After the 2013 civil war began, Kiir sidelined many SPLM heavyweights. The figures close to Kiir, such as Tut Kew Gatluak and Akol Koor Kuc, were never likely to succeed him. Bol Mel was similarly weak but served a different purpose, playing a key role in transferring state funds into the pockets of Kiir’s family. In 2021, when Kiir introduced him to a packed crowd in Bor, many were shocked. Bol Mel’s introduction to national politics came as Kiir became concerned about Akol Koor’s power, and sought a counterweight with the political ballast necessary to ensure that state funds remained with the president.
Bol Mel’s rise was dizzying. In December 2022, Kiir appointed him the special presidential envoy for special programmes, formalizing his control of the oil-for-roads programme. In March 2023, he joined the SPLM’s Political Bureau. Bol Mel was also made the SPLM’s first deputy secretary general for political affairs and mobilization and joined the National Liberation Council, the SPLM’s highest decision-making body.
Developments in 2024 appeared to pave the way for Bol Mel’s consecration as Kiir’s successor. Many of the officials who opposed him were removed from office. Akol Koor had lobbied to curb the oil-for-roads project, while Lual Wek Gem had clashed with Bol Mel over Kiir’s security. Bol Mel’s allies were given important positions, consolidating his control of the economy. In October 2024, Kiir appointed Ayuel Ngor Kacgor, an ally from the Chamber of Commerce, as managing director of the Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet). The following month, Kiir removed Africano Mande, the commissioner of the South Sudan Revenue Authority, and replaced him with Simon Akuei Deng, another former subordinate of Bol Mel at the Chamber of Commerce.
By early 2025, with many of Bol Mel’s opponents dismissed, the way seemed clear for his final ascent. In January, he was reappointed to the Nilepet board and joined the National Transitional Council. On 10 February, Bol Mel replaced the SPLM stalwart James Wani Igga as vice-president. Igga, along with Kuol Manyang and Awet Akot, who were also removed, acquiesced to their dismissals. Their families were compensated: Atony Kuol Manyang became trade minister; Agum Awet Akot, the undersecretary for youth and sport; and Igga’s eldest son, the executive director of the Roads Authority.
Bol Mel’s coronation seemed at hand. In May 2025, he was appointed first deputy chairperson of the SPLM—just one rung below Kiir. Those who opposed him were removed. After Kiir’s return from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in July, he fired SSPDF chief of defence forces (CDF) Paul Nang Majok, and replaced him with Dau Aturjong, a Malual Dinka commander more amenable to Bol Mel’s stratagems. Nang and Bol Mel’s dispute had two likely causes: firstly, Bol Mel’s failed push to replace the unit responsible for the protection of ‘J1’ (the presidential palace)—the Tiger Division—with the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF); and, secondly, Nang’s attempt to block corrupt procurement deals funnelling SSPDF contracts through Maror Akol, a Warrap businessman with close links to Bol Mel and Gregory Vasili, the first lady’s brother.[1]
Kiir’s counter-insurgency had underpinned Bol Mel’s rise. He cultivated close ties with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s family; funded the political campaigns of Museveni’s son, the UPDF CDF, Muhoozi Kainerugaba; and established links with Salim Saleh, Museveni’s brother and security advisor. When the UPDF entered South Sudan in March 2025, it seemed to serve as a praetorian guard for Bol Mel’s ambitions, contingent on continued payments to those forces. The war allowed Bol Mel to marginalize Riek Machar, a potential rival; rumours in Juba suggest his attempt to position himself as Kiir’s successor was partly behind the counter-insurgency against the Nuer white armies and Machar’s arrest.
[1] Nang was reappointed CDF in October 2025, as part of Bol Mel’s subsequent fall from grace. Author interviews with politicians, names withheld, Juba, July and October 2025.
| < PREVIOUS | NEXT > |