The principles that underpin established C-IED doctrine remain relevant. Defeating devices, preparing those exposed to IED threats, and disrupting the networks responsible for threats, as well as the systems that support their use, continue to be essential. The shift in approach examined in this Situation Update does not seek to replace these functions, but rather to place them within a wider analytical, institutional, and policy framework.
C-IED responses should no longer be primarily viewed as a standardized set of capabilities; they should also be understood as a threat-informed, context-specific, and adaptable multi-stakeholder national enterprise. IED threats emerge from interactions between drivers, enablers, and contextual factors. Understanding these interactions is key to informing the appropriate balance of prevention, preparedness, and response. Consequently, there is no single model of—or fixed pathway for developing—national C-IED capacity.
Policy and legal frameworks, institutional leadership, inter-agency coordination, information management, and mechanisms for adaptation are needed to connect individual C-IED efforts and establish a coherent and sustainable approach to addressing the use and threatened use of IEDs. National ownership therefore includes the ability to understand the threat, establish priorities, coordinate institutions, allocate resources, and adapt as the threat evolves.
Efforts to measure the effectiveness of the response should take into account the harm it seeks to prevent and reduce. IED threats affect civilians and communities as well as security and operational environments, making civilian protection, victim assistance, community engagement, gender-responsive analysis, and accountability just as important as established technical and operational objectives.
Looking beyond the device also means recognizing the limits of C-IED measures. Some conditions enabling IED use and many of its wider consequences fall outside the remit of C-IED institutions. Humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, governance, arms control, and security interventions can contribute in complementary ways to reducing IED risks. The objective is not to expand the definition of C-IED measures to incorporate these activities, but to identify where they can reinforce one another while preserving distinct mandates and comparative advantages.
These developments also have implications for international assistance. External support is more likely to be relevant and sustainable when it is grounded in a shared threat understanding, responds to nationally identified priorities, strengthens institutions and coordination, and complements rather than substitutes national capacities.
The forthcoming 2026 UN General Assembly resolution on IEDs provides an opportunity to reflect this evolution in international policy. Greater attention to threat-informed prevention, national ownership and governance, civilian protection and victim assistance, regional and cross-border cooperation, and appropriate complementarities across the HDP nexus could help align international responses with today’s threat environments. Looking beyond the device therefore means neither abandoning the core functions of C-IED nor expanding its remit, but rather placing those functions within the wider understanding of threats, institutions, people, and operating environments needed to make them effective.
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