deadly events (14 per cent) than any other weapon after firearms (68 per cent). Sticks, spears, and attacks with hands were more commonly reported in cases of sexual assault (see Table 10.2).

Table 10.1 **Perceptions of public safety in daytime and at night**			
	Daytime	**Nighttime**	**Walking to another village**
Very safe	42	26	21
Fairly safe	25	12	18
Somewhat unsafe	12	12	17
Very unsafe	21	50	44

Source: Garfield (2007, p. 34)

Figure 10.2 **Relative frequency of victimization events**

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS
REPORTING AN EVENT

Source: Garfield (2007, p. 23)

Figure 10.3 **Average number of violent events reported in total sample**

AVERAGE NUMBER OF EVENTS
IN TOTAL SAMPLE

Source: Garfield (2007, p. 24)

- Two-thirds of respondents said reducing the numbers of firearms would make people feel safer, while 20 per cent said it would make people less safe.

- Disarmament and gun control, coupled with SSR and police training, were viewed as the highest priorities for the authorities. More than one-fifth of respondents contended that firearms were South Sudan's *most pressing concern*—outranking even improving access to education (20 per cent), improving health facilities (7 per cent), and reducing unemployment (4 per cent) as the region's most urgent priorities. Almost two-thirds of respondents reported that improvements to the security sector (police and/or military) were needed.

Table 10.2 **Weapons used**						
	Stick	**Gun or rifle**	**RPG or machine gun**	**Explosive**	**Hands**	**Other/none**
Fight outside compund	33	43	0	0	9	15
Fight within compound	42	28	2	0	11	17
Robbery	6	72	3	6	4	9
Sexual assault	23	34	1	6	15	21
Attack with weapon	18	57	2	2	4	17
Death from injury or accident	5	68	14	7	2	4

Source: Garfield (2007, p. 29)

FUTURE CHALLENGES IN SOUTH SUDAN: AN EMERGING FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING HUMAN SECURITY

Despite its shortcomings, the CPA is hailed as the only vehicle for the restoration of peace and the reduction of armed violence in South Sudan. It contains detailed provisions on security during the six-year interim period, including a ceasefire, the redeployment and downsizing of the SPLA and SAF, and the dissolution of the OAGs. Under the terms of the agreement, both the GoS and the GoSS are to maintain separate armed forces, with both sides gradually withdrawing behind the North–South border of 1 January 1956. The SAF is required to withdraw all its troops from South Sudan—except for those in the JIUs—in accordance with an agreed schedule, completing 72 per cent by January 2007 and 100 per cent by 9 July 2007.[41] The SPLM/A was required to have fully withdrawn from eastern Sudan by January 2006 and from South Kordofan and Blue Nile states (disputed border areas) within six months of the full deployment of the JIUs to these areas.[42]

The pace of implementation of the CPA, which is being monitored by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),[43] has been slow, however. The SPLA withdrew from the east in July 2006, some six months late, while the formation of the JIUs has suffered 'inordinate delays' (UNMIS, 2007, p. 53). The units are still not operational, integrated or trained and reportedly contain large numbers of unruly former OAG members.[44] Delays in formation have also prevented the SPLA from redeploying from border areas (UNMIS, 2007, p. 53), which was to have been completed by 9 April 2006. SAF deployment from southern Sudan has made progress but by March 2007 there were still no reliable figures available for the respective force sizes (including the aligned OAGs), complicating verification.[45]

Despite the uncertainty surrounding the numbers of combatants in South Sudan and the sizes of their stockpiles, DDR is clearly mandated by the CPA and recognized as a key step towards obtaining a more peaceful environment.[46] All combatants (and their dependants) affected by the dissolution of the OAGs and subsequent proportional down-sizing of the SPLA, SAF, and Popular Defence Force (PDF) paramilitaries are to be targeted. Long-term reintegration[47] is supposed to strike a balance between the needs of the ex-combatants and those of the communities from which they come, although how this will be implemented remains unclear. The question of whether individual compensation will be on offer has yet to be resolved, as well as what will be done with the weapons collected. Two commissions

are scheduled to lead the implementation process—the North Sudan DDR Commission and the South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC), with an overarching National DDR Coordination Council formulating and overseeing policy. State-level DDR Commissions are scheduled to implement the programme at the local level. Identifying exactly how many individuals are candidates for DDR has now become a key political issue as people hope to take advantage of DDR and anticipated accompanying material benefits.

Planning for DDR has been problematic. By January 2007, the SSDDRC had not been formally established and neither the GNU nor the GoSS legislatures had passed relevant legislation. State-level representation had not begun due to delays in recruiting staff (UNMIS, 2007, p. 62). Both parties had started preregistration, however, and preliminary target groups of some 60,000 SAF personnel (including SAF, PDF, and SAF-aligned OAGs) and 30,000 SPLA-personnel (including aligned OAGs) have been identified. However, the UN DDR Unit, mandated by the CPA to support[48] Sudanese institutions leading the process, has struggled to build a positive relationship with national authorities and to define its role in the process.

