On 15 April 2023, armed conflict erupted in Khartoum, Sudan,[1] between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary RSF. Led by Mohammed Hamdan ‘Hemeti’ Dagalo, RSF is a product of the Sudanese state and a beneficiary of Khartoum’s past efforts to outsource counterinsurgency in the Darfur region (De Waal, 2004).
In the war against SAF, Hemeti and RSF have received material support from the Wagner Group and continue to be supported by Khalifa Haftar’s LNA and the UAE (Ali, 2024; Badi, 2025). While these dynamics have developed within different local and historical contexts, behavioural similarities among them provide a basis for fruitful comparison.
Similar to RSF in relation to SAF, the LNA’s military and economic strength rivals that of its adversary—the UN-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU). Meanwhile, the Wagner Group has advanced the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation across Africa. In its role, the UAE—with limited military capacity—outsources foreign military ambitions to mercenaries and proxies. The reliance on non-state forces by the Russian Federation and the UAE, and earlier SAF with respect to RSF, reflects a practice with deep historical roots. Across Europe’s early modern era, private warfare was commonplace, and these patterns of state outsourcing persist.
[1] All locations will be fully indicated at first mention. This publication will then use the location’s first level only.
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