Although almost three years have passed since the Comprehensive Peace Agree-ment (CPA) ended the second North–South Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), security has not improved demonstrably in many areas of the South. On the assumption that small arms and light weapons are one source of ongoing inse-curity, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People’s Lib-eration Army (SPLA) have administered or allowed a series of coercive and voluntary civilian disarmament efforts.
For the four-year-old Government of Southern Sudan, 2009 was a punishing year. It struggled to manage multiple financial, governance, and security crises while fighting for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agree-ment. Looming large were CPA-mandated legislative and executive elections scheduled for April 2010 and a referendum on Southern self-determination in January 2011. For much of the year, tensions between the ruling National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army were high, with mutual recriminations over stalled aspects of the peace process.
The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development was a diplomatic initiative aimed at addressing the interrelations between armed violence and development. Launched in 2006 by UNDP and Switzerland, the Geneva Declaration strived to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and improvements in human security by 2015. With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under Agenda 2030, a key goal of the Geneva Declaration was fulfilled and it ceased to be an active political process.
'Many smugglers think of themselves as transporters, not criminals.[i] For, they argue, isn’t the smuggling of petrol, cigarettes and other goods across largely uncontrolled borders simply a way of making a living? And in terms of moving people, can people who smuggle migrants across borders be seen rather as service providers such as bus companies — as some suggest — rather than as smugglers?
'Cities continue to increase in importance, acting as magnets for migration, innovation, and economic concentration. In 2015, almost four billion people lived in cities, a number that’s expected to increase to five billion by 2030. The UN has noted that challenges for growing cities include growing slums, increased air pollution, and heightened risks of disasters for the population. But what about violence? City dwellers are often perceived as being at more risk of violence than those in rural areas, but this is not always the case...'
The year 2018 was characterized by a decrease in lethal violence in several of the world’s hotspots, primarily due to a significant de-escalation of the armed conflicts in Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Syria. The homicide rate also decreased marginally due to population growth outpacing the nominal increase in killings between 2017 and 2018.
A traditional preoccupation with military threats to the state has long dominated Indian policy and activism aiming to prevent and reduce armed violence. This realist perspective has the effect—whether intended or not— of displacing consideration of other sources of danger related to armed violence.
With a population of almost 1.2 billion people and an area of 3.3 million square kilometres, India is home to approximately 17 per cent of the world’s population but constitutes just 2.4 per cent of its land area (MHA, 2011). India’s rates of violence vary greatly from state to state, and city to city, ranging from relatively high to negligible. These rates are reflected in the nation’s wellknown diversity in languages, literacy, economic status, and cultural customs.
There are many circumstances in which the use of force by the police is considered a legitimate action. Indeed, even in a democratic society, police are distinguished by their legal authority to use force to coerce citizens (Klockars, 1985). Given the high potential for the police to abuse force, checks and balances are needed to minimize the use of force and make officers accountable when they resort to it.
India is home to one of the world’s largest small arms industries, but it is often overlooked in international discussion because it mostly supplies domestic military and law enforcement services, rather than civilian or export markets. Small arms procurement by the Indian government has long reflected the country’s larger national military procurement system, which stresses indigenous arms production. This policy has changed since the 1990s, but its legacy will continue to affect Indian official small arms procurement for decades to come.