Notably, the CPA makes specific reference to the requirement that the parties engage in direct negotiations on force reduction in advance of DDR after the complete withdrawal of the SAF from South Sudan, and some 30 months following the signing of the agreement.[49] This provision reflects the reality that neither party was likely to undertake significant demobilization in the first two years of the interim period. On this basis the Sudan DDR programme (as outlined in the CPA) was specifically designed to focus on preparatory work, capacity building of the northern and

SPLA soldiers train in the Mestre area of western Sudan near to the border with Chad in August 2004. © Luc Gnago/Reuters

southern commissions, community arms issues, and the removal of children, women associated with armed groups, and the disabled from the armed forces for the first two years. It specifically excluded substantial demobilization until the completion of force reduction negotiations. A recent review of programme implementation strongly criticizes UNMIS's failure to follow through on the original programme strategy, however, and points out that the necessary preparatory work with the Sudanese authorities has not been undertaken (DFID, 2006). These shortcomings have resulted in a serious loss of momentum and confidence among the parties involved, alongside a reluctance to disarm in anticipation of possible future hostilities.

Indeed, as the focus of GoSS attention moves to the next phase of the peace process, which will see border demarcation, a census, elections in 2009, and the crucial referendum on secession in 2011, fears of a possible break-down of the CPA are growing (Young, 2007a). Both the elections and the referendum are dependent on the census which, in turn, is dependent on border demarcation—a process that will determine where crucial natural resources lie.[50] It is now widely expected that the entire North–South border area may become a focus of disagreement between the SPLM/A and the NCP and there is a build-up of armed forces in border areas as a result.[51] Areas of particular concern include oil-producing regions,[52] Hoffra near Raja, which is believed to have large deposits of copper and uranium, and Kaka, north of Melut, which has gum Arabic (Young, 2007a, pp. 19–25). Special petroleum police have reportedly replaced the SAF in the Polach and Adar oil production areas and similar units have been reported in Difra and other oilfields in Abyei.[53] In Bentiu SPLA officials report that these police have their origins in the intelligence forces and are well trained and equipped with heavy weapons (Young, 2007a, p. 22).[54]

Despite these ongoing security threats and what some see as preparation for future conflict, the GoSS and other actors are simultaneously making efforts to work to reverse insecurity and the widespread misuse of small arms at the local level. Community-based weapons-reduction initiatives and the informal harnessing of local security arrangements are two emerging frameworks for violence reduction.

Community-based weapons-reduction initiatives are emerging frameworks for violence reduction.

Disarming civilians: the case of northern Jonglei State[55]

Initiatives aimed at reducing private weapons possession and associated violence are increasingly understood as a fundamental part of post-conflict recovery, alongside DDR (Small Arms Survey, 2005, pp. 279–80). They involve activities such as public awareness campaigns, the tightening of regulatory frameworks, and civilian disarmament pro-grammes. Increasingly, they are linked with DDR as follow-on activities or aim to address gaps in DDR programmes.

Well aware of the high levels of gun ownership among civilians (see above), the GoSS began an ad hoc programme of civilian disarmament ahead of formal DDR[56] but as of March 2007 had yet to develop a comprehensive plan that the international community could legitimately support. Research shows that disarmament initiatives are especially complex in environments such as South Sudan, where there is no tradition of civilian oversight or transparency (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 283). Added to this is the lack of protection from armed attack by a viable police service. Lessons learned from an SPLA-led disarmament campaign in 2006 in Jonglei State, which led to considerable blood-shed and ethnic tension, include the complex nature of the required approaches. The current challenge is to learn from recent mistakes and to continue the disarmament process without further heightening local insecurity.

In late 2005, the SPLA decided to disarm the Lou Nuer in northern Jonglei State. This programme was to serve a number of purposes: to end disputes between local ethnic groups; to reinforce recognition that the SPLA was the only force with the right to bear arms; to quash fears that the SAF was supporting Jonglei dissidents to undermine the peace process; and to respond to UN pressure to carry out disarmament and ensure the security necessary for

Map 10.3   **Selected civilian disarmament sites, Jonglei State, 2006**

development (young, 2006b, p. 1). The disarmament task (see Map 10.3) was assigned to a Lou Nuer, Gen. Peter Bol Kong, whose force was ethnically mixed, to reduce the risk that the Lou would view the exercise as a means of weakening them.

Problems began in December 2005, when Lou and Gawaar Nuer pastoralists requested permission from the Dinka Hol and Nyarweng in Duk county to graze cattle on their land. The Dinka civil authorities asked the Nuer first to surrender their weapons, which they refused to do. In response, two conferences were held to resolve the dispute, but local white army members argued that they needed their weapons to protect themselves from neighbouring Murle, who had been allowed to retain their arms. During these meetings it was stressed that a forcible campaign would take place if weapons were not surrendered voluntarily. Against this background, the first skirmishes broke out between the white army and the SPLA. Wutnyang Gatkek, a Nuer spiritual leader and a former white army member, was killed in January 2006 when he went to Yuai on behalf of the SPLA to sell the disarmament programme, threatening an intensified inter-clan conflict. His death and the killing of a growing number of other SPLA soldiers stimulated demands from within the SPLA for a more aggressive response.

Skirmishing in January 2006 gave way to major battles pitting elements of the white army, the SSDF forces of Thomas Maboir, and those of Simon Gatwitch under his deputy Simon Wojong against the 'disarmament forces' of Gen. Bol Kong. A helicopter seen visiting Wojong's camp near Yuai was believed to be ferrying SAF supplies to his forces, which were assisting the white army.[57] The conflict ended on 18 May 2006, when the latter lost 113 fighters in a battle with the SPLA in the Motot area, against the loss of one SPLA soldier.[58] Between December 2005 and May 2006, some 1,200 white army members, 400 SPLA soldiers, and an undetermined number of civilians were reportedly

killed.[59] The number of weapons collected during the disarmament campaign remains uncertain. According to the UN, the exercise resulted in 3,300 weapons being obtained from Lou Nuer, while local SPLM officials claimed that 3,701 weapons were acquired in the Nyirol area alone (Small Arms Survey, 2006d, p. 4). Some of these were taken to unknown destinations while others were held locally.

