The UAE had helped connect Hemeti, Haftar, and Prigozhin, an emergent network bound by transactional interests, not ideological pursuit. In early 2019, Haftar’s forces launched an offensive in southern Libya before attacking Tripoli, Libya, in April. A week later, Sudan’s military overthrew Bashir in Khartoum, and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan assumed leadership of the Transitional Military Council with Hemeti appointed as his deputy, disrupting the UAE’s and Prigozhin’s foothold in Sudan.
As the LNA’s advance stalled in Libya, Prigozhin’s men took a more direct role in the fighting,[1] with operations heavily subsidized by the UAE (Rondeaux, Imhof, and Margolin, 2021). The offensive also drew in Darfur rebel groups to support LNA, including the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council, SLA-AW, and Hilal’s Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council (UNSC, 2021). The UAE was believed to be funding these groups and cultivating ties with their leaders (UNSC, 2021).
In November 2019, Tripoli’s Government of National Accord signed a maritime agreement with Turkey. Subsequent to that, Turkish military assistance—including advisors, air defence systems, Bayraktar drones, and Turkish-financed Syrian mercenaries—changed the course of the war against LNA,[2] forcing the Wagner Group’s withdrawal in May 2020.[3] As the war in Libya subsided, Darfuri rebels, such as JEM and SLA-MM, among others, found renewed relevance in Sudan’s political process through the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) (UN, 2020).
Meanwhile, CAR elections pushed the 2019 Khartoum Accord to a breaking point. On 19 December 2020, six armed-group signatories announced a new alliance, the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC). As CPC pressed towards Bangui, CAR, the Wagner Group’s operation in CAR changed from a training to a military mission.[4] After a failed CPC attack on Bangui in January 2021, the Wagner Group, the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA), and Rwandan bilateral forces launched a counteroffensive, bringing the CAR government and the Russian PMC close to the Darfur border.[5]
In southern Libya, the LNA’s Brigade 128 began recruiting FACT fighters after a failed offensive. Brigade 128’s commander, Hassan al-Zadma, saw FACT as critical to maintaining his influence in relation to the increasing influence of Haftar’s son, Saddam Haftar. By early 2021, FACT was reportedly no longer receiving salaries from Khalifa Haftar’s forces as his coalition weakened and priorities shifted. Sensing their weakening political position, FACT’s commanders launched an offensive to take N’Djamena.[6] The attack failed. On 20 April 2021, however, Déby was mortally wounded on the front line, further reshaping the region’s power balance. Overlapping wars revealed the limits of transactional alliances, which could unravel quickly as conditions and priorities shifted.
[1] Author interview with a GNU officer in Tripoli, Libya, July 2022.
[2] Author interview with a GNU commander in Tripoli, July 2022.
[3] Author interview with a Wagner Group fighter, location withheld, September 2023.
[4] Author interview with a Wagner Group commander in Bangui, CAR, February 2023.
[5] In early 2023, the author was in Birao, CAR. Birao is approximately 65 km from the border with Darfur, Sudan, where the Wagner Group had set up a base.
[6] Author interview with a source close to the events, location withheld, October 2024.
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