Conclusion

Kiir built a system dependent on his largesse, in which South Sudan’s already modest institutions were emptied out and turned into sites of elite patronage and competition. He fractured the SPLM and immiserated the SSPDF. If, militarily, he has outsourced the monopoly of violence to militias pursuing local agendas under the mask of national interests, politically, he has empowered weak politicians, who are beholden to him. This does not make Kiir strong: the more the system is centralized around him, the more he is beholden to politicians whose constant demands he must appease, for there are no mediating institutions between rivalrous factions, only Kiir himself. The very questions of succession and orderly transition bandied about by diplomats are antithetical to the system that Kiir has created.

Kiir’s triumph is South Sudan’s disaster. No one has the political capital necessary to succeed Kiir and hold on to power. His demise will likely augur a period of rapid changes and deep uncertainty, as elite coalitions fracture and regroup. Perhaps the bestcase scenario is that someone like Adut can cobble together enough of a coalition of self-interested elites that at least the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal and Jonglei become sufficiently vested in a new iteration of Kiir’s dictatorship. But increasingly, this seems unlikely to come to pass: the country is now too fractured. Whoever comes to power will inherit a bankrupt state and be reliant on foreign mercenaries to maintain control in Juba, while ruling the rest of the country through violence. Without Kiir’s political capital, this is not a viable formula for rule.