One significant impact of the disarmament exercise and the resulting fighting was a serious food shortage in the area. SPLA and white army units stole cattle and other livestock, impoverishing local communities, while the Lou Nuer were unable to plant. A further impact was the effective destruction of the white army in the region, as many members lost their weapons.[60] These developments also had a negative effect on other planned disarmament exercises, particularly in Akobo, another Lou Nuer community. In response to the violence, Commissioner Doyak Choal of Akobo hurriedly moved to carry out a disarmament process using traditional authorities and youth leaders, and without direct SPLA involvement. With the grudging approval of Bol Kong and the assurance of neighbouring Murle leaders that they would not attack, disarmament was peacefully carried out in Akobo in July 2006. Some 1,400 weapons were retrieved relatively peacefully (Small Arms Survey, 2006d, p. 5).

Most of the tribal leaders taking part in the Akobo exercise were anxious to demonstrate to the SPLA that an effective, peaceful, and voluntary disarmament process could take place in Jonglei. They were also seeking to regain authority in their communities and to reduce white army influence. A UN engagement[61] was added to improve legitimacy and to ensure the safe transportation of surrendered weapons. From a UN perspective, the Akobo cam-

Nuer men armed with Kalashnikovs guard their cattle against raiders, December 2005. © Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures

paign offered UNMIS a pilot for other civilian disarmament programmes, although there were concerns that most agencies and state entities were unprepared.

The SPLM/A has said it is committed to the disarmament of all South Sudan's ethnic groups, and campaigns are ongoing, including in Jonglei and Lakes states. The above case study illustrates, however, that its capacity to undertake this without violence, and in the absence of a coherent and transparent strategy, remains in question. The civilian disarmament was led, planned, and implemented by the military with little sign of accountability. Many in the SPLM/A leadership do not think sufficient efforts were made to mobilize local authorities and chiefs to support the exercise. Questions were also raised as to whether the campaigns in Jonglei State retrieved most of the weapons in the area and what has been done with them since.[62] In addition doubts have also been expressed as to whether the SPLM/A wants to disarm these groups to improve security, or simply to reinforce its power base.

The UN role was deemed controversial for having encouraged the SPLA/M to disarm civilians before the outbreak of violence, and for failing to denounce it after the violence erupted. Significantly, the exercise was not truly voluntary[63] since the forces of Bol Kong had threatened intervention if the disarmament did not take place. Recognition of this has led to a fierce debate within the UN about whether it can support similar efforts in future.[64]

Finally, the initiative illustrated the importance of adopting a reciprocal and regional approach to disarmament grounded in a thorough knowledge of local politics and the root causes of local conflicts. This has major implications for future disarmament efforts, since any initiative that fails to address these issues will expose communities to attack by their neighbours.

Harnessing local security arrangements to reduce armed violence: the Kapoeta case[65]

The term 'local security arrangements' (LSAs) encompasses systems of 'governance without government' that currently comprise South Sudan's main source of community security. These arrangements emerged during years of warfare and provided communities with modest levels of security and conflict management in the absence of any effective state presence (Menkhaus, 2006). Such coping mechanisms are the product of extensive negotiation, and usually focus on the provision of basic communal and household security, law and order, conflict management and prevention, routinized sharing of common resources, and predictable market access. They are highly valued by local communities, but are typically illiberal in their application of law and order, and often incompatible with national constitutions.

Central governments have variable and fluid relations with LSAs. States can attempt to suppress, ignore, co-opt, co-exist, or partner with them, depending on their interests, needs, and circumstances. Traditionally, externally funded state-building and DDR initiatives in post-conflict settings have tended to view them as inconsequential, devoting resources exclusively to strengthening the capacity of central government. But recent evidence suggests that more post-conflict governments and donors are adopting a more proactive approach by seeking opportunities to forge partnerships in which LSAs can play a central role in delivering basic governance to communities beyond state reach. This includes the SPLM, which has enshrined in its guiding principles a commitment to 'acknowledge and incorporate the role of traditional elders and customary law in local administration' (Mullen, 2005, p. 3), and key external donors, which are actively exploring models to harmonize traditional authorities with emerging state structures. However, LSAs vary considerably in capacity, legitimacy, and composition: many are hybrid arrangements, blending customary law with contemporary actors and practices. Some may have an important role to play in DDR and state-building initiatives in South Sudan, whereas others may be only transitional coping mechanisms.

Map 10.4 **Selected ethnic groups in Eastern Equatoria**

Research in Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria, reveals that security has improved considerably at both local and regional levels in the past four years, although some residents express concern that peace remains incomplete and vulnerable to setback. Much of the improvement can be attributed to the harnessing of LSAs, in this case 'people-to-people' peace-building efforts that have facilitated the work of tribal chiefs in brokering and maintaining peace.

