In September 2024, after Kiir postponed national elections, political debate in Juba turned to the question of succession (Craze, 2025). Now 74 and in poor health, Kiir has ruled for 20 years. In October 2024, he removed many of his rivals, such as Akol Koor Kuc, the head of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB) of the National Security Service (NSS), and Lual Wek Gem, the head of the presidential guard. The purge later extended to firmaments in Kiir’s coalition, including Tut Kew Gatluak, his Bul Nuer security advisor; James Wani Igga, the vice-president of the Economics Cluster; and SPLM heavyweights Kuol Manyang and Awet Akol, with nary a word of complaint.[1] The March 2025 arrest of the first vicepresident, Riek Machar, seemingly marked the final act in Kiir’s clear-out.
In Juba, many diplomats concluded that the cull was designed to pave the way for Bol Mel’s succession. Sanctioned by the United States since 2017, Bol Mel is a businessman from Northern Bahr el Ghazal with close ties to Kiir’s family, who helped funnel petrodollars off-book and into the president’s pockets (Craze, 2023). His political ascent was meteoric. It culminated in his appointment as vice-president of the Economics Cluster in February 2025, and as first deputy chairperson of the SPLM in May.
Bol Mel’s fall from grace was even quicker. Almost from the moment he was spoken of as a future president, rumours spread of a rupture between the businessman and Kiir’s family, centred on disputes between him and Adut Salva, Kiir’s daughter. Tensions over the arrest of Akot Lual Arech, a relative of Kiir and his former private secretary, spiralled into a struggle between Bol Mel and Kiir’s family for control of the presidential guard. The winner was Adut—whose nickname is Wun Weng, which means the owner of a cow. In the run-up to Bol Mel’s exit, most of his allies were fired. Then, on 12 November, Bol Mel himself was stripped of his titles and dismissed. He was taken to Blue House, the NSS detention facility, before being confined to house arrest.
The conviction, held by many international diplomats, that Bol Mel was Kiir’s heir apparent reflected their own desire to imagine a Kiir-less world rather than the actual dynamics of South Sudanese politics. Kiir has never chosen a successor and is aware that naming one would invite his rivals to plot against him. Kiir’s modus operandi is to build up contenders until they reveal their ambitions, at which point they are removed.[2] Bol Mel went the way of Paul Malong Awan, Nhial Deng Nhial, and Akol Koor Kuc—all thought indispensable, and all dismissed with minimal fuss.
Many were delighted with Bol Mel’s exit. The SPLM old guard saw him as ‘jumping the queue’, given that he had not fought in Sudan’s second civil war (1983–2005), and critiqued him for engaging in a level of corruption that exceeded even the SPLM’s post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement excesses (2005–11). Bol Mel has none of Kiir’s legitimacy.
Debates over the viability of his leadership touch on broader issues in South Sudanese politics (Pospisil, 2025). The generals who led South Sudan to independence are now in their 70s. Bol Mel was born in 1978. Was he, as some diplomats tentatively suggested, the rising star of a new generation, unsullied by the political struggles of the second Sudanese civil war? Or was he a figure who enriched himself using the same corrupt system employed by older leaders (UNHRC, 2025)?
Even if Bol Mel had come to power, it is unlikely he would have lasted long. For 20 years, Kiir has fractured the political elite, setting them against each other while pushing out rivals and appointing weak political apparatchiks to important positions (Craze and Markó, 2022). Kiir has created a system in which he is the necessary mediator between rival, shifting coalitions. Without him, and the political legitimacy he draws from decades in power, the system is likely to fall apart.
For some, talk of succession is foolish. One Juba-based politician speculated that ‘[Kiir] has no intention of handing over power. He wishes to take the country to elections in 2026.’[3] Kiir’s frenetic rotation of officials and his use of disorder as a political instrument suggest that long-term succession plans do not make sense in South Sudanese politics, which unfolds week by week and is driven by tactical improvisation. Bol Mel’s rise and fall offers a window into the country’s turbulent politics. Much of the diplomatic discussion about him is based on rumour and conjecture. This Situation Update assesses Bol Mel’s rise and fall within the context of his past in order to illuminate South Sudan’s likely future struggles.
[1] On 3 November, Kiir reappointed Tut Kew as his security advisor (discussed below).
[2] See Craze (2022, pp. 33–38) for an analysis of this strategy in relation to Nhial Deng Nhial.
[3] Author interview with a senior politician, name withheld, Juba, October 2025.
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