In October 2021, Burhan seized power in a coup d’état, sparking widespread protests. As Darfur rebel leaders resisted disarmament, and RSF and SAF saw little advantage in reform, the JPA stalled (Craze and Khair, 2023).
By late 2022, tensions were brewing on Sudan’s border with CAR, where CPC, Sudanese militias, Chadian rebel groups, independent mercenaries, and a new CAR group—Coalition Siriri—were mobilizing. On 29 December, a CAR government and Wagner Group delegation met with RSF near the border.[1] The presence of cross-border militias exposed limits to Hemeti’s control over Darfur. Soon after, Hemeti ‘closed’ Sudan’s border with CAR.
Hemeti’s main concern was Coalition Siriri, an armed group led by CAR nationals and largely composed of Sudanese mercenaries. In November 2022, RSF arrested retired Major General Ahmed Abdel-Rahim Shukort Allah on charges of ‘planning to carry out military action’ in CAR (Sudan Tribune, 2022), allegedly in coordination with Coalition Siriri.[2]
Adding further uncertainty in Sudan, the Framework Agreement (Redress, 2022) between civilian representatives, Burhan, and Hemeti exposed cracks over RSF leadership and its integration into SAF. When Hemeti accused Burhan’s men of fomenting rebellion in CAR, it signalled an escalation in RSF–SAF tensions. On 15 April 2023, conflict erupted between the two forces in Khartoum, reaching Darfur ten days later.
In the preceding months, Hemeti had recruited the arms trafficker Ahmet Djazouli to integrate the Ta’isha into RSF, part of a larger effort to create alliances with the Misseriya, Falata groups, and others. When war broke out, Djazouli moved his men into CAR[3] with assistance and weapons from the Wagner Group. On 25 May 2023, Djazouli crossed back into Darfur to support RSF in Nyala, Sudan.
When RSF failed to take Khartoum quickly, the UAE likely sought means to supply the paramilitary force. Chad was the natural choice; however, Hemeti’s preferential treatment of Arab groups was a significant concern among the Zaghawa.
In June 2023, Mahamat Déby, or ‘Kaka’, flew to the UAE, where Abu Dhabi promised a USD 1.5 billion loan and military vehicles. In exchange, the Emiratis built a field hospital in Amdjaress, Chad, near the border with Darfur (Marchal, 2024). The hospital, however, was also a cover for the transport of military equipment and weapons to RSF (UNSC, 2024).
Fuel and ammunition also came through Saddam Haftar’s networks, who was then the chief of staff of the LNA’s ground forces. The Wagner Group’s role in smuggling had diminished since leaving Birao, CAR, after Prigozhin’s death in August 2023. While SAF’s capture of greater Khartoum in May of 2025 put RSF on the defensive, the group has since regained ground, including the capture of SAF’s last remaining base in Darfur, in the city of El Fasher, on 26 October 2025 (Rukanga and Wandera, 2025). To support this shift in momentum, the UAE recruited Colombian ex-soldiers to buttress RSF in Darfur (Barber and Rodríguez Álvarez, 2025). Furthermore, efforts have reportedly been underway to engage CAR’s President Touadéra to diversify supply routes and reduce dependence on Chad.
[1] This fact is disputed by a source party to the delegation in Bangui, November 2023.
[2] Author interview with a source in the Coalition Siriri, location withheld, November 2023.
[3] Author interview with a source close to Djazouli in Bangui, November 2023.
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