Greater Kapoeta, comprising the newly established counties of North, East, and South Kapoeta, is a remote, poor, very rural, agro-pastoral zone in the eastern third of Eastern Equatoria State, bordering Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (see Map 10.4). During the second civil war, the town of Kapoeta changed hands several times between the SPLA and the SAF. Relations between the SPLM/A and the Toposa, the dominant ethnic group, were often strained in the 1980s and 1990s: the Toposa were periodically allied with, and armed by, the SAF, which sought to exploit ethnic tensions between the Toposa and the Dinka. Kapoeta has long been a transit point in regional small arms trafficking in and out of Sudan. Agro-pastoral communities in Greater Kapoeta are heavily armed, mainly with semi-automatic weaponry. Some local traders engage in cross-border small arms trafficking, conducting transactions in remote locations.

Armed conflict in Kapoeta over the past five years has mainly involved communal clashes over cattle raiding, and control of land and water, which have produced growing fatalities and increased levels of food insecurity. This is partly attributable to the great importance attached to cattle raiding, both as a rite of passage and as the main source of bride-wealth for young men wishing to marry. The clashes can be grouped in three conflict zones: (1) eastern Kapoeta (toward the Ethiopian border), where gang-driven cattle rustling produces intermittent conflict between Toposa and Turkana, as well as Toposa and Murle; (2) southern Kapoeta (toward the Kenyan border), where Toposa and Turkana clash over cattle and the control of grazing; and (3) western/northern Kapoeta, where Toposa and

Box 10.4 Factors influencing demand for weapons in Kapoeta

Disaggregating the motivations that shape demand for weapons is complex in any context, because demand is conditioned by a range of factors that are geographically, ecologically, culturally, socially, and economically tied. Yet a more sophisticated understanding of demand is crucial to identifying incentives for disarmament in any given context.[66]

In Greater Kapoeta, community members reported the following key drivers of demand:

- Protection of livestock from raiding
- Protection of communal access to, and control over, pasture and wells
- Self-defence in the context of clashes between ethnic groups in the region
- Deterrence against incursion and attack by rival groups
- Use of small arms by young men to engage in cattle raiding
- Prestige and status linked to gun ownership
- Use of small arms by local posses to arrest criminals
- Protection of urban property from break-ins
- Commercial sale in cross-border arms markets, and
- Stockpiling of weapons in anticipation of disarmament programmes.

Most of the population is subsistence agro-pastoralist and, with the exception of Kapoeta town's modest market, the economy is generally non-monetized. Semi-automatic weapons are one of the few manufactured goods that local households possess. Though the price of a semi-automatic is low, at times dipping to as little as USD 20, acquisition of a weapon is one of the biggest purchases most households make. That such poor people are willing, or feel compelled, to acquire a small arm is testimony to the power of demand as a driver of domestic weapons flows.

Residents cite the ubiquity of weaponry and ammunition as both the chief source of insecurity and a valued source of deterrence against crime and attack. There is clear recognition of the need for some form of gun control, but in current circumstances there is also strong opposition to disarmament, which would render local communities vulnerable to cross-border raiding from Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Because the border area is a crossroads for the regional small arms market, demand and supply of small arms in Kapoeta are likely to remain robust for years to come.

Source: Menkhaus (2006)

Buye, and Toposa and Didinga clash over cattle and grass. Recent research highlights the fact that the major sources of insecurity in Greater Kapoeta occur along fault lines between its main ethnic groups—the Toposa, Turkana, Buye, Didinga, and Murle.

Two of Kapoeta's larger conflicts—the Toposa–Turkana and Toposa–Didinga clashes—have been the target of successful peace negotiations led by local chiefs, local NGOs, churches, and local government. The use of such hybrid, ad hoc peace committees is not new: at the height of SPLM/A clashes with tribal militias in Greater Kapoeta in 1992, the SPLM/A formed a committee of militia, civil, and church leaders to investigate and end the fighting. More recently, external aid agencies have actively supported local NGOs and church groups engaged in peace processes, with positive results. This engagement has involved cross-border diplomacy and mediation by the GoSS and the Government of Kenya in the case of the Toposa–Turkana peace talks (Menkhaus, 2006, p. 3).

Women, especially war widows, played a critical, initial role in the Toposa–Buye and Toposa–Turkana peace negotiations by unilaterally walking across conflict lines to make contact with ethnic rivals and to request peace talks. Women's roles as lines of communication and catalysts of conflict resolution—known locally as the 'women's crusade'—is new and significant in this area. Women are also making efforts to dismantle the culture of cattle rustling by refusing to recite praise poetry in support of raiding or killing. An important deterrent to local crime and instability in Toposa areas is the strong taboo against cattle raiding and fighting, a taboo reinforced by the fear of the curse, or *lam-lam*.

Though government capacity to consolidate tribal peace accords has been weak, an important dimension of improved security in Greater Kapoeta is the increased commitment by GoSS officials in Eastern Equatoria. Recent peace talks between the Buye and Toposa were brokered by a coalition of senior GoSS officials and local chiefs. This commitment is threatened by growing government impatience with cattle raiding, and an inclination to pursue arrests rather than rely on customary mechanisms to arrange the return of stolen cattle. Nevertheless, the emerging actors who are taking an increasingly active role in conflict resolution constitute a hybrid coalition with the potential to develop into a more sustained partnership. Carefully targeted external support could allow them to enhance their effectiveness (Menkhaus, 2006, p. 4). Designers of effective DDR strategies must be fully cognizant of these LSAs so as not inadvertently to undermine them as sources of protection and governance.

CONCLUSION

If the CPA is implemented, South Sudan will continue its long process of recovery. Post-conflict orthodoxy points to a number of phases in this recovery: political reconstruction to build up a legitimate and capable state; economic reconstruction to rebuild infrastructure and institutions; social reconstruction to renew civil society and limit the excesses of the state; and the provision of general security to establish a safer environment (Diamond, 2004, p. 2).

