A detailed understanding of an IED threat is not an end in itself. Its value lies in informing decisions about which combination of C-IED measures to apply, where to prioritize investment, and how to develop capabilities as the threat evolves. If IED threats arise from different combinations of actors, motivations, resources, and enabling conditions, the responses to them cannot be assumed to follow a single model.
The Survey’s work in West and East Africa illustrates this point (Small Arms Survey, 2024b). For example, in contexts with no significant IED threat and limited national C-IED capabilities, priorities may centre on prevention and preparedness, including controls over explosives and components, border management, intelligence and early warning, and awareness. In areas where a threat is emerging, strengthening coordination and information-sharing arrangements and developing basic operational capacities may also become priorities. In contexts where IED use is more established and C-IED capabilities have developed over time, greater emphasis may be placed on exploitation and investigation, judicial processes, victim assistance, and mechanisms for analysing and adapting to changes in the threat.
These examples are illustrative rather than fixed categories or sequential stages; the appropriate combination of measures will depend on the specific threat, existing capacities, and national priorities.
The Survey’s approach to threat assessment combines the analysis of technical characteristics, tactics, actors, motivations, geographic patterns, and wider contextual dynamics with an evaluation of national capabilities (Small Arms Survey, 2025b, p. 3). This can help identify gaps, existing sufficient capacities, and areas where additional investment is likely to have the greatest effect. The Survey’s experience in applying the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) C-IED Capability Maturity Model and Self-Assessment Tool (C-IED CMM SAT) (Seddon and Malaret Baldo, 2020) highlighted the need to consider different national starting points—including states with no current IED threat and limited C-IED capabilities, those facing emerging or existing threats, and those confronting established threats after several years of C-IED investment (Small Arms Survey, 2024a, p. 4). Regularly reassessing both the threat and capabilities also helps to ensure that priorities remain aligned with the evolving threat rather than merely responding to past IED use.
This threat-informed approach, combined with a strong awareness of existing C-IED capabilities, is particularly relevant for meaningful international assistance. The approach can not only help maximize the effectiveness of training, equipment, and institutional models developed to respond to nationally identified priorities, but also avoid ill-advised investment. Furthermore, it can strengthen national ownership by enabling states to determine the necessary measures and capabilities, sequence investments, and allocate resources according to their threat environment and strategic priorities. Yet capabilities alone are not sufficient: their effectiveness depends on how they are governed, coordinated, and sustained within a coherent national C-IED response.
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