Conclusion

External backing of RSF and other armed actors in the region reflects three broad trends in the outsourcing of warfare. First, the Russian Federation and western states are increasingly outsourcing security to PMCs and proxies to reduce the domestic economic and political costs of foreign intervention. Second, regional powers such as the UAE are adapting similar practices. Endowed with oil wealth and limited manpower, Abu Dhabi hires PMCs and
proxies to open or maintain markets, in addition to countering real and perceived threats of jihadis and Islamist politics. Recent reports of Colombian mercenaries deployed to Darfur with Emirati backing highlight the globalized nature of this trend. Third, governments in fragile states continue to outsource the fight against rebels and armed groups to progovernment militias or outside intervenors—whether PMCs or bilateral forces.

Civil wars in CAR, Chad, Libya, and Sudan are rooted in the struggle over the distribution of power and resources between the centre and the periphery. Over time, the logic of war economies forges alliances that cross international borders and sectarian, ethnic, or religious divides. Repeated cycles of conflict generate a surplus of men whose ability to fight is a valued asset.

War and peace are profitable for those who command an armed force. Peace agreements function as the sites of price discovery, where commanders and security entrepreneurs negotiate their transactional value (De Waal, 2015). Darfur rebel groups profited from the war in Libya and ‘peace’ in Sudan. Today, Minni Minawi’s forces, who lost credibility among civilian communities in Darfur during the JPA, are now repositioning themselves as the protector of those same communities against RSF violence, gaining political currency in relation to SAF in the process.

Pervasive fragility and transborder identities sustain a market for mercenaries. An enterprising commander can seek out an umda (chief) in north-eastern CAR or Darfur to request fighters,^[1] with pricing dependent on whether those men are to be equipped with weapons. Negotiations then turn to the potential for looting, with discounts—typically between USD 300 and USD 400 per fighter—applied when such opportunities exist.

Along the Libya–Chad–Sudan border, greater wealth is at stake. Rebel groups can expect to receive salaries for their men and equipment when they sell their services. Larger states graft onto these local and regional networks, seeking to turn armed groups into proxies for their preferred geopolitical outcomes.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume intervenors can fully control these security entrepreneurs. Networks and regional actors, such as RSF, LNA, and the Wagner Group, as well as the UAE, cooperate when mutual interests align. Frustration, however, abounds when they do not. In some cases, these same paramilitary forces have turned against the governments that either created or sponsored them. For now, men like Khalifa Haftar and Hemeti only seek to capture or reshape power within the government. They do not seek to overthrow the nation-state.

That raises the question of what is truly new about these militias and paramilitaries, whose power today rivals that of nation-states. In practice, militia and paramilitary rule have long existed. What has changed is the increased scale and scope of military and economic resources that non-state actors now wield.

The resurgence of mercenary economies and transactional alliances across CAR, Chad, Libya, and Sudan exposes the limits of state-centric peacebuilding. Approaches that privilege elite bargains or military integration risk perpetuating the very market logic that sustains armed groups. A more durable path lies in constraining the crossborder financing and logistics networks that empower them, while reinvesting in civilian governance and responsible arms control at the local level. In the end, peace in Sudan will depend less on disarming non-state armed groups and government-aligned militias than on dismantling the war economies that keep them in business.

^[1] Author interview with a source close to the events, location withheld, June 2024.