Most of the region's current problems can be attributed to the inability of the fledgling GoSS to mould itself into a functioning and transparent government. To date it has demonstrated little success in the areas of conflict mediation (with some exceptions at the local level, as noted above), the provision of basic services such as water, education, and health, the institution of the rule of law, and the protection of citizens and their property. Such an uncertain climate offers ordinary people little incentive to renounce their weapons voluntarily.

However, a framework for reducing armed violence is now beginning to emerge and it is essential that the GoSS establish and implement a formal SSR strategy, as part of which DDR, civilian disarmament, and the harnessing of LSAs can be implemented. To date competition between SPLM/A factions, inter-ethnic rivalries, the absence of an effective framework for the integration of OAGs, and ongoing insecurity have effectively undermined efforts to build a consensus on this. Yet SSR constitutes one of the essential pillars of post-conflict recovery (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 276). Indeed, any action to prevent the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the establishment of effective and regulated security forces will be dependent on effective SSR.

After extensive consultation within the SPLM/A in late 2006, a National Security Council (NSC) was established within the GoSS, headed by Salva Kiir and incorporating most of the key actors in the SPLM/A. The establishment of this key policy and planning organ represents a major step forward, and provides the necessary platform from which small arms and other security-related issues can be addressed. It remains to be seen, however, whether the establishment of the NSC will enable the diverse views on security issues in South Sudan to be reconciled in effective policy and programme implementation.

In sum, South Sudan may have signed a high-level peace accord, but it remains highly unstable in numerous respects and may yet return to war. The challenge of addressing its many security concerns and preventing further conflict is only just beginning.

ANNEXE 1. STATUS OF ALIGNED OTHER ARMED GROUPS IN SOUTH SUDAN AS OF APRIL 2007*

No.	Group	Associated commander/ leader	Area(s) of operations	Comments
Merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA				
1	SSIM (SPLA)	James Leah	Nimni	Reunited/merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA.
2	SPLM/A-U Main	Lam Akol	Tonga, Warjok, Wau, Shilluk, Wadokana, Dhor	Reunited/merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA.
3	EDF Main	Col. Martin Kenyi	Magwe County	Reunited/merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA.
OAGs aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration				
4	SSUM	Lt.-Gen. Paulino Matieb	Bentiu, Rubkona, Majom, Mankien, Wankay, Nhialdiu, Heglig, Kharasana	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.
5	SSIM (SAF)	Maj.-Gen. Peter Dor	K-7 (HQ, 7 km south of Rubkona), Rubkona, Mirmir, Kaj El Sherika, along the Rubkona–Leer oil road	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.
6	Pariang National Forces (GUM)	Maj.-Gen. Samuel Mayiek	Pariang, Mankwa, Beo El Madarasa, El Gor	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.
7	Peter Gatdet's Forces	Maj.-Gen. Peter Gatdet	Wankay, Bentiu, Rubkona	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.
8	Fangak Forces (Jebel Forces II)	Brig. John Both	Kaldak, Doleib Hill, Canal Mouth	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
9	SPLM/A-U II	Maj.-Gen. James Othow	Tonga, Warjok, Wau, Shilluk, Wadokana, Dhor	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
10	Sobat Force	Simon Yei	Khor Flus	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
11	Saddam Shayot's Faction	Maj.-Gen. Saddam Shayot	Adar, Balkok, Langshem, Ghor, Machar, Malual Gauth, Renk, Shomdi, Longchuck	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
12	Mading Forces/ Chol Gagak Group	Col. Chol Gagak	Nasir, Ketbek, Mading, Malual, with an area of operations overlapping with Gordon Kong's Thor Jikany	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
13	Simon Gatwitch's Group	Maj.-Gen. Simon Gatwitch	Yuai, Malut, Waat	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized. A small splinter group went to Doleib Hill after the SPLA disarmament in Jonglei.

14	Peace and Reconstruction Brigade (Aweil Group I)	Sultan Abdel Bagi	El Miram, Bahr El Arab, Agok, Malual, Tadama, Um Driesi, Futa, Bringi	Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized. Two of Abdel Bagi's sons and their adherents are aligned with Khartoum.
15	Peace and Reconstruction Brigade (Aweil Group II)	Maj.-Gen. Abdel Aki Akol	Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing	After a violent struggle with Abdel Bagi's forces after the Juba Declaration, aligned with the SPLA in October 2006.
16	Mundari Forces I	Maj.-Gen Clement Wani Konga	Terekaka, Juba, Gemmaiza, Tali, Rejaf East and West	Officially aligned with SPLA in July 2006 but integration process not yet finalized. A sub-component of this group aligned with the SAF.
17	Bahr El Jebel Peace Forces (Bari Forces)	Mohamed El Laj/ Col. Paulino Tombe (Lonyombe)	Juba, Mongalia, Gadokoro Island, around Juba, Rajaf West	Some of the Bari Forces have joined the SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but SAF claims that one component of BPF is aligned with them.
18	SSLA	Brig.-Gen. Gabriel Yoal Doc	Akobo	SSLA has been divided into two components since a failed integration process in 2005. One component is aligned with SPLA and the other one (Akobo Force SSLM) is aligned with SAF.
19	SSDF First Division	Maj.-Gen. Tahib Ghathluak	Bentiu	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
20	A Brigade	Brig.-Gen. Adhong Kuol	Pariang	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
21	B Brigade	Brig.-Gen. Keribino Rual	Mayom	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
22	C Brigade	Brig.-Gen. Nyial Gatduel	Rupkona	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
23	D Brigade	Brig.-Gen. Gatewheel Yeal Roam	Malualkon	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
24	Mobile Forces	Brig.-Gen. Samuel Both Tap	Tunga	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
25	Longchuk Guelgook	Brig.-Gen. John Kang Rek	Longchuk	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
26	Kaldak	Brig.-Gen. Peter Tor Nyuel	Kaldak	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.

