Border dilemmas

In the far south-east of the CAR, in Haut-Mbomou prefecture, there have long been simmering tensions between political authorities, with feuding officials engaged in tit-for-tat accusations about their backing for the UPC, a rebel group responsible for multiple atrocities, and the Ani Kpi Gbe (AKG), an Azande ethnic militia in the border region, formed in March 2023 to protect the Azande community against the UPC presence. At the root of this tension is latent conflict between the Peuhl ethnic group (which comprises the majority of the UPC and is largely pastoralist) and the agricultural Azande. Clashes in April 2023 displaced thousands towards the South Sudanese border and continued into May and June.

The AKG clashed with the SSPDF on 23 April at Bambouti on the South Sudanese border.[20] It is not clear what provoked the clash, but it points to the possibility of the AKG’s becoming involved in conflict in Western Equatoria. For some, this is an opportunity. In 2023, Emannuel Riko, the former director of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission for Yambio, formed the Community Patriotic Front and announced that it was the military wing of the Azande Kingdom, making explicit the pan-national promise of Peni’s coronation. The king was quick to denounce Riko’s project, and Nando’s forces subsequently arrested Riko en route to Tambura. For the Avongara elite, as for the king, a pan-national Azande military project risks alienating Kiir, undermining their own position in South Sudan, and providing rhetorical fuel for Futuyo’s fire: the governor is constantly warning that the Azande Kingdom poses a threat to other ethnic groups in Western Equatoria.

At present, the Azande of Western Equatoria have little interest in a pan-national project, even if many of them have family ties that cross national borders. Despite the Avongara elite’s intent to put a dampener on South Sudan’s involvement in the CAR conflict, the potential for cross-border spillover remains acute. During the violence in Tambura in 2021, Futuyo not only made common cause with Balanda Fertit members of the SPLA-IO in Western Bahr el Ghazal state, who provided supplies for his forces, but also connected with ex-Séléka forces on the CAR border. In the same year Nando attacked ex-Séléka in Bambuti, having earlier—in 2016—recruited in the Azande areas of the DRC. Nando’s forces also clashed with the UPC in November 2020. In such a context, the AKG could easily be drawn into a conflict that extends beyond South Sudan’s borders, potentially pitting the Azande against an unstable coalition of Balanda, Peuhl, and ex-Séléka forces.


[20] Author interviews with Azande commanders, UN officials, and international experts, August 2023.

< PREVIOUS NEXT >