Identifying the appropriate capabilities to address a particular IED threat is only one part of developing an effective national C-IED response. These capabilities must also function together as a coherent system. The Survey’s assessments in West and East Africa have highlighted the importance of cross-cutting elements—including policy and strategy, institutional arrangements, inter-agency coordination, information management, and adaptation—in connecting preventive and responsive measures (Small Arms Survey, 2024b, pp. 4–5; 2025a, p. 6). C-IED is not only a technical and operational challenge, but also one of governance.
A national policy or strategy can translate threat understanding into priorities and responsibilities and lay the foundation for coordinated action, while also providing a basis for allocating resources and assessing progress. The institutional arrangements supporting this framework will vary. C-IED efforts may sit within criminal justice, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or other security systems, with implications for legal frameworks, institutional responsibilities, and the roles of—and balance between—civilian and security actors. While no single institutional model applies across all contexts, a designated lead entity should have sufficient authority to provide strategic direction and coordinate the national C-IED response (Amoroso, 2024).
The designation of a lead entity is particularly important because C-IED responsibilities and capabilities typically span multiple institutions. Defence and security forces, regulators, prosecutors, and other civilian institutions each have distinct responsibilities and therefore contribute different expertise and information. Effective inter-agency arrangements, ideally coordinated by a designated lead entity, can connect these functions, establish shared priorities, and reduce gaps and duplication (Small Arms Survey, 2024a, pp. 6–7).
This coordination relies on effective information management. Maintaining an understanding of an evolving national threat requires mechanisms to collect, analyse, and share information between institutions and act across institutional boundaries. Fragmented databases, inconsistent reporting, weak feedback loops, and unclear information-sharing procedures can undermine this process. Functional information sharing depends on technical systems alongside agreed procedures, appropriate authorization, clear mandates, and institutional trust; a designated lead entity can help ensure coherence across these arrangements (Small Arms Survey, 2025a, pp. 19–20).
Institutional arrangements may also need to connect with regional mechanisms where IED threats extend across borders—such as when IED-related materials, financing, technical knowledge, and perpetrators move across borders, often through networks operating in multiple countries (UNCCT et al., 2022, p. 27). Regional organizations and frameworks facilitate information exchange, threat analysis, cross-border cooperation, capacity development, and the identification of emerging trends and shared vulnerabilities (Ghana NACSA, 2025). National and regional arrangements must also, however, be capable of responding to changes. As perpetrators adapt technologies, materials, tactics, targets, and methods, continued threat monitoring and institutional learning are essential to inform the necessary modifications to policies, training, capabilities, and resource allocation.
Ultimately, an effective national C-IED response depends not only on the capabilities of individual institutions, but also on their ability to work together as a coherent system. Clear leadership, inter-agency coordination, effective information management, and mechanisms for adaptation are therefore essential to connect and sustain the various elements of the response. The effectiveness of these arrangements should ultimately be considered in relation to their overarching purpose: preventing and reducing the harm caused by IEDs.
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