27	Tiger Battalion	Brig.-Gen. Lueth Akol	Jalhag	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
28	Jamam Maban Battalion	Brig.-Gen. Deng Many	Jamam Maban	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
29	Jamus Brigade	Brig.-Gen. Chuol Gaga	Nasser	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
30	Jamus Second Battalion	Col. Joseph Lual	Akobo	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
31	Watt Battalion	Brig.-Gen. Joseph Bilieu	Waat	It is unclear whether this group is incorporated into the SPLA or aligned and separate.
32	Pibor Faction	Maj.-Gen. Ismael Konyi	Pibor, Fertit, Gamrok, Loyikwangali	
33	Popular Defence Forces	Col. Luciano Pasquel Ulaw	Tonj	
34	Al Fursan (Fursan Forces)	Al-Haj Basheer Mawein	Raja	
Not on recent SAF/SPLA lists: probably absorbed or disintegrated				
35	Adong Peace Forces II	Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing	Adong, Baiet, Olang	Has previously been reported by SPLA as aligned group. However, does not appear on the recent SAF/SPLA lists. Possibly absorbed or disintegrated.
OAGs aligned with SAF after the Juba Declaration comprising some SSDF groups and several splinter groups				
36	James Gai's faction	Col. James Gai	Bentiu, Rubkona	Small splinter group after SSUM and SSIM (SAF) when they decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
37	Tut Galuak's faction	Col. Tut Galuak	Mayom, Wankay	Small splinter group.
38	Bafanj Mantuel's faction	Col. Bafanj Mantuel	Fariang, Mankien, Kwach	Small splinter group.
39	Fariang faction	Col. Denis Kor	Fariang, El Tor, Fanshien, Biu, Mankwao	Small splinter group.
40	Abyei Forces (SSDF Abyei)	Thomas Thiel	Fariang, El Tor, Fanshien, Biu, Mankwao	Thomas Thiel was recalled to Khartoum when his harassment of the UN became an embarrassment for SAF, but his group is still located in Abyei.

41	Nasir Group (Thor Jikany)	Maj.-Gen. Gordon Kong	Ketbek (HQ, 3 km south of Nasir), Nasir, Mading, Ulang, Kadbit, El Desin	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
42	Fangak Forces (Jebel Forces)	Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tang-Ginya	Bashlakon, Fangak, Deil, Kwerkan, Kwerdaf, Faguer, Fag, Kaldak, Dor	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
43	Sabri Achol's Forces	Col. Sabri Achol	Akoka, Fanmadid, Rom	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
44	Akobo Faction (Akobo Force SSLM)	Brig. Koith Simon	Akobo, El Nasser, Denjok, Wallak, Alalli, Achuil, Bormad, Yakwach	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
45	Dinni Forces	Brig. Hassan Doyak	Dinni, Glashiel	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
46	The United Faction (SPLM/A-U II)	Brig. Ashuang Arop	Tonga, Warjok, Wau, Shilluk, Wadokana, Dhor	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee. A splinter group from James Othow's group when he decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
47	Doleib Forces	Maj.-Gen. Thomas Maboir	Doleib, Waj Mabor, Khor Flus, Wat	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
48	Yuai Faction	Col. David Hoth Lual	Doleib, Waj Mabor, Khor Flus, Wat	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee. A splinter group from Simon Gatwitch's group when he decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.
49	Bor Salvation Forces (Bor Group)	Col. Kelia Deng Kelly	Bor	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee. However, sources within SPLA also claim that the Bor Group has decided to join SPLA.
50	Balkok Forces	Maj.-Gen. John Duet	Balkok, Langshek, Ruam, Khor Machar, Malual Gauth, Luak, Adar	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
51	Renk Faction	Brig. Mohamed Chol Al Ahmar	Renk, Shomdi, Al Mansura, Goy Fammi, Wadakona, Al Tuba, Madimar, Kaka	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
52	Mellut Faction	Col. William Deng	Melut, Kom, Falloj, Deltima, Fariak	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
53	Maban Forces	Lt. Col. Musa Doula	El Jamam, Kajuri, El Bonj	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
54	Allak Deng Faction (Northern Upper Nile Group)	Lt. Col. Allak Deng	Melut, Falloj, Fariak	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.

