Restrictions to movement, and their impact on South Kordofan’s economy

South Kordofan’s economic fortunes have been in freefall since well before the ousting of President Bashir; however, the October 2021 coup consolidated that downward turn as international assistance was frozen in response to the military takeover.[23] In SPLM-N areas where optimism over economic recovery had risen following Prime Minister Hamdok’s visit to Kauda in January 2020, the coup immediately raised new apprehensions.

The outbreak of conflict hit the state’s economy hard in both government- and SPLM-N-controlled areas, since both the production and transport routes of goods arriving in, and exiting, the state were disrupted or cut and government disbursement of already scarce state funds halted.[24] The cost of market goods across the state has skyrocketed and hunger has become a palpable problem in both urban and rural areas given basic food scarcity (USAID, 2023). The western side of the state—along the Dilling–Kadugli axis—has fared worse than the eastern sector of Abassiya, Abu Jubaiyah, and Rashad, in part because the arrival of internally displaced persons without food or supplies has boosted competition for both, affecting pricing and scarcity.[25] Most problematically, government employees, including police and soldiers, stopped receiving salaries from the outset of the conflict: some 70 per cent of income in the state is derived from government salaries, and the health of marketplaces across South Kordofan is heavily reliant on the payment of these salaries.[26] All-important peace markets in Abassiya, Abu Jubaiyah, Kalogi, and Kuloulu have all been affected by severe shortages and high prices.[27]

Roads into South Kordofan—the lifelines of the state’s economy—have been blockaded, with checkpoints set up by the RSF or bandits. The crucial Dilling–Kadugli road had been blocked by fighting between SAF and the SPLA-N, though as of writing SAF controls a southern 60-km section of this road from Kadugli to Taiga Tagatu while the SPLA-N controls the northern section from Dilling down to Dushuol/Dashul. The SPLA-N had control of the Kadugli–Dilling road, with only civilian movements allowed (Radio Dabanga, 2023c).[28] The road from Kosti—the key route for international aid and assistance—sees some trade, but has been regularly rendered unsafe by looting and the presence of RSF roadblocks.[29] Fighting around Dubeibat blocked another north–south route. As a result, agricultural, livestock, charcoal, and forest products produced in South Kordofan for trade in Khartoum and beyond simply cannot be transported and sold to generate income.

In areas where cross-line trade between government and SPLM-N-held areas had been a lifeline for populations on both sides, much of that trade has now largely been halted—a further casualty of the SPLA-N’s offensives against SAF positions. Two peace markets in As Sunut locality—in Kasha and Shifir—continue to operate, facilitating cross-line trade. They serve three main towns of Abu Zaba, Dilling and As Sunut.[30] The conflict has forced the establishment of new routes and currently goods are moving around South and West Kordofan along four axes: Al Fula–Lagawa–Jangaro–Kadugli; Na’am–Keilak–Kadugli; Adu Zabad–Om Jamina (Kasha) or Shifir-Dilling; and Aweil–Meiram–Babanusa.[31] In southern sectors of SPLA-N-held territory, including Kadugli, goods mostly arrive from South Sudan. In northern and western sectors held by the SPLA-N, goods are smuggled in from government-held areas.[32]

The existential nature of the current conflict and associated criticality of paying troops means that control of gold mines in South Kordofan, a major source of revenue for SAF, the RSF, and the SPLA-N, is ultimately likely to be violently contested. In response to the conflict, many miners working in small-scale artisanal gold mines—especially in Azraq, Kalogi, and Talodi—have simply continued to mine.[33] Larger companies on the eastern side of the Nuba Mountains, however, have struggled to continue operations given the shortage of fuel and supplies.


[23] Author interviews with a Western ambassador, Khartoum, 30 August 2022, and a Humanitarian Aid Commission official, Khartoum, 20 March 2023.
[24] Author telephone interview with a confidential South Kordofan-based civil society source, 18 September 2023.
[25] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 22 June 2023.
[26] Author telephone interview with a civil society figure, 21 June 2023.
[27] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 14 May 2023.
[28] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 22 June 2023.
[29] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 22 June 2023.
[30] The Kasha market is located in Om Jamina village. Information provided by a South Kordofan-based civil society organization, 7 March 2024 . Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based civil society figure, 9 March 2024.
[31] Information provided by a South Kordofan-based civil society organization, 7 March 2024. Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based civil society figure, 9 March 2024.
[32] Author telephone interviews with two South Kordofan-based civil society figures and an international NGO official, 1 March 2024.
[33] Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic, 14 May 2023.


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