In the wake of the 2021 coup, both SAF and the RSF ramped up force numbers in South Kordofan, seemingly with an eye on securing access to gold mines and due to ongoing concern over backlash from Al Hilu’s SPLA-N, which had not signed the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) that brought most other armed groups into the transitional government. The RSF had recruited in particular from the erstwhile PDF and other Arab militias of the Hawazma and Misseriya, reflecting a particular phenomenon in which fighters formerly of the PDF—a militia built to further an Islamist agenda—joined the RSF to fight their former comrades in SAF, itself freighted with a significant and influential Islamist cadre.[37] The RSF is reported to have strong links with more than 1,000 fighters affiliated with the Al Attawa militia of the Hawazma Baggara, along with strong ties to Shawabna and the Misseriya (Radio Dabanga, 2023a). Prior to the conflict between SAF and the RSF, these groups had received weapons from the RSF, and, with its support, were active in serious tribal conflicts, the worst of which saw the Misseriya Humr evict the entire population of Nuba from Lagawa.[38] When the conflict erupted in mid-April, Baggara militias that had not already joined the RSF were urged to do so.[39] The Bashir government’s disregard for these Baggara groups in its final decade had generated disaffection and anger in Hawazma and Misseriya Humr communities in South and West Kordofan.[40] The country’s multiplying economic woes, and clear appeals from the Mahariya Reizegat to the collective Al Attawa identity, drove many young men and Baggara leaders to turn away from the NCP, Islamists, and the PDF, and towards the RSF.
SAF, by contrast, had been concerned that excessive numbers of new recruits would dilute fealty to the institution and constitute a potential threat to command and control.[41] Rather, it repositioned troops to expand its presence at an existing base in Abu Jubaiyah in June 2021 after the collapse of JPA negotiations with the SPLM-N in Juba in late 2020.[42] This militarization was corroborated by the government’s declaration of a state of emergency in the state in February 2022, which had been renewed monthly since its inception but had done little for security in the state which itself had markedly worsened since the coup.[43] This, along with inevitable questions over the post-coup government’s legitimacy became the pretext for the SPLM-N’s refusal in January 2022 to renew its ceasefire arrangement with the government.[44] Until then, the ceasefire had been renewed by both sides every six months since the 2016 cessation of hostilities between the government and the SPLM/A-N.[45] In the wake of the coup, and having rejected the renewal of the ceasefire, both wings of the SPLA-N—those of Al Hilu and of Sovereign Council member Malik Agar—began to recruit.[46] Reflecting growing fears over insecurity in the state, civil society groups reported observing weapons and ammunition moving into South Kordofan well before the outbreak of SAF–RSF conflict.[47]
[37] The PDF was officially disbanded by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement but continued to fight in South Kordofan.
[38] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 14 May 2023. The RSF had sought to set up training camps in Abu Kershola in the eastern part of South Kordofan, though this plan faced strong backlash from communities in the area (Radio Dabanga, 2023a).
[39] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based NGO worker, 27 June 2023.
[40] Author interviews with senior Misseriya Humr figures in Abyei, Al Fula, and Muglad, 2010–15, and with a West Kordofan state official, Khartoum, 12 October 2021.
[41] Author interview with a confidential source, Khartoum, 10 March 2023.
[42] SAF established a new firga (a base led by a general) at the Abu Jubaiyah base. Each firga has six liwa (major generals). Author telephone interview with former Sudanese government official, 27 June 2023.
[43] This state of emergency was renewed on a monthly basis to allow the new, post-coup administration to learn and understand the security context of the state. Author interview with Hamid al Bashir, former South Kordofan governor, Khartoum, 21 March 2023.
[44] The government unilaterally renewed this ceasefire after the October 2021 coup (Sudan Tribune, 2023). Confidential update seen by the author.
[45] Author telephone interview with a senior humanitarian official, 30 June 2023. The SPLM-N did, however, issue positive statements concerning the country’s December 2022 Framework Agreement.
[46] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 22 June 2023. The RSF had provided funding to several community leaders in South Kordofan to encourage them to turn away from Al Hilu and towards Agar’s wing of the SPLM-N, angering Al Hilu and bringing the two wings close to conflict on several occasions. Confidential research document seen by the author, May 2020.
[47] Confidential presentation by a civil society figure at a Chatham House event, 23 May 2023.
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