55	Mading Forces	Lt. Col. Peter Tuaj	Nasir, Ketbek, Mading, Malual, with an area of operations overlapping with Gordon Kong's Thor Jikany, Baljok, Mayor, Forinang	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
56	El Nasser Forces	John Jok	Dit, El Deshin, Kech, Abiech, Ram Kiir	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
57	National Peace Forces (Fertit)	Maj.-Gen. El Tom El Nur Daldom	Bazia, Geitan, Taban, Buseri, Halima, Baggara, Angessa, Farajalla, Ambor, Boro El Medina, Katta Manaba, Khor Ghana, Dem Zuber, Ayabello, Sabo, Mangayat, Raja, Tumsah, Abu Shoka, Ghatena	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
58	Kaltok Forces	Lt. Col. Gabriel Mading Fon	Kaltok	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
59	Mundari Forces II	Unknown	Terekeka, Juba Road, Tali, Rejaf East, Kaltok, Jemeiza, Sudan Safari, Jebel Lado, Tali Road	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
60	EDF II	Brig. Fabiano Odongi	Torit, Juba, Torit Road, mountains around Torit	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
61	Toposa Forces	Chief Lokipapa/ Brig. Justin Akodo	Juba, Jabur, Lafon	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
62	Bahr El Jebel Peace Forces (Bari Forces) II	Mohamed El Laj/ Col. Paulino Tombe (Lonyombe)	Juba, Mongalia, Gadokoro Island, around Juba, Rajaf West	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
63	Boya Forces	Lt. Col. Mohamed Losek	Torit, Chukudum, Nokchok	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
64	Didinga Forces	Brig. Peter Lorot	Didinga hills, Chukudum hills, Chukudum, Nokchok	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
65	Lafon Forces	Col. Kamal Ramadan Balento	Lakoro/Lafon	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
66	West Equatoria Forces (Western EDF)	Maj. Samuel Steward	Juba, Coda	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
67	Akoka Peace Forces	Brig. Thon Amum	Akoka, Fanmadid, Rom	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.
68	Saddam Shayot's Faction II	Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing	Adar, Balkok, Langshem, Ghor, Machar, Malual Gauth, Renk, Shomdi, Longchuck	As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.

* This list is not exhaustive.
Source: Young (2006b, pp. 42–48), updated

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	NSC	National Security Council
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration	OAG	Other Armed Group
		PDF	Popular Defence Forces
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	RPG	rocket-propelled grenade (launcher)
EDF	Equatoria Defence Force	SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
GNU	Government of National Unity	SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army
GoS	Government of Sudan		
GoSS	Government of South Sudan	SSDDRC	South Sudan Disarmament, Demobiliza- tion, and Reintegration Commission
GoU	Government of Uganda		
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment	SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit	SSR	security sector reform
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army	SSUDA	South Sudan United Democratic Alliance
LSA	local security arrangement	UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
NCP	National Congress Party	UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Forces

ENDNOTES

1   As of 1 January 2006 the top five recipients of Sudan's refugees were neighbouring Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. See <http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3b028097c.html#Numbers>

2   Correspondence with US government officials, November 2006.

3   For more on the HSBA research project, see <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan>

4   For 2007 alone, nearly USD 1.3 billion is required for humanitarian activities and USD 560 million for recovery and development in Sudan. Of those totals, USD 279 million and USD 349 million, respectively, are for the south. See UNOCHA (2006b, pp. 6–10).

5   Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) estimate that the conflict claimed these lives between 1983 and 2002. The overwhelming majority (97 per cent) died from indirect causes, such as disease and malnutrition.

6   See UNHCR (2006).

7   The CPA is a collection of separate agreements negotiated up to 31 December 2004 and signed in a formal ceremony on 9 January 2005. They are: the Machakos Protocol (20 July 2002); Agreement on Security Arrangements (25 September 2003); Agreement on Wealth Sharing (7 January 2004); Protocol on Power Sharing (26 May 2004); Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States (26 May 2004); Protocol on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict (26 May 2004); Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing (31 December 2004); and Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities (31 December 2004). See the full text of the agreement at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6AZBDB?OpenDocument>

8   CPA (Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 7(a)). Members of OAGs may either be incorporated into the respective armies, police, prisons, or wildlife forces of the signatories or reintegrated into society.

9   The full text of the Juba Declaration is available at <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/jubadecljan06.pdf>

10   Recent HSBA field research has found that new SSDF members are now being recruited to replace those who have joined the SPLA. For more information on the SSDF see Young (2006c).

11   For the latest figures on regional displacement see UN Human Rights Council (2007, p. 13) and UNSC (2007b, p. 3).

12   See USGAO (2006) for details on the debate surrounding the numbers of dead in Darfur. See also Tanner and Tubiana (2007) on armed groups operating in Darfur.

13   The following agreements have been signed: Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, 8 April 2004, N'Djamena, Chad; Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, 8 April 2004, N'Djamena, Chad; Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers, 28 May 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, 9 November 2004, Abuja, Nigeria; Protocol of the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur, 9 November 2004, Abuja, Nigeria;

Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur, 5 July 2005, Abuja, Nigeria; and Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006. All are available at <http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf>

14   UN Security Council resolutions include resolution 1556 (30 July 2004), which paves the way for action against the GoS; resolution 1564 (18 September 2004), which states that sanctions will be considered; resolution 1591 (29 March 2005), which approves a travel ban and asset freeze for individuals accused of international crimes in Darfur; and resolution 1672 (25 April 2006), which imposes sanctions on four Sudanese individuals accused of human rights violations.

15   See Small Arms Survey (2006e) for background information on the Darfur Peace Agreement.

16   See report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) and UN Human Rights Council (2007) for details on widespread abuses of human rights and humanitarian law committed by GoS-aligned and rebel forces in Darfur. UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) has permitted the International Criminal Court to examine and act on alleged violations of international criminal law.

17   By November 2006 approximately four million people, or two-thirds of the entire population of Darfur, were in need of humanitarian assistance. During the last six months of 2006, more relief workers were killed than in the previous two years combined. In December 2006 alone, 29 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked in Darfur and 430 relief workers relocated. See UNSC (2007a, p. 5) and UN Human Rights Council (2007, p. 16).

18   For information on the regional impact of the conflict, in particular on the Central African Republic, see Small Arms Survey (2007a).

19   See UN Panel of Experts on Sudan (2006) at <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2006/795>

20   See ESPA (2006). See also Young (2007b) for more on the Eastern Front.

21   Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLM controls 70 per cent of positions in the GoSS; the other southern parties 15 per cent; and the NCP 15 per cent.

22   The GoSS Assembly is currently demanding accountability for the defence budget, which consumes more than one-third of the government's entire budget. See Young (2007a, p. 13).

23   This sections draws upon information and analysis from Young (2006c).

24   Critically, it did not specify when that referendum would take place.

25   See CPA (Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, para. 11.9). This date was subsequently extended to 9 March 2006, after which alignments were considered illegal.

26   The JIUs were designed as a symbol of national unity during the interim period and will form the nucleus of a national army in the event of a united Sudan. They are to contain equal numbers of SAF and SPLA and to be based in the following areas: South Sudan (24,000); Nuba Mountains (6,000); southern Blue Nile (6,000); and Khartoum (3,000). See CPA (Agreement on Security Arrangements, paras. 4 and 4.1).

27   Young (2007a) examines the uncertainty surrounding the numbers of SSDF, who remain aligned with Khartoum.

28   While precise numbers remain unclear, by April 2007 OAG members aligned with Khartoum were estimated to number fewer than 10,000.

29   Observations on field visit to Ketbec, August 2006.

30   See <http://www.ecosonline.org/> for general information on Sudan's oil industry.

31   See <http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/oilfieldmap_Sudan_ECOS.pdf> to view Sudan's oil concessions.

32   Interview with county commissioner in Adar, August 2006.

33   Interviews with senior GoSS officials in Malakal, August 2006.

34   Interviews with senior SPLA officials in Malakal, August 2006.

35   Email correspondence with Peter Chuol Gatluak, SSDF Secretary General and spokesman, March 2007.

36   This section is from Schomerus (2006).

37   For more information on the LRA, see Small Arms Survey (2006a, ch. 11).

38   Interview with SPLA officer, Maridi, June–September 2006. This may have been a last attempt by Khartoum to maintain relations with the group.

39   This section is based on Young (2006a).

40   This section is based upon Garfield (2007).

41   CPA (Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 3(b), and Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, para. 18.2).

42   CPA (Agreement on Security Arrangements, paras. 4(c) and 3(c), and Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, para. 18.5).

43   Having determined that the situation in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council established UNMIS (Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005). Its mandate includes monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire, investigating violations, observing movements of armed groups, and assisting with DDR. As of 28 February 2007 the Mission's strength was 9,978 uniformed personnel, supported by more than three thousand civilian personnel.

44   Both sides are said to be reluctant to commit their best men and equipment to the JIUs for fear of an outbreak of future hostilities.

45   Relations between the SPLA and the SAF are characterized by mutual distrust and a general lack of transparency. The SPLA, in particular, has a history of inflating its figures to ensure respect from the SAF, which has always been superior in terms of access to technology and air power.

46   CPA (Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 3(e)).

47   CPA (Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, para. 24.6).

48   CPA (Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, para. 24.3).

49   CPA (Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, para. 19).

50   Notably, the GoS has already rejected the findings of the Abyei Boundary Commission, which placed oil-producing areas in South Sudan.

51   Young (2007a) contains a detailed examination of this thesis.

52   Since 1999 areas of Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Kordofan States have been producing oil. Both the GoSS and oil-producing states in the South maintain they are not receiving their fair share of oil revenues from Khartoum, in violation of the CPA (UNSC, 2007c, para. 19).

53   Interviews with UN officials, Abyei, February 2007.

54   The CPA stipulates that the JIUs are to monitor oil fields that are to be 'demilitarized', but this has yet to be implemented.

55   This section is based on Young (2006b). For a review of civilian disarmament, see Small Arms Survey 2006(d).

56   Notably, while the CPA calls for DDR of armed groups, it provides comparatively little guidance on the question of disarming civilians. The CPA's only reference to civilian disarmament is in section 14.6.5.15 of the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, which empowers the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee to 'monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed'. This clause gives rise to two problems: first, there is a lack of clarity about what constitutes 'illegal' in this context since gun laws have not yet been enacted in South Sudan; second, the distinction between civilians and combatants is far from clear.

57   Interview with UN official in Malakal, 23 August 2006.

58   Interview with SPLM official in Motot, 25 August 2006.

59   These figures are very rough estimates.

60   In January 2007 local residents said in interviews that it was impossible to buy guns locally since the disarmament and that they feared being caught with them by local authorities. Punishments being meted out include fines, being beaten and having guns confiscated.

61   The UN did not participate in, or actively support, the forcible disarmament in northern Jonglei State.

62   At a February 2007 workshop on civilian disarmament Vice-President of South Sudan Riek Machar indicated that collected weapons may be recycled for police forces in South Sudan.

63   A 22 August 2006 UNMIS press release greatly overemphasized the voluntary nature of the process. See <http://www.unmis.org/English/2006 Docs/PR36.pdf>

64   Communications with senior UN DDR officials, November 2006.

65   This section is from Menkhaus (2006).

66   See Small Arms Survey (2006a, pp. 141–63).

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